Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

palgrave
macmillan

Sumanto
Al Qurtuby.com

Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia

Sumanto Al Qurtuby

Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia

palgrave
macmillan

Sumanto Al Qurtuby
Department of Global Studies
IRC for Finance and Digital
Economy, KFUPM Business School
King Fahd University
of Petroleum & Minerals
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia

ISBN 978-981-19-1336-5 ISBN 978-981-19-1337-2 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1337-2

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Cover illustration: Maram_shutterstock.com

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

I would like to dedicate this book to the loving memories of my father and brothers. Rest in peace you all.

Acknowledgments

The COVID-19 pandemic has suffered many people around the world. But, to me, it is also because of this pandemic that I was able to focus, concentrate, write, and finally complete this monograph. The majority of the data and information used in this book were gathered before the coronavirus pandemic through various research techniques, including in-person and virtual interviews and conversations, questionnaire surveys, and email correspondences. Some additional data were collected during the pandemic.

In 2020, when the pandemic reached Saudi Arabia, I started writing the monograph, usually began at 4 a.m. The first draft was written for four months during the summer session from May to August. That summer, because of the pandemic, I was stuck in my office and apartment. The Saudi government at that time discouraged people living in Saudi Arabia to go outside within or out of the Kingdom to limit and minimize the pandemic's spread. Taking the same line, the university where I work (i.e., King Fahd University of Petroleum & Minerals) also encouraged its foreign staff and faculty members, for the moment, to stay in the Kingdom or on campus.

Because of this urgent situation, I also decided not to go home to my home country Indonesia, which I usually did in the previous summer vacations, to see my mom and relatives in a small village and a highland of Central Java, as well as visit the graveyards of my beloved father and older brothers. I then decided to contemplate writing and finishing

the manuscript before the Fall term began. Once completed, I sent the manuscript to the publisher. The following year, 2021, I received feedback from anonymous reviewers. Based on their comments, I then revised the manuscript which took several months because, while revising, I also had to teach students and did other things at my university.

* * *

To my little knowledge, this is the first scholarly work and academic book ever that tries to compare issues of terrorism and counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. To me, besides some differences (e.g. forms of governments, social structure, characteristics of society, cultural practices, levels of ethnoreligious plurality, etc.), the two countries have shared some similar features not only related to terrorism and counterterrorism but also other issues that in turn drove and intrigued me to write this monograph. For example, both Saudi Arabia and Indonesia are Sunni Muslim-majority countries. The two also has special characteristic. While Indonesia is renowned as the world's largest Muslim-majority nation, Saudi Arabia is home to Muslim's Holy Sites of Makkah and Madinah, making it very special for Muslims across the world.

Interestingly, besides holding a title as "Muslim-majority nation," the two countries have suffered from terrorism, including Islamist terrorism, and various forms of violent extremism. In the past, many academic and non-academic communities alike have indeed dubbed Saudi Arabia and Indonesia as a "nest of terrorism." Nonetheless, fascinatingly, both nations have been considered as among the world's topmost pioneering successful programs on combating and preventing terrorism, including terrorist rehabilitation, reeducation, and reintegration.

This fact provides a critical test of the conventional wisdom that militants and terrorists are the fact-resistant human and the hardest to turn around. Certainly, this temporary success does not mean that both countries have been saved and secured from terrorist threats. No country in the world could guarantee peace and security away from terrorism and extremism. But, at least, the governments of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have been able to deradicalize and rehabilitate many terrorist actors and helped them reintegrate into society.

The book's focus is to examine the complex history and contemporary developments of forms of terrorism, especially Islamist terrorism, along with its actors, motives, institutions, and networks, as well as ways

of combating terrorism and radicalism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. This book underscores the significance of a multifaceted study on various aspects of terrorism and counterterrorism in the Global South that pay equal attention to standpoints and approaches offered by the state (government) and non-state (society) alike.

* * *

The book would not be accomplished without the help of many people, whom I owe gratitude. First of all, I would like to express my appreciation to Kirsten Schulze at the London School of Economics and Political Science and the anonymous peer reviewers for their helpful comments, suggestions, and criticisms on an earlier draft of this manuscript that eventually help to sharpen and strengthen the foundations, arguments, rationales, structures, and analyses of the present book. Thanks also to the Deanship of Scientific Research at King Fahd University of Petroleum of Minerals, which funded some portions of the research and fieldwork before the pandemic whose findings were also used in this book, through the Societal Research Grant No. SS151001.

Moreover, I thank my countless informants—both Saudis and Indonesians—for their willingness to share and supply knowledge, experience, data, and information for this book. All of the informants, coming from various professions, gender, ethnicity, and religion, are committed to building a peaceful society and a secure nation in their respective countries. My apologies, due to limited space, I am not able to mention all of their names on this page. The vast majority of the informants have been anonymous in this book.

As well, thanks to some distinguished scholars who are willing to write an endorsement for this book, including my mentor Robert Hefner at Boston University as well as Lisa Schirch at the University of Notre Dame in Indiana, and John Esposito at Georgetown University. Special thanks go to my cheerful colleagues and friends, either at the Department of Global Studies, IRC for Finance and Digital Economy, or elsewhere, for sharing their knowledge, experiences, and jokes that could energize my life. I would also express my gratefulness to my beloved wife (Asri) and daughter (Victoria) for their understanding, dedication, support, encouragement, and love.

Contents

1 Introduction 1

Part I

2 Terrorism in Saudi Arabia 49

3 Saudi Government and Counterterrorism 97

4 Saudi Society on Terrorism and Counterterrorism 143

Part II

5 Terrorism in Indonesia 189

6 Indonesian Government and Counterterrorism 245

7 Indonesian Society on Terrorism and Counterterrorism 285

Part III

8 Comparing Terrorism: Saudi Arabia and Indonesia 319

9 Comparing Counterterrorism: Saudi Arabia and Indonesia 351

10 Saudi-Indonesian Relations, Bilateral Cooperation on Combating Terrorism, and Prospects for Future Peace 383

Bibliography 417

Index 439

List of Tables

Table 2.1	A brief summary of chronology of terrorism in Saudi Arabia	56
Table 4.1	A brief summary of survey results on Saudi views of terrorism and counterterrorism	149
Table 4.2	A brief summary of Saudi opinions on the roots of terrorism	168
Table 4.3	A brief summary of Saudi opinions on counterterrorism	177
Table 5.1	Indonesia's multiple terrorisms	193
Table 5.2	Comparison between Jamaah Islamiyah and Jamaah Ansharud Daulah	233
Table 7.1	A brief summary of Indonesian opinions on the roots of terrorism	288
Table 7.2	A brief summary of Indonesian opinions on counterterrorism	301

Check for updates

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Do not fear those who operate in the shadows
—Michael Brady (*Into the Shadows*)

Terrorism has a long history within human society. However, it seems that terrorism gained international public attention since al-Qaeda's deadly attacks on the United States' iconic landmarks—the Pentagon of Washington, DC and the World Trade Center (WTC) of New York City—on September 11, 2001, which took some 2,976 lives and wounded more than 6,000 people. Today, terrorism is one of the world's most ubiquitous and daunting phenomena that seems to be no one, society, or country could escape from it. The facts show that terrorism has currently spread across the world from Europe to North America, from Africa and the Middle East to South and Southeast Asia. Saudi Arabia and Indonesia—the book's focus of study—have been among the worst places on earth that have bitter experiences of terrorist acts. Terror can be a public theater or a social drama whose real targets are actually not the innocent victims but the watchers or the spectators. Since terrorism has no borders, it has thus become a critical concern of many societies, countries, and regions from the West to the East, from the North to the South—becoming a global phenomenon across cultures, nations, and continents.

Initially, the word "terrorism" entered Western vocabulary in the 1790s during the "Reign of Terror" (known as "The Terror"—*la*

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022

S. Al Qurtuby, *Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1337-2_1

Terreur) which refers to a series of massacres and numerous public executions that took place during the French Revolution (1789–1799) and the creation of the First French Republic (1792–1804). This massive carnage was in response to revolutionary fervor, anticlerical sentiment, and bogus accusations of treason by the French statesman Maximilien Robespierre[1] (1758–1794), who led the arrest and execution of numerous political adversaries whom he and his allies deemed to oppose the Revolution and the formation of the Republic (Kennedy 2000; Popkin 2016).

Secondly, the term regained unpopularity and became infamous on the stage of modern politics during the Anarchist Movement in the nineteenth century when it introduced the notion of indiscriminate violence into the public sphere (Rudolph 2018). The first acts of anarchism were rural uprisings intended to provoke the illiterate masses of the Italian countryside. After the revolts failed, the anarchist activists took the form of terrorism by individual protesters, who would attempt to murder ruling elites aiming at making the state look vulnerable and inspiring the masses with their self-sacrifice. The anarchists had indeed carried out several symbolic murders between 1890 and 1901 whose victims included such notable political figures as King Umberto I (Italy), PM Antonio Canovas del Castillo (Spain), and President Marie Francois Sadi Carnot (France), among others. During the Anarchist Movement, many groups that have eventually come to be recognized as advocates of legitimate resistance or liberation struggles have dabbled to one extent or another in terrorist activities (Carter 1978; Brooks 1994).

Overtime, ever since the Anarchist Movement, the term terrorism came to be associated with militant activities of non-state private groups, networks, and organizations, no longer connected with state actors. In other words, the connotation of the term terrorism gradually shifted from state terrorism to civil terrorism. Examples of terrorist groups abound across the globe. They included the Ku Klux Klan (the United States), Irgun and the Stern Gang (British Mandate Palestine or Israel), the Ulster Volunteer Force (Northern Ireland), the Revolutionary of Armed Forces

[1] Maximilien Robespierre became increasingly popular for his attacks on the monarchy and his advocacy of democratic reforms. In 1790, Robespierre was elected president of the powerful Jacobin political club, and after the fall of the monarchy in 1792, he was elected first deputy for Paris to the National Convention that later abolished the monarchy, declared France a republic and put the king on trial for treason (and later was executed in 1793) (Kennedy 2000; Popkin 2016).

of Columbia (Venezuela), the Turkish Grey Wolves (Turkey), the Baader-Meinhof and the Red Army Faction (Germany), the Red Brigade (Italy), the Montoneros (Argentina), and the Tupamaros (Uruguay), among many others (Hoffman 1999; Sageman 2004).

Since the end of the twentieth century, the trajectory of terrorism, with its origin in the Muslim world, has taken a new turn. Whereas the (non-Islamist) terrorist groups described above had relatively narrow focus on quite specific outcomes (e.g. nationalism/national identity or political economic ends), a number of Islamist terrorist groups have multiple and complex focuses and objectives ranging from establishing an Islamic state to freeing the world from what they deemed as Islam's and Muslim's foes (Juergensmeyer 2003; Esposito 2002).

Afghanistan, in particular, became the birthplace of "Islamist terrorism," namely acts of terrorism committed by Islamists (Ramakrishna 2014). The term "Islamist" refers to Muslim individuals or groups that support Islamism, namely a political ideology based on a reinvented version of Islamic law or a political ideology that strives to derive legitimacy from Islam (Tibi 2012; Hwang 2009; Berridge 2018). It was in Afghanistan where the Islamist terrorist group al-Qaeda was born. What started as a liberation movement of the Afghan jihadists (with the backing of the United States) against the Red Army (former Soviet Union) that occupied Afghanistan evolved into a body of like-minded individuals determined to confront what they viewed as Western political, economic, military, and cultural domination of Muslim lands (see Chapters 2 and 5).

Although the embryo of the birth of al-Qaeda was since late 1980s, following the Red Army's defeat, al-Qaeda emerged as an international jihadist terrorist organization in its own right was only after Osama bin Laden (1957–2011) returned from Sudan to Afghanistan in 1996.[2] More specifically, al-Qaeda was transformed into a global terrorist group since this organization was led by Ayman al-Zawahiri (b. 1951), al-Qaeda's future ideologue and the mastermind of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, one

[2] Osama bin Laden, accompanied by Ayman al-Zawahiri and a large number of Arab Afghan jihadists, left for Sudan in 1992 to take part in the Islamic revolution under the Sudanese leader Hassan Turabi. It was in Sudan that bin Laden gathered around him more veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War. As the US and Arab Saudi pressure mounted against Sudan for harboring bin Laden, the Sudanese authorities requested him to leave Sudan. Bin Laden, then, traveled back to Afghanistan, arriving in Jalalabad in "a chartered jet with an entourage of dozens of Arab militants, bodyguards, and family members including 3 wives and 13 children" (Rashid 2001: 133; Esposito 2002: 17–8).

of the most deadly organizations in the Middle East. Zawahiri filled the leadership of al-Qaeda following the death of Abdullah Yusuf Azzam (1941–1989), a Palestinian-born activist scholar, the ideological father of al-Qaeda as well as Osama's former teacher and spiritual adviser. An activist of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, Azzam, was assassinated by the Egyptian members of al-Qaeda in Peshawar, Pakistan, due to an internal conflict between him and Bin Laden over the foundations of legitimate jihad (Gunaratna et al. 2002; Hegghammer 2006; Rashid 2001; Esposito 2002). Azzam, an Al-Azhar-trained Palestinian ideologue, advocated the ban of jihad or restricted military involvement in other Muslim wars of national liberation, while Bin Laden prescribed unrestricted global jihad and war in all Muslim-majority countries against the United States and its allies.

After a series of spectacular operations on Western (principally American) interests in the Middle East, the world witnessed the extraordinary tragic events of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon by al-Qaeda members.[3] Prince Turki bin Faisal Al Saud, who was the head of Saudi Arabia's General Intelligence Presidency (*Riasat al-Istikhbarat al-'Amah*; known also as the General Intelligence Directorate) for 23 years (1979–2001), claimed that in the months before the 9/11, his intelligence agency knew that something alarming and troubling was being planned. Prince Turki, a scholar who is now chairman of King Faisal Foundation's Center for Research and Islamic Studies, resigned from the General Intelligence Directorate just 10 days before the 9/11 tragedy. In an interview with Martin Chulov of *The Guardian*, Prince Turki said, "In the summer of 2001, I took one of the warnings about something spectacular about to happen to the Americans, British, French and Arabs. We didn't know where, but we knew that something was being brewed" (Chulov 2018). Prince Turki also denounced Bin Laden: "God help us from Satan. You [Osama bin Laden] are a rotten seed like the son of Noah. The flood will engulf you like it engulfed him" (*Asharq al-Ausat*, October 15, 2001).

[3] Although Bin Laden claimed to be the one who was responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks, he was not behind the first global jihad operation against the United States. In February 1993, the terrorist attack took place targeting the World Trade Center in New York City, orchestrated by Ramzi Yousef, an independent Arab Afghan, with the assistance of a radicalized community of New York-based Egyptian Islamists.

Ever since this calamity, the West (non-West alike) has consistently portrayed Muslim world as the supporter of global terrorism and violent extremism. In fact, history has recorded that the terrorist acts committed not only by Muslims but also by non-Muslim actors (see, e.g., Juergensmeyer 2003; Sageman 2004; Mamdani 2005; Asseri 2009). There are plenty of examples of the terrorist acts committed by non-Muslims throughout the world. In Japan, a series of terrorist acts took place from the mid-1970s until early 2000s. These included the bombings of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in Tokyo and most famously the 1995 subway sarin attack committed by members of a cult movement Aum Shinrikyo (see Asai and Arnold 2003: 106–14). New Zealand has also recorded a number of terrorist attacks by non-Muslims since the early 1950s until most recently in 2019, where two consecutive mass shootings took place at mosques in Christchurch in the South Island of New Zealand (BBC 2019). The United States also experienced several terrorist attacks by non-Muslims since 1978 onwards including, most recently the 2019 El Paso shooting, as well as the 1995 Oklahoma City bombings, arguably the deadliest terrorist attack in the US history prior to the 9/11 attacks. The bombings were carried out by Timothy McVeigh, who sought revenge against the federal government for the 1993 Waco siege (CNN 2020).

Although terrorism has been the major phenomenon committed by secular radicals or extremists of multiple faiths, Muslim-majority countries have long been blamed for the rise of terrorist ideologies and militant activities. Saudi Arabia, more specifically, has become a main target of this blackmailing campaign in part because the majority of the 9/11 terrorist perpetrators were Saudis, making it earned a status as "al-Qaeda country." Indeed, after the 9/11 tragedy Saudi Arabia has been seen not so much as a victim but as a cause of the problem. However, the blasts, it should be noted, were not only intended to attack and undermine the United States' national interests but also to target its allies, including most notably Saudi Arabia (Asseri 2009: 3–5; Al-Jubeir 2002; Al Saud 2013).

However, Saudi Arabia is not alone. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, attention has also turned to Indonesia, and the possibility of Islamist terrorist groups operating from or within that country. The American attention to Indonesia might be because the US government discovered Indonesian terrorists, particularly those connected to the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) radical group, were among international terrorist groups that had built connections with al-Qaeda. In his study of the biographies

of 172 individuals belonging to the global Islamist jihadist movement, Marc Sageman, a retired US Foreign Service Officer who served in Islamabad from 1987 to 1989 where he worked closely with the Afghan mujahidin, offers insightful account regarding the leadership dynamics among international terrorists and their links to al-Qaeda. Of 172 persons, 31 came from Saudi Arabia and 12 from Indonesia. The rest came from Egypt (24), France (18), Algeria (15), and Morocco (14), among others (Sageman 2004).

Experts of Southeast Asia's terrorism studies, such as, among others, Sidney Jones (2005a, b), Rohan Gunaratna et al. (2002), Zachary Abuza (2002b, 2003), Greg Barton (2004), Angel Rabasa (2003), Solahudin (2013), Kumar Ramakrishna (2014), as well as Kirsten Schulze and Julie Chernov-Hwang (2019), also notified that the al-Qaeda network had a number of cells active in Indonesia. Since 2010, especially since the death of Noordin M. Top, JI's main recruiter, al-Qaeda-linked terrorist activities declined and new forms of terrorism emerged. This is among the reasons why although al-Qaeda elite members initially did not consider Indonesia as America's allies, the country later became one of Southeast Asia's main targets of terrorist operations by al-Qaeda's sympathizers and networks.

In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States—under the George Bush administration—proclaimed the global war on terror and invited other countries to join this campaign against (Muslim) terrorists that, according to Bush and his allies, have threatened worldwide human's security as well as international peace and stability. Until now, after more than two decades, the rhetoric "war on terror" continues to exist even if the nomenclature has shifted. The global and prolonged effects of the US-led declaration and campaign of the "war on terror" are, as noted by Tahir Abbas (2021b: 4), "it has made the world an unsafe place and divided the Muslim world with the rest of the world far more than it had done before it began." Specifically, the US government blamed al-Qaeda-linked terrorist groups as the offenders of the deadly attacks that resulted in some 3,000 casualties. The American government also accused Saudi Arabia as the most responsible for the terrorist acts of the 9/11 mainly because 15 of 19 terrorists that blasted the WTC and the Pentagon were Saudi nationals. Not only the fact that fifteen out of the nineteen aircraft hijackers involved in these horrific attacks were also Saudi, Osama bin Laden himself who was a Saudi claimed that the 9/11 catastrophe was under his control and responsibility (Gendron 2010: 488).

What the West (American) neglect is the important historical facts that al-Qaeda in fact was born from the reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in which the United States as one of the main backers against the Red Army and one of the main trainers of the al-Qaeda members, including Bin Laden himself (Rashid 2001, 2008; Barfield 2012). After accusing Saudi Arabia, the American government then enlisted the Kingdom—as well as Indonesia—among the "nests" of global terrorism (Abuza 2002a, b). The United States also declared Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia and the Philippines, as the Second Front in the War on Terror project (Gunaratna et al. 2002; Rabasa 2003, 2007).

Additionally, the United States listed a number of militant Muslim groups considered to be Foreign Terrorist Organizations having links to the Afghan jihadists, including al-Qaeda (Afghanistan), Abu Sayyaf Group (the Philippines), and Jamaah Islamiyah (Indonesia) (ICG 2002a, b, 2004). Of these terrorist organizations, al-Qaeda had been viewed by the United States as the most dangerous and widespread terrorist group operating in wide-reaching major countries including Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. At the time, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), known as Daesh in Saudi Arabia, was not born yet (Schulze and Chrenov-Hwang 2019; Schulze and Chinyong Liow 2018). Up to now, although their roles are deteriorated, al-Qaeda, ISIS (ISIL), and other transnational terrorist groups, along with its international networks, pose a major threat to global security across the globe, including Saudi Arabia and Indonesia.

Perhaps due to the dominant role played by al-Qaeda (and Bin Laden), many experts and specialists of terrorism studies at the time had underscored its leading role in spreading terrorist acts throughout the world (i.e. global/transnational terrorism) (Gunaratna et al. 2002; Corbin 2002; Bergen 2001). Rohan Gunaratna, a former specialist on the Tiger Tamils of Sri Lanka, argued that al-Qaeda is axis of global terrorism and Bin Laden was a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) presiding over a global terrorist organization composed of al-Qaeda members and leaders of Southeast Asian militant Islamic groups (Gunaratna et al. 2002). Other experts such as Jane Corbin and Peter Bergen also pointed out that al-Qaeda was run like a business conglomerate or multinational corporation under the directorship of Bin Laden, who served as CEO of the "terrorist company." Bergen made an analogue of al-Qaeda to the Saudi Binladin Group, the large construction company founded by the father

of Bin Laden (Corbin 2002: 33; Bergen 2001: 31). Another specialist, Zachary Abuza, claims that al-Qaeda was composed of a central leadership of around thirty individuals, an international network of twenty-four constituent groups, eighty front companies operating in fifty countries, and a membership of between 5,000 and 12,000 organized into cells in sixty different countries[4] (Abuza 2002b: 429–30).

In response to a range of terrorist operations that al-Qaeda and other radical militant groups (e.g. ISIS, Jamaah Islamiyah, and others) mounted within Saudi Arabia and Indonesia in the post-9/11 catastrophe, the authorities in the two countries had developed a series of measures against acts of terrorism that have come to be regarded as pioneering strategies. These measures include developing a variety of strategic policies and approaches of counterterrorism (CT), anti-terrorism (AT), or terrorism prevention (TP)—comprising hard and soft models of countering terrorism such as terrorist rehabilitation, de-radicalization, or disengagement programs, among others—aiming to fight against terrorists (individuals or groups), stabilize the nations, and prevent terrorist acts from occurring in the future. This book aims, among others, to discuss and analyze these complex issues of terrorism and counterterrorism.

Focus, Significance, and Contribution

The present book is about the comparative study of terrorism, with a focus primarily on Islamist terrorism, albeit other forms of terrorism are also discussed, and counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. The term "Islamist terrorism" used in this book refers to any violent act against civilians or governments committed by Islamist groups or radical jihadists, either those having links to transnational extremist organizations or purely local-based terrorists. Unlike other forms of terrorism, Islamist

[4] Carlyle Thayer found three main methodological problems in the discussion of the role of al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia in particular. First deals with the characterization of al-Qaeda as an organization (how to best typify al-Qaeda as an organization). Second problem concerns shifting time (how to account for change over time). Third relates to assessment of agents of terrorism in Southeast Asia (how to assess the question of agency in al-Qaeda's connection to the ASG, JI, and other radical Islamist groups in Southeast Asia) (Thayer in Kingsbury 2005: 53–72). Furthermore, Thayer said that since the Taliban regime had been overthrown by the US-led global "War on Terrorism," al-Qaeda international organization has been gravely disrupted.

terrorism has typically been characterized by, among others, ideologically-motivated actions, that is, to revive Islam from outside influences, to clean up the world from earthly feces, and finally to establish an Islamic state, government, or caliphate based on, according to their claim, the Qur'an and shari'a. Yet, although Islamist ideology is significant to understand the rise of Islamist terrorist movement in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and other countries, it is important to bear in mind that Islamist terrorism is literally not simply about an ideology. As this book has shown, many factors and motives have indeed contributed to the emergence of Islamist terrorism worldwide and the people's involvement in the terrorist actions and organizations.

In his study on Islamist terrorism and militancy in Indonesia, Kumar Ramakrishna, Head of International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at Singapore's Nanyang Technological University, argues that current analyses on Islamist terrorism and other types of religiously motivated terrorism that identify the ideology as the "root" (the quotation mark is from him) of terrorism are incorrect (Ramakrishna 2014: 1–4). For him, Islamist terrorism is rooted in much deeper level beyond ideology, namely Human Nature itself. Ramakrishna, furthermore, argued that Islamist terrorism or religious fundamentalism in general is the product of a mixture of "a highly tuned dualistic, the Manichean Mindset and an embattled religiosity" (ibid.: 1). I will modify little bit Ramakrishna's argument, which is arguing or assuming an ideology as the primary root of the emergence of Islamist terrorism is only partially true. For some "diehard terrorists" (e.g. Islamist terrorist ideologues and militants), an ideology might have been among the important factors and motives for their engagement in terrorist activities but for "ordinary terrorists," an ideology is definitely not the key and the main rationale. For example, many Saudi and Indonesian young men (or women) departing for Syria or Iraq to join radical groups were driven or motivated by the desire to provide humanitarian assistance for their fellow Muslims (and refugees) who have been suffered or effected by the wars. Additionally, as the 2020 Global Terrorism Index report indicates, violent conflict also remains a central factor becoming one of the primary drivers of terrorism, with over 96 percent of deaths from terrorist incidents in 2019 occurring in countries already in violence (The Institute for Economics and Peace 2020: 1–2).

Furthermore, the use of the term "Islamist terrorism," instead of "Islamic terrorism," suggests that this particular sort of terrorism has

nothing to do with Islamic faith but rather is linked to a certain group of Muslims, namely radical Islamists, militant jihadists, or extremist terrorists (Juergensmeyer 2003; Mamdani 2005; Abou El Fadl 2005). The definition of Islamist terrorism, thus, covers what Marc Sageman (2004) calls "Salafi jihadism" which, according to him, represents a radical fringe of global Salafi movement. Sageman revealed that Salafi jihadism is a new development in the history of terrorism mainly because it combines fanaticism (excessive enthusiasm in religious belief) with the terrorism against both the "near enemy" (local governments or Muslims outside their groups) and the "far enemy" (foreign governments and their populations) in pursuit of the jihadist objective of building an Islam or sharia-based country. Yet, it should be clarified that even though the jihadist movement might be influenced by Salafism, not all Salafi groups are interested in jihadism, Islamism, and terrorism (see, e.g., Hwang 2009). Equally important, unlike Sageman's remark, establishing an imagined Islamic state only serves as one of terrorist Islamists' motives and objectives.

The book in particular examines views or perspectives of governments and societies of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia concerning terrorism and ways of countering—and preventing from—terrorist threats. A leading expert on terrorism studies, Alex Schmid, has noted that the counterterrorism policies of states and groups of states in non-Western countries have received relatively little attention by specialists and experts in all fields (Schmid 2011). Taking the same line with Schmid's observation, the editors of *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy* have also noted that existing literature on terrorism and counterterrorism has overwhelmingly focused on (or dominated by) the strategic and operational policies of major Western states such as the United States or the United Kingdom The editors, moreover, underscore the presence of a large portion of academic work, scholarly literature, and policy studies that has been guided by the idea that lessons of counterterrorism from the United States and from 9/11 are applicable for matters of terrorism (and other major violent extremism and political violence) anywhere and everywhere in the world from the Global North to the Global South. Other studies have focused on the examination of terrorism and counterterrorism in European states but still remain in the realm of Western-centrism (Romaniuk et al., eds. 2017).

It is for this reason, among others, that this book is written. There is a compelling need for a multifaceted study on various aspects of terrorism and counterterrorism in the Global South that pay equal attention to

standpoints and approaches offered by state (government) and non-state (society) alike. Still, the book tries to look at the still underresearched field (especially on counterterrorism) and to go beyond the counterterrorism approach and policy of a small, yet dominant group of players (i.e. the United States and its allies). It will reassess the existence, and relevance, of a set of variations of counterterrorism models in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia that might impact security at various levels, locally and globally.

It is worth noting that this book does not only discuss the comparison per se but also elucidate Saudi Arabia's roles, influences on—or contributions to—if any, the rise of Indonesia's Islamist terrorism. Is there Saudi influence on Indonesia's Islamist terrorism? If so, in what way or channels the influence came from and under what circumstances? Chapters 5 and 8 discuss this issue. As well, the book tries to expound Saudi-Indonesian bilateral relations and cooperation on combating terrorism and other defense and security-related issues. Since when did the relationships and collaboration take place? What kind of cooperation have the two countries agreed upon and done so far? What are the outcomes of the collaboration? Is cooperation beneficial for both sides? Chapter 10 discusses and analyzes the relations and highlights the partnership on defense, security, and counterterrorism matters between the two countries.

As discussed in chapters that follow, even though both Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have suffered from terrorism (see Chapters 2 ans 5), the two countries have different local dynamics regarding socio-historical roots of terrorism as well as the variety of terrorist activities, forms, motives, objectives, and actors (see Chapter 8). The different nature of terrorism, despite some similarities, might offer useful theoretical insights, explanations, and analyses. Not only terrorism, does counterterrorism also present dissimilar local dynamics and development, notwithstanding some resemblances (see more details in Chapters 3, 6, and 9). It is, hence, interesting to see, compare, and analyze the phenomena of terrorism and counterterrorism in the two nations.

Moreover, to my little knowledge, what makes this book is noteworthy is that there is no single academic work so far that tries to compare terrorism and counterterrorism in these two countries. The previous work on terrorism (or counterterrorism) merely focuses on either Saudi Arabia or Indonesia. Accordingly, this study could fill the gap of the existing literature and study on this subject. To me, more specifically,

comparing Saudi Arabia and Indonesia (and not other countries) in relation to terrorism and counterterrorism is significant mainly because of the following reasons.

First, the unique position that the two countries have: whereas Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim-majority country, Saudi Arabia is one of the most important and influential (Sunni) Muslim-dominated nations, not only because of its roles and contributions it has played in international domains but also it is in the Kingdom where Mecca (Makkah) and Medina (Madinah), Muslims' holiest places and the most significant pilgrimage sites, are located.[5] Although both Saudi Arabia and Indonesia are Muslim-majority countries (and are dominated by Sunnis), the two have a different governmental system, political organization, social structure, ethnoreligious diversity, as well as societal and Muslim dynamics that might offer interesting lessons and analyses in relation to terrorism or counterterrorism. The degree of plurality and complexity of Muslim population also differ from one another in which Indonesia appears to be a much more plural and complicated.

Second, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have been generally listed as among the world's top "terrorist destinations." In fact, the two countries have been dubbed as the producers of terrorists and religious radicals. No doubt, there is a great number of terrorists that hold Saudi or Indonesian nationalities and citizenships. This is among the reasons why Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have suffered from terrorism. Both countries have been the targets of terrorist activities before and after the 9/11 attacks that drove attentions of local, national, and international terrorism experts, scholars, media, analysts, and policymakers. I have noticed that even though the two countries have suffered from terrorism, the local dynamics and varieties of terrorism (experiences, practices, histories, agencies, structures, etc.) differ from one another in which Indonesia seems to be more complex and diverse (see Chapters 2, 5, and 8). For example, unlike in Saudi Arabia, there have been many terrorist organizations, networks, and groupings in Indonesia.

Third, interestingly, despite having been dubbed as the "nest of terrorism," the two countries have been considered as among the world's topmost pioneering successful programs on counterterrorism and

[5] On the history of Saudi Arabia see, for example, Weston (2008), Wynbrandt (2010), Al-Rasheed (2007), Yamani (2009), while on that of Indonesia see, for example, Ricklefs (2008), Vickers (2013), and Hannigan (2015).

counter-radicalism (including de-radicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration). Although not always successful, these programs are indeed able to deradicalize many terrorists and help them integrate or return to their societies. This fact provides a critical test for those who consider and believe that terrorists have closed minds and fact-resistance that are unable to learn from previous bitter experiences (see, e.g., Schmid 2011). The Saudi and Indonesian examples of terrorist disengagement from terrorism and radicalism, via the government-led rehabilitation programs (Rudolph 2018; Hwang 2018), challenge the conventional wisdom that Islamist terrorists are the toughest to turn around. As well, the cases support a study, initiated by John Horgan and Tore Bjorgo, *Leaving Terrorist Behind*, which examines various processes by which individuals and groups disengage from terrorism (Horgan and Bjorgo 2009). A comparative study of terrorist disengagement, the work investigates the factors that affect individual disengagement in the context of a terrorist group's collapse and the effectiveness of a government's policies to turn terrorists around. Regrettably, while there has been a growing awareness of the need to understand and prevent processes of radicalization into terrorism, disengagement, and de-radicalization from terrorism, with a few exceptions, have long been neglected areas in research on terrorism (Gunaratna et al. 2011).

Notwithstanding the temporary success of the Saudi and Indonesian-led de-radicalization and rehabilitation programs, this, however, does not mean that terrorist activities have disappeared entirely from the public stage of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. In fact, terrorist acts do still occur occasionally and sporadically but its scale and intensity or strength have dropped and condensed significantly since recent years. Hence, it might be useful to compare and learn from one another on ways of combating terrorism and radicalism. Although the two countries have been praised for their endeavor in countering terrorism, both have different local dynamics, strategies, and tactics of counterterrorism programs, approaches, and policies, which might offer some insights and lessons.

This book, moreover, discusses the origins, historical dynamics, contemporary development, and shifting phenomena of terrorism (e.g. its actors, causes, motives, strategies, tactics, and so forth) as well as examines ways of combating terror and pacifying terrorists initiated by the two governments of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. Since the past two decades, the Saudi and Indonesian governments have initiated and developed

various robust models, policies, programs, tactics, and strategies of counterterrorism and violence deterrence. This book, thus, studies the two governments' overall actions in countering terrorism as a mean of insuring the security of the state as whole. Not only depicting the governments' strategies and tactics of counterterrorism, this study also investigates their effectiveness and ineffectiveness or strengths and weaknesses in combating terrorist acts, ideology, and actors.

Although each country has specificity in combating, countering, and preventing terrorism, the counterterrorism model developed by the two governments encompasses the same method, namely military ("hard approach") and non-military model ("soft approach"), containing terrorist rehabilitation, de-radicalization, reintegration, or disengagement programs. Therefore, this comparative study can broaden readers' perspectives and understandings (e.g. on similarities and differences and what lessons that people might learn from them) on terrorism and approaches of combating terrorism in the two countries. As for Saudi Arabia, the book discusses efforts of the government in fighting against terrorism and extremism since the 1960s (see Chapter 3), while in Indonesia especially since the New Order era (see Chapter 6).

A large number of existing research and studies put too much emphasis on the deep description and thorough analysis on terrorism by examining its roots, actors, networks, institutions, financers, ideologies, goals, and so forth. On the contrary, academic studies that deal with issues around counterterrorism, anti-terrorism, and de-radicalization approaches, policies, programs, activities, strategies, and tactics set forth by either the government or non-governmental agencies, including ex-terrorists are still limited (e.g. Gunaratna et al. 2011; Hwang 2018; Rudolph 2018). Counterterrorism, hence, is still an understudied area. The existing studies on counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia generally focus on the aftermath of the 9/11, whereas this book presents attempts at countering terrorism by the governments of these two countries before the 9/11 tragedy. In fact, both Saudi and Indonesian governments have engaged in counterterrorism approaches long before the 9/11 catastrophe (see Chapters 3 and 6).

Moreover, this study portrays Saudi and Indonesian people's (public) understandings, attitudes, and opinions on root causes of terrorism and better approaches of counterterrorism (see Chapters 4 and 7). Exploring society's ideas on terrorism and counterterrorism is useful for those concerned about terrorism and counterterrorism studies, including

scholars and policymakers, since they might provide alternative views of root causes of terrorism as well as of its strategic solutions. Indeed, outcomes of my interviews and conversations with countless individuals—both Saudis and Indonesians—on factors of terrorism and ways to overcome it are interesting to further research and discussion as well as sources of policy-making.

Lastly, as mentioned earlier, the present book discusses Saudi Arabian–Indonesian cooperation in combating global terrorism and radicalism that took place since few years ago. The book, hence, underscores the vitality of looking at terrorism, anti-terrorism, and counterterrorism from multiple perspectives, analyses, policies, and approaches. It introduces readers multiple strategic counterterrorism methods and anti-terrorism approaches, derived from the cases of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, as well as underlines the importance of collaboration across cultures, nations, and societies to fight against global terrorism. The book hence contributes to understanding about the Saudi's and Indonesia's struggle and skirmish against violent extremists and terrorist groups. By focusing on this topic, the book aims to show that terrorism has been a major threat in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. For this reason, the Saudi and Indonesian governments are on an ongoing combat against terrorism and other forms of radicalism (see, e.g., Gendron 2010; Ansary 2008; Bahgat 2004; Gause III 2004; Boucek 2008; Asseri 2009; Rudolph 2018).

The book argues that defeating the global terrorist threat requires strategic peacebuilding approaches and tactical counterterrorism methods by, for instance, engaging international financial, diplomatic, intelligence, and defense communities and law enforcement organizations in an atmosphere of cooperation across nations. As well, combating terrorist needs cooperative diplomatic and economic policies to address the changing face of terrorism and the global terrorist threat, differentiates between protective measures and long-term preventive policies, and makes recommendations for effective cooperative non-military strategies (Cortright and Lopez 2007).

Data and Research Method

Data used for analysis in this book are mainly from the findings and field notes of my previous research and ethnographic fieldwork in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia between 2016 and 2019. One of the previous research and fieldwork whose data and findings used in this book was a research

project entitled "Saudi Arabia's Domestic Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Youth Perspectives and Government Responses," which, in 2016, won a Societal Research Grant from the Deanship of Scientific Research, King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals. During the research and fieldwork for this project, I had an opportunity to conduct interviews and conversations with many (male) Saudis from various ages (mostly youth), professions, and backgrounds across the Kingdom. Other data and information used in this manuscript were from the official reports of Saudi Arabian and Indonesian governments' institutions and from secondary sources such as media reports, research/survey findings of Saudi's and Indonesia's noted research institutions, or scholarly publications (books, articles, research reports, and so forth).

The research combined quantitative and qualitative methods in data collection and analysis aiming at comprehending the origins and contemporary developments of Saudi Arabia's and Indonesia's domestic terrorism and the complexity and plurality of terrorist actors, rationales, and motives. The mixed method is useful to understand Saudi and Indonesian society's responses as well as the governments' approaches toward their home terrorism and ways of countering, preventing, or transforming terrorist ideology and practices.

The quantitative method included administering a questionnaire survey to Saudis and Indonesians to find out their opinions and basic information about roots of terrorism, terrorist groups, effective ways of countering and preventing terrorism, and so forth. As for the qualitative method, the research employed grounded research. During the field research, I undertook interviews and conversations with selected informants, both Saudis and Indonesians, besides terrorism experts, scholars, and religious leaders to obtain alternative insights on the topic studied. In general, some basic questions for informants include: What factors that contributed to terrorism? Why do some people become terrorists and engage in terrorist activities? Why did some people travel to Syria (or Iraq), either to live in a new "Islamic state" territory they had imagined or to join the terrorist groups? What motives actually that drove their engagement with terrorism (and other forms of extremism) and their trip to Syria or Iraq?

While some Indonesians—both males and females, adults and youths—had traveled to both Syria and Iraq to join terrorist groups in the areas, especially ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and Levant), some Saudis (mostly, if not all, male youths) generally only journeyed to Syria. Hussain (2016) has noted that around 1000 Southeast Asians (mostly Indonesians, the

rest were Malaysians and a few Singaporeans and Filipinos) have traveled to Iraq and Syria (usually via Turkey) to become fighters along with local terrorist groups. Even though the number of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, particularly those from North Africa, the Middle East, or Europe, is excessively higher (each around 8000), the number of Indonesians (and other areas of the Asia–Pacific) who made the passage to these regions are steadily growing (Gunaratna et al. 2016: 51), before they lately realized their mistakes, and then began to stop their journey. Yet, as my research indicates, Indonesians who traveled to Syria/Iraq are not necessarily to fight or engage in the war. Many of them were motivated by the desire to assist Muslim refugees or to live in what they imagined or assumed as a "real" Islamic state.

Some jihadists returned to their homelands whereas others are stuck in Syria or Iraq with no clear future. In Indonesia, many people rejected their plan to return home because they feared that the returnees could contaminate others to spread terrorism and radicalism in the country. It is true that unless those radicalized are not deradicalized, they will pose a security threat, infect others with their radical ideology and bitter experiences, and will form a part of the extremist iconography. Concerning this particular group, both returnees and those trapped in Syria or Iraq, I asked Indonesian informants queries related to the proper way to deal with them and what the governments should do and respond to them.

Another cluster of questions for informant deals with counterterrorism issues such as: What are the effective and strategic ways to handle terrorism and radicalism? Are the government's counterterrorism (and terrorism prevention) approaches in the right direction? Does the government need to involve society in combating terrorism and formulating counterterrorism approaches? If so, how and in what way is society's involvement in the government-supported counterterrorism programs?

The primary aims of the formal interviews and informal conversations are to gain knowledge and gather data and information about the following information.

- The nature and root causes of (Islamist) terrorism.
- History, trajectory, perpetrators, and their underlying motives of terrorist actions.
- Terrorist networks and organizations (home and abroad) that could possibly contribute to Saudi Arabia's and Indonesia's domestic terrorism and extremism.

- Strategic approaches and effective responses to terrorism and terrorist groups.
- Potential sources for building future sustainable peace and security in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia.

In short, the research employed several key methods as follows. First, historical, archival, and textual analysis aiming at examining the history and current developments of Saudi's and Indonesia's terrorism and terrorist actors in order to understand changes (concerning motives, purposes, targets, perpetrators, and so on) that might occur from time to time from place to place within the two countries. Second, a network analysis to examine individual, institutional, and social networks of the terrorists. Third, a media analysis (print and online, including social media and the Internet) aiming at examining various narratives of terrorism and jihadist extremism, including those of terrorist actors since most contemporary terrorist groups utilize modern technology and the Internet to spread their messages, to recruit followers, and to terrorize society. Fourth, content analysis to investigate and analyze discourses of research participants and informants. In a conclusion, the method was a mixture of historical, anthropological, sociological, and religious studies of terrorism by emphasizing more on actor-/agency-centered analysis and discourse without neglecting structure-based perspective. It also combined both emic and ethic approaches to analyze, interpret, and understand the data and social facts related to terrorism and counterterrorism.

Background/Setting of the Book

Although terrorist acts occurred long before the 9/11 tragedy, it is these catastrophic attacks that initially triggered a flood of publications on terrorism, Islamist radicalism, and violent Islamism. Following the terrorist attacks, the West (the United States in particular and its allies)—through their high-rank government officials, political analysts, policymakers, media specialists, think-tank consultants, conservative religious groupings, and even academic community—has become an active agent in the debate about the links between Islam or Muslim world and terrorism, while ignoring other sources, roots, and actors of transnational and domestic terrorism.

With few notable exceptions, a large number of scholars and specialists of terrorism studies in the post-9/11 try to link the calamity to

Islam that, according to these studies, inherently teaches and encourages extremism, intolerance, resentment, and killing against "infidel" others (e.g. Lewis 2003, 2004; Spencer 2004; Gabriel 2002; Hammond 2010). Many of them view terrorism and radicalism as a problem of those who follow a religion (Islam) that is medieval at best (i.e. rigid, intolerant, dogmatic, uncompromising, and violent) (Abbas 2021a). Many studies have indeed underlined and overemphasized Islam's intrinsic contribution to or Muslim's significant role in global terrorism and other types of extremism. The 9/11 disaster gives a further impetus for the deepening misunderstanding and misconception about Islam and Muslim society (Mamdani 2005; DeLong-Bas 2004; Nardin, ed. 1998; Dennis 1996; Esposito 1994).

Particular attention is given to Islamist ideology or Salafi-Jihadi ideology, which according to them, serve as the main source or even the sole root of global terrorism. Here are a few examples. In a much-praised speech in 2011, Former British Prime Minister David Cameron said that terrorism's root lies in the existence of the extremist ideology (Forsyth 2011; Ramakrishna 2014). Richardson (2006) argues that a legitimizing ideology is a key ingredient that fed or supplied for the rise of terrorism. Cozzens (2006) revealed that Salafi-Jihadi ideology has been the primary reason for the birth of al-Qaeda and its affiliates worldwide. Barton (2004) underlines the jihadi Islamist ideological orientation as the primary engine of the appearance of Indonesian-based Jamaah Islamiyah terrorist organization.

Perhaps, due to the perception or even conviction that ideology is the main root of Islamist terrorism, many governments and state authorities in the world whose countries are affected by terrorism, including those of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, have created specific counterterrorism approaches that are centered around the ideas and ways of combating the terrorist ideology (Chapters 3 and 6). Since the governments assumed that Islamist radicalization and terrorism are inherited from within the religion (Islam), it is significant for them to have policies and programs that limit the effects of the ideological pull of extremism so that the youths are reluctant to join terrorist organizations. As Abbas (2021a, b) has noted, such an ideology-based counterterrorism approach tends to take agency away from an individual or group actors whose motivations and objectives of joining terrorist organizations may well be more to do with non-ideological factors.

A large number of studies, moreover, relate the 9/11 catastrophe with Saudi Arabia mainly because Bin Laden, al-Qaeda's founder, was a Saudi and fifteen out of the nineteen aircraft hijackers involved in the horrific attacks were also Saudi (Gendron 2010: 488; Ansary 2008). The bulk of the studies focus on the examination of the Kingdom's history and contemporary development of terrorism and extremism. While some scholars put emphasis on the origins and root causes of the emergence of terrorism and extremism in modern Saudi (e.g. Trofirmov 2007; Hegghammer 2010; Matthiesen 2015), others focus on Saudi's role in creating and exporting global radicalism and international terrorism (e.g. Schwartz 2003; Gold 2003; Kovacs 2014). Some, furthermore, try to link the domestic terrorism to pan-Islamism ideology of the Islamist terrorists, while others with the international networks of Afghanistan's or Iraq's terrorist-jihadist groups (e.g. Hegghammer 2010, 2015; Gunaratna et al. 2002, 2016).

Many studies have also underscored Saudi Arabia as an exporter of global terrorism, incubator of terrorist ideology, or producer of radical zealots. The studies also pointed out Saudi society as the keen supporter of terrorism and Islamist extremism. Southeast Asia too, especially Indonesia, has been portrayed by some observers as a web of terror or crucible of terror (e.g. Abuza 2002a, b, 2003). Some studies even go further by stating that Wahhabis (wherever they are, either in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, or elsewhere) are extremist, violent fanatics, wreaking havoc, death, and destruction against anyone whom they considered to be unbelievers or infidels (*kuffar*) (see, e.g., Gold 2003; Schwartz 2003; Nisan 2007; Rabasa 2003, 2007).

While not all this debate is essentially based on scholarly assessment to understand the dynamics of contemporary Muslim societies or Islamic religious discourses and practices, serious effort was put into identifying the origins of terrorism, with the result that Saudis, Wahhabis, or Muslims in general were directly accused of promoting religiously motivated and sanctioned violence, including terrorism. They, in particular, attributed Saudi government as the backer—financially and politically—of global terrorism and radical Islamism campaign. The Saudi government officials have dissociated their state religion from the 9/11 atrocities. A report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (known as the 9/11 Commission) also found no evidence of the Saudi government's involvement and its senior officials in the attacks (Blanchard and Prados 2007: 2).

Nonetheless, such accusations against the Saudi government and society continue to flourish. Whereas some allegations were based on factual evidence, others are more on the basis of reactive emotions. Interestingly, in an interview with the *National Journal* to respond to the involvement of Saudi nationalities in the 9/11 attacks, Adel Al-Jubeir, former Saudi Ambassador to the United States (2007–2015) and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, made an interesting comment: "Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization has membership from 60 different countries. He could have put any number of nationalities on those planes. He intentionally chose the Saudis to give the operation a Saudi face in order to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia" (Al-Jubeir 2002: 1408).

It is true that, as mentioned earlier, fifteen out of the nineteen airplane hijackers that blasted the WTC and the Pentagon in the 9/11 were Saudis. Bin Laden was also Saudi and a great number of Saudis in the past (in the 1980s–1990s) also engaged in "jihad wars" in some foreign countries (Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechen Republic, among others), participated in radical and terrorist activities, and joined such notorious extremist groups as al-Qaeda, ISIL, and others. There is plenty of academic work that discusses this subject (e.g. Hegghammer 2006, 2010, 2015; McCants 2015), some of which have been highlighted in this book. Nevertheless, this does not mean that all Saudi people, including Wahhabis (or Salafis in general), as discussed in this book, are fans or promoters of global terrorism and radicalism. As a matter of fact, many Saudis are against terrorism and extremism (Chapter 4).

The Saudi government has also been struggling for combating terrorism and radicalism at home in part because the country, like others, has also suffered from terrorist acts for decades (see Chapter 2). Terrorism has indeed been one of critical issues facing the contemporary Saudi government and its citizens. Moreover, terrorist acts have not only threatened socio-economic-political stability and national security of the Saudi state and society but also contributed to the destructive image and disparaging portrayal of Saudi Arabia in the world. Due to the damaging effect of terrorism, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, speaking at the inaugural meeting of the Islamic Military Counter-Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC) Ministers of Defense Council in Riyadh, vowed to combat

terrorism "until we see its defeat" and the extremists will no longer "tarnish our beautiful religion."[6]

Interestingly, although the West (and others) attributed Saudi Arabia as "al-Qaeda nest," the puzzling question is: Why there have not been more Saudi al-Qaeda members. Since the 1980s, thousands of Saudis have fought as mujahidin in foreign conflicts such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Iraq (Asseri 2009; Hegghammer 2010; Farquhar 2017). Given this large pool of activists and militant jihadists, one would expect al-Qaeda to be very strong in Saudi Arabia. However, recent research has shown that al-Qaeda has found it notoriously difficult to recruit and operate in the Kingdom (Hegghammer 2010, 2015). Many Saudis also expressed their reluctance and refusal in joining al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups (see Chapter 4). al-Qaeda's first and last major attack in the Kingdom was 2003s suicide car bombings in the Riyadh compounds (see Chapter 2), launched by al-Qaeda-linked terrorists, which was crushed by the Saudi authorities after a couple of years. Since 2001, Saudi operatives have also not been involved in major attacks in the West.

Even though there were no Indonesian nationalities among the hijackers in the 9/11, Indonesia later became the subject of allegation of a terrorist nest because of the involvement of some Islamist activists and religious leaders in the country in a number of notorious extremist organizations such as Jamaah Islamiyah and later Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, Jamaah Ansharud Daulah, Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, among others. A quantity of scholarly work has devoted to the study of Indonesia's terrorism, some of which have been discussed in this book (see, for instance, Jones 2005a, b; Solahudin 2013; Jones and Solahudin 2014; Karnavian 2014; Ramakrishna 2014; Schulze 2018; Schulze and Chinyong Liow 2018). In fact, like in Saudi Arabia, the majority of Indonesians rejected terrorism and are not part of any terrorist group (Chapter 7). Moreover, although there is a number of studies on terrorism, literature on Indonesia's counterterrorism and terrorism prevention is still inadequate. This book, hence, among other things, aims to fill the gap and complement the existing literature as well as to balance

[6] Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman conveyed this statement at an inaugural meeting of the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC) Ministers of Defense Council in Riyadh on November 25, 2017. https://www.arabnews.com/node/1199381/saudi-arabia. Retrieved May 25, 2020.

opinions and outlooks about Saudi Arabia's and Indonesia's terrorism and counterterrorism.

The brief depiction previously sketched provides a setting for this book to emerge.

Scholarship Shortcoming

There are scholarship shortcomings on the following issues that drove me to write this book. First is the fair and detailed assessment on the comparative study of the historical dynamics and contemporary development of Saudi Arabia's and Indonesia's terrorism as well as the roles and contributions of the two countries to counterterrorism and terrorism prevention programs. Previous studies on counterterrorism and terrorism prevention in the two countries generally emphasize the post-9/11 counterterrorism and anti-terrorism policies and approaches. It is accurate to say that, following the 9/11 terrorist tragedy, the two countries have initiated and developed vigorous anti-terrorism policies, counterterrorism approaches, and de-radicalization programs that need for further study (e.g. Asseri 2009; Rudolph 2018; Hwang 2018). Specifically, the government of Saudi Arabia began an ambitious and wide-ranging counterterrorism effort since the occurrence of a series of deadly domestic terrorist attacks in 2003, whereas Indonesia started developing the programs since the Bali bombings in 2002.

In reality, however, the two governments have engaged with counterterrorism policies and programs long before the 9/11 catastrophe (see Chapters 3 and 6). In Saudi Arabia, the counterterrorism tradition goes back in the late 1920s, when the founder of modern Saudi state, King Ibn Saud (1875–1953), led counter-extremism and terrorism attempts in overcoming the Ikhwan revolt (Meijer 2012). In Indonesia, combating terrorism and radicalism goes back in the late 1940s, when the newly born Indonesian government, led by President Sukarno (1901–1970), struggled to overcome the Communist uprising. Today, unlike in the previous years, both Saudi Arabia and Indonesia are far better off in security terms because, in the phrase of Sidney Jones (2005b: 53) the rapidly improving law enforcement, hundreds of arrests of the radicals, hundreds of disengaged terrorists, better understanding of the problem's scope, and clear public outrage over the bombings that have taken place.

Second, unbiased study on Islam, Muslim societies, or Islamism, Salafism, and Wahhabism in particular. While the term Salafism might

have positive connotations, evoking the historical and religious authenticity of Muslim forebears[7] (*salaf al-salih*), the labels of Islamism and Wahhabism generally have negative meanings, inducing fanaticism, intolerance, and violence on behalf of religion (Islam). In reality, however, Islamism and Wahhabism are multifaceted. The two have always been marked by diversity, both over time and at any given point in time. The two groups (Islamists and Wahhabis) have radical (and some ultra-militant) factions as well as less-violent clusters in both strategies and discourses they utilize and develop. It is the radical factions (including those who backed up or joined international terrorist organizations) that often support, encourage, and commit radical actions and violent extremism, including terrorism. Yet, many of them are not interested in carrying out violence. As some scholars of Saudi studies have noted (e.g. Hegghammer 2010; Commins 2015b; Farquhar 2017; Thompson 2014, 2019), the views expressed by Islamists and Wahhabis have indeed varied on a whole range of issues, including those of intergroup relations, violence, terrorism, and pacification. Accordingly, linking terrorism to Wahhabism is at times inapt and misleading because Wahhabism is generally more concerned about theological than political or ideological matters (Commins 2015a, b). Equally important, although some Islamist groupings have engaged in terrorist activities and other forms of violence (e.g. vigilantism), connecting terrorism to Islamism is sometimes irrelevant since many Islamists have employed various tactics and practices (Hwang 2009).

As Natana DeLong-Bas has said, the militant Islam of Osama Bin Laden and other small minority of Islamist extremists (e.g. the devotees of ISIS) do not have its origins in the teachings of Shaikh Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab (1703–92), a theologian and religious reformist from Najd in central Arabia that attempted a return to the true principles of Islam. As well, Bin Laden's Islamic militancy is not representative of Wahhabi Islam as it is practiced in contemporary Saudi Arabia (DeLong-Bas 2004: 278–9; Commins 2015a). Thomas Hegghammer (2010: 5) also said that Wahhabism does not "dictate" Islamist activism mainly

[7] To say that the doctrine is Salafi is to ascribe it the authority of Islam's pious ancestors (Arabic: *aslaf* or *salaf al-salih*). The claim has been part of the theological discourse since the ninth century of the Islamic Middle Age. In modern times, the Salafi label has attained a firm grip on the contemporary Sunni imagination as a marker for Islam in its pristine form (Commins 2015b: 151–66).

because it is not "a political doctrine, but a living tradition, interpreted and contested by successive generations." Moreover, Stephane Lacroix (2005: 36–7) pointed out that Wahhabism is "a religious tradition[8] developed over the centuries by the ulama of the official Saudi religious establishment founded by the heirs of Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792), an establishment which in return considers itself the legitimate guardian of this tradition". Wahhabism and the Saudi religious establishment historically constitute the core of the Saudi intellectual field. However, the Wahhabis never refer to themselves as such and always use the terms Salafis or *Ahl al-Tauhid* (Commins 2009).

Indeed, as other groups, Muslims, Islamists, Saudis, Wahhabis, or Salafis are neither monolithic nor stagnant groups since changes (in ideas, thoughts, interpretations, understandings, and practices) have always taken place within these communities. My conversations with countless Saudis, some of their outcomes are presented in this book (Chapter 4), also indicate that Wahhabism and terrorism are not interlinked. Many Saudi informants have expressed their disagreement with terrorism and radicalism and at the same time denouncing the evil deeds of the extremists and terrorists. Sadly, however, unrepresentative al-Qaeda's or the ISIS/ISIL' terrorist and Islamist ideology have often been associated with Saudi society and Wahhabi Islam. Not only in Saudi Arabia, have people also tended to link Indonesian terrorists with Wahhabism or what they call "Sawah," an acronym for Salafi–Wahhabi.

Furthermore, the previous studies also tend to overemphasize issues related to Sunni extremist violence without trying to examine factions within Sunni as well as Shia militancy. In reality, actors of terrorism in Saudi Arabia were not only Sunni militants but also other radical groupings, including Shiites such as Hezbollah al-Hejaz, which were allegedly responsible for a series of terrorist acts in late 1980s and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing (Burke 2003; Leonnig 2006; ICG 2004; Matthiessen 2010, 2015; Al Mustafa 2015; Al Suhail 2017). By examining and analyzing multiple factions of radical groups, the book will

[8] The moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre defines tradition as an argument extended through time in which certain fundamental agreements are defined and redefined in terms of two kinds of conflicts: those with critics and enemies external to the tradition who reject all or at least key parts of those fundamental agreements, and those internal interpretative debates through which the meaning and rationale of the fundamental agreements come to be expressed and by whose progress a traditional is constituted (cited in Zaman 2002).

thus complement previous studies and analyses on terrorism and violent extremism.

Third, studies that acknowledge the changing phenomena of patterns or motives of terrorism and activities of terrorist individuals. Terrorist organizations are a constantly changing phenomenon and a constantly expanding information base (Jones 2005a, b; Chenoweth and Lowham 2007). Like other groups, terrorists are not fixed individuals. In fact, some individuals engaged in terrorist activities in the past now disengage these evil deeds and start contributing to promoting appeasement, de-radicalization, and disengagement programs among their peers (see Hwang 2018). Likewise, by paying close attention to Saudi and Indonesian people's voices and changing dynamics of local factors, this book will hence fill gaps in scholarships about Saudi Arabia's and Indonesia's domestic terrorism and provide solid data on the shifting nature and diversity of terrorists' motives, rationales, and actors.

The fact that terrorists in the two countries targeted various places and groups of people: worship places, religious communities, foreigners, locals, state buildings, government officials, ordinary masses, companies (e.g. Saudi Aramco), malls, police personnel, or military officers indicate that terrorism has indeed multiple roots and complex motives. These facts also illustrate that terrorism has indeed posed a major menace for both Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. In this regard, although the pan-Islamism ideology or global jihad perspective (e.g. Hegghammer 2010; Atwan 2015) or al-Qaeda/ISIS-centric paradigm (Abuza 2002a, b, 2003; Gunaratna et al. 2002; McCants 2015) are undoubtedly useful as a framework for analyzing the rise of domestic terrorism in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and other countries, such perspectives, analyses, and paradigms are not enough to comprehend the complexity and dynamics of the occurrence of home terrorism because of the following reasons. First, characteristics of terrorism are not always Islamist or ideological in nature since there are various motives and objectives of terrorism. Second, faces of terrorism have evolved or shifted from time to time for some fundamental reasons. Third, there are multiple independent terrorist agencies and networks (international, regional, or local), as well as local socio-political dynamics and historical grounds that have contributed to the emergence of violent extremism.

The fourth issue is a wide-ranging study that go beyond traditional understandings and analyses of terrorism that tend to link terrorism to

particular (Islamist) ideology, poverty, or ignorance (i.e. lack of education). In fact, many terrorists actually came from middle-class society with high education and good income. As well, although ideology is an important contributing factor to terrorism, terrorist acts many times have nothing to do with particular ideology. As Gambetta and Hertog (2017) have convincingly told us, extremism, including terrorism, is a complex phenomenon in which people involved in terrorist activities have occasionally nothing to do with ignorance, poverty, and ideology but with terrorists' social mobility or a particular mindset seeking order and hierarchy. Furthermore, root causes of terrorism can be vengeance, social media abuses, friendship networks, online religious sermons, among others. Hence, modern terrorism is a complex social fact and phenomenon that requires a variety of approaches to understand it.

Fifth, a study that investigates Saudi-Indonesian relations and collaboration between the two governments on defense and security matters as well as counterterrorism strategies and anti-terrorism approaches and policies. As noted earlier, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have developed a fruitful partnership on combating terrorism and radicalism, including intelligence exchange and conducting regular training and workshops for those—civilian and military—concerned about counterterrorism, anti-terrorism, and post-terrorism resolution but academic studies on this theme are almost zero (see Chapter 10).

Lastly, sixth, an academic work of terrorism and counterterrorism that pays an equal consideration to standpoints of state actors (government officials) and non-state actors (society). To my knowledge, the existing studies generally examine state's (government's) opinions on terrorism and their policies for combating it or discusses and document deeply terrorist actors along with their activities, views, organizational affiliations, networks, motives, and objectives. There is limited scholarship that studies and highlights perspectives of non-terrorist communities concerning terrorism and their expectations for creating a peaceful and secure society. As well, there is lack scholarly work that compares and contrasts standpoints of state and society on both terrorism and counterterrorism.

Frameworks for Understanding Terrorism and Counterterrorism

All the way through the human history, terrorism has been practiced by political organizations with both rightist and leftist objectives; by nationalistic, ethno-linguistic, ideological, and religious groups; by revolutionaries, and even by state institutions such as armies, intelligence services, and police. However, the term "terrorism" itself is notoriously difficult to define. The subject of terrorism—its definitions, history, movements, variations, practices, or behaviors—is always poignant, complex, debatable, and controversial, as clearly expressed by numerous experts on this subject (see, e.g., Hoffman 1999; Crenshaw 2010; Schmid 2011; Horgan and Braddock 2012; Romaniuk et al., eds. 2017). Terrorism is also a value-laden concept. While defining terrorism is a daunting task, so is categorizing terrorist groups and organizations, as evidenced by the hundreds of terrorist typologies that exist in the literature. The following popular dictum—"One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" (Laqueur 1987: 7, 302)—is a mirror of the highly subjective and judgmental nature of terrorism as a political concept.

Defining Terrorism

Up to now, there is no an agreed definition of terrorism and what constitutes terrorism. According to Martha Crenshaw, an eminent scholar of terrorism studies, since the early 1970s scholars and practitioners have tried to define, conceptualize, and elucidate terrorism and to measure the efficiency of government responses to the menace. At first, it consisted few analytical studies but now the research field has expanded to thousands of entries, with a vast spike following the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Crenshaw 2010). However, the concept of terrorism is still contested, although some scholars tried to clarify it. Boaz Ganor, Founder and Executive Director of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, for example, contends that an "objective definition of terrorism is not only possible; it is also indispensable to any serious attempt to combat terrorism" (Ganor 2002: 287–8). For him, a correct and objective definition of terrorism can be based on recognized international laws and principles concerning what behaviors are allowed in conventional wars between nations. Ganor said, one of the primary features that distinguished terrorist organizations from other radical groups such as freedom

fighters is the target of their operations. While freedom (guerilla) fighters target military or government officials and their properties, terrorists deliberately target civilians (ibid.: 287–304). However, those targeting civilians are not only terrorists. As a result, not only scholars, activists, or states, the international community and body such as the United Nations (UN) have also failed in its attempts to adopt a convention defining precisely what it meant by terrorism and its components.

In a response to the UN's struggle in defining terrorism, Thomas Mockaitis wrote an interesting comment:

> The United Nations has struggled for years to agree on a common definition of terrorism. Two issues consistently block consensus: inclusion acts of terror by states and the insistence by some members that any definition must distinguish between the acts of terrorists and those whom they consider 'freedom fighters'. Many also express the justifiable concern that efforts to combat terrorism may erode human rights that the organization has consistently fought to upload. Faced with this seemingly insurmountable impasse, the organization continues to expand the legal framework for combating terrorism. (Mockaitis 2007: 2)

Since there is no international consensus on definitions of terrorism, effective cooperation across society and country to combat terrorism is not an easy task. Indeed, throughout history since Robespierre's Reign of Terror in 1793–1794, the definition of terrorism has varied and changed over time depending on interests, motives, goals, and politics of individuals and social groups, as well as relations between states. Nowadays the term also tends to be used in different ways, with different meanings, connotations, and emphases. States (government officials and policymakers) and society actors (including activists and scholars) have frequently expressed different opinions and understandings on terrorism and factors that constitute terrorism. Hoffman (1999: 20–34) has analyzed 109 definitions of terrorism and shortlisted an overwhelming 22 "definitional elements" ranging from violence or force to publicity, and coercion to unpredictability. Furthermore, *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*, edited by Alex Schmid (2011), documents 250 definitions of terrorism (reproduced in an appendix).

Due to the varied definitions of terrorism, accordingly, scholars must look to past debates in coming up with a workable definition for their research purposes, and at the end, it seems to depend on one's point

of view. Because of the inherent ferocity and violence of terrorism, the term in its popular usage has developed an intense stigma. This definition problem, as Rudolph (2018) has noted, has been bedeviled throughout the contemporary era since the new common usage has created confusion and made it difficult to agree on the essence of terrorism and its elements. This problem, as discussed in this book, has also had an impact on counterterrorism policies and anti-terrorism models in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia.

In the paragraphs that follow, I will provide several examples of (even contested) definitions of terrorism, given by state authorities, transnational/international organizations, or eminent scholars on terrorism studies (see also e.g. Hoffman 1999; Townshend 2002; Schmid 2011). The US Department of Defense defines terrorism as the "calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological" (quoted from Asseri 2009: 3). The US State Department, in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (d), defines terrorism as "Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience."

The British government defines terrorism as "the use of threat, for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, or ideological course of action, of serious violence against any person or property" (ibid.). Moreover, the German government outlines terrorism as "the enduringly conducted struggle for political goals, which are intended to be achieved by means of assaults on the life and property of other persons, especially by means of severe crime" (cited from Schmid 1992: 8–9). The U.N. General Assembly Resolution of 1999 stated that, "acts of terror" are "all criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke state of terror in the general public. A group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are, in any circumstance, unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them."[9]

Moreover, the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism—also referred to as the Arab Agreement for Counterterrorism—defines

[9] This definition was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 17 December 1999, 54/126/1999.

terrorism as follows "Any violent act or threat, whatever its motive or purpose, which takes place to implement a criminal plan, whether individual or collective, aiming to cause panic among the people and frightening them, causing harm or exposing their life, freedom and security to danger" (Aljahani 2005). Additionally, the Organization of Islamic Conference's Islamic Fiqh Academy defined it as a form of aggression, intimidation, or threat posed by the state, a group, or the individual against the integrity of human life, religion, property and intellect. The late Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (1928–2011), former Saudi Minister of Defense, defined terrorism as "every action which has the aim to instill fear in innocents, to bring corruption on earth, or organized to achieve these ends" (cited in Aba al-Khail 2003: 298), and in 1989, the Saudi Council of Senior Ulama used this definition (ibid.: 426–7).

Scholarly definitions of terrorism also abound. Bruce Hoffman (1999) defines terrorism as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence, or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. Thayer (in Kingsbury 2005: 53; Thayer 2005) distinguishes the term "old terrorism" from that of "new terrorism." For him, the term "old terrorism" relates to selective political violence committed by anti-government insurgents and ethno-nationalist separatists. "New terrorism," by contrast, refers to high-profile mass causality (apocalyptic) attacks against civilians by internationally networked militant groups. Another term of terrorism is what so-called state terrorism which Hoffman (1988: 13–44) defines as violence and coercion committed or sponsored by a ruling government to weaken and destroy opposing and resisting forces of the regime which they perceived to be potential to threaten, delegitimize, and destabilize their states.

Lewis Branscomb (2007: 2) distinguishes between tactical terrorism and strategic/catastrophic terrorism. The tactical terrorism is typified by the use of conventional small arms weapons or explosives (e.g. car bombs) against individuals in an effort "to put political pressure on a government that has proved intransigent regarding the political objectives of the terrorists." Examples of this type of terrorism abound in Indonesia, India, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere. Saudi Arabia has also experienced this form of terrorism. On the contrary, the strategic terrorism or catastrophic terrorism, according to Branscomb, "seeks to inflict maximum damage against targets that are ideologically despised by the terrorists." By committing such shattering terrorist acts, the terrorists wish to draw attention to their cause, to impose maximum destruction on the legality

of a government regime, to inflict major economic penalties on the country (or countries) in question. Examples of this form of terrorism include al-Qaeda's attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001, the Bali bombings in 2002, the Riyadh bombings in 2003, and the Tokyo subway attack by the Aum Shinrikyo in 1995, among others.

All of these efforts to define terrorism—by state institutions, international bodies, or scholars—tend to be problematic and contested. Their disagreement is mainly related to actors (state or non-state actors—individuals or social groupings), activities (what acts considered as "terrorist acts": warfare, hijacking, bombing, murdering), and motives of terrorism (terrorism or fighting for freedom and human/civil rights). In the state's view, state authorities are the only one that has the right to use force (the legitimate use of violence), a claim that has long been criticized and contested by non-state actors. If a state can justify the use of violence, why non-state violence is illegitimate and unjustifiable?

The definitions offered by international organizations tend to avoid a reference to the perpetrators of terrorism. This might be due to the contest between state and non-state agencies pertaining to actors of terrorism. Acts considered terrorism are also debatable and contested. Are war and guerilla warfare part of terrorist acts or not? The boundaries between terrorism and warfare are really blurred. As well, motives of actors committing violence are also an essential part of difference and contestation mainly because, for instance, activists of civil rights or freedom fighters refused to be called "terrorist" or associated with terrorist groups.

Even though there are divergent views on defining terrorism, experts and officials (scholars, policymakers, and so forth) virtually seem to agree that indiscriminate attacks targeting civilians of any community or group constitute terrorism. They also consider the use of certain weapons deemed illegitimate by the international organizations (e.g. bombs or chemical weapons) in violent acts as part of terrorism. Lastly, they seem to agree that actors' legitimacy, goals, or objectives can be assessed to determine whether or not their actions "terrorism."

The Book's Concepts of Terrorism, Islamist Terrorism, and Counterterrorism

Since there is no international agreement on the definition of terrorism, this book defines terrorism loosely as the deliberate use of violence and intimidation by individuals or groups to generate terror and create a

general climate of fear in a population in order to achieve particular (usually political, ideological, religious, or economic) ends and objectives. More specifically, this book focuses on "Islamist terrorism," namely acts of terrorism committed by Islamists—individuals or social groupings (see, e.g., Ramakrishna 2014; Barret 2014, 2017). The term "Islamists" means activists or supporters of the ideology of Islamism (Cordesman and Obaid 2005). By emphasizing on Islamist terrorism, this does not mean that this study neglect terrorism or terrorist acts committed by non-Islamists. In fact, the book also outlines terrorist activities committed by multiple terrorist groups and individuals.

Nevertheless, focusing on specific actors of terrorism—the Islamist terrorists—is helpful in examining and analyzing the book's subject mainly because there are multiple agencies of terrorism. However, although the book's main focus on "Islamist terrorism," this does not mean that all Islamist individuals and groupings are by default "terrorist" because they are deeply complex (even disputed) communities. While some (radical Islamists) engaged in terrorism and militancy, others tend to avoid physical violent acts or use less-violent actions in pursuing their agenda (Bubalo and Fealy 2005; Hwang 2009; Bayat 2013). Still, some Islamists tend to circumvent radicalism while at the same time committing verbal violence and tacitly endorsing terrorism and direct violence.

Islamism might be best viewed as a dystopian ideology that distorts universal religious values, reality, history, humanity, and social facts to fit its "anti"-platform such as anti-Semitic/Jewish, anti-Christian, anti-Western, anti-democracy, anti-secularism, anti-liberalism, anti-pluralism, and so forth. It is imperative to underline that Islamism substantially differs from the religious faith of Islam, albeit its concept might be based on or derived from certain Islamic texts, doctrines, and discourses, or Qur'anic injunctions. Unlike Islam, Islamism can be described as a politically based fundamentalist movement that seeks to change Muslim societies by deriving its programs, activities, platforms, and ideologies from particular Islamic discourses and texts. Frequently used to describe the ideology of political Islam, Islamism seeks a greater role for Islam in the government, economy, and society. Islamism's central agenda is to make the state actively promote enforcement of sharia and to uphold Islamic values and principles (Hwang 2009; Platzdasch 2009; Hilmy 2010; Tibi 2012).

Factors contributing to terrorism—either Islamist terrorism or other forms of terrorism—vary considerably ranging from ideology, economic

shortage, poverty, unemployment, psychological issues, and social problems to corruption of territory, denial of rights, and an unresponsive international system. Some experts also underline the following as part of factors contributing to terrorism: a lack of religious knowledge and education, the lack of role models; and socio-economic factors such as democratic changes, social hierarchy, economic gaps, family breakdown, illiteracy, unemployment, instability, and generational conflict, and many others (Gunaratna et al. 2002; Abdulmahmood 2005; Asseri 2009; Rudolph 2018). Moreover, Gambetta and Hertog (2017) argue that terrorism is occasionally linked to terrorists' particular mindset and social mobility or such factors as revenge, abuses of social media, networks of friendship, and online religious sermons through social media devices, among others. Therefore, like definitions of terrorism, factors contributing to terrorism also become an arena of contestation among experts, scholars, stakeholders, and policymakers within state and society.

In an attempt to analyze the phenomena of Islamist terrorism in both Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, this study tries to implement Edward Said's (1983) traveling theory and Roland Robertson's (2012) "glocalization" concept. As Edward Said has suggested in his "travelling theory" that idea travels, not only from "person to person, from situation to situation, from one period to another" in a socio-historical vacuum, but also in response to specific historical and social changes. This is to say that local, regional, or national contexts and history have been central factors in nurturing any idea or ideology, including terrorism. In fact, the presence of terrorist ideology and its actors in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia cannot be avoided from socio-political-economic-cultural dynamics in the countries. In other words, terrorism is not simply about "outside influence" (foreign factors) but also "inside inspiration" (local issues). To borrow the term sociologist Roland Robertson, Islamist terrorism is a "glocalization phenomenon," a mixture of both universalizing (global, international) and particularizing (local) tendencies; accordingly, understanding its emergence as merely a global or international influence without paying attention to local factors will be misleading.

This book aims, among others, at revisiting arguments and theoretical frameworks set forth by the so-called international terrorism experts that tend to put more emphasis on the al-Qaeda (or recently ISIS/ISIL) factor on the rise of global and local terrorism without providing an equal analysis and assessment on domestic factors. This book suggests that although there had been some connections between militant Islamists in

Saudi Arabia and Indonesia to Afghanistan (or the Arab Middle East)-based jihadists and terrorists, global terrorism experts' emphasis on the al-Qaeda/ISIS-centric paradigm as a framework for analyzing the rise of the countries' terrorism is over-exaggerated. As well, the book provides a critical assessment for academic and non-academic communities alike who have overstated and dramatized the central role and contributions of ideology as the "locomotive of Islamist terrorism carriage" without understanding the plurality of agency (terrorist actors) and multiple complex roots of terrorism and violent extremism.

As terrorist attacks and radicalism continue around the world and present a security challenge to most governments and societies, questions multiply around the effectiveness and advantages of current counter-errorism and anti-terrorism strategies and tactics. In response to the extremist and terrorist threats, the majority of governments rely on military force that have dominated the global counterterrorism agenda long before the 9/11 incidents. These policies and approaches include vital investment in operational counterterrorism (such as capture, kill, destroy, and disrupt) and anti-terrorism (e.g. protection of personnel and infrastructure) but not in strategic counterterrorism or measures aimed at shifting the enabling milieu (Gunaratna et al. 2011: 1).

The military and repressive approaches, as in the cases of Indonesia and Saudi Arabia in the past before the 2000s, have often further radicalized individuals and increased support for terrorist groups among the general populace. Obviously, counterterrorism needs multiple approaches beyond traditional military models, and this is how the book defines and understands counterterrorism, namely approaches to combating or countering terrorism by combining military (hard) and non-military (soft) methods. To borrow the concepts of Cortright and Lopez (2007), the book defines and classifies counterterrorism into two forms, namely (1) tactical counterterrorism approach (military models) that focuses on finding, destroying, and defeating operative terrorist cells by the government and state apparatus, and (2) strategic counterterrorism method (non-military techniques) that includes multiple policy responses and other soft approaches designed to eliminate the sustaining and underlying conditions that feed extremist terrorism.

Within these definition and frameworks, this book highlights approaches and techniques of counterterrorism set forth by the governments of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia to dismantle the terrorist networks

and, over the long term, to prevail over the religious convictions, ideologies, and other principal factors that give rise to (Islamist) terrorism. In brief, the book underscores the vitality of both military approach and non-military strategies for combating terrorism. As Cortright and Lopez (ibid.) have suggested, more strategic approaches by amalgamating military and non-military models toward combating terror need to be implemented in order to be successful in transforming extremism to moderation, from violence to nonviolence, and so forth.

Last but not the least, the book underscores the need to go beyond the Islamist (or Salafi jihadist) ideological framework in understanding roots of terrorism and implementing methods of counterterrorism. This emphasis is imperative mainly because, to date, the government officials, state authorities, policymakers, stakeholders, and other relevant agencies, in the words of Tahir Abbas (2021b: 2–3), "have continued to look for the problems and solutions within the religion, people's interpretations, Jihadism as ideas within Islamic poetry, or using notions of strategic communications or combating online narratives as a way in which to deal with the problem before it supposedly clicks into place." While ideology is certainly an important factor that contributed to the rise of Islamist terrorism, it is nonetheless not sufficient studying Islamist terrorism and implementing approaches of counterterrorism by merely pay attention on ideology while neglecting other key supporting factors.

Outline of the Book

This chapter is an introduction of this book that outlines the book's settings, focus of study, research methodology, and theoretical frameworks. It introduces readers about what the present book is about, along with underlying rationales and arguments for writing this work. The lack of research and academic literature on issues around counterterrorism, anti-terrorism, as well as a comparative study of terrorism and counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, became one of the primary driving forces that led to the birth of this book.

Chapter 2 focuses on the study of the nature, historical dynamics, and recent developments of terrorism in Saudi Arabia. It discusses anything related to terrorism or terrorist activities in the Kingdom: its roots, factors, networks, organizations, actors, backers, motives, purposes, ideologies, financers, targets, and so forth. The purpose of this chapter is to underscore the plurality and complexity of terrorism and terrorist

groupings, as well as to understand the nature, trajectory, and the shifting phenomena of terrorism in Saudi Arabia from past to present-day era regarding driving factors, main actors, underlying motives, and the like.

Chapter 3 examines the Saudi government's approaches and strategies of counterterrorism. More specifically, it examines the Kingdom's initiatives of counterterrorism, anti-terrorism, and violence deterrence by highlighting their programs, policies, and measures related to strategies and tactics of combating terrorism and of preventing it from occurring in the future. Not only depicting the government's strategies and tactics of counterterrorism, this chapter also examines their strengths and weaknesses in combating terrorist acts, ideology, and actors. In brief, this chapter puts emphasis on the Saudi government overall actions in countering terrorism as a mean of insuring the security of the state as whole.

Chapter 4 Saudi investigates Saudi society's views, opinions, and ideas regarding domestic terrorism as well as appropriate approaches of counterterrorism in their home country. This chapter, in particular, will focus on Saudi youths' outlooks of terrorist acts in the Kingdom as well as assess their opinions, thoughts, and suggestions to deal with and overcome such a violent extremism. Focusing on the young Saudis is vital in part because most perpetrators of terrorist acts are the youth. The youths might offer indispensable, alternative insights on notions and ways of combating and transforming Islamist terrorists to become tolerant, nonviolent groupings.

Chapter 5 traces the history and contemporary developments of terrorism in Indonesia, highlighting the tendency of changing phenomena of terrorism from the New Order to the post-New Order era. The chapter also discusses multiple forms of terrorism—from state to civil (non-state) terrorism—as well as various motives, actors, networks, organizations, objectives, and ideologies of those engaged in terrorist activities. The aim of this chapter is to show that terrorism in Indonesia is far from being the monolith. The chapter also investigates frictions, conflicts, tensions, and contests among terrorist individuals and groupings in the country due to different agendas. More importantly, perhaps, it sketches several terrorist individuals who disengage with or are no longer involved in terrorism and radicalism.

Chapter 6 analyzes Indonesian government's efforts, approaches, strategies, programs, tactics, and policies concerning counterterrorism as well as examines their strengths and weaknesses in countering and preventing terrorism and radicalism from happening in the future.

Although Indonesian government, especially its anti-terror unit, has done many efforts in combating terrorism, through multiple strategies and tactics, Indonesian society is still unsafe from terrorist threats. Several times, in the aftermath of the Bali bombings that took hundreds of casualties, terrors still took place in some areas targeting multiple buildings (religious and secular alike) and people (Muslims and non-Muslims).

Chapter 7 assesses opinions, notions, and thoughts of Indonesian societies regarding (1) terrorist acts that happened in their country and (2) best ways or apt approaches of countering and preventing terrorism. Assessing society's ideas on factors contributing to terrorism as well as productive models for fighting against terrorism and terrorist groups and individuals might be helpful for overcoming terrorism in the country. Society's opinions, frequently ignored by policymakers and the elites, are always useful and noteworthy as resources for combating terrorism, making policy concerning radicalism, as well as approaching and transforming terrorists and radical groupings.

Chapter 8 outlines similarities and differences anything related to terrorism (e.g. factors, roots, objectives, groupings, networks, and so on) between Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. It is interesting to find the fact that although Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have long suffered from terrorism, the nature and local dynamics of terrorism in the two countries differ from one another. The differences include the plurality of terrorist groupings, along with their socio-historical roots, motives, purposes, organizations, and networks (individual or organizational). The chapter, hence, tries to analyze rationales and factors contributing to these differences. Notwithstanding differences, resemblances also exist. For instance, both have witnessed the presence of Islamist terrorist individuals and organizations, which is the main focus of study of this present book. Lastly, the chapter also discusses Saudi Arabia's roles, contributions, and influences on the rise of Indonesia's Islamist terrorism.

Chapter 9 compares counterterrorism policies, strategies, approaches, tactics, or programs between Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. I have noticed that even though the two countries have applied "hard" (military) and "soft" (non-military) approaches in combating—and preventing society from—terrorism, its specific implementation, process, and mechanism differ from one another. The distinction is mainly because the two countries have distinct types of society, social structure, governmental system, political and cultural practices, economic condition, geographical area, as well as the variety and complexity of terrorism, among others. The

chapter also provides analyses of strengths and weaknesses as well as criticisms regarding the existing counterterrorism approaches (including programs on de-radicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration). It also discusses challenges and suggestions for the Saudi and Indonesian governments in the making of a more robust, comprehensive approach on counterterrorism and antiradicalism.

Chapter 10 outlines Saudi-Indonesian prolonged bilateral relations, discusses cooperation on counterterrorism strategies and programs, underscores lessons learned, and highlights prospects for future peace for both Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. Since the last few years, the Indonesian government and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have joined forces to combat terrorism and radicalism. However, so far, there is no study yet that analyzes this issue. Is the collaboration on combating terrorism fruitful for both sides? What kinds of collaboration have the two countries made? In addition, this chapter aims at providing a room for intellectual contemplation and reflection regarding terrorism and counterterrorism in the two countries, drawing from previous discussions in the chapters. What lessons can we learn from Saudi Arabia and Indonesia pertaining terrorism and counterterrorism? What are the prospects of future peace and security in the two nations? Lastly, the chapter provides counsels and remarks on "wise," effective, and strategic ways of dealing with radicalism and terrorism in both countries, as well as on what needs to be done in the future to protect people from terrorism, to save the world from radical extremism, and to create sustainable global peace and security.

References

Aba al-Khail, Sulayman bin Abdallah bin Hamud. 2003. *Mawqif al-Mamlaka al-ʿArabiyya al-Saʿudiyya min al-irhab: Dirasa sharʿiyya ʿilmiyya watha'iqiyya* [The Position of The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Towards Terrorism: A Legal Scientific Documentary Study]. Riyadh.

Abbas, Tahir. 2021a. *Countering Violent Extremism*. London: Bloomsbury.

———. 2021b. "Reflection: The 'War on Terror', Islamophobia and Radicalization Twenty Years On." *Critical Studies on Terrorism*. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2021.1980182.

Abdulmahmood, A. 2005. *Counterterrorism*. Riyadh: Naif Arab University for Security Science.

Abou El Fadl, Khaled. 2005. *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists*. New York, NY: HarperSanFrancisco.

Abuza, Zachary. 2002a. "Al-Qaeda's Asian Web of Terror." *Time* (Asia) 160 (22): 38–40.

———. 2002b. "Tentacles of Terror: Al-Qaeda's Southeast Asian Network." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 24 (3): 427–465.

———. 2003. *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Aljahani, A. F. 2005. *Terrorism: Concept and Reality*. Riyadh: Naif Arab University for Security Sciences.

Al-Jubair, Adel. 2002. "Saudi Arabia Does Not Support Terrorism." Interviewed by Lee Michael Katz. *National Journal* 34 (19): 1407–1409.

Al-Rasheed, Madawi. 2007. *Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Al Mustafa, Hassan. 2015. "Hezbollah el-Hejaz: A Story Not Yet Written." *Al Arabiya*, October 1. https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2015/10/01/Hezbollah-al-Hejaz-A-story-not-yet-written. Accessed May 21, 2020.

Al Saud, Turki Al Faisal bin Abdul Aziz. 2013. "Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy." *Middle East Policy* 20 (4): 37–44.

Al Suhail, Turki. 2017. "Iran Planned to Revive Hezbollah al-Hejaz Under al-Mughassil's Command." *Asharq al-Ausat*, Augustus 25. https://web.archive.org/web/20170901120355/https://english.aawsat.com/turkisuhail/news-middle-east/iran-planned-revive-hezbollah-al-hejaz-al-mughassils-command. Accessed May 21, 2020.

Ansary, Abdullah F. 2008. "Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach." *Middle East Policy* XV (2). http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/combating-extremism-brief-overview-saudi-arabias-approach. Accessed September 26, 2015.

Asai, Yasufumi, and Jeffrey L. Arnold. 2003. "Terrorism in Japan." *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine* 18 (2): 106–114.

Asseri, Ali S. Awadh. 2009. *Combating Terrorism: Saudi Arabia's Role in the War on Terror*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Atwan, Abdel Bari. 2015. *Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate*. Los Angeles, CA: The University of California Press.

Bahgat, Gauwdat. 2004. "Saudi Arabia and the War on Terrorism." *Arab Studies Quarterly* 26 (1): 51–63.

Barfield, Thomas. 2012. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Barton, Greg. 2004. *Indonesia's Struggle: Jamaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam*. Sidney: University of New South Wales Press.

Barret, Richard. 2017. "Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees." Working Paper, October 31. The Soufan Center.

———. 2014. "The Islamic State." Working Paper, November. The Soufan Group.
Bayat, Asef. 2013. *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
BBC. 2019. "Christchurch Shootings: 49 Dead in New Zealand Mosque Attacks." May 15. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47578798. Accessed June 26, 2020.
Bergen, Peter L. 2001. *Holy War, Inc. Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden*. Florence, MA: Free Press.
Berridge, W. J. 2018. *Islamism in the Modern World: A Historical Approach*. London, UK: Bloomsbury.
Blanchard, Christopher, and Alfred Prados. 2007. "Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues." *CRS Report for Congress*. Congressional Research Service.
Boucek, Christopher. 2008a. "Counter-Terrorism from Within: Assessing Saudi Arabia's Religious Rehabilitation and Disengagement Programme. *The RUSI Journal* 153 (6): 60–65.
Branscomb, Lewis M. 2007. "Science, Technology and Countering Terrorism: The Search for a Sustainable Strategy." In *Weapon and Technology to Counter Terrorism: Proceedings of an Indo-US Workshop*, edited by The National Academy of Sciences, 1–13. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
Brooks, Frank H. 1994. *The Individualist Anarchists: An Anthology of Liberty (1881–1908)*. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Bubalo, Anthony, and Greg Fealy. 2005. *Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism, and Indonesia*. Lowy Institute Paper No. 5. Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney.
Burke, Jason. 2003. *Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror*. London: I.B. Tauris.
Carter, April. 1978. "Anarchism and Violence." *Nomos* 19: 320–340.
Chenoweth, Erica, and Elizabeth Lowham. 2007. "On Classifying Terrorism: A Potential Contribution of Cluster Analysis for Academics and Policy-Makers." *Defence & Security Analysis* 23 (4): 345–357.
Chulov, Martin. 2018. "My Son, Osama: The al-Qaeda Leader's Mother Speaks for the First Time." *The Guardian*, August 3. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/03/osama-bin-laden-mother-speaks-out-family-interview. Accessed May 12, 2020.
CNN. 2020. "US Terrorist Attacks Fast Facts." Updated May 25. https://edition.cnn.com/2013/04/18/us/u-s-terrorist-attacks-fast-facts/index.html. Accessed June 26, 2020.
Commins, David. 2009. *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*. London: I.B. Tauris.
———. 2015a. *Islam in Saudi Arabia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
———. 2015b. "From Wahhabi to Salafi." In *Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Social, Political, Economic and Religious Change*, edited by Bernard

Haykel, Thomas Hegghammer, and Stephane Lacroix, 151–166. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Corbin, Jane. 2002. *The Base*. London, UK: Simon & Schuster.
Cordesman, Anthony H., and Nawaf Obaid. 2005. *Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia: Asymmetric Threats and Islamist Extremists*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Cortright, David, and George Lopez. 2007. *Uniting Against Terror: Cooperative Nonmilitary Responses to the Global Terrorist Threat*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Crenshaw, Martha. 2010. *Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes and Consequences*. London: Routledge.
Cozzens, J. B. 2006. *Identifying Entry Points of Action in Counter-Radicalization: Countering Salafi-Jihadi Ideology Through Development Initiatives–Strategic Openings*. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.
DeLong-Bas, Natana J. 2004. *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Dennis, Anthony. 1996. *The Rise of the Islamic Empire and the Threat to the West*. Bristol, IN: Wyndham Hall Press.
Esposito, John L. 1994. *The Islamic Threat*. New York: Oxford University Press.
———. 2002. *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Farquhar, Michael. 2017. *Circus of Faith: Migration, Education, and the Wahhabi Mission*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Forsyth, J. 2011. "Clegg Collides with Cameron Over Extremism." *The Spectator*, March 3. http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/2011/03/clegg-collides-with-cameron-over-extremism. Accessed June 16, 2014.
Gabriel, Mark. 2002. *Islam and Terrorism: What the Qur'an Really Teaches About Christianity, Violence, and the Goals of Islamic Jihad*. Lake Mary, FL: Charisma House.
Gambetta, Diego, and Steffen Hertog. 2017. *Engineers of Jihad: The Curious Connection Between Violent Extremism and Education*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Ganor, Boas. 2002. "Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?" *Police Practice and Research* 3 (4): 287–304.
Gause III, Gregory F. 2004. "Saudi Arabia and the War on Terrorism." In *A Practical Guide to Winning the War on Terrorism*, edited by Adam Garfinkle, 89–102. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
Gendron, Angela. 2010. "Confronting Terrorism in Saudi Arabia." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 23: 487–508.
Gold, Dore. 2003. *Hatred's Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism*. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing.

Gunaratna, Rohan, Jolene Jerard, and Lawrence Rubin. 2002. *Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*. Columbia, NY: Columbia University Press.
———, eds. 2011. *Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalization*. London, UK: Routledge.
———. 2016. "The Islamic State's Eastward Expansion." *The Washington Quarterly* 39 (1): 49–67.
Hammond, Peter. 2010. *Slavery, Terrorism, and Islam*. Maitland, FL: Xulon Press.
Hannigan, Tim. 2015. *A Brief History of Indonesia: Sultans, Spices and Tsunami*. Clarendon, VT: Tuttle Publishing.
Hegghammer, Thomas. 2010. *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism Since 1979*. London: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2006. "Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia." *Middle East Policy* 13 (4): 39–60.
———. 2015. "Classical and Global Jihadism in Saudi Arabia." In *Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Social, Political, Economic and Religious Change*, edited by Bernard Haykel, Thomas Hegghammer, and Stephane Lacroix, 207–228. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Hilmy, M. 2010. *Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia: Piety and Pragmatism*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Hoffman, Bruce. 1999. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press (2nd ed., 2017).
Horgan, John, and Tore Bjorgo, eds. 2009. *Leaving Terrorist Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*. London: Routledge.
———, and Kurt Braddock. 2012. *Terrorism Studies*. London: Routledge.
Hussain, Zakir. 2016. "How ISIS Passing Through Singapore Were Nabbed." *The Straits Times*, March 6.
Hwang, Julie Chernov. 2009. *Peaceful Islamist Mobilization in the Muslim World: What Went Right*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
———. 2018. *Why Terrorists Quit: The Disengagement of Indonesian Jihadists*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
ICG (International Crisis Group). 2002a. "Al-Qaida in Southeast Asia: The Case of the 'Ngruki Network' in Indonesia." ICG Asia Briefing.
———. 2002b. "Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyyah Terrorist Network Operates." ICG Asia Report No. 43.
———. 2004. "Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix." Asia Report No. 83, September 15.
Institute for Economics & Peace. 2020. Global Terrorism Index 2020: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism. Sydney, November. http://visionofhumanity.org/reports.
Jones, Sidney. 2005a. "The Changing Nature of Jemaah Islamiyah." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 59 (2): 169–178.

———. 2005b. "The Changing Face of Terrorism in Indonesia: Weaker, More Diffuse and Still a Threat." Proceedings of the ASPI Conference. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Barton, Australia.

———, and Solahudin. 2014. "Terrorism in Indonesia: A Fading Threat?" *Southeast Asian Affairs*: 139–147.

Juergensmeyer, Mark. 2003. *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Karnavian, Muhammad Tito. 2014. *Explaining Islamist Insurgencies: The Case of al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah and the Radicalization of the Poso Conflict, 2000–2007*. London, UK: Imperial College Press.

Kennedy, Michael L. 2000. *The Jacobin Clubs in the French Revolution, 1793–1795*. New York: Berghahn Books.

Kingsbury, Damien, ed. 2005. *Violence in Between: Conflict and Security in Archipelagic Southeast Asia*. Clayton and Singapore: Monash Asia Institute and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Kovacs, Amanda. 2014. "Saudi Arabia Exporting Salafi Education and Radicalizing Indonesia's Muslims." GIGA Focus, No. 7: 1–7.

Lacroix, Stephane. 2005. "Islamo-Liberal Politics in Saudi Arabia." In *Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs*, edited by Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman, 35–56. London, UK: C. Hurst & Co.

Laqueur, Walter. 1987. *The Age of Terrorism*. Toronto and Boston: Little Brown.

Leonnig, Carol D. 2006. "Iran Held Liable in Khobar Attack." *Washington Post*, December 23. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/22/AR2006122200455.html. Accessed May 19, 2020.

Lewis, Bernard. 2003. *What When Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East*. New York: Harper Perennial.

———. 2004. *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*. New York, NY: The Random House.

Mamdani, Mahmood. 2005. *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror*. New York, NY: Three Rivers Press.

Matthiesen, Toby. 2015. *The Other Saudis: Shiism, Dissent and Sectarianism*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2010. "Hizbullah al-Hijaz: A History of the Most Radical Shi'a Opposition Group." *The Middle East Journal* 64 (2): 179–197.

McCants, William. 2015. *The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Meijer, Roel.. 2012. "Saudi Arabia's Religious Counter-Terrorism Discourse." *Middle East Institute's Policy Analysis*, February 15. https://www.mei.edu/publications/saudi-arabias-religious-counter-terrorist-discourse. Accessed June 9, 2020.

Mockaitis, Thomas R. 2007. *The 'New' Terrorism: Myth and Reality*. Westport, CT: Pentagon Press.

Nardin, Terry, ed. 1998. *The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Nisan, Mordechai. 2007. "Saudi Arabia's Jihad in the Middle East and the World." The Ariel Centre for Policy Research, Israel.
Platzdasch, Bernhard. 2009. *Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in the Emerging Democracy*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Popkin, Jeremy D. 2016. *A Short History of the French Revolution*. London: Routledge.
Rabasa, Angel. 2003. *Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals, and Terrorist*. London: Routledge.
———. 2007. *Beyond Al-Qaeda: Countering Terrorist and Other Non-Traditional Threats*. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation.
Ramakrishna, Kumar. 2014. *Islamist Terrorism and Militancy in Indonesia: The Power of the Manichean Mindset*. Berlin, Germany: Springer.
Rashid, Ahmad. 2001. *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*. Yale: Yale University Press.
———. 2008. *Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*. New York: Viking Penguin.
Richardson, L. 2006. *What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Terrorist Threat*. London: John Murray.
Ricklefs, M. C. 2008. *A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Robertson, Roland. 2012. "Globalization or Glocalization?" *The Journal of International Communication* 18 (2): 191–208.
Romaniuk, Scott, Francis Grice, Daniela Irrera, and Stewart Webb, eds. 2017. *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Rudolph, Rachael. 2018. *Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia: New Approaches to Radical Threats*. London, UK: I.B. Tauris.
Sageman, Marc. 2004. *Understanding Terror Networks*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Said, Edward. 1983. *The World, the Text, and the Critic*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Schmid, Alex. 1992. "The Response Problem as a Definition Problem." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4 (4).
———, ed. 2011. *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*. London: Routledge.
Schulze, Kirsten E. 2018. "The Surabaya Bombings and the Evolution of the Jihadi Threat in Indonesia." *CTC Sentinel*, July, pp. 1–6.

———, and Julie Chernov-Hwang. 2019. "Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: New Insights into Jihad in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 41 (1): 1–13.

———, and Joseph Chinyong Liow. 2018. "Making Jihadis, Waging Jihad: Transnational and Local Dimensions of the ISIS Phenomenon in Indonesia and Malaysia." *Asian Security* 15 (2): 122–139.

Schwartz, Stephen. 2003. *The Two Faces of Islam: Saudi Fundamentalism and Its Role in Terrorism*. New York: Anchor Books.

Solahudin. 2013. *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jema'ah Islamiyah*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Spencer, Robert. 2004. *The Myth of Islamic Tolerance: How Islamic Law Treats Non-Muslims*. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.

Thayer, Carlyle A. 2005. "Leadership Dynamics in Terrorist Organizations in Southeast Asia." Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Center for Defense Leadership Studies.

Thompson, Mark C. 2014. *Saudi Arabia and the Path to Political Change: National Dialogue and Civil Society*. London and New York: I.B. Tauris.

———. 2019. *Being Young, Male and Saudi: Identity and Politics in a Globalized Kingdom*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Tibi, Bassam. 2012. *Islamism and Islam*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Townshend, Charles. 2002. *Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Trofirmov, Yaroslav. 2007. *The Siege of Mecca: The Forgotten Uprising in Islam's Holiest Shrine and the Birth of al-Qaeda*. New York, NY: Doubleday.

Vickers, Adrian. 2013. *A History of Modern Indonesia*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Weston, Mark. 2008. *Prophets and Princes: Saudi Arabia from Muhammad to the Present*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Wynbrandt, James. 2010. *A Brief History of Saudi Arabia*. New York, NY: Checkmark Books.

Yamani, Mai. 2009. *Cradle of Islam: The Hijaz and the Quest for Indentity in Saudi Arabia*. London, UK: IB Tauris.

Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. 2002. *The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Part I

CHAPTER 2

Terrorism in Saudi Arabia

> Terrorism has no religion, it has no nationality, it has no ethnicity, and it has no humanity. It is incumbent upon all of us to do everything in our power to defeat it.[1]
>
> —Adel Al-Jubeir (Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs)

Introduction

This present book, as described in the Introduction (Chapter 1), defines or understands terrorism as the systematic, unlawful use of terror, violence, coercion, and intimidation by individuals or groups aiming at creating public fear in the pursuit of achieving particular objectives, either secular or religious ends (political, ideological, or economic). In light of this definition, actors and types of terrorism in Saudi Arabia and beyond, including Indonesia (see Chapter 5), vary considerably. As presented in this chapter, Saudi Arabia's terrorist incidents were committed by a variety of radical individuals and extremist groups from multiple backgrounds with varied means, motives, and objectives.

The chapter, more specifically, tries to sketch the nature, historical dynamics, and contemporary developments and changes of terrorism in

[1] An official report by the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, DC. https://www.saudiembassy.net/sites/default/files/SAUDI%20ARABIA%20AND%20COUNTERTERRORISM.pdf. Accessed June 7, 2020.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022

S. Al Qurtuby, *Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1337-2_2

Saudi Arabia. Even though the book's focus of study is Islamist terrorism, the chapter describes various types of terrorism and their perpetrators, along with the underlying factors, reasons, motives, and objectives for the terrorist acts in order to understand the plurality and complexity of terrorism in the Kingdom. The following are some questions that guide this chapter. What is the nature of terrorism in Saudi Arabia? Does terrorism in the Kingdom take a single or multiple forms? What are the factors that contribute to—and rationales behind—terrorist actions in the Kingdom? Why and how did some Saudis become terrorists and engage in radical activities? Are terrorist actors in the Kingdom varied or a monolithic group? Is there a connection between terrorism and Wahhabism or do Wahhabi teachings contribute to the rise of terrorism? Lastly, do forms of terrorism and its actors shift over time?

As well, since the book's focus is on terrorism, the chapter does not analyze other types of violence that took place in the Kingdom, for example, the riots in Eastern Province (Ash Sharqiyah) in 1979 and the 1987 Hajj disturbances in Makkah mainly because the two incidents represent different dynamics, besides out of the book's scope. The 1979 riots, preceded by days of mass protests and demonstrations, were triggered and orchestrated by Shia workers in ARAMCO (now Saudi Aramco, Saudi Arabian Oil Company), the Kingdom's multinational petroleum and natural gas company based in Dhahran, Eastern Province. They warned American employees of ARAMCO that they would be targeted if the United States attacked Iran from Saudi soil. This incident caused hundreds of Americans and their families to leave Saudi Arabia (Matthiesen 2015a: 101–9).

Moreover, the 1987 incident was a clash between Iranian Shiite pilgrims and Saudi riot police officers in Makkah during the Hajj pilgrimage. The clashes began when a group of Iranian Shiite pilgrims[2] and possibly Shiites from other countries such as Lebanon, Pakistan, and elsewhere massed and marched after Friday's midday prayers for a political demonstration, which is outlawed by the Saudi authorities. The clashes come at a time of growing tension over the gulf war. An official Saudi statement reported some 402 people were killed, including 275 Iranians,

[2] Reportedly, there were 155,000 Iranian pilgrims among the more than 2 million Moslems, mostly Sunnis, at the 1987 pilgrimage. The pilgrims at the time marched on Mecca's streets and chanted "Death to America! Death to the Soviet Union! Death to Israel!" and brandished portraits of their leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

85 Saudi citizens and security men, and 42 pilgrims of other nationalities (Kifner 1987).

There is a sizable literature on Saudi Arabia's terrorism which primarily focuses on the examination of the history and contemporary developments of religiously inspired terrorism and extremism. As I explained elsewhere (Al Qurtuby and Aldamer 2021), some specialists of Saudi politics study the origins and root causes of the rise of terrorism, radicalism, and extremism in the modern Kingdom, which were carried out by various Muslim groups (Hegghammer 2010a; Matthiesen 2015a, b; Meijer 2005; Trofirmov 2007). Other scholars analyze the debate and contest of religious authority among Saudi radical Islamist groups, for example, between Sahwa (Islamic Awakening) and Shaikhs of Jihadi-Salafism (e.g. Al-Sharhan 2015). Still, others emphasize the role and contributions of the Saudi government in creating, producing, and exporting global and transnational terrorism (Dennis 1996; Gabriel 2002; Gold 2003; Gunaratna et al. 2002; Hammond 2010; Lewis 2004; Nisan 2007; Schwartz 2003). Additionally, some experts study the connection between Saudi Arabia's domestic terrorism and Islamist terrorists' pan-Islamism ideology (Hegghammer 2010a), while others relate it to the global networks of terrorist jihadist groups of Afghanistan, Iraq, or Syria (Abuza 2002b, 2003; Gunaratna et al. 2002; McCants 2015).

Undoubtedly, the previous studies have largely added and contributed to the rich scholarship and literature of Saudi Arabia's politics, religion, terrorism, and radicalism. Various analyses and perspectives of the scholars are also valuable and rewarding. For example, the global jihad perspective or al-Qaeda/ISIS-centric paradigm is certainly useful as a framework for analyzing and understanding the rise of terrorism at local, national, regional, and international levels. Nonetheless, there is a gap in the existing study and literature because only a few scholars, particularly those who write about terrorism, have a deep knowledge on the dynamics and variations of Saudi societies as well as a clear understanding of the Saudi domestic security and threat environment. As well, to my knowledge, only a few observers and scholars have gathered data and information about terrorism directly from Saudi societies to find a variety of "viewpoints from within." Moreover, much of the literature, with few notable exceptions, tend to neglect multiple independent terrorist agencies and networks (international, national, regional, or local), local socio-political dynamics, and historical grounds that have contributed to the emergence of terrorism and other forms of violent extremism.

This chapter, thus will fill the gap and complement the preceding studies and current scholarships on the Kingdom's domestic terrorism. Nevertheless, the chapter is not intended to analyze (or criticize and challenge) the existing literature nor is engaged in the debates of the current scholarships. It is only to depict and provide data of a series of terrorist incidents, along with explanations of actors involved and motives of terrorism, from the past to the present. By presenting and describing the facts of terrorist incidents, the chapter aims to explain that Saudi Arabia itself, in fact, is not immune to terrorism and radicalism.

Furthermore, by paying attention to Saudis' voices and changing dynamics of local factors, I hope that it will also contribute to scholarships about terrorism in Saudi Arabia and provide data in understanding the nature and diversity of terrorists' motives, rationales, and actors. The fact that terrorists in the Kingdom target not only mosques or particular Muslim groups (e.g. Shiites) but also state buildings, government officials, ordinary masses, industries (e.g. Saudi Aramco), malls, and military personnel indicates that terrorism has multifaceted roots, complex motives, and varied purposes (Asseri 2009; Hegghammer 2006, 2008, 2010a, b; Meijer 2005; Rudolph 2006, 2018). Moreover, these series of terrorist incidents, as explained in the following paragraphs, also provide strong evidence that Saudi Arabia has faced serious and real threat of terrorism, driving the government to make robust efforts in the combat against terrorism (Chapter 3).

Between the 9/11 Attacks and the 5/12 Tragedy

When a group of al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorists blasted the Pentagon and the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 (hereafter the 9/11), millions of Saudis, including Bin Laden's family, perhaps watched the tragedy on live television. In an interview with *The Guardian*, Ahmad, Osama bin Laden's half-brother, expressed his unpleasant feeling:

> I was shocked, stunned. It was a very strange feeling. We knew from the beginning [that it was Osama bin Laden], within the first 48 hours. From the youngest to the eldest, we all felt ashamed of him. We knew all of us were going to face horrible consequences. Our family abroad all came back to Saudi. They had been scattered across Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Europe. In Saudi, there was a travel ban. They tried as much as they could to maintain control over the family. They were all questioned by

> the authorities and, for a time, prevented from leaving the country. Nearly two decades on, the Bin Laden family can move relatively freely within and outside the Kingdom. (cited in Chulov 2018)

Saudi elite members of both state and society also condemned the 5/11 tragedy. Crown Prince Abdullah, for instance, said, "Arabs and Muslims stand aloof from such acts that no sane and God-believing individual would commit." Grand Mufti Shaikh Abdul Aziz al-Shaikh, the Kingdom's leading religious authority, said, "Hijacking planes, terrorizing innocent people and shedding blood cannot be tolerated by Islam, which view them as gross and sinful acts." Surprisingly, Safar al-Hawali, a radial preacher of the Sahwa movement who strongly opposed the presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia during the Second Gulf War, also condemned the 5/11 attacks as a "sinful deviation" from peaceful proselytizing (Weston 2008: 399–400).

Although many Saudis condemned the 9/11 tragedy, few if any of them realized that this tragic event had just set in motion forces that would eventually bring bloodshed to the streets of Riyadh. Indeed, in the next years after the catastrophe, Saudi Arabia has been one of the main targets of Islamist terrorism, when cells affiliated with al-Qaeda began an active terror campaign directed at both foreigners, especially Americans, and the Saudi government. Just months after the 9/11 tragedy, around January 2002, Bin Laden formally ordered fighters of Saudi nationals in Afghanistan (numbering between 300 and 1,000) to return to Saudi Arabia through such countries as Pakistan, Iran, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates, and begin to prepare a series of terror campaigns in the Kingdom.

On May 12, 2003, about 20 months after the 9/11, these ex-Saudi Afghan jihadists linked to al-Qaeda finally succeeded in launching its first attack that marked the beginning of a protected wave of violence in Saudi Arabia. Known as the East Riyadh operation (or say, the 5/12 tragedy), three suicide car bombs struck compounds housing Western (mostly American) expatriates (thereby known as the Riyadh compound bombing), killing thirty-five people and wounding hundreds. Previously, in 2002, al-Qaeda planned several attacks but failed following the arrest of Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, one of al-Qaeda's key leaders (Meijer 2005; Cordesman and Obaid 2005; Ansary 2008; Hegghammer 2010a, b). Since the Riyadh compound bombing, over the next few years, Saudi

Arabia witnessed a series of terrorist acts—suicide bombings, shootings, kidnappings, and beheadings—and unprecedented levels of internal violence across the Kingdom would take the lives of hundreds of people and injure thousands. Never before in its modern history had Saudi Arabia experienced internal violence of this scale and duration.

However, Saudi Arabia is not alone in this regard. Terrorist acts, either linked to al-Qaeda and other militant groups, have taken place in many countries including Indonesia, Iraq, Syria, the United States, France, England, Kuwait, Iran, Lebanon, Egypt, Tunisia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Turkey, the Philippines, among many others. Terrorism has thus become a critical concern of many countries and societies across the world. In 2002, Indonesia also witnessed al-Qaeda-linked horrific terrorist attacks: the Bali bombings that killed hundreds of foreigners (mostly Australian), and in the following year, in 2003, the terrorists blasted the JW Marriot Hotel in Jakarta, killing dozens and wounding hundreds (see Chapter 5).

The 9/11 tragedy, furthermore, fueled criticism within the United States of alleged Saudi involvement in terrorism or of Saudi negligence in acting against terrorist groups. One of particular concerns raised in the United States was the suspicion that public or private funds may be flowing from Saudi Arabia (along with other Middle East countries) to finance international terrorist activities, including in the United States. Yet, reliable figures on the amount of money originating in or passing through Saudi Arabia and ending up in terrorist hands generally are difficult to obtain (see Blanchard and Prados 2007: 1–28).

Nonetheless, the allegation was mainly because the majority of the perpetrators of al-Qaeda-led 9/11 attacks were Saudi nationals. In responding to the 15 Saudi hijackers (out of 19) that blasted the WTC and the Pentagon, Adel al-Jubeir, Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and former Ambassador to the United States, made an interesting comment as follows: "Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization has membership from 60 different countries. He could have put any number of nationalities on those planes. He intentionally chose the Saudis to give the operation a Saudi face in order to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia."[3] Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Al-Jubeir, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and previous Advisor at the Saudi

[3] Adel Al-Jubeir. 2002. "Saudi Arabia Does Not Support Terrorism." Interviewed by Lee Michael Katz. *National Journal*, May 11 (2002), p. 1407.

Royal Court, played a crucial role, becoming "the face of Saudi Arabia" in the United States. At that time, he was the man representing the Kingdom to explain issues related to terrorism, al-Qaeda, Saudi–American relations, and other crucial issues through hundreds of television appearances, media interviews, and talks to many universities, civic organizations, business institutions, think tank groups, World Affairs Councils, among many others, across the United States.

Apart from the accusation of Saudi Arabia as the "nest" of terrorists, the fact shows that the Kingdom itself has suffered from terrorism that took place long before the 9/11. A report from the Center for International Communication, Saudi Ministry of Media, shows that from 1979 to 2017, Saudi Arabia became the target of 841 terrorist attacks that claimed more than 3,000 casualties, including 333 security personnel. Reportedly, throughout this period, 695 terrorists were killed, 346 injured, and hundreds imprisoned. Saudi security forces successfully thwarted 223 attacks. The attacks did not only take place in the Kingdom but also overseas. At least, 22 terrorist operations were carried out against Saudi diplomatic and economic entities abroad.[4] For a brief summary of the terrorist acts in Saudi Arabia, see Table 2.1.

Moreover, notwithstanding the widespread view of Saudi Arabia as the "terrorist hub," the terrorists have failed so far in injecting their missions and propaganda in the Kingdom. As well, contrast with popular opinions, the majority of Saudi society is in reality against extremism and terrorism, denouncing them as the inhuman evil deeds (see Chapter 4). After a thorough study, Gendron (2010: 487–508) also concludes that many Saudis refused to recognize the Kingdom's reputation as an incubator of terrorism, even after the international outcry that followed the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It is true that, as discussed below, some (male) Saudis (mainly youth) joined militant groups and terrorist organizations—al-Qaeda and others such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant—but this does not mean that all societies in the Kingdom support terrorism.

[4] See https://cic.org.sa/2018/02/more-than-840-terrorist-attacks-targeted-saudi-arabia-between-1979-and-2017/. Accessed May 24, 2020.

Table 2.1 A brief summary of chronology of terrorism in Saudi Arabia

Year	*Cases and types*	*Alleged perpetrators*	*Motives and objectives*
1960s	Bombings; attempted coups; sabotages	Gamal Abdel Nasser—backed leftists and radical seculars Syria's Baathist regime The Arabian Peninsula People's Union	Toppling Saudi Kingdom Anti-monarchical government
1979	Hijacks of hajj pilgrims; the seizure of the Grand Mosque of Haram and Ka'ba	Juhayman al-Otaybi and his apocalyptic rejectionist group	Protest against the ruling family whom the insurgents accused of being the main factors of Saudi Arabia's moral decadence To restore Saudi society' morals and religious practices
1985–1989	The bombing of a gas plant in eastern Saudi Arabia The bombing of industrial and oil installations in Jubail, Ras al-Juaima, Ras Tanura The bombings in Riyadh	Militant activists of Shiite-linked Hezbollah al-Hejaz	Destabilizing the royal family Attacking the Westerners, especially Americans
1995	A car bomb exploded in Riyadh targeting a Saudi National Guard military facility (i.e. the US-operated National Guard Training Center)	Veterans of the wars in Afghanistan and Bosnia, as well as a former rejectionist-turned-jihadist	Anti-Americanism and protests against the ruling family following the US military presence in the Kingdom since the Second Gulf War
1996	The powerful truck bombing blew up the American Khobar Tower complex (the US barracks)	Radical Shia activists of the Hezbollah al-Hejaz	Targeting the (white) Americans and sending a message to the Saudi-ruling family

Year	*Cases and types*	*Alleged perpetrators*	*Motives and objectives*
2000–2003	A series of sporadic and minor attacks, mainly in Riyadh & Khobar	Alcohol traders of Western expatriates but the "real actors" remained unclear	Targeting white Westerners (victims include American, British, Canadian, Australian, or German nationals)
2003 (since May)	Riyadh's residential compound bombings	al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP) The Haramain Brigades	Targeting foreign (mostly Western) expatriates Targeting Saudi government officials
2004	Tens of sporadic terrorist acts occurred in multiple places in the Kingdom	QAP militant activists The Haramain Brigades	Targeting foreign (mostly Western) expatriates Targeting Saudi government officials & properties US Consulate in Jeddah
2006	A suicide car bomb attack took placed on a major oil production facility in Abqaiq of eastern Saudi Arabia	Unclear	Destroying Saudi property
2007	Militants shot a group of French tourists who were returning from the historical site of Madain Saleh in the northwest of Saudi Arabia	Allegedly QAP	Targeting Western foreigners
2015–2016	A series of suicide bombing attacks in Qatif, Ahsa, Dammam, Saihat, Madinah, Jeddah, Abha, and Najran	ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria)	Targeting Shiites and Saudi security forces
2019	A failed terrorist attack in Zulfi, north of Riyadh	ISIL	Saudi Ministry of Interior building

Early Terrorism Before the 1990s

Terrorism is not new to Saudi Arabia that took place following the 9/11. Religious radicals—individuals or collectivities—nothing to do with al-Qaeda, have indeed existed in the Kingdom before the 9/11 tragedy, many of which have been successfully cracked down by the government of Saudi Arabia. In fact, radical Islamist ideology that drove terrorists and extremists to commit terrorism have nurtured in Saudi Arabia long before the 9/11 catastrophe occurred. This is to say that although al-Qaeda played a vital role in Saudi Arabia's domestic terrorism, it is unfair bias to solely consider it as the only factor or cause of terrorism in the Kingdom.

There are indeed multiple reasons for domestic terrorism in the Kingdom ranging from anti-Americanism, Western-supporting government, anti-Shiism, Islamic puritanism, and so forth. There are also multiple factors or root causes that contributed to domestic terrorism in Saudi Arabia. These factors include, but not limited to, the following. First, the presence of members or activists of Muslim Brotherhood either linked to Egypt, Syria, or others, since 1960s. Second, the prolonged existence of conservative radical Islamist clerics and scholars outside the Muslim Brotherhood. Third, the growth of militant Islamist ideology either linked to the Muslim Brotherhood or other groups. Fourth, the presence of the US troops in the Kingdom. Fifth, anti-Shiism sentiment.

In short, the rise of domestic terrorism in Saudi Arabia is a mixture of political, economic, ideological, socio-cultural, religious, and mundane factors and rationales that existed in the Kingdom long before the terrorist tragedy of the 9/11, 2001. Three groups particularly played a vital role in pre-1990 terrorism in the Kingdom, namely Nasser-backed leftists and radical seculars, Juhayman al-Otaybi and his apocalyptic group, and Shiite-linked Hezbollah el-Hejaz.

Nasser-Backed Leftist and Radical Seculars

The Kingdom has been the target of sporadic terrors at least since late 1950s or early 1960s, when Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–1970) made repeated attempts to create groups that could overthrow the Saudi rule and to subvert the Saudi military (Cordesman and Obaid 2005). In 1952, through the Free Officers coup, Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrew the monarchy, set up a new Republic of Egypt, and introduced far-reaching land and political reforms in the following year. The establishment of the

Egyptian Republic marked the advent of secular left-wing Arab nationalism, republicanism, and socialism in the region. With Soviet backing, made it his mission to export his ideology to the rest of the Arab world in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia.

The socialist-leftist, pan-Arab and republican politics of Baathist's Syria and Nasser's Egypt collide with the very foundations of Saudi dynastic rule, at the time under King Saud bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (r. 1953–1964) and then King Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (r. 1964–1975). As a result, Saudi Arabia witnessed a series of Cairo-backed violence and coup. As early as 1955, Egyptian-trained Saudi officers attempted to topple the Saudi monarchy. This effort happened again in 1957. The late 1950s saw a peak in a covert campaign of subversion undertaken by Egyptian intelligence services, with Saudi Arabia being a main target of such attempts. These repeated efforts to bring down the Saudi rule, added with Egypt's massive military invasion of Yemen in 1962 and southern Arabia, made the relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt deteriorated, albeit previously the two countries tried to establish a good bilateral relationship (Farquhar 2017: 68–70; Mann 2012: 749–64).

Whether or not the Nasser-backed repeated attempted coups and attacks were part of "terrorism" is a matter of debate and depends on how we define terrorism, terrorist actors, and terrorist activities. However, it was obvious that between 1966 and 1967, a series of bomb blasts occurred in Saudi Arabia. Egypt (and Syria too) relapsed to propaganda and terror in its effort to oust the Saudi rulers. In 1966, Cairo and Damascus started operating more vehemently against the Saudi government and personages. As a result, the terrorist exploded a powerful bomb at the complex of Eastern Province Governor in Dammam on December 3. One week later, two bombings blasted on the Trans Arabian oil pipeline in Turaif of Northern Borders Province, resulting in a loss of 15,000 barrels of oil. There was also an explosion in the private office of the Minister of Interior on January 7, 1967, which wounded 40 people. Following the terrorist attacks, the Saudi Minister of Interior immediately published an announcement blaming the wave of attacks against Saudi Arabia on Egypt and Syria and claiming that their motive was to destabilize the government and sabotage the monarchy's thriving oil industry (Mann 2012: 753–4).

Members of the Arabian Peninsula People's Union (*ittihad sha'b fi al-jazira al-'arabiyya*), a Nasserist political party based in Saudi Arabia, claimed responsibility for the attacks (Hegghammer 2009: 395–416).

The union, founded by Nasir al-Sa'id in 1959, was one of the largest opposition groups in the Kingdom. The union had its origin in the Federation of Sons of the Arabian Peninsula, an opposition group consisting of Saudi Arabia's working class in the late 1950s in Cairo that advocated the violent overthrow of the Saudi government. Until Saudi Arabia and Egypt patched up relations in 1967, the union waged a sequence of violent campaigns against the Kingdom by launching guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and bombings, including an attack outside the Defense Ministry in Riyadh in February 1967 (Sreedhar 1982; Peterson 2003). After the tragedy, Saudi authorities arrested several hundred suspects (including Yemenis), executed 17 of them, and expelled the rest.

Unlike terrorist acts that occurred since the 1990s, the violent acts during this period were not committed by militant Islamists but a sort of radical seculars. The tensions between the governments of Saudi Arabia and Egypt drove the Kingdom to harbor activists and elite members of the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin) that were engaged in conflict with Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and the Baath Party of Syria. The presence of the Muslim Brotherhood scholars, leaders, and activists contributed to the emergence of religious militancy and Islamist ideology in the Kingdom that later, starting in early 1980s, influenced the rise of the Sahwa movement.

Juhayman al-Otaybi and His Group

Saudi Arabia had a first major experience with terrorism and a clash with extremists and radical Islamists in particular on November 20, 1979. At that time, a group of militant apocalyptic sect, led by Juhayman al-Otaybi (1936–1980), seized control of one of Muslim's holiest site: the Grand Mosque of Makkah or Mecca[5] (known as Masjid al-Haram) (see e.g. Hegghammer 2010a; Hegghammer and Lacroix 2011; Trofirmov 2007; Wright 2001). In the early hours of that day (Tuesday), the stage was set for the most unholy of outrages in the history of modern Makkah.

[5] Mecca or Makkah (Bakkah in ancient time), used interchangeably in this book, is a city in western Saudi Arabia, located in the Ṣirāt Mountains, inland from the Red Sea coast. By Muslims, Mecca is considered to be the holiest city, where Prophet Muhammad, the founder of Islam, was born and where the Ka'bah, Muslim's holiest site is located. It is toward this religious center (the Ka'bah) that Muslims turn five times daily in prayer. All devout and able Muslims attempt a hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca at least once in their lifetime.

Actually, carrying firearms within the Grand Mosque, where the Ka'bah (Islam's most sacred sanctuary) is located, is strictly prohibited. Even the guards, they were only armed with sticks. An armed assault on the precincts of the mosque was impossible.

However, on the first day of the Islamic new year of 1400, the unthinkable happened. "While I was praying I saw dozens of armed men coming towards the Ka'bah," said the Grand Mosque Imam, Shaikh Mohammed Al-Subayil, in a 2012 interview with *Arab News*, one of Saudi Arabia's main media, shortly before he passed away. This tragic event, causing the death of hundreds of people, was an unthinkable incident that shocked the Muslim world and cast a shadow over Saudi society for decades. Like Americans who never forget the 9/11 tragedy, Saudis also never disremember the 11/20 horrific incident.

Jim Paul described this disastrous event as follows:

> On November 20, 1979, the first day of Islam's 15th century, 50,000 pilgrims in the Great Mosque of Mecca had just finished the first prayer as dawn was breaking. The blare of a loudspeaker jarred the stillness, as a voice began reciting the Qur'an. Soon the same voice began to denounce the Saudi regime, and announced the arrival of a Mahdi (savior) to cleanse a corrupt Arabia. The faithful sat thunderstruck. Hundreds, perhaps a thousand of the Mahdi followers, including some women and children, emerged from the midst of the crowd to take charge. Equipped with walkie-talkies, machine guns and automatic rifles, they bolted shut the main doors and took up the positions of defense. Some stood guard on the seven minarets. Others positioned themselves along the parapets and upper windows of the huge structure. When the Saudi authorities became aware of what was happening, they rushed army units as well as police and National Guard to the scene. By mid-morning, the mosque was surrounded. (Paul 1980: 3–4)

Juhayman al-Otaybi, the chief organizer and the group's military leader that took over the Grand Mosque, was a disaffected former member of the Saudi National Guard who had received some US military training. Juhayman, who hailed from Sajir, a Bedouin settlement in the center of the Arabian Peninsula, had become seized by the belief that the rulers of Saudi Arabia, regarded by the entire Islamic world as keepers of the faith and the custodians of the holy mosques of Makkah and Madinah, were in fact responsible for turning Islam from the true path. On December 5, 1979, an editorial of *Arab News* wrote the following "Juhayman and

his followers were a group of religious extremists who believed that the society around them was filled with infidels and that they must use force to change that situation."[6]

The rebels, who called themselves the Ikhwan, represented radicalized clique of an extreme pietist organization known as al-Jama'a al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba (JSM, established in Madinah in the late 1960s and died out in 1979) that condemned what it perceived as the degeneration of social and religious values in Saudi Arabia due to modernization and consumerism.[7] According to Prince Turki bin Faisal Al Saud (b. 1945), who in 1979 was the head of Saudi Arabia's General Intelligence Directorate (*al-Mukhabarat al-Ammah*) and took part in organizing a military operation to remove the hostage-taking terrorists from the Grand Mosque of Haram, the religious group, based in a small village outside Madinah, consisted of students from various religious seminaries. Juhayman and his group had been on the radar of the authorities for some time. This group, moreover, had put their faith in the eschatological figure of the Mahdi, the supposed redeemer of Islam whose appearance, according to the Hadith (Prophet Muhammad's sayings), heralds the Day of Judgment. "Their aim, according to their beliefs, was to liberate the Grand Mosque from the apostate rulers of the Kingdom and to liberate all Muslims by the coming of the so-called Mahdi," Prince Turki said in an interview with *Arab News*.

This religious group believed that the end of the world was approaching and the Mahdi, an Islamic messianic figure, had manifested himself in one of the group's members (namely Muhammad bin Abdullah al-Qahtani, a student of theology and soft-spoken young preacher) and that the latter needed to be consecrated in the Grand Mosque at the end of the Islamic calendar. However, the idea of the Mahdi was not the only rationale of Juhayman's insurrection and terror. In an interview with *Arab News*, Mansour Alnogaidan, the general manager of Harf and Fasela Media, which operates counterterrorism websites, who has done

[6] https://www.arabnews.com/juhayman-40-years-on. Accessed May 12, 2020.

[7] Saudi Arabia, flush with oil money, gradually transformed into a consumerist society. Cars and electrical goods were becoming commonplace, the country was urbanizing, and in some regions, men and women began to mix in public. This condition might make Juhayman and his fellows in the JSM upset and frustrated. Although Saudi society might greet enthusiastically modernization and consumerism, Juhayman and his JSM's members continued to live an austere life, proselytizing, studying the Qur'an and the hadiths, and adhering to the tenets of Islam as defined by the Saudi religious establishment.

extensive study on the Makkah siege, said that there were a number of reasons behind the 1979 incident. These include an "existing idea and desire in the mind of Juhayman and his group that they were the successors of a Bedouin movement by the name of Ikhwan-men-taa-Allah. Some believed they had a vendetta against the Saudi government. Another issue was essentially the personal desires of certain people (such as Juhayman) who sought power and control. He wanted to satisfy something inside him" (*Arab News* 2018).

Whatever the motives of Juhayman and his group, their insurgency and terrorist acts finally ended. After two weeks of battle (November 20 to December 4, 1979), the military, along with the special counterterrorism forces of an allied country, regained control of the mosque from the insurgents and terrorists. A fatwa issued by the Kingdom's main clerics and religious establishment, led by Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah bin Baz (1910–1999) and assembled by King Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (r. 1975–1982) cleared the Saudi military to use any degree of force to expel the rebels. After receiving a fatwa that legalized the military to enter the mosque, anti-tank guided missiles and heavy guns were then employed to dislodge the rebels from the minarets, and armored personnel carriers were sent in to breach the mosque's gates.

Surely, it was not an easy task for Saudi authorities during that time to handle the armed group and rescue the hostages mainly because the catastrophic event was unexpected and unthinkable. As well, due to the seizure took place during the pilgrimage season where many pilgrims home and abroad were inside the mosque and occurred in the holy place of the Grand Mosque of Haram, where all people, including the police and military, were not allowed to bring guns. In addition, some elite members of the Royal family were overseas. Crown Prince Fahd was in Tunis for an Arab summit meeting, while Prince Abdullah, head of the National Guard responsible for protecting the royal family, was in Morocco. Therefore, it was left to the ailing King Khalid and Defense Minister Prince Sultan to coordinate a response.

Reportedly, the battle between Saudi security forces and the insurgents resulted in the death of more than 200 troops and militant terrorists, including the "Mahdi" Muhammad Abdullah al-Qahtani. Juhayman and some 67 of his fellow rebels who survived the assault were captured and later beheaded in the squares of multiple cities: Riyadh, Makkah, Madinah, Dammam, Buraidah, Abha, Ha'il, and Tabuk. Following the tragedy, King Khalid implemented sticker religious policies to prevent

the occurrence of a religious group similar to Juhayman's organization in the future. As a result, since the 1979 tragedy (or early 1980s), Saudi Arabia witnessed an era of what so-called *al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya* (Islamic Awakening or Sahwa[8] for short) movement, namely the rise of religious conservatism and militancy throughout the Kingdom, marked by an upsurge in extracurricular activities with a religious orientation. Sahwa was a loose and fluid subgroup within Muslim community that strove to build a distinct identity for themselves (Al-Rasheed 2007: 66).

The Sahwa movement, led by a number of conservative and close-minded preachers such as Safar al-Hawali, Salman al-Ouda, Ayidh al-Qarni, and Nasir al-Omar, was a sort of faction of Saudi Qutbism, an extremist jihadist Islamist ideology developed by Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), the figurehead of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Ideologically, the Sahwa Islamists espoused a blend of traditional Wahhabism and contemporary Muslim Brotherhood. Even though mentors of the first generation of Sahwists were traditional Wahhabi ulama, they distinguished themselves from the Wahhabi establishment by their willingness to discuss issues of contemporary significance rather than concentrate on abstract theological debates (ICG 2004).

Picked in the 1990s, activists of the Sahwa originated from Syrian and Egyptian Muslim Brothers. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Nasserist and Baathist regimes persecuted the Muslim Brothers in their home countries; accordingly, they looked for asylum in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government gave them shelter. At the time, the Saudi rule, due to lack of skilled human resources, urgently needed well-trained professionals at a time of rapid, oil-induced modernization. Muslim Brothers came to play a key role in the new and expanding administration, especially in education where they designed school and university curricula and were the bulk of the faculty (ICG 2004).

[8] Some scholars have conducted studies on the Sahwa. While some focused on the Sahwa as a local Saudi variant of political Islam, Islamists, or most recently, radical Salafi group, others offered detailed biographies of famous Sahwa scholars such as Safar al-Hawali, Salman al-Ouda, or Nasir al-Omar, documenting their rhetoric and following their engagement with politics over a critical decade in the history of Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, some Saudi sources also identified Sahwa as a manifestation of "Islamawist" defined as an uncompromising group who use and abuse Islam in pursuit of ideological aspirations and political careers. Some viewed Sahwa as a fruit of alien religious interpretations and Islamist political movements, primarily the Egyptian and Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, Qutbist ideologies and jihadi trends (Al-Rasheed 2007: 65–6).

The Muslim Brothers then taught at schools and universities as well as preached at mosques or religious circles that later radicalized and politicized some Saudi societies. After the Juhayman tragedy, the Sahwa members and activists demanded a bigger role for clergy in the government and society to create a more conservative and puritan Islam as a defense against Western cultural influences, which seemed to be agreed and approved by King Khalid. The Muslim Brothers, furthermore, criticized liberals, accusing them undermining Saudi society through secularization, as well as the Wahhabi establishment for its lack of interests in contemporary issues.

A Saudi-respected cleric and Islamic scholar, Shaikh Abdulrahman Howsawi also admitted the contribution of the Sahwa to the deepening climate of religious fanaticism, militancy, and conservatism in the Kingdom. However, he disagrees with claims made by Juhayman and other similar militants who blamed the Kingdom as the root causes of the "irreligious" society and the growth of Islamist radicals. For Howsawi, the regional upheavals, especially the Iranian Revolution in 1978–1979, had actually inspired and drove the emergence of religious militancy in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia. Howsawi has noticed that prior to the occurrence of the Sahwa movement, Saudi society had enjoyed a great degree of freedom in which various arts flourished while women were actively involved in the country's workforce.[9]

Nevertheless, since the 1980s, photographs of women in newspapers were forbidden, films were prohibited, music was played less, female singers were banned from TV, gender segregation was strictly imposed, cinemas and music shops were closed, educational curriculum was changed to provide many more religious studies in schools and universities, and so forth. Not only changing Saudi society to become more devout and conservative, as Shaikh Ahmad bin Qasim Al-Ghamdi, a former director of the religious police in Makkah, said the Sahwa has also influenced some Saudis (mostly youth) to join foreign terrorist groups and militant Islamist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qaeda, and later ISIL (or ISIL).[10]

[9] Interview with Shaikh Abdulrahman Howsawi. The interview was conducted by my research assistant, Hussain Al-Alawi, Dhahran, December 2019.

[10] https://www.arabnews.com/node/1558176/saudi-arabia. Accessed 14 May 2020.

Shiite-Linked Hezbollah Al-Hejaz

Besides Nasser-backed radical leftists and secularists as well as Juhayman and his apocalyptic group sketched earlier, Shiite-affiliated Saudi Hezbollah (known as Hezbollah al-Hejaz) was also an important actor of the terrorist acts in the Kingdom since mid-1980s and reemerged in 1996 during the Khobar Tower bombing. From its inception in 1987, this group adopted and advocated violent means to achieve its agenda against the royal family and the United States. Allegedly, members of this group were responsible for a number of terrorist attacks in the Kingdom since late 1980s (Matthiesen 2010: 179–97; Jones 2009).

These series of terrorist attacks against Saudi interests included the 1987 bombing of a liquid petroleum plant in Ras al-Juaima in eastern Saudi Arabia, which was the first attack by Hezbollah al-Hejaz (Peterson 2003: 122). In March 1988, the Sadaf petrochemical plant (Saudi Arabia Petrochemical Company) in Jubail industrial area became the target of bombing attacks by the group.[11] In the same year, several bombs also detonated at the Ras Tanura oil installations and one reportedly failed to explode at Ras al-Juaima. These series of attacks further bolstered a policy of ARAMCO (now Saudi Aramco—Saudi Arabian Oil Company) leadership not to employ Shia workers in sensitive areas. Several bombings by the Hezbollah also occurred in Riyadh in 1985 and 1989. Following the bombings, Saudi authorities arrested a great number of the bombers and attackers in the "Shia bases" in Qatif, Dammam, and Ahsa, among others. The detentions of the defendants were accompanied by confrontations with gunmen linked to the terrorist operation representing the group's first military action.

Additionally, Hezbollah al-Hejaz and its networks or allies such as the Islamic Jihad Organization in Hijaz[12] (*Munazzamat al-Jihad al-Islam fi*

[11] Saudi authorities arrested and executed four suspects, namely Mohammad al-Qrous, Ali al-Khatem, Khaled al-Aalq, and Azhar al-Hajaj. The others, including Shaikh Abdul Karim al-Hubail, were detained, some of whom were released in 1994. One suspect was an employee at Sadaf, while others had received military training by Lebanon's Hezbollah and participated in a battle against Israel. See https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2015/10/01/Hezbollah-al-Hejaz-A-story-not-yet-written. Accessed May 21, 2020.

[12] The Islamic Jihad Organization in the Hijaz was a new front organization whose membership made up of Saudi and Lebanese Shia with links to Palestinian groups and factions inside Iran.

Hijaz) also targeted Saudi embassies and diplomats abroad such as in Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Lebanon, and Thailand, among others (Matthiesen 2015a: 136–7; Peterson 2003). Members of Hezbollah al-Hejaz often collaborated with other Shia-based militant groups in the Gulf or the Middle East for their terrorist plans. In 1989, for example, the government beheaded members of Hezbollah al-Kuwait and Hezbollah al-Hejaz for smuggling explosives and placing them near the Grand Mosque of Haram in Makkah. The sequence of Shia-linked terrorist actions provided the government with a legitimacy to crack down all Shia opposition movements and organizations.

Founded in 1987, Hezbollah al-Hejaz was a cleric-based group aligned with Iran and modeling itself on Lebanese Hezbollah but operated primarily in Saudi Arabia. Hezbollah (lit. "Party of God"), which was inspired, supported, and directed by elements of the Iranian government, is the name used by a number of related radical groups and terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Kuwait, and Bahrain, among other places. One of the main reasons for the establishment of Hezbollah al-Hejaz was the clash between Saudi Arabia and Iran over the "hajj incident" of 1987 between Saudi security forces and Shiite hajj pilgrims of various nationalities that held marches in Makkah demonizing the West and praising Ayatollah Khomeini (1902–1989), Iran's supreme leader (Matthiesen 2015a: 126).

Hezbollah al-Hijaz's members included Saudi-based Iranian loyalists, some Saudi Shiite students of Islamic studies, and defectors of Organization for the Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula (OIRAP) that followed Grand Ayatollah Sayed Mohammad al-Shirazi (1928–2001), an Iranian-Iraqi Shia marja' and political theorist, who was at odds with Tehran (Al Mustafa 2015). Following ideological and political disputes, some members and activists of OIRAP split and established the Hezbollah al-Hejaz that maintains the principle of the *vilayat-e-faqih* (lit. Guardianship of Faqih-Islamic jurist; i.e. Islam gives an Islamic jurist custodianship over people) and loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini.

Many ordinary and elite Saudi Shiites (clerics and scholars) whom I talked to and interviewed actually disagreed with Hezbollah al-Hejaz's notions, objectives, and actions. Leading Shiite scholars and clerics such as Shaikh Mohammed al-Obidan, Shaikh Ibrahim al-Battat, and Syed Hashim al-Salman, among others, viewed the group more preoccupied with politics than religious studies, and their ways were not strategic and

beneficial for the well-being of Saudi Shiites in general.[13] Yet, activists of the group were active in recruiting its membership, especially from young Shiites, by exploiting sectarian tensions, people's admiration for Ayatollah Khomeini, and feelings of discrimination and injustice. Nonetheless, the group in general failed in receiving broad support from the Saudi Shia community. Many Saudi Shiites respected with classical eminent clerics, most notably Iraq's Najaf-based Ayatollah Sayed Abu al-Qasim al-Musawi al-Khoi (1899–1992), one of the most influential and non-politicized traditional Shia scholars and clerics.

Additionally, many Shia businessmen and civic leaders in the Kingdom that have a close ties with the ruling family also did not endorse the Hezbollah al-Hejaz, believing that dialogue and communication with the government are the best ways to resolve problems. After 1994, following a 1993s royal amnesty by the late King Fahd (1921–2005) and improved Saudi–Iranian relations, most of the group's cadres returned to Saudi Arabia and began to change their activities and strategy from politics to social and *da'wa* (Islamic propagation) and from violence to nonviolence, while few refused. Those who refused to return—and were placed on the US terrorist list—included Ahmed al-Mughassil, Ali al-Hoori, Abdulkarim al-Nasser, and Ibrahim Yacoub. Some of them allegedly involved in the 1996 Khobar bombings that resulted in the crackdown of this group by Saudi authorities. The clampdown, added with the Saudi–Iranian rapprochement following the accession of Mohammad Hatami (b. 1943), a newly elected Iranian president in 1997, led to the vanishing of this group (Matthiesen 2010, 2015a; Al Mustafa 2015; see Chapter 3 in details).

The Rise of Sunni Jihadism and Terrorism

While the success of the Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979 contributed to the emergence of Saudi Shia militancy in Saudi Arabia, what are the settings and contexts for the rise of Sunni militant jihadism and pan-Islamist terrorism in the Kingdom in the 1990s?

The Juhayman case described earlier had certainly an important indirect effect on Saudi Islamism by prompting the Kingdom to give religious

[13] Interviews with some leading Shiite scholars in Hasa (Ahsa), Saihat, Dammam, and Qatif between 2016 and 2018, assisted by Mahdi Al-Mabrook.

clerics, shaikhs, and ulama more power and Islamic activists more political space in the early 1980s. However, Juhayman and his group failed in attracting, inspiring, or influencing other Saudis to join in his apocalyptic-typed Islamist movement and terrorism in the aftermath of their death. Saudi Arabia only started experiencing serious internal security problems with intense terrorist activities affiliated with ideologies of pan-Islamism and global jihadism when Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda actively turned against the Kingdom in the mid-1990s by launching terrorist attacks.

Surely, one cannot understand why some Saudis (especially the male youth) joined al-Qaeda without comprehending the socio-historical contexts as well as religious, ideological, and political processes that had contributed to the shape and rise of the Islamist terrorism and jihadism in the Kingdom. In this regard, understanding social contexts and political dynamics of pre-1990s within Saudi society and the globe is a vital step to provide a basis and rationale for the appearance of al-Qaeda-linked Islamist terrorism in the Kingdom.

It is imperative to note that in the early 1980s, unlike in the 1990s, there was no sizable community of radical Sunni Islamists and pan-Islamist terrorists in Saudi Arabia. Juhayman and his rebels that hijacked Makkah's Grand Mosque of Haram were peripheral and an exception in this regard representing only a small community in the Saudi political landscape, albeit their violent acts had inspired and influenced the Kingdom to give more restrictions on religious education, teachings, and practices resulting in the growth of the Sahwa. But, again, Juhayman and his group were not the main factor and rationale for the pan-Islamist terrorists to emerge in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. Juhayman's group only represented a pietist current of Saudi Islamism that is different from the pan-Islamist movement that later produced al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (QAP)-linked terrorists.

Like Juhayman's group, the Sahwa movement (Sahwism) might have an indirect effect to the advent of the pan-Islamist terrorism in the 1990s but not a direct influence. In addition, the Sahwa, which first appeared in the 1970s in Saudi universities, was essentially a non-violent reformist religious movement. Sahwa's ideological content is a mixture of Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood. Hegghammer (2010a, b) has noted that Sahwa's aims, means, and social base also differed from those of pan-Islamist terrorists. Since the 1970s, the Sahwa emerged and grew under the influence of exiled activists, teachers, and preachers affiliated to the Egyptian and Syrian Muslim Brotherhood that had escaped from

their home countries to circumvent prosecution from the regimes. Two prominent Muslim Brotherhood scholars from Syria and Egypt—often cited as influencing Sahwa—were Muhammad Surur bin Nayif Zain al-Abidin (1938–2016) and Muhammad Qutb (1919–2014), the younger brother of Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), Egyptian Islamist thinker, and Muslim Brotherhood's ideologue.

The Saudi government harbored the Muslim Brothers mainly as a buffer against the influence of pan-socialism and secular republicanism, advocated by Baathist and Nasserist regimes of Syria and Egypt, which threatened the existence of the Kingdom (Mann 2012; Commins 2009, 2015). Under the influences of the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi universities became an ideological melting pot, from which the Sahwist hybrid emerged. In the mid-1980s, followers of Sahwa (i.e. Sahwists) began to engage in open polemics against the modernist literary current known as the *hadatha* (lit. modernity/modernism) whose main figures included such intellectuals as literary critics Abdullah al-Ghaddami, poet Ali al-Dummaini, and female novelist Raja' Alim (Lacroix 2005). After the Gulf crisis and the deployment of US troops to Saudi Arabia during the Second Gulf War of 1990–1991, the Sahwa, led by Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-Oudah, presented formal political demands to the Saudi government that later resulted in the crackdown of this group (Hegghammer 2010a, 2015; Alterman and McCants 2014).

Socio-Historical Contexts of Jihadism and Islamist Terrorism

To be exact, the two main events and settings that later shaped and led Saudi militant jihadism and pan-Islamist terrorism were (1) the Afghan War that began in 1979 (and then wars in Bosnia, Chechnya, and others) and (2) the growing US presence in the Middle East (especially Saudi Arabia) since the Second Gulf War in 1990–1991 in particular. The Afghan War broke out between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. During the war, the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia backed up Afghanistan (Rashid 2001; Ewans 2002). Moreover, the Gulf War (1990–1991) was a battle waged by coalition forces (mainly United Kingdom, France, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt) led by the United States against Iraq (at the time under Saddam Hussein, r. 1979–2003) in response to Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. The war was codenamed (1) Operation Desert Shield for operations leading to the buildup of troops and defense of

Saudi Arabia and (2) Operation Desert Storm in its combat stage (Estes 2006a, b).

The Soviet occupation in Afghanistan drove attentions of some Muslim-majority countries and transnational Islamic groupings. In response to the war, some of them sent fighters (militias or jihadists) while others delivered aid workers or humanitarian service volunteers. Still, others issued fatwas (non-binding legal opinions or religious edicts) or calls for jihad against the Red Army. Like jihadists from Southeast Asia (mainly Indonesia, the Philippine, Malaysia, and Thailand) and elsewhere, many young Saudis went to Afghanistan during the battle. For most Saudi fighters who went to Afghanistan in the 1980s, jihad initially was about repelling infidels (i.e. the Soviet communists) in blatant cases of territorial invasion (Hegghammer 2006).

At first, mobilization of Saudi fighters (jihadists) to Afghanistan was an uneasy process. Most Saudis who went to Afghanistan between 1981 and 1984, especially under Saudi Red Crescent and Saudi Relief Committee, were mainly administrators and aid workers, not jihadists. The surge of Saudi jihad forces came later in the mid-1980s. Some Afghan mujahidin leaders such as Abdul Rasul Sayyaf (b. 1946), who along with Gulbuddin Hekmetyar (b. 1949) represented the most radical faction of the Afghan warlords battling against the Soviets (Rashid 2001; Barfield 2005), had tried to socialize conditions of the Afghan War that needed help to attract Arabs and Saudis to join jihad during their visits to the Kingdom. Yet, their efforts resulted in limited success.

It was actually Abdullah Azzam (1941–1989), who played a crucial role in convincing and mobilizing Saudi volunteers for jihad in Afghanistan. Azzam wrote two popular books on Afghanistan's jihad, printed several times in the Arab Middle East, that later attracted and influenced Saudis and other Arabs in the Middle East to join his jihad struggle. These two books were *God's Signs in the Afghan Jihad* (*Ayyat al-Rahman fi Jihad al-Afghan*), prefaced by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, and *Defending Muslim Lands* (*al-Difa an Ardh al-Muslimin*), endorsed by the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia the late Shaikh Abd al-Aziz bin Abdullah bin Baz (known as Shaikh Bin Baz, 1910–1999). Principally, the books highlight the miracles (*karamat*) when *mujahid* (jihadist) dies as a martyr that bring them into Heaven as well as underscores jihad in Afghanistan as an individual duty (*fard'ain*) for Muslims. Shaikh Bin Baz's endorsement on jihad fatwa, reportedly the first official call for jihad against other people in another country, was also significant in influencing some Saudis

to join jihad against the Soviets (Nisan 2007; Alterman and McCants 2014).

The various efforts made by Azzam and Sayyaf finally succeeded in attracting some Saudis to join jihad in the Afghan War. Beginning late 1983 or early 1984, a small group of Saudi fighters went for Afghanistan, including Osama bin Laden (1957–2003), who had previously been politicized and radicalized by Muslim Brotherhood—affiliated high school and university teachers. In fact, Azzam himself was Bin Laden's mentor. Later, between 1985 and 1986, Bin Laden played a vital role in the mobilization for Afghanistan as the main sponsor of Azzam's Services Bureau for Arab jihadists (*maktab al-khidmat*). After subsequent visits and talks, while distributing Azzam's writings in Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden was successful in recruiting some young Saudis from the Hijaz area, especially his friends, acquaintances, and networks to join the jihad forces. Bin Laden himself offered to pay their expenses. In 1987, more Saudis went to Afghanistan.

The escalation was mainly due to the growth of more publicity (Arab newspapers and magazines) on jihad and mujahidin. The mainstream Saudi media started writing more about the Afghan Arabs. Still, Azzam and Bin Laden actively encouraged and facilitated the visit of Saudi journalists to Afghanistan. Azzam continued to write influential treatises such as the very popular *Join the Caravan* (*Ilhaq bi al-Qawafillah*), a very influential jihadist text containing invitations, reasons, and justifications for jihad.[14] Therefore, in the late 1980s, a significant number of Saudi jihad volunteers landed in Afghanistan. The mobilization of Saudi militias continued even though the Soviets had withdrawn from Afghanistan in 1989. The post-Afghan War mobilization, no longer under Bin Laden, was to support the mujahidin that fought against the communist regime of Najibullah Ahmadzai (1947–1996) during the so-called Afghan civil war from 1989 to 1992. The mobilization of Saudi jihad volunteers to Afghanistan ended when the mujahidin captured Kabul in 1992.

Whereas the Afghan War helped deepen and radicalize religious militancy and spirits of jihadism, the Second Gulf War of 1990–1991 contributed to the increase of anti-Western (mainly American) and anti-Saudi government sentiments among some Saudi religious conservative groups, most notably the Sahwa, and ex-Saudi Afghan jihadists. In other

[14] An English version of *Join the Caravan* can be accessed at https://english.religion.info/2002/02/01/document-join-the-caravan/. Accessed May 18, 2020.

words, the Gulf war triggered a process whereby jihadists became both more critical of the Saudi regime and more openly hostile to the United States. Indeed, the Gulf War of 1990–1991 between Iraq and a US-led international coalition organized under UN auspices had decisively settled the issue of Iraq's seizure of Kuwait on August 2, 1991. The war also inaugurated the permanent introduction of US ground and air forces into a region previously frequented only by its naval forces. However, US military presence in the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, created internal tensions and disagreements, especially between the Saudi government and militant religious groups (Matthiesen 2015b).

Kenneth Estes (2006a, b) said that US aircraft, under the commander in chief of Central Command, army General Norman Schwartzkopf (1934–2012), first reached Saudi Arabia on August 8, 1990, followed by US Army airborne and Marine Corps ground units, just a few days after Iraqi forces crossed into Kuwait. The naval aviation from offshore aircraft carriers and supporting land bases backed up their departure to the Kingdom. US President George H. W. Bush (1924–2018) ordered the US Central Command, which was built in the wake of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, to reinforce and defend Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Gulf emirates, at the same time fomenting a growing coalition determined to resist and ultimately expel Iraqi forces.

Within a month, strong military forces had been built in Saudi Arabia to block any Iraqi moves against the Kingdom. The US forces dubbed the defensive buildup "Operation Desert Shield," an operation aimed at confining Iraqi moves to the Kuwaiti territory already seized. Estes (2006b) has noted that the US military deployments to the Gulf exceeded any similar undertaking since World War II. Reportedly, more than 500,000 troops deployed to the Gulf during a six-month period. Not only were multiple divisions of US ground forces sent to Saudi Arabia, but also bases in all the Gulf countries from Bahrain to Oman received US naval and air forces, and the growing logistic structure necessary to support them.

Saudi Responses to the Foreign Military Presence in the Kingdom

As mentioned earlier, reactions varied—some agreed while others not—in responding to the US military presence in Saudi Arabia (and the Gulf). The most critical responses primarily came from the religious establishment—particularly the Sahwa—and ex-Saudi Afghan jihadists under

Osama bin Laden. A specialist of Saudi Arabia studies, Noel Meijer (2005: 274–5) said that in a response to the current situation, hundreds of ulama, clerics, judges, university professors, and other noted scholars signed and sent "the Letter of Demands" (*kitab al-matalib*) and "the Memorandum of Advice" (*Mudhakkirat al-Nasiha*) to the late King Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (1921–2005).

These two petition letters, in contrast with the liberal petition signed by a group of intellectuals and businesspersons, demanded more rigorous religious norms, independence from the United States (and other foreign countries), and accused the Kingdom as the root of the problem. Moreover, the petitions also stated (warned or threatened more precisely) that Saudi citizens should withdraw their allegiance from rulers as long as they did not abide by the sharia. The religious conservatives, for the first time, used the term "*takfir*"—the denunciation of infidel or unbelief toward one's opponent—as a means of de-legitimating the ruling family of Al Saud. Lastly, these radical oppositional petitions also condemned the United States as the embodiment of evil, decadence, and the spearhead of the Western, Christian 'war on Islam' (Teitelbaum 2000: 35–8). In brief, the Sahwa activists in particular denounced Riyadh's failure to conform to Islamic values, corruption, and subservience to the United States, while condemning official clerics (the Wahhabi establishment) for their silence on all the above.

During the subsequent years, the government opted for a mixture of accommodation and repression against the critics, and gave a choice to them, either to resist against the royal family or accommodate with the authorities. Some (like radical groups and activists of the Committee for Defense of Legitimate Rights) chose resistance while others (e.g. religious clerics and scholars) opted for cooperation. The authorities arrested some detractors and curbed the radical factions, including the Sahwa. At the time, it was without a doubt not easy for the government to respond to the situation. On one hand, the government needed strong military support from the United States to help Kuwait liberate from Iraq's invasion but on the other, they faced internal tensions and strong criticism from militant and conservative religious groups.

However, the government's hard approaches succeeded in toning down the radical rhetoric and making the religious conservatives temporarily silent from criticizing the political authorities. As an outcome of the government's firm actions, by the second half of the 1990s, the nonviolent opposition was either suppressed, imprisoned, exiled (e.g.

Muhammad al-Mas'ari and Sa'ad al-Faqih, who fled to London, UK), incorporated, or allowed to voice their ideas as long as in accordance with the limits that the government had laid down (Meijer 2005; ICG 2004).

Although the government was successful in cracking down the nonviolent opposition and advocacy groups, another problem emerged, namely the occurrence of violent radical jihadist faction, mainly ex-Afghan jihadists, and pan-Islamist terrorists. The crackdown on the Sahwa convinced the radical jihadists, including Osama bin Laden, of the pointlessness of non-violent protest, advocacy, and opposition, and this incident made them consider terrorist acts and military campaigns against US forces more seriously.[15] As a result, since then (mid-1990s), a series of terrorist actions took place in Saudi Arabia targeting either Americans, along with their property in the Kingdom, or Saudis themselves, both government officials and their properties or ordinary people. Actors of the terrorist acts during this period varied however as discussed in the following paragraphs.

Terrorism in the 1990s

Driven by the controversy over the US military presence in Saudi Arabia during the Second Gulf War of 1990–1991, a new community of activists for whom jihad meant something much more drastic emerged in the mid-1990s, namely confronting the United States with terrorist operations anywhere in the world, including in Saudi Arabia. In other words, following the Gulf War, militant jihadists began to shift their focus to fighting the growing US presence in the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, and the Saudi rulers that they accused of being responsible for the arrival of the US troops in the Kingdom.

In this regard, the Gulf War triggered a process whereby jihadists became both more critical of the Saudi rulers regime and more openly hostile to the United States. This group of more radical activists mostly consisted of former Saudi jihadists in Afghanistan (during the Afghan

[15] Although Bin Laden's Islamist and jihadist ideas, views, and ideology were initially shaped and influenced by teachers of the Muslim Brotherhood or the Sahwa (e.g. Safar al-Hawali), he was not active in the Sahwa movement. Bin Laden was not interested in the minutiae of the Sahwa's domestic reform program but he respected and supported the Sahwa primarily because of its clear stance on the issue of US troops' presence in Saudi Arabia.

War), Bosnia, Chechnya, and elsewhere or those nothing to do with jihad involvement overseas but they adopted politicized radical religious views. Although still debatable, Iran or Lebanon-linked Shiite Islamist militants in the Kingdom were also part of the "terrorist crew" that were responsible for the 1996 Khobar bombing (Burke 2003; Leonnig 2006).

Even though this militant group initially was not interested in targeting the United States or Saudi Arabia, since early 1990s, the pan-Islamist jihadists had always been hostile to the United States. This period marked the first time Sunni Islamist began to seriously contemplate all-out war against the United States. The notion of anti-American jihad had the benefit of appealing to both the socio-revolutionaries and the jihadists (of Afghanistan and others) partly because the former saw it as a way to undermine local regimes, while the latter saw it as the logical extension of Abdullah Azzam's struggle to liberate Muslim community (*umma*) from the subjugation of "infidels."

Several driving factors contributed to an increasingly anti-American worldview. These include, but not limited to, the continued US military presence in Saudi Arabia, the US deployment to Somalia, and the arrest of the prominent radical Egyptian cleric, Omar Abdel-Rahman (1938–2017), known as the "Blind Shaikh," in New York. Another important factor that needs to be underlined was the onslaught of the Sahwists by the Saudi government in 1994. Since then the Sahwa was silenced until it reemerged and severely weakened in the late 1990s. Riyadh's crackdown on the Sahwist movement in particular had convinced the militant jihadist and Islamist faction, including Bin Laden, which nonviolent political protest and struggle against the US military presence (as did by the Sahwa) was fruitless. This case partially influenced the radical jihadists to take violent actions—terrorist acts—at a later stage.

In the second half of the 1990s, furthermore, Bin Laden and other militant jihadists took pan-Islamism to its most radical conclusion and articulated the doctrine of global jihadism that advocated global warfare against the United States. Saudi Arabia occupies a central place in the intellectual history of global jihadism primarily because the Kingdom was the original cause for which the doctrine was formulated. The American "occupation of the land of the two holy places," referring to the US military presence in Saudi Arabia, was a central theme in most of the radical jihadists' and Bin Laden's statements in the second half of the 1990s.

Although the Saudi Senior Council of Ulama (*Majlis Hai'at Kibar al-Ulama*) issued a fatwa that permitted the advent of the US troops in

the Kingdom during the Second Gulf War, the militant jihadists vociferously opposed their presence and accused of Saudi rulers as betrayal and treason (Ansary 2008). For the radicals, the US military presence in Saudi Arabia was totally unacceptable for several reasons. First, the US presence ran counter to religious imperatives concerning the purity of the Arabian Peninsula and the sanctity of Mecca and Medina. Second, the US presence amounted to an occupation of sovereign Muslim territory and the domination of Saudi population by a non-Muslim power. Third, the occupation had deep economic consequences. Additionally, Bin Laden and other militants also argued that the occupation of the Arabian Peninsula was not like that of any other Muslim territory since Saudi Arabia holds a unique position in the Islamic world.

Factors Contributing to Bin Laden's Shifting Views and Strategies

To conclude, factors such as the annexation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia's rebuttal of their suggestion and counsel that mujahidin be called upon to defend the country against Iraqi forces, and, especially, the deployment of US troops in the Kingdom, all had contributed to the jihadists' and Bin Laden's changing views, strategies, and tactics—from passive to aggressively active in confronting the United States and Saudi Arabia. In 1991, due to Bin Laden's strong criticism of the Saudi government and its alliance with the United States gained intensity, besides having invitation from Sudanese hardline Islamist cleric Hasan Al-Turabi (1932–2016), Bin Laden moved to Sudan. About three years later, the Saudi government stripped Bin Laden's Saudi citizenship.

At this stage, Bin Laden in particular (but also others ex-Saudi Afghan jihadists) was moving in directions far from his early orientation and started seeing the United States as the foremost hindrance to political and ideological change in the Kingdom and even a direct military threat to global Muslim community (Islamic umma). By the mid-1990s, Bin Laden concluded that a direct, global war and confrontation against the United States was essential and deeply needed. Finally, on August 23, 1996, Bin Laden issued a communique, entitled "A Declaration of Jihad against the Americans Occupying the Lands of Two Holy Sites" (*i'lan al-jihad ala al-amirikin al-muhtalin li bilad al-haramain*) that directed against the United States and the Saudi-ruling family. Below is an excerpt of the declaration:

> It is not concealed from you that the people of Islam had suffered from aggression, iniquity and injustice imposed on them by the Jewish-Christian alliance and their collaborators to the extent that the Muslims' blood became the cheapest and their wealth and assets looted by the hands of the enemies….God is Most Great. Today, from the same shelters in Afghanistan, we are working to lift off the injustice that was inflicted upon the nation [Saudi Arabia] by the Jewish-Crusaders alliance, especially after their occupation of the Prophet's land, praise and peace be upon him, and their desecration of land of the two holiest sites [the Grand Mosque of Haram in Makkah and the Nabawi Mosque in Madinah]. We ask Allah to grant us victory.[16]

Indeed, later on, Bin Laden implemented what he stated in the declaration: launching terrorism in Saudi Arabia, albeit jihadist terrorist acts in the Kingdom preceded the "Declaration of War on the United States." On November 13, 1995, for instance, a car bomb exploded targeting a Saudi National Guard military facility (i.e. the US-operated National Guard Training Center). Reportedly, the building targeted by the bomb was headquarters for a $5.6 billion multi-year program to help the Saudi military be better prepared to defend the country—one of several Pentagon projects accelerated after the Gulf War (McIntyre 1995). Not long after the explosion, King Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud convened his ministers and "expressed his condemnation of this criminal act, which is foreign to our society, beliefs and religion."[17] It was the first terrorist attack against the US military in Saudi Arabia in half a century and was the most spectacular signs of violent Islamist terrorism with attacks on US targets. This attack reportedly killed five Americans and two Indians, and injured sixty people. About thirty-four of the wounded were Americans. One of the Americans killed was an enlisted US soldier, while the other four were civilians.

The US officials stated that two groups have claimed responsibility for the attack, namely Tigers of the Gulf and the Islamic Movement for

[16] Bin Laden's letter of declaration of war against the United States can be accessed in the following link: https://ctc.usma.edu/harmony-program/declaration-of-jihad-against-the-americans-occupying-the-land-of-the-two-holiest-sites-original-language-2/. Accessed May 19, 2020.

[17] See https://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/14/world/bomb-kills-4-americans-in-saudi-arabia.html. Accessed June 1, 2020.

Change, an extremist group that advocates a complete break in Saudi–US relations[18] (McIntyre 1995). However, on April 22, 1996, four suspects confessed on Saudi television in which they regarded the bomb attack as part of jihad against the Saudi rulers and the Americans. A month later, the government executed the culprits. Three of the four suspects were identified as ex-combatants of the wars in Afghanistan and Bosnia, whereas the fourth terrorist was a former rejectionist-turned-jihadist,[19] who left his rejectionist study circle in Riyadh in late 1994 (Burke 2003; ICG 2004). The jihadist terrorists made a statement (or warning/ultimatum more precisely) saying that unless the Crusaders' forces leave Saudi Arabia, foreigners, as well as Saudi forces and members of the royal family would become legitimate targets (Meijer 2005: 276). The terrorists targeted the Saudi rulers mainly because they considered the ruling family as infidel (*kufr*) due to two primary reasons (1) they did not implement the sharia and (2) making an alliance with non-Muslim countries (Teitelbaum 2000: 76).

The second bloody terrorist attack in the Kingdom took place in the city of Khobar in the Eastern Province (Ash Sharqiyah) on June 25, 1996. A powerful truck bomb blew up the tower-style dormitory for US Air Force pilots and staff (the American Khobar Tower complex or the US barracks). At the time, coalition forces, assigned to Operation Southern Watch, a no-fly zone operation in southern Iraq, as part of the Iraqi no-fly zones, used the Khobar Tower complex as living quarters. The attack apparently had killed 19 Americans and injured almost 400 people of various nationalities; among them were 17 Saudi nationals. Saudi authorities had sentenced the suspects of this tragic event.

[18] According to a report of the International Crisis Group (ICG 2004), neither terrorist suspects claimed membership in any particular group or organization. They said, however, that they had been influenced by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Muhammad al-Mas'ari, and Osama bin Laden. To date, there is no hard evidence of Bin Laden's involvement. The widespread assumption that al-Qaeda was involved appears to be based essentially on the fact that he praised the militants in subsequent interviews.

[19] Unlike Sahwa reformers, the rejectionists focused on questions of individual faith, morals, and ritual practices, as opposed to broader social, and cultural or political issues. They were also hostile to the very concept of the nation-state, seeking not to modify it but to break with it, either through withdrawal or via revolt. Whereas Sahwa reformists were dominant in schools and universities, rejectionists avoided official education altogether, seeking religious teaching elsewhere.

Identities of the perpetrators remained uncertain, resulting in considerable debate and suspicion whether an al-Qaeda affiliate or Iranian-sponsored Shiite radicals were responsible for the blast. However, in an official statement, released on the same day of the bombing, the American government named members of Shiite-affiliated Hezbollah al-Hejaz (Party of God in the Hijaz) as responsible for the attack. On June 21, 2001, the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released an official statement, entitled "Terrorism Charges Have Been Brought against 13 Members of the Pro-Iran Saudi Hizballah." In addition to the pro-Iranian Hezbollah, the FBI also mentioned another suspect that was associated with the Lebanese Hezbollah.[20]

The FBI's statement was mainly based on "Indictment" of the United States District Court of Alexandria, Virginia, which listed 13 names of terrorist suspects associated with the Hezbollah al-Hejaz, which were responsible for the Khobar Towers bombing.[21] According to the court document, one of the terrorist suspects was Ahmed al-Mughassil, head of Hezbollah al-Hejaz's military wing, who was in charge of directing terrorist attacks against American interests in Saudi Arabia. A native of Qatif, al-Mughassil was also actively involved in recruiting young Saudi Shiites to join the group's ranks; arranging them for military training at Hezbollah camps in Lebanon and Iran; directing them in surveillance of potential targets for attack by Hezbollah; and planning and supervising terrorist attacks. In 2015, after nearly two decades in hiding (allegedly was hidden by Tehran) since the Khobar Tower bombing, al-Mughassil was arrested in Beirut, Lebanon, and handed over to Saudi authorities. Saudi

[20] The terrorist suspects included the following names Ahmed Al-Mughassil (also known as Abu Omran), Ali Al-Houri, Hani Al-Sayegh, Ibrahim Al-Yacoub, Abdel Karim Al-Nasser, Mustafa Al-Qassab, Abdallah Al-Jarash, Hussein Al-Mughis, and the unidentified Lebanese, listed as "John Doe." The remaining five suspects were Sa'ed Al-Bahar, Saleh Ramadan, Ali Al-Marhoun, Mustafa Al-Mu'alem, and Fadel Al-Alawe. See the FBI statement in the following link https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/pressrel/press-releases/terrorism-charges-have-been-brought-against-13-members-of-the-pro-iran-saudi-hizballah. Accessed May 19, 2020.

[21] "United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division: United States of America v. Ahmed al-Mughassil-Indictment" (June 2001 Term—at Alexandria). FBI National Press Office. 21 June 2001. https://www2.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel01/khobar.pdf. Accessed May 21, 2020.

judicial documents revealed that Iran persisted throughout the years in reviving Hezbollah al-Hejaz under al-Mughassil's command.[22]

Finally, in 2006, a US court also found Iran and Hezbollah guilty of orchestrating the Khobar Towers attack. A federal judge of the United States ruled that Iran is responsible for the blast and ordered the Iranian government to pay $254 million to the families of the Americans who died in the attack. The US District Judge Royce C. Lamberth said that Iranian government agencies and senior ministers financed and directed the bombing by a militant Saudi wing of the Islamist terrorist group Hezbollah. Iran, as predicted, refused to participate in the case and insisted that it has no connection to the bombing (Leonnig 2006).

At some point, by blasting the Khobar Tower complex, Hezbollah al-Hejaz had betrayed King Fahd's positive response and political willingness to reconcile with the Shiite radical faction. Desiring to end Shiite opposition to the government, King Fahd promised to work toward improving conditions for Shiites in Saudi Arabia. These include the following: ordering the elimination of derogatory terms for Shiites from textbooks, removing certain other forms of explicit discrimination, meeting and building communication with respected Shiite clerics, and allowing many Saudi Shiite exiles to return to Saudi Arabia (Nasr 2007: 238). In 1993, King Fahd issued "a royal pardon" for Shiite militants and oppositional groups resulting in their homecoming for those living overseas after a series of terrorist attacks in late 1980s. Finally, a pact was achieved in which Hezbollah al-Hejaz was dissolved and its members had to formally and practically dissociate themselves from foreign groups and movements. However, the bombing of 1996 broke the pact and promise resulting in the crackdown of Hezbollah al-Hejaz's members and activists.

Even though the terrorist acts of 1995 and 1996 had different dynamics, there is little doubt, that both were landmarks in the radicalization and militantization of Islamist dissent that began with the Second

[22] The Saudi General Prosecution revealed the way Iran planned to revive the movement through a case filed against five Saudis it accused of being trained on weapons inside the Iranian Revolutionary Guards camps. The five Saudis, who can be described as "Iran's powerful men in Saudi Arabia," were also trained on the use of RPGs, which were also used in 2017 by terrorists in the Awamiya town of Qatif region. In addition, the five suspects are accused of receiving training on the use of other explosives, including TNT, RDX, C4, and others. The five Saudi suspects also face accusations of providing Iran with information, and of forming a terrorist cell that operates under al-Mughassil's command to train Saudi youths in military camps (Al Suhail 2017).

Gulf War. Since the 1996 bombing, terrorism in Saudi Arabia was for a while typified by a series of minor attacks on individual foreigners, mainly Westerners. These attacks remained minor and sporadic until 2003.

Terrorism in the 2000s

A series of small-scale attacks on Western expatriates that took place between 2000 and 2003, presumably committed by amateur militants driven by anti-Western society. In 2000, there were at least three cases of terrorist bombing—two in Riyadh, one in Khobar. All victims of the car bombings were British nationals, namely Christopher Rodway (died, his wife injured), Mark Payne (injured but survived), and David Brown (survived but lost his sight and part of his hands).

Between 2001 and 2003, several minor bombings (parcel bombs, car bombs, or bombs placed in a trash bin or public area) blasted in various regions including Tabuk but mainly in Riyadh and Khobar, all targeting Westerners—European, North American, or Australian nationals. Riyadh and Khobar are among the main sites for Western expatriates in Saudi Arabia.[23] The terrorism studies expert Thomas Hegghammer noted that there was no public statement of any investigation or prosecution for all the attacks that targeted Westerners between 2001 and 2003. However, alcohol traders consisting of a group of Western expatriates in the Kingdom were accused of the bombings. The Saudi authorities arrested and detained the suspects, who were all well-paid professionals with no record of violent crime. Attacks of a very similar nature on western nationals continued despite the arrests of the alleged perpetrators (Hegghammer 2010a: 82).

Post-1995/6 deadly terrorist campaigns reemerged on May 12, 2003; this time orchestrated by al-Qaeda-linked pan-Islamist terrorists (known as al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula or QAP for short).[24] Several major

[23] Furthermore, a sequence of murder attempts on civilian judges and police officers in the region of Jawf, arguably the only cases of violence against civilian representatives of the government in modern Saudi history that occurred between 2002 and 2003.

[24] It is unclear when the QAP was officially established. Meijer (2006) said, Osama bin Laden once requested Yusuf al-Ayeri (1974–2003), Bin Laden's cadre who was trained in Afghanistan's terrorist training camp, to build an al-Qaeda branch in Saudi Arabia after al-Ayeri's release from a prison in late 1990s. Later on, al-Ayeri became the first chief of the QAP reported directly to Bin Laden. There were at least two important factors that led to the founding of the QAP: the collapse of the Taliban regime and the global

attacks by this group included three car bombs (and small arms) detonated near residential compounds in Riyadh in 2003 that housed foreign military experts working for the Saudi armed forces. Over a dozen al-Qaeda terrorists attacked the compounds, reportedly killing some 38 foreign nationals and 1 Saudi, and injuring 200 others. About five days before the blast, the Saudi Minister of Interior made the unprecedented phase to publish nineteen names and photographs of the most wanted terrorists for which a reward has been set. By taking this stage, the Saudi authorities had for the first time declared war on terrorists and the Salafi jihadist movement.

The government released nineteen names of wanted terrorists and jihadists after the police discovered the Ishbiliya terrorist cell in Riyadh along with considerable stockpiles of weapons and explosives, following the accidental bomb explosions on March 18, 2003 (Meijer 2005: 279–80). A Saudi court had sentenced five men to death for their role in the May bombings. The court also ordered to jail some 37 people for between 3 and 35 years. Other terrorist members of the cell chose to fight themselves to death, an action called "indirect suicide" (*intihar ghayr mubhasir*) or the "method of suicidal resistance" (*uslub al-muqawama al-intihari*). The attacks were part of a campaign by an al-Qaeda offshoot that aimed to destabilize the Kingdom. The Riyadh compound bombings led to an onslaught against militants by the Saudi government. Police and National Guard troops were involved in hundreds of raids, seizing weapons and equipment used by the militants.

Terrorist acts continued, however. Between May and October 2003, large-scale clashes between police and terrorists occurred across the country. During this period, Saudi Arabia witnessed another car bomb explosion that targeted another residential compound in Riyadh. It was the first volley in what became a campaign of terror against foreign workers in the Kingdom and their Saudi hosts. The policy and security forces dismantled a number of terrorist cells in Makkah, Madinah, Riyadh, Qasim, and Jizan. On November 8, 2003, the terrorists struck back with their major offensive. Two suicide bombers blasted the al-Muhayya residential compound, killing seventeen and wounding over a hundred. Because many victims were Arab and Muslim, including many

outcry following 9/11. Initially the QAP were responsible for setting up five autonomous cells focusing exclusively on terrorist operations within Saudi Arabia. The first cell was responsible for the bomb attack in May 2003 (Cordesman and Obaid 2005).

children, the attack triggered a public backlash. In December, a faction called the Haramain Brigades initiated a new campaign targeting high-level Saudi officials. A sequence of terrorist attacks in 2003 led the authorities to subsequently launch a three-year crackdown on the jihadist terrorist group, imprisoning thousands of people. The QAP lost many mid-level operatives, as well as its then-leader, Yusuf al-Ayeri, who was killed in May 2003 (ICG 2004; Meijer 2006).

Throughout 2004, trends of minor sporadic terrorist acts—by means of bombing, gun shut, or kidnapping—still mainly targeting Western expatriates but also Saudi government's officials and properties continued. Tens of terrorist acts occurred this year. In this year, the campaign launched by al-Qaeda to topple the US-allied Saudi monarchy was at its height.[25] Whereas an attack on a company in Yanbu killed some six people, a militant attack on a residential compound in Al-Khobar left more than 20 people dead. In the same year, militants (gunmen) fought their way into the US Consulate in Jeddah, reportedly taking 18 staff and visa applicants' hostages for a short time before Saudi security forces stormed the building, killing three of the attackers and arresting six others.[26] As well, a car bomb exploded in front of the traffic police headquarters in central Riyadh, killing six and wounding almost 150. The Haramain Brigades[27] claimed responsibility for the bombing. However, a QAP leader, Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, denied the involvement of his organization, and insisted that "the Jews, the Americans and the Crusaders in

[25] For chronology of terrorist attacks on Westerners in Saudi Arabia, along with the casualties, see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-deaths-chronology/chronology-of-attacks-on-westerners-in-saudi-arabia-idUSL264134020070226. Accessed May 22, 2020.

[26] On the US Consulate attack, see https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/dec/06/saudiarabia.usa. Accessed May 22, 2020.

[27] The Haramain Brigades, which claimed responsibility for anti-government attacks in 2003 (December) and for the attack on the traffic police headquarters in 2004 (April), appear to have split from the QAP in late November 2003 over the issue of whether to target the Saudi government and objectives. Other cells appear to have adhered to the overall QAP strategy and to have focused on Western targets, but have developed distinct tactical specialties. The infiltration operations in Yanbu and Khobar, for instance, were allegedly carried out by the al-Quds Squadron, while responsibility for the random attacks on foreigners in Riyadh in early June 2004 has been claimed by the Falluja Squadron (ICG 2004).

general" remained priority targets[28] (ICG 2004). After 2004, there have been no major attacks targeting Western foreigners.

In 2005, there was no major record of terrorist incidents. In contrast, the Saudi security forces engaged in a three-day gunfight with al-Qaeda militants in the city of Al-Ras in Al Qassim. During the ambush, the security forces reportedly killed 18 radicals, injured six, and captured three. Among the dead were Saud bin Hommoud al-Quatii (a weapons smuggler, an explosives expert, and an Afghanistan veteran) and Kareem al-Tihami Idriss al-Mejjati (a notorious Moroccan terrorist and an ex-combatant of the Afghan War). The ambush was the longest gun battle between militants and Saudi security officials since the Kingdom's war on terror began in May 2003 following a series of kidnappings and bombings (Jawhar and Wagner 2005). The late King Abdullah (1924–2015; at the time Crown Prince) congratulated the security forces who had "demonstrated their courage in facing up to terror acts. We thank each one of them for their heroic deeds"[29] (cited in Bahaa 2005).

The terrorist attack reemerged in 2006. A suicide car bomb attack took place on a major oil production facility in Abqaiq of eastern Saudi Arabia. The tragedy was a reminder of several attacks by terrorists in late 1980s, which also targeted oil and gas companies in eastern Saudi Arabia. Saudi officials said at least two cars packed with explosives tried to ram the gates of the facility. Saudi security guards opened fire, causing at least one of the vehicles to explode, killing the occupants. There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the attack but Ayman al-Zawahiri in that year called for attacks on oil facilities, saying oil revenues went to what he called "the enemies of Islam."[30]

In 2007, there was no terrorist bombing except an attack by militants toward a group of French tourists who were returning from the historical site of Madain Saleh in the northwest of Saudi Arabia. That year of 2007 also marked another major success on the part of the Saudi authorities that succeeded in arresting hundreds of terrorist suspects. In the following year, 2008, there was no record of a terrorist attack. However, in 2009, al-Qaeda attempted to assassinate (but failed) the Saudi royal family, namely

[28] www.aljazeera.net, 22 April 2004; *The Guardian*, 28 April 2004.

[29] See https://web.archive.org/web/20130326185702/http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/737/re9.htm. Accessed May 22, 2020.

[30] See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4747488.stm. Accessed May 22, 2020.

Prince Muhammad bin Nayef (known as MBN), a former Minister of Interior (Riedel 2015).[31] It was the first strike against a member of the royal family since al-Qaeda launched a wave of attacks in the Kingdom in 2003.

At the time, MBN led the counteroffensive, issued lists of the most wanted al-Qaeda terrorists, and then proceeded to hunt them down. However, the MBN-led Interior Ministry commandos were able to hunt terrorists without causing blowback among the population since the ministry understood the need for proportionality and discretion in fighting a terror underground. For several years, hence, the Kingdom was a battlefield as al-Qaeda attacked multiple targets including government officials, Shiites, security forces, the police, civilians, and foreigners. During these battles, hundreds died and many more wounded. Responding to these battles, Riedel (2015: 21) wrote, "It was the longest sustained campaign of violent unrest Saudi Arabia had endured in 50 years, and the most serious internal challenge to the House of Saud since the establishment of the modern state in 1902. Before it was over, the war would cost the government well over $30 billion."

Between 2009 and 2013, there was no major terrorist attack. Throughout these years, the Saudi government was successful in hunting down terrorist individuals and groups. Hundreds of terrorist suspects, once again, had been detained and sentenced by the courts and authorities. In 2013, QAP tried to launch a terrorist attack but failed. Yet, the QAP continued its efforts to inspire sympathizers to support, finance, or engage in conflicts and wars outside of Saudi Arabia and encouraged individual acts of terrorism within the Kingdom. Finally, in 2014, QAP militants claimed responsibility for the minor terrorist attack on the Saudi–Yemeni border. The QAP's lack of success in Saudi Arabia can be attributed to the Saudi government's continued domestic and bilateral efforts to build, augment, and refine its capacity to counter terrorism and violent extremist ideologies in the Kingdom, while increasing participation in international counterterrorism efforts (see Chapter 3).

Hegghammer (2010a: 8–9) argues that the QAP campaigns in Saudi, through both acts and discourses, unlike other terrorist groups in the Kingdom, exhibited a primarily pan-Islamist agenda, albeit the top leadership of al-Qaeda may well have wanted regime change. The QAP

[31] See more detail at http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2015/06/14/A-history-of-domestic-terrorism-in-Saudi-Arabia-.html. Accessed February 18, 2018.

campaign marks its sharp distinction with the previous cases of terrorism and radicalism in the Kingdom that had nothing to do with the ideology of pan-Islamism. From its launch in 2003 until the next few years, as described before, the QAP has committed several deadly terrorist acts throughout the Kingdom resulting in the deaths and injuries of many people (both civilians and security personnel), making its campaigns become one of Saudi's most brutal violent actions.

2015 Onward: ISIL-Linked Terrorism

In recent years, particularly since 2015, Saudi Arabia has been facing a new terrorist threat from the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—known in Arabic acronym as Daesh (officially the Islamic State).[32] ISIL members and activists were not only non-Saudis but Saudis as well. Reportedly, more than one thousand young Saudis had fled their country to join ISIL (The Soufan Group 2015; Barret 2014, 2017), albeit the government had issued a decree that sets mandatory prison sentences for any Saudi who joins ISIL and dares to return (House 2015). Since 2015, Saudi ISIL militants had indeed posed a threat to the Kingdom by committing a series of terrorist attacks.

Unlike groups committed terrorism in pre-2015, ISIL mainly targeted Shia communities and mosques that they called as "temples of the apostates" (one of several derogatory terms the group uses to refer to Shiites), as well as the Saudi government officials, apparatus, and properties. Between 2015 and 2016, ISIL had launched several major terrorist attacks and sectarian strife in several major cities in Saudi Arabia, which it calls "Najd Province." ISIL-linked suicide bombers, for instance, struck Shia mosques in Eastern Province (Ash-Sharqiyyah), where some segment

[32] A brutal terrorist organization operating mainly in Iraq and Syria, ISIL originated as Jama'at al-Tauhid wa al-Jihad (known as Jama'at). Founded in 1999, the Jama'at was a militant jihadist group in Jordan led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who ran military training camps in Afghanistan. The Jama'at pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and participated in the Iraqi insurgency following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. In 2014, the group proclaimed itself a worldwide caliphate and began referring to itself as the Islamic State (al-Daulah al-Islamiyyah). From 2013 to 2019, ISIL was led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and since 2019 the group is led by Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi. The United Nations holds ISIL responsible for committing human rights abuses, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

of population is Shiite. Qatif, Saihat, and al-Ahsa or Hassa in the Eastern Province are one of Saudi's Shia concentrations.

On May 22, 2015, a huge blast occurred at the Imam Ali mosque in the village of al-Qadeeh, in Qatif governorate of Eastern Province (Ash Sharqiyah). The bomber detonated a suicide belt inside the mosque where Shiites performed Friday prayer. The attack was the first to be claimed by the Saudi branch of ISIL (sometimes called Hijaz Province of the Islamic State), which was formally established in November 2014. Reportedly, at least 21 people had been killed and more than 80 injured in the blast.[33] Just one week after the Qatif bombing, an ISIL-linked suicide bomber blew himself up near a Shiite mosque in Dammam (the provincial capital of Eastern Province), killing four people on May 29, 2015. It was the second attack by ISIL against a Shiite mosque in Saudi Arabia. The bomber tried to enter the Mosque during Friday prayer and detonated his bomb in the parking lot after being stopped by security guards.[34]

Furthermore, on August 6, 2015, an ISIL suicide bomber killed at least 17 people (members of security forces and workers) in an attack on a mosque used by members of a local security force in southwest Saudi Arabia. The attacker struck as men were praying in the mosque in the headquarters of the Special Emergency Force in Abha, the capital of Asir province.[35] As well on October 25, 2015, an ISIL suicide bomber murdered two people and injured some 26 in a Shia Ismaili mosque in Najran, eastern Saudi Arabia. Reportedly, the bomber (Saad Saeed al-Harthi) had tried to reenter Saudi Arabia illegally after spending four years in Syria with ISIL. A 95-year-old Saudi who died during the blast blocked the bomber outside the mosque and prevented more people from being killed.[36]

In 2016, a series of suicide bombings took place in some areas in the Kingdom: Ahsa, Madinah, Jeddah, Qatif. At the end of January 2016, the terrorists (suicide bombers) attacked a Shia mosque (al-Ridha Mosque) in al-Ahsa of Eastern Province during the Friday prayer. The attack killed

[33] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32843510. Accessed May 23, 2020.

[34] Associated Press, 29 May 2015.

[35] See https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-saudi-security-bomb/suicide-bomber-kills-15-in-saudi-security-site-mosque-idUKKCN0QB17Q20150806. Accessed May 23, 2020.

[36] See https://www.arabnews.com/featured/news/826976. Accessed May 23, 2020.

some four people and injured 18.[37] As well, four suicide bombs exploded in three locations on July 4. One of these exploded in the parking lot of the Nabawi Mosque in Madinah, a second holiest site after the Makkah's Haram Mosque, killing at least four people. The second and third suicide bombers targeted a Shia mosque in Qatif of Eastern Province but they failed to harm anyone but themselves. A fourth militant blew himself up after police tried to arrest him near the US Consulate in Jeddah. Two Saudi police officers reportedly were injured.

Since Saudi joined forces with the United States to raid the ISIL in Iraq and Syria, its leaders began to threaten to attack Shiites in the Kingdom and destabilize the House of Saud (*The Economist* 2017).[38] In reality, however, they targeted not only Shiites but also Saudi authorities (the policy, security forces, and government officials). In 2014, ISIL leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, called in an audio recording for Muslims to rise up against the House of Saud. Baghdadi did not refer to Saudi Arabia by its name, since ISIL and other militants do not recognize the Saudis Kingdom. Instead, he used the construction al-Haramain, a reference to the land of Islam's two holiest cities—Makkah and Madinah—where the religion was founded. "O sons of al-Haramain, the serpent's head and the stronghold of the disease are there. Draw your swords and divorce life, because there should be no security for the… [Sauds]"[39] (cited in Bazzi 2015).[40]

Moreover, Baghdadi also announced that ISIL was expanding, creating new "provinces" of its self-declared caliphate in five new countries: Saudi, Yemen, Libya, Algeria, and Egypt. While ISIL sympathizers had pledged allegiance to Baghdadi in other states, including Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, the ISIL leader singled out only those countries where the movement has a strong base of support and could mount sustained attacks. Nevertheless, Baghdadi also urged ISIL supporters to carry out "lone wolf" attacks wherever possible. Baghdadi declared the following, "Oh soldiers of the Islamic State erupt volcanoes of jihad everywhere. Light the earth with fire against all dictators." After Friday's bloodshed

[37] https://www.arabnews.com/featured/news/872726. Accessed May 23, 2020.

[38] https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21652037-islamic-state-claims-its-first-attack-inside-saudi-borders-bloodshed-kingdom.

[39] Saloul is a derogatory reference to the House of Saud.

[40] https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-new-wave-of-terrorist-violence.

(i.e. lethal terrorist attacks in France, Kuwait, and Tunisia, which blasted on Friday in the holy month of Ramadan in 2015), it seems that ISIL followers are heeding his call.

However, although ISIL threatened and terrorized the Kingdom with several bloody attacks, the Saudi government has never lost its gut. It continues to combat terrorist groups in order to create national security and social stability in the Kingdom. As a result, the Kingdom has enjoyed peacefulness, at least for the moment. Between 2017 and 2020, no suicide bombings, except minor gunfights between the police or security forces and some ISIL members such as a failed terrorist attack on the interior ministry building in Zulfi, north of Riyadh on April 21, 2019. The four terrorist attackers—armed with machine guns, bombs, and Molotov cocktails—were shot dead during the exchange of fire with Saudi security forces[41] (*Arab News* 2019).

Multiple Terrorisms: Concluding Remarks

Based on the depiction and analysis sketched above, few conclusions can be drawn as follows. First, despite the fact that there was no evidence that relates terrorism to Islamic doctrines and to the teachings of Mohammed bin Abd al-Wahbab (1703–1792), the founder of Wahhabism, hundreds of terrorist acts occurred in Saudi Arabia long before the 9/11 tragedy in the United States. The terrors occurred in the 1960s and intensified from the mid-1990s onward. Since the 1960s, Saudi Kingdom and society have suffered from terrorism that resulted in the deaths and injuries of thousands of innocent people.

Second, there were multiple factors, interests, and motives for the terrorist and militant acts, signifying the multiplicity and density of terrorism. Several factors contributed to the emergence of the domestic terrorism including—but not limited to—the following. First, geopolitical changes in the Middle East and the Gulf in particular. Second, the modernization process that shifted and transformed Saudi society to become away from Islamic values, according to some militant religious conservatives.

Third, the wide-presence of Westerners, especially Americans, in Saudi major firms, particularly ARAMCO, which potentially created jealousy

[41] https://www.arabnews.com/node/1485646/saudi-arabia. Accessed May 24, 2020.

among Saudi citizens. Fourth, the involvement of Saudis in foreign wars, especially in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Somalia, among others that radicalized those engaged in the wars (i.e. jihadists). Fifth, the Second Gulf War—i.e. Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990–1991 that led to the deployment of American troops in Saudi Arabia, which the United States used as a military base. Sixth, Saudi's involvement in the battles in Iraq and Syria that caused ISIL take revenge.

Third, perpetrators—individuals, organizations, and factions—of terrorism vary considerably coming from diverse backgrounds. These included secular leftists, apocalyptic rejectionist group, Hezbollah al-Hejaz, veterans of jihadi wars abroad, al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula, the Haramain Brigades, ISIL, among others. Fourth, multiple terrorist groups caused multiple motives and objectives of terrorism including toppling Saudi government, ousting Westerners (mainly Americans) from the Kingdom, taking revenge, reinstalling Saudi society and culture to become "religious," among others.

In brief, terrorism in the Kingdom is manifold. However, it is obvious that the terrorists used Islam only as a "cloak" to conceal their real non-religious motives and objectives. Although various terrorist groups had tried to destabilize the Kingdom hundreds of times, the Saudi government so far has won the battles through various counterterrorism and anti-terrorism strategies, tactics, policies, and programs, which are the subject of the following Chapter 3.

References

Abuza, Zachary. 2002a. "Al-Qaeda's Asian Web of Terror." *Time* (Asia) 160 (22): 38–40.

———. 2002b. "Tentacles of Terror: Al-Qaeda's Southeast Asian Network." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 24 (3): 427–465.

———. 2003. *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Al Qurtuby, Sumanto, and Shafi Aldamer. 2021. "Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia." *Contemporary Review of the Middle East* 8 (1): 56–76.

Al-Rasheed, Madawi. 2007. *Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Al-Sharhan, Saud. 2015. "The Struggle for Authority: The Shaykhs of Jihadi-Salafism in Saudi Arabia, 1997–2003." In *Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Social, Political, Economic and Religious Change*, edited by Bernard Haykel,

Thomas Hegghammer, and Stephane Lacroix, 181–206. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Al Mustafa, Hassan. 2015. "Hezbollah el-Hejaz: A Story Not Yet Written." *Al Arabiya*, October 1. https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2015/10/01/Hezbollah-al-Hejaz-A-story-not-yet-written. Accessed May 21, 2020.

Al Suhail, Turki. 2017. "Iran Planned to Revive Hezbollah al-Hejaz Under al-Mughassil's Command." *Asharq al-Ausat*, Augustus 25. https://web.archive.org/web/20170901120355/https://english.aawsat.com/turkisuhail/news-middle-east/iran-planned-revive-hezbollah-al-hejaz-al-mughassils-command. Accessed May 21, 2020.

Alterman, Jon B., and William McCants. 2014. "Saudi Arabia: Islamist Rising and Falling." In *Religious Radicalism After the Arab Uprisings*, edited by Jon B. Alterman, 144–175. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Ansary, Abdullah F. 2008. "Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach." *Middle East Policy* XV (2). http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/combating-extremism-brief-overview-saudi-arabias-approach. Accessed September 26, 2015.

Asseri, Ali S. Awadh. 2009. *Combating Terrorism: Saudi Arabia's Role in the War on Terror*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bahaa, Sherine. 2005. "Striking Hard." *Al Ahram Weekly*, No. 738, April 7–13. https://web.archive.org/web/20130326185702/http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/737/re9.htm. Accessed May 22, 2020.

Barfield, Thomas. 2005. "An Islamic State Is a State Run by Good Muslims: Religion as a Way of Life and Not an Ideology in Afghanistan." In *Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, and Democratization*, edited by Robert W. Hefner, 213–239. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Barret, Richard. 2014. "The Islamic State." Working Paper, November. The Soufan Group.

———. 2017. "Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees." Working Paper, October 31. The Soufan Center.

Bazzi, Mohamad. 2015. "ISIS, Saudi Arabia, and a New Wave of Terrorist Violence." *The New Yorker*, June 29. https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-new-wave-of-terrorist-violence. Accessed September 11, 2020.

Blanchard, Christopher, and Alfred Prados. 2007. "Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues." *CRS Report for Congress*. Congressional Research Service.

Burke, Jason. 2003. *Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Chulov, Martin. 2018. "My Son, Osama: The al-Qaeda Leader's Mother Speaks for the First Time." *The Guardian*, August 3. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/03/osama-bin-laden-mother-speaks-out-family-interview. Accessed May 12, 2020.

Commins, David. 2009. *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*. London: I.B. Tauris.

———. 2015. *Islam in Saudi Arabia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Cordesman, Anthony H, and Nawaf Obaid. 2005. *Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia: Asymmetric Threats and Islamist Extremists*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Dennis, Anthony. 1996. *The Rise of the Islamic Empire and the Threat to the West*. Bristol, IN: Wyndham Hall Press.

Estes, Kenneth W. 2006a. *The Second Gulf War (1990–1991)*. Zurich, Switzerland: International Relations and Security Network.

———. 2006b. "Iraq Between Two Occupations: The Second Gulf War (1990–91)." Zurich, Switzerland: International Relation and Security Network.

Ewans, Martin. 2002. *Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics*. New York: HarperCollins.

Farquhar, Michael. 2017. *Circus of Faith: Migration, Education, and the Wahhabi Mission*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Gabriel, Mark. 2002. *Islam and Terrorism: What the Qur'an Really Teaches About Christianity, Violence, and the Goals of Islamic Jihad*. Lake Mary, FL: Charisma House.

Gendron, Angela. 2010. "Confronting Terrorism in Saudi Arabia." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 23: 487–508.

Gold, Dore. 2003. *Hatred's Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism*. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing.

Gunaratna, Rohan, Jolene Jerard, and Lawrence Rubin. 2002. *Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*. Columbia, NY: Columbia University Press.

Hammond, Peter. 2010. *Slavery, Terrorism, and Islam*. Maitland, FL: Xulon Press.

Hegghammer, Thomas. 2006. "Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia." *Middle East Policy* 13 (4): 39–60.

———. 2008. "Islamist Violence and Regime Stability in Saudi." *International Affairs* 84 (4): 701–715.

———. 2009. "Jihad, Yes, but Not Revolution: Explaining the Extraversion of Islamist Violence in Saudi Arabia." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 36 (3): 395–416.

———. 2010a. *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism Since 1979*. London: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2010b. *The Failure of Jihad in Saudi Arabia*. West Point: Combating Terrorism Center.

———. 2015. "Classical and Global Jihadism in Saudi Arabia." In *Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Social, Political, Economic and Religious Change*, edited by Bernard Haykel, Thomas Hegghammer, and Stephane Lacroix, 207–228. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

———, and Stephane Lacroix. 2007. "Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-'Utaybi Revisited." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 39: 103–122.

House, Karen Elliot. 2015. "Kingdom at the Crossroads: Can Saudi Arabia Find a Middle Path?" *Time*, February 9, pp. 24–28.

ICG (International Crisis Group). 2004. "Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix." Asia Report No. 83, September 15.

Jawhar, Sabria S., and Rob L. Wagner. 2005. "Battle of Al-Ras." *The Saudi Gazette*, April 12. https://sites.google.com/site/roblwagnerarchives/battle-of-al-ras. Accessed May 21, 2020.

Jones, Toby. 2009. "Embattled in Arabia: Shi'is and the Politics of Confrontation in Saudi Arabia." Occasional Paper Series, June 3. Shi'a Militancy Program, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point.

Kifner, John. 1987. "400 Die as Iranian Marchers Battle Saudi Police in Mecca; Embassies Smashed in Teheran." *The New York Times*, August 2. https://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/02/world/400-die-iranian-marchers-battle-saudi-police-mecca-embassies-smashed-teheran.html. Accessed May 16, 2020.

Lacroix, Stephane. 2005. "Islamo-Liberal Politics in Saudi Arabia." In *Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs*, edited by Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman, 35–56. London, UK: C. Hurst & Co.

Leonnig, Carol D. 2006. "Iran Held Liable in Khobar Attack." *Washington Post*, December 23. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/22/AR2006122200455.html. Accessed May 19, 2020.

Lewis, Bernard. 2004. *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*. New York, NY: The Random House.

Mann, Joseph. 2012. "King Faisal and the Challenge of Nasser's Revolutionary Ideology." *Middle Eastern Studies* 48 (5): 749–764.

Matthiesen, Toby. 2010. "Hizbullah al-Hijaz: A History of the Most Radical Shi'a Opposition Group." *The Middle East Journal* 64 (2): 179–197.

———. 2015a. *The Other Saudis: Shiism, Dissent and Sectarianism*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2015b. "The Domestic Sources of Saudi Foreign Policy: Islamists and the State in the Wake of the Arab Uprisings." Working Paper Series. Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.

McCants, William. 2015. *The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

McIntyre, Jamie. 1995. "US Vows Terrorist Bomb Won't Effect Saudi Relationship." *CNN*, November 13. http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9511/saudi_blast/pm/. Accessed May 19, 2020.

Meijer, Roel. 2005. "The 'Cycle of Contention' and the Limits of Terrorism in Saudi Arabia." In *Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society,*

Foreign Affairs, edited by Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman, 271–314. London, UK: C. Hurst & Co.

———. 2006. "Re-reading of al-Qaeda Writings of Yusuf al-Ayiri." *ISIM Review* 18: 1–2.

Nasr, Vali. 2007. *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future*. New York: W. W. Norton.

Nisan, Mordechai. 2007. "Saudi Arabia's Jihad in the Middle East and the World." The Ariel Centre for Policy Research, Israel.

Paul, Jim. 1980. "Insurrection at Mecca." MERIP Reports No. 91: 3–4.

Peterson, J. E. 2003. *Historical Dictionary of Saudi Arabia*. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.

Rashid, Ahmad. 2001. *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*. Yale: Yale University Press.

Riedel, Bruce. 2015. "The Prince of Counterterrorism." *The Brookings Essay*, September 29. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. http://csweb.brookings.edu/content/research/essays/2015/the-prince-of-counterterrorism.html. Accessed June 7, 2020.

Rudolph, Rachael. 2006. "Identity, Foreign Policy, and the War on Terrorism in Saudi Arabia." MA thesis, Faculty of the School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC.

———. 2018. *Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia: New Approaches to Radical Threats*. London, UK: I.B. Tauris.

Schwartz, Stephen. 2003. *The Two Faces of Islam: Saudi Fundamentalism and Its Role in Terrorism*. New York: Anchor Books.

Sreedhar. 1982. *The Gulf Scramble for Security*. New Delhi: ABC Publishing House.

Teitelbaum, Joshua. 2000. *Holier than Thou: Saudi Arabia's Islamic Opposition*. Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

The Soufan Group. 2015. "Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq." Unpublished manuscript.

Trofirmov, Yaroslav. 2007. *The Siege of Mecca: The Forgotten Uprising in Islam's Holiest Shrine and the Birth of al-Qaeda*. New York, NY: Doubleday.

Weston, Mark. 2008. *Prophets and Princes: Saudi Arabia from Muhammad to the Present*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Wright, Rubin. 2001. *Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

CHAPTER 3

Saudi Government and Counterterrorism

I vow to combat terrorism until we see its defeat and the extremists will no longer tarnish our beautiful religion[1]

—Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman Al Saud

Introduction

This chapter outlines the Saudi government's attempts, approaches, and initiatives on combating terrorism and radicalism as well as analyzes their strengths and limitations. It sketches how the Saudi rulers, especially since the reign of King Faisal (r. 1964–75) until King Salman (r. 2015-), deals, engages, overcomes, and resolves issues and problems of terrorism and extremism. The purpose of the chapter is present facts and information about the Saudi government's uneasy attempts at fighting terrorism hoping that international societies are aware of the Kingdom's long struggle in the combat of extremist and terrorist threats. The chapter also assesses and analyzes the effectiveness/ineffectiveness, strengths, and weaknesses of the government's policies and approaches of counterterrorism.

[1] Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman conveyed this statement at an inaugural meeting of the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC) Ministers of Defense Council in Riyadh on November 25, 2017. https://www.arabnews.com/node/1199381/saudi-arabia. Retrieved May 25, 2020.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022

S. Al Qurtuby, *Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1337-2_3

Some questions the chapter tries to answer are as follows. What are the government's strategies and tactics in combating terrorism? What are the types of counterterrorism approaches and programs or anti-terrorism policies that the government have to fight terrorist threats since the 1960s until recently? How do they apply and what are the underlying rationales of these approaches and programs? Are the government's strategies, tactics, approaches, and programs effective, productive, and successful in combating terrorism and radicalism? What are the limitations and weaknesses of the counterterrorism approaches? What kinds of barriers, if any, do the government have and how do they overcome them? As well, what are the resemblances and differences in ways of combating terrorism before and after the 9/11 tragedy and the 2003 Riyadh bombings?

To my knowledge, the existing literature generally discusses and emphasizes the Saudi government's counterterrorism attempts since the 2000s onwards, especially since the late King Abdullah (1924–2015) (see, for example, Boucek 2008a, b; Gendron 2010; Rudolph 2006, 2018). It is difficult to find studies of combating terrorism by the Saudi government before the 2000s. Accordingly, this chapter will fill the gap and complement the previous studies and existing literature on this subject. In fact, the Saudi government's attempts at fighting terrorism and extremism go back long before the 2000s. Meijer (2012a, b) even said that Saudi Arabia's tradition of combating extremism and terrorism goes back to the founding of the modern Saudi state by King Ibn Saud (1875–1953). In response to the Ikhwan revolt, between 1927 and 1930, the king led counterterrorism efforts known as "the struggle against extremism" (*ghuluw*). This tradition of combating extremism was resurrected in late 1950s or early 1960s onwards following major terrorist attacks in the Kingdom by multiple Muslim militant groups from various ideological, political, and Islamic streams.

Nonetheless, although the chapter describes the government's counterterrorism efforts since the reign of King Faisal in the 1960s, the bulk of this chapter will discuss and analyze the Kingdom's policies, strategies, and tactics of counterterrorism and anti-terrorism in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 (the 9/11) and in Riyadh on May 12, 2003 (the 5/12). This is mainly because the Saudi government has developed more robust, strategic, and comprehensive measures of fighting against terrorism only after the 9/11 and 5/12 tragedies. In a response to three suicide car bombings of Riyadh's housing compounds in May 2003 that claimed some thirty-four innocent lives and injured many

others (see Chapter 2), the late Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (then king in 2005), who was applauded as a moderate political leader, stated blatantly: "I vow to my fellow citizens, and to the friends who reside among us, that the State will be vigilant about their security and well-being. Our nation is capable, by the Grace of God Almighty and the unity of its citizens, to confront and destroy the threat posed by a deviant few and those who endorse or support them. With the help of God Almighty, we shall prevail."[2]

About thirteen years later, in 2017, another Crown Prince, namely Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (b. 1985) declared, "I vow to combat terrorism until we see its defeat and the extremists will no longer tarnish our beautiful religion." The Crown Prince conveyed this statement at an inaugural meeting of the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC)[3] Ministers of Defense Council in Riyadh on November 25, 2017. The crown prince, furthermore, said, "The biggest danger of this terrorism and extremism is the tarnishing of the reputation of our beloved religion. We will not allow this to happen. Today, we start the pursuit of terrorism and we see its defeat in many facets around the world, especially in Muslim countries. We will continue to fight it until we see its defeat."[4]

Indeed, following a series of deadly domestic terrorist attacks in 2003, particularly since the late King Abdullah, the Saudi government had begun an ambitious wide-ranging counterterrorism endeavor, combining military and non-military approaches (commonly known as hard and soft approaches), to fight against radical and terrorist groupings across the Kingdom. Besides traditional security, military, and law-enforcement attempts to capture, jail, or assassinate terrorists, the Saudi government also launched a parallel strategy to combat the ideological justifications

[2] An official statement of Crown Prince Abdullah, *Post-September 11 Scenarios: The Efforts of the Embassy of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to Combat Terrorism* (Islamabad: Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2005), 21.

[3] The IMCTC encompasses an integrated approach to coordinate and unite on the four key domains of ideology, communications, counterterrorism financing, and military aiming to fight all forms of terrorism and extremism, as well as to join other international security and peacebuilding attempts. The coalition will develop, gather, shop, and disseminate extensive information on counterterrorism and antiradicalism programs, as well as best techniques embarked on by member nations and international organizations.

[4] See Mohammed bin Salman's statement at https://www.arabnews.com/node/1199381/saudi-arabia. Retrieved May 25, 2020.

for violent radicalism and extremism within the Kingdom (see e.g. Gause III 2004; Meijer 2005; Cordesman 2006; Boucek 2008a, b; Ansary 2008; Al-Saud 2009; Riedel 2015; Alyami 2015; Mahboob 2017).

Over the past decade, the government has increased defense and security spending as well as set up groundbreaking centers to pacify radical extremists, including terrorists. Additionally, Saudi Arabia has for years been counter-messaging and working on ways to disengage and de-radicalize imprisoned terrorists and violent extremists. In other words, the Saudi authorities do not only view the struggle against terrorism and other forms of violent extremism as merely a physical combat against terrorists and extremists but a "war of ideas" centered upon issues of legitimacy, authority, and legality/illegality in Islam. Until now, Saudi Arabia has gained its reputation as one of the leading nations combating terrorism and terrorist financing and has been working closely with its allies on all fronts. The Kingdom continues to hunt down the terrorists, cutting off the money and destroying the mindset that terror organizations—al-Qaeda, ISIL, and others—create and rely on.

To abridge, the government's efforts of counterterrorism include the following: fighting terrorist activities; containment consequences of terrorist act; participation in security media message; intellectual confrontation; preemptive operations; creation of public awareness on the danger of terrorism; participation of religious scholars, security experts, and psychologists in the rehabilitation committees; coordination across relevant ministries and agencies; cooperation with regional and global institutions; among others (Al Zahrani 2012; Al-Saud 2009; Khan 2014).

The result of these multiple counterterrorism efforts, for the moment, is rather fascinating. From late 2016 until 2019, the Kingdom for the most part has been quite peaceful, free from sporadic terrorist acts, and its citizens have enjoyed security and stability. It seems the terrorists failed to gain popular support for their cause since there have been civilian innocent victims (both Saudi and other nationalities) resulted from their brutal violent acts, which doomed them to defeat; thereby, Saudi Arabia has been one of few countries in the world where the fight against home terrorism and extremism has harvested real success. Again, this is for the moment since we never know what is happening in the future. At present, the only challenge Saudi Arabia has are attacks from the Houthis of Yemen who sent missiles numerous times targeting the Kingdom's facilities from airports and government offices to mosques and oil industry areas.

Although more vigorous, tactical, and all-inclusive endeavors of countering terrorism and extremism took place since the 5/12 terrorist catastrophe, this does not mean that the Kingdom did nothing on how to solve and combat terrorist attacks that blasted the Kingdom prior to this tragedy. In fact, since the 1960s or even before 1932, when King Ibn Saud united four major regions (Hijaz, Najd, Asir, and parts of eastern Arabia) into a single state, the Kingdom had tried to overcome multiple terror attacks. In efforts to combat terrorism, the Kingdom also applied multiple approaches depending on the situations (e.g. geopolitical dynamics, the nature of issues, or actors of terrorism), although its models are not as comprehensive as those in the post-5/12 since it still took—and were dominated by—the traditional modest forms such as military/security approach.

Combating Terrorism, 1960–2001

Ever since the Kingdom faces terrorism, it tries to overcome it. In the 1950s and 1960s, when the Soviet-backed Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–70) and Syria's Baathist regime, launched a series of campaigns to overthrow the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (see Chapter 2), the Saudi government had conducted a variety of measures to deal with it. The campaigns took various forms: attempted coups, guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and bombings mainly through Nasser's channel in the Kingdom, especially Ha'il-based the Arabian Peninsula People's Union (APPU). A revolutionary Arab organization based on the premise of scientific socialism, the APPU arguably was Saudi Arabia's most politically diverse membership of the group opposition aiming to overthrow the Kingdom and to unite the Arabian Peninsula (Sreedhar 1982; Peterson 2003).

The government's responses towards the APPU are typically a mixture of repression (hard approach), co-optation, and accommodation. Following the bombing attacks between 1966 and 1967, Saudi authorities hunted down, arrested, executed, and jailed a great number of the union's members that severely weakened the party. The provisional pact between Riyadh and Cairo (Mann 2012), the demise of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1970, and the subsequent decline of the popularity of Nasserism also helped contribute to the APPU's decay. Other factors that undermined and contributed to the downfall of the union and other traditional left wing (socialist) Arab groups were Iraq's Saddam Hussein's defeat

in the Gulf War, the collapse of most Marxist governments, and the Egyptian–Syrian cooperation with the United States.

Finally, in the 1980s, the APPU was one of the several leftist (Arab Socialism–Marxism) and Islamist opposition groups that Saudi government was able to neutralize and "pacify" through an amalgamation of hard and soft approaches such as co-optation and accommodation (Dekmejian 1995). As an outcome, even though Saudi Arabia did face a challenge from Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Baath Party of Syria, and Arab socialism in the past, there is little evidence that such political movements retain any political strength (Cordesman 2001).

Apart from the crackdown of pro-Nasser leftist and Republican group, the emergence of Arab Republicanism, Socialism–Marxism, or Nasserism drove the Kingdom to harbor the Muslim Brothers (i.e. members and activists of the Muslim Brotherhood) of Egypt and Syria who suffered under Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Baath Party due to their political antagonism against the two regimes. At the time, there was an odd, impermanent coalition between Saudi royal family and the Muslim Brotherhood. A sort of "symbiosis mutualism" was created in which the Muslim Brothers sought a haven to avoid persecutions of Nasser and the Baathists while Saudi rulers tried to use them to counter Egypt's (and Syria's) aggressive, violent propaganda on Pan-Republicanism, Arab Socialism, or secular-nationalist movement.

However, the Kingdom did not utilize them, for instance, as "foot soldiers" to confront physically against Saudi's Nasserist groups, including the APPU-related activists and terrorists, but rather as one of the Kingdom's vanguards—along with "traditional Wahhabis"—to challenge ideologies and movements that opposed the Kingdom (e.g. Nasserism or Pan-Arab Socialism) through Islamic discourses and movements such as Pan-Islamism. The Kingdom also used them to help boost religious education—e.g. designing school's curricula, teaching Islamic disciplines, and developing universities (e.g. the Islamic University of Madinah, see Farquhar 2017), among others. I do not want to discuss this issue in detail since this is not the book's primary scope. However, suffice to say that harboring and co-opting the Muslim Brothers were part of the Kingdom's strategies and tactics to counter Arab leftists and radical republicans that competed against Saudi ruling family by committing various forms of violence from coups to terrorist attacks. If later, the Muslim Brothers helped contribute to the shape of the Sahwa movement that eventually tested the Kingdom (see Chapter 2), that is certainly different story and dynamics.

Responding to the Juhayman Case

When Juhayman al-Otaybi and his apocalyptic rejectionist group hijacked and seized Makkah's Grand Mosque of Haram (Masjid al-Haram) for nearly three weeks in 1979 (see Chapter 2), the Saudi authorities used military approach to retake the Grand Mosque and secure the pilgrims who trapped in the mosque.[5] The use of this hard approach mainly because the rebels refused to surrender and release the innocent hajj pilgrims. At first, the Saudi rulers officially did not intend to regain the mosque violently but rather starve out the militants. However, their attempts were unsuccessful. Finally, the Saudi authorities used the military model.

It took about two weeks to recapture the Grand Mosque from the insurgents due to the location where the rebels committed their violent and terrorist acts was considered by Muslims a sacred site in which people, including the military and the police, are not allowed to bring lethal weapons. In order to get in the mosque, the military forces required a fatwa or approval from Saudi Council of Senior Scholars[6] (*majlis hai'at kibar al-ulama*), which at the time was led by Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz (1910–99). After receiving the fatwa that allowed them to enter the mosque with military equipment, Saudi National Guards and the army began to assault the terrorists. The battle between the security forces and the insurgents resulted in the deaths and injuries of hundreds of people, including pilgrims, rebels, and military personnel (Wright 2001; Trovimof 2007).

The Saudi authorities arrested and beheaded the rebels who survived from the battle (about 67), including Juhayman, the group's leader. The Council of Senior Scholars, once again, issued a fatwa that found the defendants guilty of at least seven crimes, namely violating the Grand Mosque's sanctity, violating the sanctity of Muharram, killing

[5] See a brief story about Juhayman al-Otaybi and the 1979 tragedy at https://www.arabnews.com/juhayman-40-years-on. Retrieved May 27, 2020.

[6] The Council of Senior Scholars (also known as the Senior Council of Ulama) whose members were appointed by the King of Saudi Arabia (now headed by Shaikh Abdul Aziz Al Shaikh) is the Kingdom's highest religious institution that counsels the king on religious matters. In 1972, King Faisal issued a royal decree to establish the council. Until 2009, the council's members were restricted from Hanbali madhab. However, in 2009, King Abdullah expanded its members to include scholars from Shafii, Maliki, and Hanafi madhabs.

fellow Muslims, disobeying legitimate authorities, suspending prayer at the Grand Mosque, erring in identifying the Mahdi, and exploiting the innocent for criminal acts (Commins 2009: 168).

Following the bloody attacks, King Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (1913–82) did not react to the upheaval by cracking down on religious radicals and puritans but rather by implementing a sticker enforcement of Sharia law across the Kingdom, giving conservative ulama (Islamic scholars) more power, and providing religious police with more authority. It seems that King Khalid had come to agree with a group of conservative ulama and shaikhs that foreign influences such as modernization and consumerism and any everyday practices that are considered irreligious (un-Islamic) were part of the problem that led the appearance of people like Juhayman and his group. In addition to social conditions, misinterpretation and misunderstanding of Islam were also a central element that drove people as Juhayman and his group to emerge. For King Khalid, the solution to the religious turmoil was simple: by implementing more religion (Lacey 2009; Wright 2001).

The assumption was that by applying sticker religious approaches, policies, and activities in education, families, public spheres, and everyday life, people such as Juhayman and his group would not reemerge in the future. This is mainly because, according to the logics of the king and the Wahhabi official religious establishment, Juhayman and his fellows were the product of two fundamental but interrelated issues. These issues are, first, modernism that caused moral decadence and irreligious practices of Saudi society and second, incorrect interpretations and understandings of Islam (e.g. on the firm belief that Muhammad bin Abdullah al-Qahtani, one of the rebels, was the Mahdi[7] as well as the use of violence and terrorism). In other words, Juhayman and his fellows represented an aberrant group that are away from the true and authentic Islamic teachings that teach and encourage modesty and peace for the devotees of Islam.

[7] The Mahdi (lit. the guided one) is an eschatological concept for redeemer of Islam who, according to some Islamic traditions, will appear in the world and rule for several years before the Day of Judgment. The concept of Mahdi is a religious offshoot that is also present in other religions such as Judaism and Christianity. It depicts the Mahdi as a person who, by Allah's Grace, will bring salvation and justice to the world. Once the Mahdi comes, according to the Islamic tradition, everyone will be in good health, prosperity, and well-being. Throughout the centuries, some people declared themselves as the Mahdi such as Muhammad Ahmad, a Sudanese clerics who led a rebellion against Egyptian authorities in Sudan in 1881.

Accordingly, the implementation and enforcement of more conservative religious practices in all aspects of Saudi's society would help resolve the society's problems of immorality and irreligious cultures on one hand and avert the appearance of a misguided group such as Juhayman and his men on the other. Interestingly, although Juhayman contributed to the shape of the Kingdom's dark history, the Saudi government does not take revenge on his offspring. In fact, in 2018, the government promoted Juhayman's son, Hathal, to the rank of colonel in the Saudi National Guards, which in 1979 became one of the security forces that recaptured the Grand Mosque and fought against the rebels.[8] The promotion of Hathal bin Juhayman al-Otaybi was also part of the Saudi government's effort and soft approach to cut off a chain of terrorism and a cycle of vengeance that might ascend from the terrorists' family and progeny.

Responding to the Hezbollah Al-Hejaz and the Islamic Jihad Organization

In the aftermath of the 1979 tragedy of the Makkah's Grand Mosque confiscation, Saudi Arabia experienced another terrorist attack in late 1980s (between 1985 and 1989). This time, the perpetrators were activists of Shiite—linked Hezbollah al-Hejaz and possibly other Shia militant groups such as the Islamic Jihad Organization in the Hijaz and Hezbollah al-Kuwait (see Chapter 2). Unlike with previous radical and opposition groups—the APPU and Juhayman's group—the case of Hezbollah al-Hejaz was a bit complex, difficult, and risky to deal with mainly because the group's members and activists were from Shia community, which is a significant minority group comprising between 10–15% of Saudi Arabia's total population.

Another reason, the group had a regional network in the Middle East (e.g. Lebanon, Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq among others), in addition to support from, mainly the Iranian regime, which was in rivalry with the Kingdom. Consequently, if failed to handle properly and strategically, it could turn into a backlash against the Saudi ruling family. Indeed, throughout the 1980s, in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, relations between Shiites and the Saudi government remained very tense.

[8] See at https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2018/09/03/Son-of-Juhayman-infamous-Mecca-attacker-promoted-to-be-a-Saudi-Guards-colonel. Retrieved May 27, 2020.

The government's task in dealing (peacefully) with the Hezbollah al-Hejaz became more complicated and dilemmatic since the rulers received pressure from the non-Shia religious militant and conservative factions such as the Sahwa that disagreed with any efforts of peacebuilding and reconciliation with Shiites. However, in general though, the Kingdom was successful in the crackdown of Hezbollah al-Hejaz.

Following Hezbollah al-Hejaz's terrorist attacks, the Saudi government implemented two types of separate but complementary approaches, namely hard or military approach and soft or non-military approach. The hard approach included the arrest, detention, and killing of the perpetrators of terrorism, while soft model comprised, among others, negotiation, dialogue, co-optation, accommodation, Shia related policies improvement, and the royal pardon not only with the survived terrorists but also other Shia non-terrorist radicals and opposition groups as well.

A series of terrorist attacks and other types of violence committed by Shia militants gave the Saudi government a basis, justification, and rationale to clear-out the terrorists and radicals that challenged the ruling family. By late 1980s, the Saudi authorities arrested dozens of terrorists and many Shia political elites, activists, and militants that severely weakened Hezbollah al-Hejaz and its networks. Some Hezbollah al-Hejaz's terrorist suspects had been executed in late 1980s such as Azhar Ali al-Hajjaj, Ali Abdalla al-Khatim, Muhammad Ali al-Qarus, and Khalid Abdul Ghamid al-Alq, whereas others were detained and jailed.

In addition to applying "hard approaches," the government also opened "new gates" by implementing "soft methods" through various programs and policies. Exploratory and productive meetings—in Saudi Arabia or abroad—between representatives of the Saudi government and Shia elite members have become recurrent since late 1980s. Some Shia opposition leaders, including Hassan al-Saffar from Pan-Shia Association in Saudi Arabia (*rabitat umum al-Shi'a fi al-Su'udiyya*) and Tawfiq al-Saif from the Organization for the Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula (*munazzamat al-thawra al-Islamiyya fi al-jazira al-'arabiyya*), held various meetings, including clandestine meetings, with Saudi notables of the royal family or their representatives. These included meetings with a delegate of Prince Turki Al-Faisal, head of Saudi Intelligent Directorate; Ghazi al-Qusaybi, Saudi Ambassador to the United Kingdom; Abdul Aziz al-Tuwayjri, former deputy of the Saudi National Guard and advisor to Crown Prince Abdullah; Prince Bandar bin Sultan Al Saud, the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, and other important Saudi officials.

The meetings led to heated discussions among Saudi Shia opposition groups who demanded several important and pressing issues in order to improve Shia–Saudi relations in the future. These issues included the official recognition of Shia as an Islamic sect; a termination of anti-Shia propaganda campaigns; the consent of building Shia mosques and schools; an amendment of the education system and curricula that allowed Shiites to teach students in accordance to their Islamic beliefs, doctrines and religious practices; and the permission to publish Shia books and magazines. As well, the release of hundreds of Shia political prisoners, the return of hundreds of Shia opposition activists who lived abroad, and the lifting of travel bans on thousands of Shiites in the Kingdom (Matthiesen 2015a: 148–56).

In a response to the "Shia demands," in 1992, King Fahd introduced and issued three decrees, namely the Basic Law of Saudi Arabia or Basic System of Government,[9] the Law of the Provinces, and the Law of the Majelis al-Shura. The Basic Law regulates many important issues including citizenship, economy, law, finances, and so forth of Saudi citizens, regardless of their Islamic sects and affiliations. The Law of the Provinces turned the Kingdom's regions into administrative units and introduced local councils. The Law of the Majelis al-Shura incorporated Shia membership.

The Issuance of the Royal Amnesty and Its Implications

Moreover, in 1993, King Fahd issued a royal amnesty for Shia opposition groups that forgave Shiites who engaged in violent and oppositional activities, resulting in the homecoming of many Shia exiles who fled the country during the turmoil in the 1980s. The government also released some forty Shia political prisoners, most of them were leaders and members of the Hezbollah al-Hejaz such as Ja'far al-Mubarak, a suspect of the 1988 bombing. In addition to the shifting local dynamics and development within the Kingdom, another important factor that contributed to the 1993 royal pardon was the improvement of Saudi–Iranian relations

[9] The Basic Law of Saudi Arabia or the Basic System of Government (*al-nizam al-asasi lil hukm*) is a constitution—like a charter that is divided into nine chapters and consists of 83 articles. The constitution of Saudi Arabia is the Qur'an and the Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad (stated in the Basic Law's Article 1). However, the Basic Law contains many characteristics of what might be called a "constitution" in other countries.

(at the time Iran was under President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, r. 1989–97), following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait that Tehran firmly opposed. Indeed, Iran's antagonism against Iraq's annexation led to the restoration of diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 1991.

After the release of Shia political prisoners and the return of Shia exiles, a Shia delegation met King Fahd and his son, Prince Muhammad bin Fahd Al Saud (b.1950) at the king's palace in Jeddah.[10] The delegation thanked the king for issuing a royal pardon and releasing the prisoners. They also addressed a number of issues such as the possibility of Shia employment in local firms, the passport issuance for Shiites living overseas, the lifting of domestic travel bans for Shiites, or the taking care of wives whose husbands were in exile. King Fahd promised and agreed to resolve these issues, and for wider political and religious issues would be discussed and handled with relevant ministries (Lacey 2009). Not only having meeting with King Fahd and Prince Muhammad bin Fahd, the Shia delegation also held meetings with other high-ranking government officials such as the Minister of Interior, Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (1934–2012), and Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (1924–2015).

In brief, the 1993 pact changed the local political landscape and dynamics profoundly, especially in the region of Eastern Province (Ash Sharqiyah), where most Shiites resided (particularly in Ahsa, Qatif, Dammam, Saihat, and Khobar among others). From the government's point of view, the 1993 accord that granted a royal amnesty was a crucial accomplishment. At least, it succeeded in silencing the most outspoken media outlets abroad and many Shia opposition leaders. Additionally, the deal was able to co-opt many Shia political activists, placing them under the surveillance of the security services. In 1993, years of grassroots activism and exile politics ended with the integration or co-optation of most Shia political and opposition leaders and activists into Saudi networks of patronage. Only a few (such as Nimr al-Nimr, who, in 2016,

[10] Reportedly, the meeting was held in a friendly manner and atmosphere. The Shia delegates recalled that King Fahd was not wearing the *mislah,* the clock that Saudi ruling family members only put aside if in the company of their families or close friends (Lacey 2009). This appearance and gesture indicated the king's acknowledgment of Shiites as part of Saudi's big family and friends, and was strategic to rebuild trust and reconcile with Shia groups who were involved in conflict and tensions with the government.

was sentenced to death by the government) remained critical to the government.

Unfortunately, however, the 1993 peace deal was later destroyed with an incident of the 1996 Khobar Tower bombing that was allegedly committed by Hezbollah al-Hejaz militants (see Chapter 2). The Khobar Tower bombing resulted in the massive crackdown of Hezbollah al-Hejaz's activists, and the government began to keep an eye on Shia rival groups suspiciously. As a result, Saudi–Shia relations deteriorated again and only recovered later during the reign of King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud (r. 2005–15). Prior to the Khobar Tower bombing, in 1995, Saudi Arabia also witnessed bloody terrorist attacks at the US-operated National Guard Training Center in Riyadh, which were committed by Sunni reformist jihadists and ex-combatants of the Afghan War (see Chapter 2) that also resulted in the massive crackdown of the terrorists and their cells. In general, the Saudi authorities applied military or security approaches to deal and overcome the two cases of the terrorist bombings in Khobar and Riyadh.

In the aftermath of the 1996 bombing until early 2002, when minor sporadic cases of terrorism occurred, the Saudi government still focused on hard approaches: arresting, detaining, or killing terrorist suspects, or destroying their cells. The Saudi ruling family, especially since King Abdullah started developing more robust strategies and tactics of combating terrorism following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon, and more specifically in the aftermath of the Riyadh bombing in May 2003.

Combating Terrorism, 2001–2020

On May 12, 2003, as stated earlier, three suicide car bombings (and small arms) carried out by a dozen of al-Qaeda terrorists exploded at Riyadh compounds that housed foreign military experts working for the Saudi armed forces. The attack killed and wounded many people, mostly Americans but also other Westerners. It was the first major attack in Saudi Arabia by al-Qaeda and its network (i.e. the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula). It was also the first volley in what became a campaign of terror against foreign workers in the Kingdom, especially Westerners, and their Saudi hosts, including the government's officials and properties. For the next three years, after the 5/12 tragedy, Saudi Arabia became a battlefield of

al-Qaeda activists and jihadists in which hundreds died and many more were injured during the combats (see Chapter 2).

Directly after the attack, George Tenet, the director of CIA (Central Intelligence Agency of the United States) from 1996 to 2004, flew to Saudi Arabia. He wanted to meet the late Crown Prince Abdullah, a "de facto king" after King Fahd suffered a stroke since 1995, as well as Prince Muhammad bin Nayef (MBN), who was Assistant Interior Minister for Security Affairs. Crown Prince Abdullah became a Saudi king in 2005, following the death of King Fahd, while MBN became the Minister of Interior in 2012, replacing Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz Al Saud. During the meeting, Tenet said to the crown prince, "Your Royal Highness, your family and the end of its rule is al-Qaeda's objective now. al-Qaeda operatives are prepared to assassinate members of the royal family and attack key economic targets" (cited in Riedel 2015: 8–9). Tenet tried to convince both crown prince and MBN about the danger of al-Qaeda within the Kingdom.

King Abdullah's Key Role and Contributions

In a response to the 5/12 Riyadh bombings, the crown prince vowed to confront terrorism, hunt down terrorists, and destroy terrorist nests. It was Crown Prince Abdullah actually who initiated strategic counterterrorism and antiradicalism programs. MBN strengthened, modified, and developed Abdullah's initiatives, and later (since 2017) Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) boosted and advanced the initiatives and programs. According to Bruce Riedel, director of the Brookings Institution's Intelligence Project who served as a senior advisor on the Middle East to several presidents of the United States, elite members in Riyadh, who were friendly with Osama bin Laden during the Russian–Afghan War of 1979–89, was late and slow in responding Osama's and al-Qaeda's threat to their soil.

When George Tenet in late 1990s warned the Saudi royals that Bin Laden had built an extensive underground infrastructure inside the Kingdom since the 1990s in the aftermath of the Afghan War, they were skeptical, and even after the 9/11 tragedy, their minds were slow to change. Insisting that the fifteen Saudi hijackers that blasted the WTC

and Pentagon were "dupes in a Zionist plot," Riyadh was still not convinced that al-Qaeda had a base within the Kingdom's borders and posed a hazard to the Saudi royals and societies. At the time, most

Saudi royals still thought that it was impossible for Osama and al-Qaeda to make Saudi Arabia become the target of their terrorist operation (Reidel 2015:1–21). The 2003 Riyadh housing compound bombing was a "wakeup call" for the Saudi authorities on the peril of al-Qaeda within the Kingdom, and since then they began to realize that the terrorist group was indeed perilous for the Kingdom's security.

Soon after the Riyadh blasts and hearing counsels of George Tenet, the Saudi government, through the Ministry of Interior, responded by making a list of the most wanted al-Qaeda-linked terrorists and then proceeded to hunt them down ruthlessly. In a seminar (held in London, UK) on "Countering Terrorism: the Experience of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia," Prince Turki Al-Faisal, Saudi ambassador to Britain, said that the Kingdom within six months had arrested nearly 600 suspects, mostly youths between the ages of 15 and 25 years, in a nationwide crackdown on terrorists following the 2003 Riyadh compound bombing. Prince Turki said that of the arrested, around 190 had already been released, between 70 and 90 had been sent for trial, and between 250 and 300 were under interrogation (Al-Jundi 2003).

Moreover, Crown Prince Abdullah responded the homegrown terrorism with a series of crackdowns including raids by security forces, detentions, anguish, and public beheadings on terrorist suspects. The crown prince also pledged to fight against al-Qaeda terrorists and their underlying ideology and made the protection of the Kingdom's critical infrastructure a top priority. Abdullah's strategies on combating terrorism (or radicalism in general) did not only rely on security/military approaches by capturing or killing the terrorists and destroying their cells but also attacking the ideological and religious roots of terrorism that fed al-Qaeda militants by conducting social, judicial, and educational reforms.

Reforms Under King Abdullah

In order to achieve his agenda to create Saudi Arabia as a secure and peaceful country away from terrorism and extremism, Abdullah had issued various progressive decrees and policies as well as conducted multiple strategic major reforms and changes. These included the royal decree on the restriction of fatwa[11] (Islamic legal edict) issuance, in which only

[11] Fatwa is a nonbinding legal opinion (legal pronouncement/formal ruling/interpretation) on a point of Islamic law given by qualified jurists (legal

officially approved religious scholars allied with the Council of Senior Scholars (*majlis hay'at kibar al-ulama*) would be permitted to issue fatwas. Individual fatwas related to personal matters are exempt from the decree. The limitation of fatwa was helpful to control public opinions and avoid the possibility of the issuance of "wild" fatwas by "dissident" clerics or militant Islamist scholars outside the official religious establishment. The "illegal" fatwas could influence Saudis—youths in particular—to wage jihad against the Saudi government or commit violence on Islam's behalf that could jeopardize the Kingdom's security and socio-political stability.

As a conservative Muslim society, fatwas by respected Islamic scholars and clerics could give an effect or inspiration for Saudis to commit violence in the name of Islam or God. Thousands of Saudis who went to Afghanistan and other places such as Chechnya and Bosnia for jihad between 1980 and 1990s were, among others, influenced by fatwas of Shaikh Abdullah Azam or Shaikh Bin Baz (see Chapter 2). It is, hence, important for Saudi authorities to control the production of legitimate fatwa to regulate and control people's behaviors, thoughts, and actions in accordance with the government's objective and agenda to combat extremism and terrorism. King Abdullah later on, in 2012, also dismissed the head of religious police, replacing him with a more moderate cleric. The appointment was also part of Abdullah's tactics to "silence" and curtail the influence of the militant and conservative groups on Saudi societies.

Other significant reforms, changes, and developments under Abdullah's the auspices were the reform of the Shura Council (*majlis al-shura*) that accommodated Shia scholars and non-Wahhabi Sunni clerics, the 2005–11 municipal elections, women's emancipation, and judicial improvement (e.g. making domestic violence as a crime), and educational reform, among many others. In an effort to reform the education system, the Ministry of Education, with Abdullah's backing, had appointed fourteen experts or specialists of education and religious scholars to make the necessary changes in the schools' textbooks and curricula that teach or instruct intolerance and radicalism.[12]

scholars or Islamic law specialists) on specific issues. Those who are qualified to issue a fatwa, individuals, or collectives, are called a mufti.

[12] In 2003, under the patronage of the crown prince, Shaikh Abdul Aziz al-Qassem (former judge) and Ibrahim Al-Sakran (author and journalist) examined three curricula

For Abdullah, to fight against terrorism, the Kingdom also needs to foster reform. Actually, Abdullah's reform agenda did not only take place in the aftermath of the 2003 Riyadh bombings. Following the 9/11 tragedy, Abdullah was keen to combat terrorism and foster reform, but he became more serious in his attempts of fighting against terrorism and fostering reform after the 2003 Riyadh attacks. One of the major reforms Abdullah had undertaken, either during his tenure as a crown prince or a king, was about the crackdown of Saudi charitable organizations—home and abroad—that were used as conduits to fund terrorist activities and support terrorist groups.[13] In 2002, for example, Crown Prince Abdullah helped the United States freeze the assets of Bosnian and Somali branches of Saudi-based Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, which was believed to be supporting terrorist organizations and activities including al-Qaeda and the 9/11 operation.[14] During the next few months, the Saudi government froze $ 5.7 million in forty-one bank accounts belonging to suspected terrorists according to the US government (Weston 2008: 406).

Moreover, Crown Prince Abdullah shut down charities and companies run by Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda members since they allegedly used some funds from the Saudi charitable foundations (besides individuals) for terrorist activities[15] (Blanchard and Prados 2007; del Cid Gomez 2015). The crown prince also gave information to the Federal Bureau of

for Saudi middle and high schools: Al-Hadith (a curriculum on matters of the Prophet Muhammad's sayings), Al-Fiqh (a curriculum on matters of Islamic law), and Al-Tauhid (a curriculum on matters of belief in God or monotheism). The study's findings showed that the texts encouraged religious intolerance and violence towards others (Wynbrandt 2010: 296).

[13] Charity is one of the primary pillars in Islam. Muslims have long seen that giving money to Islamic causes is a sign of piety and they believe that God would grant Heaven for the charity givers in the afterlife. Accordingly, it is not surprising if many Saudis have donated their wealth for charity and charitable institutions, both within the Kingdom and overseas. However, unfortunately, the militants used or misused the charities for violence and terrorism.

[14] In addition to Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, the United States also listed other Saudi charities that were often fronts for al-Qaeda including Benevolence International, the Muwafaq Foundation, the al-Wafa Humanitarian Organization, and the International Islamic Relief Organization.

[15] On the charitable organizations, companies, and other financial sources that al-Qaeda and its networks used for terrorist activities, drug trafficking, and other crimes across the world see, among others, del Cid Gomez (2015) or Blanchard and Prados (2007).

Investigation (FBI) and the European police forces about suspicious Saudi bank accounts in several countries including Sweden and Switzerland. Still, Abdullah ordered the removal of thousands of donation boxes from mosques, supermarkets, and shopping malls across the Kingdom that might be potential for financing terrorism and extremism. As well, the crown prince gave permission to 15 agents of the FBI and IRS (Internal Revenue Service) of the United States to open a bureau in Riyadh. Equally important, in 2002, the crown prince established a high commission for oversight of all charities and unveiled measures aiming at ending the flow of funds to terrorists as well as approved the "Rules Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing," issued by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (Weston 2008:406–7; Wynbrandt 2010: 280–1).

The Closure of Charities Used for Financing Terrorism

Following the 2003 Riyadh bombings, Abdullah's efforts in combating terrorism were harder and broader than before. Besides hunting for, detaining, or even shooting down terrorists, Abdullah also conducted other measures of combating and preventing terrorism. In an attempt of preventing terrorism in the future, Abdullah issued a royal decree, signed by the ailing King Fahd, which ordered all Saudi charity organizations, particularly those dubbed for terrorist financing, to stop their work abroad. Under Abdullah's instruction, in 2005, the Saudi police created a Financial Intelligence Unit (previously, Saudi Arabian Financial Crimes Unit) aiming at intensifying efforts to block charitable organizations for funding terrorist activities as well as enforcing the laws against terrorist financing and money laundering.

It is therefore obvious that since 2003, aiming at stopping individuals or organizations that financially support terrorism and extremism within Saudi borders and beyond, the Saudi government, under the direction of Crown Prince Abdullah, has already put in place the majority of its new financial controls and banking regulations. Moreover, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) had issued instructions to all financial institutions to implement 40 recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) of the G-8 countries regarding money laundering and recommendations concerning terror financing. TATF, in 2010, reported that Saudi Arabia was ranked first in the Gulf and among the top ten within G-20 countries in combating money laundering and terror financing. This, again, indicates Saudi's commitment concerning war on terrorism.

Promoting Interfaith and Intergroup Dialogues

Crown Prince Abdullah also promoted interfaith and intergroup dialogues by establishing the King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue[16] (KACND, in Arabic it is normally referred to as *markaz al-hiwar al-watani*) that held regular meetings (called "National Dialogue" meeting) involving scholars and clerics from various Islamic sects and groups. Located in Riyadh, the center is an independent national institution which seeks to strengthen channels of communication and dialogue between Saudi citizens from multiple and different backgrounds and affiliations, including Shia, women, and non-Hanbali Islamic groupings. The late King Fahd said, "I have no doubt that the establishment of the center and the continuation of the dialogue will turn out to be a historic achievement, which could go a long way toward creating a new channel for responsible self-expression. In the long run, this will be very effective in fighting extremism and fanaticism and can create a healthy and clean environment which promotes enlightened attitude and rejects terrorism and terrorist ideologies."[17]

By founding KACND, Abdullah played as an intermediary between state and society that mediated conflicting members of the society and Muslim groups. Instead of keeping the different groups apart, the king brought them together. In addition, Abdullah also co-founded King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz International Center for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue[18] (KAICIID, known by its acronym the International Dialogue Center), a Vienna-based intergovernmental organization whose mandate is to promote the use of dialogue globally, to prevent and resolve conflict, and to enhance understanding and cooperation among diverse complex societies across the globe.

All of these policies, initiatives, and programs were part of Abdullah's endeavors to weaken radicalism and curb terrorists' movements and influences in the society. On one hand, King Abdullah employed hard approaches by destroying terrorists and their nests, but on the other hand, he co-opted non-terrorist Muslim groups, including non-terrorist militants and opposition groupings within Sunnis and Shiites, in a rather

[16] Information on this institution see https://www.kacnd.org/

[17] https://web.archive.org/web/20130323011920/http://www.kacnd.org/eng/prince_word.asp. Access 25 March 2018.

[18] Information on this institution see https://www.kaiciid.org/

sophisticated form through KACND. It is true that KACND highly selected scholars and clerics were invited in the meetings. However, the public gatherings of Saudi respected ulama from different religious and ideological groupings—Wahhabi, non-Wahhabi Sunni, Twelver Shia, Sufi, Ismaili, among others—were a great attempt of the government that needs to be appreciated. It was the first time in the Kingdom's history that various religious elite members of Saudi society met in a public meeting.

Between 2003 and 2010, KACND convened eight National Dialogue meetings. The topic for the 2003 first National Dialogue meeting, held two months after the Riyadh bombing, was about "Reinforcing National Unity," which was greatly influenced by the recent domestic terrorism in the Kingdom, in addition to the US invasion of Iraq. Chaired by the president of the Saudi Shura Council, Shaikh Salih al-Hussain, the meeting discussed two main topics, namely (1) National Unity and the Role of Scholars and (2) Relations and International Treaties and the Effect of Understanding them on National Unity. The issue of national unity covered a variety of themes including terrorism and religious extremism. The second National Dialogue meeting was conducted in Makkah between December 27, 2003, and January 1, 2004. Because of the persistent terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia, the meeting's agenda still focused on Islamic militancy and terrorism as well as ways to combat the extremism and related religious fanaticism (Thompson 2014: 64–6).

The Role of MBN

Although the general commands of counterterrorism came from Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud (again, as a crown prince or king), the "field commander" of counterterrorism programs was essentially Muhammad bin Nayef (MBN) through the Ministry of Interior, which has been the frontline to counter extremist and terrorist ideology, along with the Ministry of Defense. The Defense Ministry, for instance, founded the Ideological Warfare Center that focuses on educating people and raising awareness about the danger of extremism and radicalism through leading-edge visual tools (Obaid 2014). Trained by the Federal Bureau Intelligence (FBI) and the Scotland Yard Unit on security and counterterrorism issues, MBN became "the face of the Saudi war on terror" who regularly appeared on television and in newspapers to elucidate the government's plans and programs on seeking out terrorists and their cells, cracking them down, and combating terrorist ideology and mindset. As

well, MBN actively explained the danger of al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups for Saudi national security. Riedel described MBN's strategy of combating terrorism as efficient, deadly, and careful in the sense that he did not engage in "massive and disruptive search-and-destroy operations that would have entailed collateral damage, and created an impression that the Kingdom was in flames" (Riedel 2015: 9–10).

As well, MBN, dubbed as the "Prince of Counterterrorism," in tracking down the terrorists and radicals was prudently targeted and selective to avoid civilian casualties or avert blowback among the populace. Long before his appointment as the Interior Minister in 2012, MBN had been the backbone of the Ministry of Interior when his father led the ministry. Following a series of terrorist attacks that blasted the Kingdom, MBN had been at the vanguard of counterterrorism initiatives combining hard and soft approaches. Under the hard approach, MBN brought terrorists and militants in by force, jailed, or sentenced them in accordance with Islamic judicial practice. MBN implemented the soft approach for select individuals found guilty of participating in terrorist activities or of going to war zones abroad who have completed their sentences and were deemed promising candidates to be released back into society. The soft approach aims to help such individuals reintegrate into society (Ansary 2008; Boucek 2008b).

MBN, furthermore, developed multiple programs that are in line with the soft approach including developing the rehabilitation program for terrorists and radicals who were either arrested by the police or defected from the terror apparatus due to disillusionment with the jihadist cause. To make the soft approach successful, MBN established Muhammad Bin Nayef Center for Counseling & Care, which develops creative programs of counterterrorism including art therapy (Alyami 2015). Due to MBN's lengthy involvement in combating terrorism, it is understandable why the terrorists tried to murder him and bombed his ministry building.[19]

As for 2015 alone, the Interior Minister had run five special high security prisons with some 3,500 convicts, mostly former al-Qaeda operatives,

[19] In 2004, for instance, al-Qaeda militants rammed a car bomb into the fortified Interior Ministry. In 2009, al-Qaeda terrorist tried to assassinate MBN but the suicide bomber failed to do so. This assassination was the first attack against a member of the royal family since al-Qaeda launched a wave of terrorist attacks in the Kingdom to topple the monarchy in 2003 (Gendron 2010: 488–9).

whose purpose was to rehabilitate (not incarcerate like other jails for criminals) the terrorist suspects. In these special prisons, the captives received special treatment from the ministry as it showered them with benefits. The detainees, for instance, could receive visits from their families and friends or even went to weddings and funerals with supervision. The government, aiming at making the terrorists' families take responsibility for the future of their children, provided special allowances for the terrorist families for better housing, medical care, and education. The theory is, as Riedel (2015: 21) has said, "If the family feels it has a stake in the rehabilitation of their wayward children, it will take on the job of convincing them of the error of their ways." According to the Ministry of Interior, about 20% of the "alumni" of its rehabilitation prisons return to terrorism. However, this percentage or rate of recidivism in Saudi Arabia is considerably below that of prisons in the United States or Europe.

The tireless endeavors of multiple counterterrorism programs and initiatives run by King Abdullah and MBN finally brought a success, so that the government had gained the upper hand on al-Qaeda and the menace was dispersing. The terrorists and jihadists lost the skirmish for hearts and minds in the Kingdom. Even though at first some Saudis sympathized and supported the jihadists during the Afghan War and afterward, they later on were cynical with the terrorists since they targeted their homeland and innocent Saudis. As a result, al-Qaeda terrorists failed to get public/popular support from Saudi society for their cause, which doomed them to defeat and collapse. The collapse of al-Qaeda, however, does not mean the end of terrorism in the Kingdom. In the aftermath of al-Qaeda's downfall, since 2015 onwards, Saudi Arabia has witnessed multiple attacks from a new terrorist group: ISIL.

Counterterrorism Under King Salman and MBS

Yet, Saudi authorities do not lose their guts in combating terrorism. The war on terrorism continues, and this time (since 2017), the main field commander that lead the combat has been Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman (MBS). With the support of his father, King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (b. 1935), MBS has continued, developed, and boosted counterterrorism efforts previously led and championed by MBN and the late King Abdullah. MBS conveyed his commitment in fighting against terrorism at an inaugural meeting of the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC), Ministers of Defense from the Coalition Member Countries, in

Riyadh on November 25, 2017, in which he vowed to combat terrorism until "we see its defeat and the extremists will no longer tarnish our beautiful religion."[20]

Pioneered by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the IMCTC was established in December 2015 to form a unified pan-Islamic front in the global fight against terrorism and other forms of violent extremism throughout the Muslim–majority nations. More specifically, the coalition (of some 41 Muslim-dominated countries) aims at combating all types of terrorism and radicalism as well as joining other international security and peacekeeping groups. It encompasses an integrated approach to coordinate and unite on the four key domains of ideology, communications, counterterrorism, and military. Acting in response to the peril of (Islamist) terrorism and extremism that have affected Muslim-dominated countries and distorted the image of Islam, the IMCTC has developed, gathered, shopped, and disseminated a wide range of information on counterterrorism programs and techniques embarked on by member nations and international organizations.[21] MBS continues to strengthen the IMCTC's agenda.

Since 2017, when he was appointed as a crown prince, MBS—certainly with King Salman's support—has led Saudi Arabia to be a leading country in using soft power and security, setting up public and private institutions that raise awareness about extremist ideology, initiating dialogues between different societies, and taking regional and global initiatives to uproot terrorism and extremist ideologies. Until now, MBS' efforts continue to combat terrorism.

Multiple Types of Counterterrorism and Anti-Terrorism

As described earlier, to fight against terrorism, the government of Saudi Arabia has made various great efforts to support—politically, financially, religiously, and morally—global campaigns against extremism, home, and abroad, by initiating and financing multiple counterterrorism programs, initiatives, and institutions (Gause III 2004; Bahgat 2004;

[20] https://www.arabnews.com/node/1199381/saudi-arabia. Retrieved June 6, 2020.

[21] For more information on the IMCTC, see https://imctc.org/English. Retrieved June 6, 2020.

Boucek 2008a, b; Asseri 2009; Gendron 2010; Hegghammer 2010a; Mahboob 2017; Rudolph 2006, 2018). The attempts especially became more serious and robust since Crown Prince Abdullah, following the 9/11 and 5/12 al-Qaeda terrorist attacks in both the United States and Saudi Arabia. Not only combating terrorism or establishing centers of terrorism and counterterrorism in home, the Saudi Kingdom also donated hundreds of millions US dollar to the UN and non-UN counterterrorism centers across the globe aiming at contributing to battling terrorism abroad. This is to say that the Saudi government has initiated, advanced, and implemented several important policies, strategies, and tactics of counterterrorism and anti-terrorism.

"Hard" and "Soft" Approaches

In general, the Saudi government uses two basic approaches in combating terrorism, namely hard approach and soft approach (Asseri 2009; Rudolph 2006, 2018). Countries having problems with terrorism, including Indonesia, generally employ these two models of counterterrorism, albeit their implementations, specificity, tactics, and programs differ from country to country due to different socio-historical contexts and geo-cultural-political dynamics. In general, the hard approach to counterterrorism refers to the use of coercion or military or security measures (force, detention, murder, destruction, and for forth) in the battle against terrorist groups. The soft approach, to borrow the phrase of Jessica Stern, "seeks to undo the radicalization process by engineering the individual's return to moderate society, usually by providing them with a stable support network, probing their original reasons for radicalizing, and divorcing them from their extreme beliefs and social contacts" (Stern 2010: 108).

Proponents of the soft approach believe that in order to be effectively conquest terrorism and other forms of violence and extremism in the long term, it is essential to comprehend, contest, and refute the ideology behind it, rather than simply strive to abolish every terrorist in sight. The approach seeks to render terrorist activities and extremist movements obsolete by undermining the basis upon which these acts and movements are built, hoping that by doing so their acts and movements will be delegitimized from within. In other words, in order to be effective in the combat on terrorism, there needs to be as much emphasis placed on

fighting the "War on Ideas" as there is on fighting the "War on Terror" (Hoeft 2015: 3–4).

Furthermore, borrowing the terms of Cortright and Lopez (2007: 2–3), the Saudi government has applied two main strategies and tactics of combating terrorism, namely "tactical counterterrorism" and "strategic counterterrorism." Whereas "tactical counterterrorism" focuses on finding, destroying, and defeating operative terrorist cells by using military/security approaches, "strategic counterterrorism" includes multiple policy responses designed to eliminate the sustaining and underlying conditions that feed extremist terrorism. Due to the global nature of the terrorist threat, cooperative non-military responses are also necessary elements of counterterrorism strategy. No doubt, countering the multifaceted and complex threat of terrorism requires a broadly cooperative effort involving religious, legal, economic, political, cultural, and military cooperation from virtually every organization and grouping in any given society.

Since terrorism is not only local–national but also global–international phenomena, combating it requires a tactical transnational cooperation across nations and societies. In this regard, the Saudi government has built strategic partnerships and forged allies with foreign governments, international communities, and multilateral organizations to advance counterterrorism objectives and protect the Kingdom's national security. In 2011, for instance, the Kingdom signed a deal with the United Nations to establish the United Nations Center for Counter Terrorism (UNCCT). The Kingdom itself donated $10 million to its founding. In 2014, the late King Abdullah donated additional $100 million to enhance its capabilities and effectiveness in helping countries facing terrorist threats combat extremism and terrorism. The Saudi government said that the initiative for the founding of UNCCT was conceived in 2005, when the late King Abdullah held the "Counter-Terrorism International Conference" in Riyadh. In the same year, in 2014, to show Saudi's serious commitment in combating terrorism home and abroad, King Abdullah also issued a royal decree on counterterrorism. Additionally, as depicted earlier, the Saudi government had pioneered the establishment of the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition, an alliance of 41 Muslim–majority countries in the global combat of terrorism.

In brief, in an endeavor to fight against terrorism and to prevent it from occurring in the future, Saudi government has focused on three

key issues: the actor, finance, and mindset.[22] The actor is those who commit terrorism (i.e. the terrorist), the finance is the money or financial resources used by the terrorists to fund terrorist-related violent acts, and the mindset is the terrorist's ideology and conviction as well as religious understandings and interpretations that might drive acts of terrorism and radicalism.

Combating the Terrorist Actor

Let me briefly discuss the three issues. First, the men (the terrorist actor). Although terrorist groups had attacked the Kingdom since the reign of King Saud (see Chapter 2), the government's strategic wide-ranging attempts in dealing with the terrorists took place since the late King Abdullah, following al-Qaeda terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 and in Saudi Arabia in 2003. As well, even though there have been multiple terrorist groups with multiple ideological and political backgrounds in the Kingdom since 1960s onwards, only towards Sunni Islamist terrorists linked to al-Qaeda and ISIL that the government seems to engage more seriously and comprehensively by developing various counterterrorism programs.

Through the Saudi Ministry of Interior and relevant ministries (e.g. the Ministry of Defense) and agencies (e.g. the Presidency of State Security), the Saudi government has been unceasingly restructuring operations and coordination on counterterrorism and antiradicalism. More specifically, the need to restructure and develop constantly this matter is to better address national security hazards, thwart terrorist attacks, as well as dismantle the physical presence of the terrorist groupings and their ability to operate from or within Saudi Arabia. Rigorous training, education, the inclusion of technology, and community outreach are among activities the Saudi government has conducted for security forces in order to foil many terrorist plots within the Kingdom and to pull apart al-Qaeda's or ISIL's operations and cells. The authorities have also created an unwelcome environment for radicals and terrorists. As well, Saudi security professionals regularly participate in joint programs throughout the world, including with the United States, where they join forces to onslaught terrorist

[22] See the Saudi government's initiatives on combating terrorism at https://www.saudiembassy.net/sites/default/files/Report%20on%20Counterterrorism.pdf. Retrieved June 8, 2020.

activities and track terrorist financing. Still, neighborhood police units engage and work directly with community members, encouraging citizens to provide tips and leads about suspicious activity. This approach has led to arrests of most wanted terrorists and to the discovery of safe houses where terrorists were meeting, plotting, and staging attacks.

Combating the Financier of Terrorism

The second issue the Saudi government focuses on is the financer. Besides combating perpetrators of terrorism, the government has also been fighting against terrorist donors, both individuals and groupings or institutions (Blanchard and Prados 2007; Boucek 2008a, b; Al-Saud 2009; Rudolph 2018). Terror networks flourish on illicit funding, often hiding behind charity programs and charitable institutions. Realizing the danger of terror financing, the government has transformed Saudi Arabia to be one of the world's strictest financial control systems to foil funds going to support terrorist activities home and abroad. According to an official report of the Saudi government,[23] since 2003, the Kingdom has controlled and issued regulations on financial issues and institutions to stop or prevent the misuse of money for terrorism. In 2003, King Fahd (under Crown Prince Abdullah's counsel and direction for sure since the king was ill) issued a Royal Decree No. M/59 on Anti-Money Laundering Law. In the same year (2003), the government founded the Saudi Arabian Financial Crimes Unit (later, it became the Financial Intelligence Unit).

The government, through the Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA), had issued instructions to all Saudi financial institutions to implement the 40 recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) of the G-8 concerning money laundering and the recommendations regarding terror financing. Saudi Arabia has a long history of combating money laundering and terrorism financing, through its efforts and cooperation with various relevant regional and international organizations, including, among others, the FATF, the MENAFATF (the Middle

[23] See the Saudi government's report at https://saudiembassy.net/files/PDF/Reports/Counterterrorism.pdf. Accessed on September 26, 2015.

East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force), and the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units[24] (Al-Othaimin 2017).

The government realizes that in order to effectively implement the system of Anti-Money Laundering/Combating Terrorist Financing (AML/CFT), it needs strong financial institutions and strategic collaborations across relevant agencies and ministries. In this regard, the government has assigned and authorized several institutions to govern the AML/CFT. These include the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA), the Capital Market Authority (CMA), the Bureau of Investigation and Prosecution, and the Ministries of Finance, Interior, as well as Commerce and Industry. The Saudi AML/CFT strategy is wide-ranging. The religious community also contributed to the Kingdom's AML/CFT strategy since the government involved them in committees and a task force to study, review, and advise in the workings of money laundering and terrorist financing (Rudolph 2018: 130–1).

Moreover, the Saudi AML/CFT strategy covers initiatives undertaken at the domestic, regional, and international levels. At the domestic level, the government has enacted regulations and laws to better protect its banking and financial institutions. The government has also criminalized money laundering and terrorist financing, besides applied institutional tools in the banking, financial, and security sector to fight and prevent the practices of money laundering and terrorist financing. At the regional level, Saudi Arabia has conducted several important policies and programs. These included the following: including ratifying and signing a number of treaties and conventions; collaborating with various relevant agencies in the Gulf countries or the Middle East; spearheading multilateral AML/CFT initiatives among the Arab Ministers of Interior and Justice; sponsoring and participating in various conferences and training programs on terrorist financing, among others (see e.g. Realuyo 2015).

Lastly, at the global-international level, the Kingdom has also ratified and signed additional treaties and conventions with various UN agencies; assumed membership and participation in global entities such as such as the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units and the Financial Action Task Force; and sponsored several international anti-terrorism

[24] The Egmont Group is an informal body established in 1995, aimed at strengthening international cooperation between FIUs to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The group comprises 127 countries with active FIUs.

centers and programs; among others. Through the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), the government has offered various programs to train judges, bankers, prosecutors, customs officers, investigators, and other officials from the government departments and agencies on legal matters involving methods of terrorism financing and money laundering (Al-Saud 2009; Khan 2014).

The following are some examples of Saudi corporation with regional and global networks on combating terrorism and terrorist financing. In 2017, Saudi Arabia took practical steps in the founding of the US–Gulf anti-terrorism financing center (i.e. the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center/TFTC) whose formation comes as part of the application of terms of the joint agreement signed during the third US–Gulf summit held in Riyadh in May 2017. A collaborative approach to confronting new and evolving threats arising from terrorist financing, the TFTC represents a new and creative response that leverages existing tools and formalizes cooperation between the United States, Saudi Arabia, and partners in the Gulf to counter terrorist financing.[25] The Riyadh-based center will monitor and share information regarding both outgoing and incoming financial transactions to the Middle East and North Africa. This highlights the determination of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries to curb the sources of terrorism, which has become a global and regional concern, and has affected the security and stability of the financial system and the economy.

To ensure the success of the controls and regulations on terror financing, the Saudi government (through, among others, the Naif Arab University for Security Sciences and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency) created special training programs for bankers, prosecutors, judges, customs officers, and other officials from government departments and agencies. The Kingdom also established the Saudi National Commission for Relief and Charity Work Abroad to oversee Saudi's charitable organizations and their activities home and abroad. If the commission finds institutions conducting suspicious illicit activities, it will freeze them. It is important to note that there are thousands of Islamic charities organizations in Saudi Arabia, and through the SAMA, the government has instructed all banks and financial institutions in the Kingdom to stop all financial transfers by Saudi charities to any accounts

[25] See https://sa.usembassy.gov/u-s-saudi-arabia-co-chair-new-terrorist-financing-targeting-center/

outside the country. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has joint forces with the United States and Great Britain to hunt down charitable institutions used to fund terrorism-related activities. As an outcome, they have designated several organizations dubbed as terrorism funders (and then froze their assets) under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267.[26] Not only working together with the American and British governments, Saudi Arabia has also collaborated with other countries throughout the world to ensure programmatic effectiveness and to maintain fruitful cooperation.

Combating the Mindset of Terrorists

Lastly, the third focal issue that Saudi government focuses on combating terrorism is the mindset. Realizing the vitality of terrorists' mindset and its contribution to terrorism and radicalism, the government has also implemented soft counterterrorism strategies, tactics, and policies. These include everything from direct outreach to Saudi society to terrorist education efforts. This soft counterterrorism approach is a sort of a "war of ideas" aiming at undermining any justifications for terrorism and extremism on an intellectual level as well as instilling the concepts of moderation and tolerance. More specifically, the soft counterterrorism strategy is made up of three main components as follows. First, prevention programs aiming at deterring people from getting involved with violent extremism and terrorism. Second, rehabilitation programs designed to encourage supporters and sympathizers to relinquish terrorism and renounce violence. Third, aftercare programs to prevent recidivism and to reintegrate people back into Saudi society (Boucek 2008a: 60; Al-Saud 2009).

The Kingdom has also undertaken several initiatives to counter the extremist mentality and to promote moderation, antiradicalism, and tolerance among its citizenry. These include (1) Public Awareness Campaign, (2) Public and Religious Education, and (3) Global Interfaith Dialogue

[26] Examples of organizations labelled "terrorist financiers" that had been dissolved and froze their assets included the notorious Haramain Foundation and its international branches (in Pakistan, Tanzania, Kenya, and Indonesia, among others), International Islamic Relief Organization, and Saad Al-Faqih's London-based Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA). Saad Al-Faqih himself is named on the UN Security Council Resolution 1267 list of individuals tied to al-Qaeda.

Initiative (Asseri 2009; Rudolph 2018). As well, Saudi Arabia, on a more advanced, focused level, has been conducting two distinct, yet complementary programs. First is the counter-radicalism program that aims at combating the spread and appeal of extremist ideologies among the general populace through education, religious activities, popular pronouncements, and the provision of positive alternative outlets for at-risk groups. The program strives to instill the true value of the Islamic faith such as tolerance and moderation (Huq 2016). Second, the Rehabilitation program, administered under a scheme called the Counseling Program organized under the auspices of the Saudi Ministry of Interior, intends on reintegrating deviants and extremists back into society, changing their behaviors (by disengaging them), and shifting their beliefs (by de-radicalizing them).

More specifically, the program, designated to target terrorists who have completed their prison sentences, seeks to encourage Saudi security detainees to repent and repudiate extremist ideologies or renounce ideologies that espouse terrorism, especially the doctrine of *takfiri*.[27] Any individual committed or participated in a violent crime that constitutes murder will not be released following completion of the course. The Rehabilitation program also includes reeducating actors and sympathizers of terrorism and extremism through intensive religious debates and psychological counseling. Through intensive religious debate and psychological counseling, religious scholars work to demonstrate to participants that they have been following corrupted interpretations of Islam. After proving that they had deviated from proper Islamic doctrines and teachings, the counselors then teach and inject the state-endorsed interpretations of Islam that, on one hand, discourage radicalism and terrorism and promote conciliation and tolerance on the other.

The program is quite successful in bringing the terrorists back into society. Boucek (2008a, b) has noticed that one of the keys to the Rehabilitation program's success is the extensive social support given to detainees and their families, intended to offset hardship and short-circuit

[27] Takfiri is a doctrine that states or accuses another Muslim of apostasy. *Oxford Islamic Studies Online* defines "takfiri" as "pronouncement that someone is an unbeliever (*kafir*) and no longer Muslim." Takfir is used in the modern era for sanctioning violence against leaders of Islamic states who are deemed insufficiently religious. It has become a central ideology of multiple militant and terrorist groups. See http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2319

further radicalization within a family. Saudi authorities, combining coercion and co-optation, use traditional cultural factors such as honor, family hierarchies, and powerful social obligations to prevent recidivism. The data up to 2008 show that, of the roughly 1.400 Rehabilitation program participants that have renounced their beliefs via this initiative and been released, only 35 people (about 2% recidivism rate) have been rearrested on security offenses. Unlike in other countries, repatriated Saudis do not seem to return to the battlefield.

Furthermore, the Public Awareness Campaign, coordinated by six government ministries, was designed to reinforce the true value of the Islamic faith, the correct understanding of Islamic discourses, and the accurate interpretation of Islamic texts, as well as to educate Saudi citizens about the hazards of extremism and terrorism for individual, social, economic, and national security and wellbeing. The campaign includes advertisements on television, radio, and billboards, as well as programs on television, in schools and mosques, and at sport events. It also includes a series of public series announcements that continuously aired on a number of main Arabic satellite networks, including Al-Arabiya, MBC, and Future Television, as well as on Saudi TV channels.

Moreover, the Public and Religious Education focuses on conducting an ongoing program to modernize textbooks and curricula, introduce enhanced teaching methods, and provide better teachings for educators. As part of this program, the government has banned imams, clerics and preachers for giving intolerant and anti-pluralist religious sermons that might provoke and trigger fanaticism and extremism in the society. The Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, in particular, has been conducting programs to educate imams as well as monitor mosques and religious/Islamic schools (Al-Saud 2009; Gendron 2010).

Building Intergroup and Interfaith Dialogues

The Global Interfaith Dialogue Initiative, more specifically, focuses on promoting interfaith dialogue and interreligious understandings, either in national or international levels. Since the late King Abdullah, the Kingdom has developed a productive interfaith engagement and intrareligious meetings and dialogues with multiple Islamic groups in the Kingdom (Shiites, Sufis, and Sunni non-Hanbali religious clerics and scholars) and non-Muslim groupings (outside the Kingdom), including Jews, Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, Sikhs, Shinto, among others.

Another important institution related to this intergroup dialogue initiative is the King Abdul Aziz Center for National Dialogue (KACND). The center focuses on building and disseminating the culture of dialogue, discussing national issues that affect the life of Saudi citizens, and taking part in the development of the nation through enabling the participation of different groups, intellectual tendencies, and social organizations through mechanisms of dialogue. Thompson (2014: 2) argues that the activities of KACND, including the famous annual national meeting, represent a viable attempt to address socio-political issues and the ongoing national dialogue process accurately reflects the aspirations and concerns of Saudi society.

In its official homepage, it states that the KACND has seven primary objectives as follows:

- Consolidating national unity within the framework of the Islamic faith and deepening it further through comprehensive national dialogue.
- Contributing towards the presentation of the true image of Islam inside and outside the country based on moderation through constructive dialogue.
- Tackling social, cultural, political, economic, and educational problems using dialogue channels and its mechanisms.
- Promoting the concept and characteristics of dialogue within the society and turning them into a method for dealing with various types of problems facing the society.
- Encouraging the largest possible number of people to take part in the dialogue and to further strengthen the role of civil societies with the aim of ensuring justice, equality, and freedom of expression within the framework of the Sharia law.
- Reactivating the national dialogue in close collaboration with the relevant establishments.
- Reinforcing communications and national dialogue channels with organizations and individuals outside the Kingdom.
- Developing a strategic vision for national dialogue and ensuring the application of the results obtained in the process.[28]

[28] See https://web.archive.org/web/20130323025324/http://www.kacnd.org/eng/center_goals.asp. Access 25 March, 2018.

Saudi Counterterrorism's Strengths and Limitations

These are some strengths and weaknesses of the Saudi government's models and programs on counterterrorism. For the most part, the Saudi government has indeed done a superb job in combating and countering terrorism. A mixture of "hard approach" and "soft approach" or "tactical counterterrorism" and "strategic counterterrorism" is apt and fruitful in fighting against extremism and preventing it from occurring in the future. This is mainly because terrorism is not simply a cluster of violent acts but also a set of radical beliefs that seek to legitimize violence in the name of, in the case of Saudi Arabia and to some degree Indonesia, Islam.

Under "hard approach," the security force arrested the terrorists and the judges sentenced them in accordance with Islamic judicial practice. Moreover, the "soft approach" focuses on non-military methods aiming at providing advice, consultation, and education of select individuals found guilty of participating in—or contributing to—terrorist activities in order to reintegrate into society. The program undermines extremist views and ideologies and disrupts the activities of those who promote radicalism (Ansary 2008; Rudolph 2018).

Through dialogue, intellectual interaction, self-expression, psychological reconstruction, social awareness, and heavily religious reeducation, the soft approach is able to correct subjects' corrupted ideologies. More specifically, by employing three-pronged strategies that targets the financial resources of terrorist individuals and groupings, strengthens the state's strategic understanding of the present terrorist threat, and rehabilitates extremist elements in Saudi society, the government has been relatively successful in containing terrorists, along with their groups, on Saudi soil (Al Saud 2009: 74–80).

Part of the Saudi government's soft models of counterterrorism and antiradicalism is developing a counterterrorist discourse, which for Riyadh, is not just an ideology but is also translated into a policy. This is obvious from the language applied and the practices implemented in the rehabilitation and de-radicalization programs as well as the larger Intellectual Security[29] (*al-aman al-fikr*) campaign (Meijer 2012a, b). One

[29] The Intellectual Security (*al-aman al-fikr*) program adopts the terminology of religious psychology of waging a battle against "malicious" and "envious people." The program is preventive, designed for the general public of Saudi society. In this regard,

of the most noticeable elements in this regard is the close collaboration between religious and political authorities in the counterterrorism and anti-terrorism campaigns. Since its inception in 2003, following the Riyadh bombings, the government, pioneered by Crown Prince Abdullah and MBN, established the Advisory Committees (*al-lijan al-munasiha wa al-ra'aya*) of counterterrorism initiatives consisting of various elements of Saudi society—including media and social work—but the religious establishment (besides political authorities) was heavily represented in the committees and programs of combating terrorism.

The committees, for example, comprise 160 ulama (Islamic scholars) and only 40 psychologists and social workers (Meijer 2012a: 136). The government puts emphasis on the religious experts because they believe that terrorism is about "religious deviation"; therefore, the role of Islamic scholars and clerics is pivotal in correcting the terrorists' (wrong) thought and understandings of Islam. Indeed, the government gave the committees' religious group main tasks to combat or refute (*tafnid*) terrorist prisoners' spurious arguments (*shubahat*), incorrect convictions, and wrong understanding of Islamic texts, practices, and discourses. The government regarded this initiative as highly successful since many detainees had returned and reintegrated into their society.

In general, Saudi Arabia's extensive counterterrorism programs and policies have been considered quite fruitful, for the moment, indicated by the absence of major terrorist acts since last 2016 until recently, and by the reintegration of some terrorists into society. However, this temporary peace does not certainly guarantee sustainable peace and security in the future. Indeed some limitations of the policies, approaches, and programs exist. For example, the government seems to see and believe terrorism as an "ideological problem"; thereby, they have spent lots of efforts to counter the underlying Islamist ideology that they assumed as an engine and a driving force of terrorist acts. But, in reality, terrorism is more than and beyond an ideology. As Tahir Abbas (2021b: 2) has rightly noted, "While indeed the ideologues are problematic and they are often in possession of numerous tools at their disposal, they remain rare relative to the ordinary young men and the few women who join the likes of

the Intellectual Security differs from the Advisory Committees that was designed for the prisoners of the terrorist rehabilitation special jails. The aims of the Intellectual Security initiative are to raise public awareness and consciousness and present strong and correct arguments to counterterrorism.

extremist organizations for quite local reasons but project their ambitions globally" (see also Abbas 2021a). It is true that in many cases, joining extremist and terrorist groups is not about an ideological stance but an expression of agency. In fact, many young people joined radical groups because of, for instance, unemployment or difficulty in finding desired jobs. Many terrorist recruiters, including those linked to ISIL, promised to give jobs or offer salaries to young men if they were willing to join their terrorist organizations. This is to say that terrorists have used unemployment issues, among others, a means to mobilize young men as actors to facilitate the spread of far-right hate and ideology.

In this regard, the government needs to think beyond ideology and requires further strategic approaches and additional tactical domestic counter-terrorist policies. The aim of the additional approaches is twofold, namely, in the short term, to get rid of terrorist organizations that threaten Saudi national security and, in the long run, to prevent similar terrorist groupings from reemerging in the future and to create a more social and economic stability. In this regard, what the government needs is just to add and elaborate some extra strategic counterterrorism approaches, while continuing to strengthen tactical counterterrorism programs.

The Saudi government so far has not fully involved all elements of society as an integral part of its comprehensive strategic programs to combat terrorism and to maintain peace, stability, and security in the Kingdom. Principally, the Saudi authorities (government officials and security forces) have acted alone or only involved some segments of society (e.g. middle/elite groups such as religious scholars, academicians, businesspeople, or clerics) in fighting against terrorists and their extremist ideologies. Accordingly, to be more productive and successful, the government needs to involve more large elements of Saudi society, including youths, women, civil society groupings, and Muslim minorities as an essential part of the anti-terrorism and extremism campaign, as well as develop or add new models such utilizing friendship networks for countering violence extremism (Williams, Horgan and Evans 2016: 45–65). The government across the globe generally has often overlooked the potentials of youths, women, civil society organizations, and minorities in the combat of terrorism. In fact, these groups are part of the substantial strategic value of counterterrorism; thereby, the government needs to maximize their roles and contributions in combating against the radicals,

transforming terrorists into pacifist groupings, and preventing radicalism from occurring in the society.

Several studies (e.g. Cortright, Greenberg, and Stone 2016) have also underscored the vitality and centrality of the roles of civil society groupings[30] in many parts of the world in combating extremism, building global peace, maintaining security, and influencing regional, national and international peacebuilding policy. Civil society associations in many countries have played an increasingly powerful role in the global landscape, emerging as key actors in preventing and managing conflict, and building more peaceful and sustainable societies. Accordingly, encouraging civic society movements intent on promoting coexistence is one of key successes in fighting against extremism, and a new strategy could lend support to such organizations and reinvigorate them to prevent counterterrorism fatigue. The involvement of civil society can result in better informed, more inclusive, more accountable government decision-making, and more effective peacebuilding policies. Involving civil society groupings, along with government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, security forces, and other diverse stakeholders and actors in the society, including youths and women groupings, could be more strategic and fruitful in combating terrorism and extremism as well as keeping stability and national security at the same time.

Besides civil society associations, women groupings have also played a vital role in violent prevention, conflict resolution, and counterterrorism across the globe in part because they are well-positioned to detect early signs of extremism. Women's central roles in many families and communities also afford them a unique vantage point from which to recognize unusual patterns of behavior and signs of impending conflict.

[30] The usual standard definitions of civil society developed in the existing literature are that it is a space or "intermediate associations" between families and kin groups on one hand, and the modern state on the other. Weller (1999: 15) argues that in order to fulfil the usual standards of civil society, these intermediary associations should have the following features. First, be voluntary, namely based on the free choice of autonomous individuals (this is to say that civil society should be self-organizing civil organizations). Second, act with civility, that is, "accept the rights of others to disagree" (accordingly, organizations like gangsters cannot be said to be civil society). Third, respect the legitimacy of the state while, in turn, enjoying a free space for action guaranteed by the state. There is a huge debate about the concept of civil society in academia (see e.g. Al Qurtuby 2018: 5–34).

In addition, evidence suggests that women are well-positioned to mitigate radicalization. Traditional efforts by governments and nongovernmental organizations to combat radicalization and terrorism typically focus on reaching out to political or religious leaders—who are predominantly male. However, recent research shows that anti-terrorism messages are disseminated quite effectively throughout families and communities by women, who can challenge extremist narratives in homes, schools, and social environments, and have particular influence among youth populations (see Bigio and Vogelstein 2017, 2016).

The United Nations Security Council and the Counter-Terrorism Committee have also highlighted the vitality of women in assisting and at the same time combating violent extremism and terrorism. Although there has been a steady increase in the radicalization and recruitment of young girls and women by female terrorists—as in the case of Indonesia and elsewhere—there is also a strong evidence of women's vital roles and contributions to countering terrorism and radicalism. Women are often highly influential in families, communities, societies, or even governments so that their proactive participation in counterterrorism efforts can affect positive change. In its resolution 2178 (2014), the U.N. Security Council also encourages member states to develop strategies and tactics to counter the violent extremist narrative that can incite terrorist acts, address the conditions conducive to the spread of violent extremism and terrorism, including by empowering women.

Since the late King Abdullah, Saudi women have evidently played a great role in many sectors of Saudi society (Thompson 2015); thereby it is high time to include them in the counterterrorism scheme. This is to say that, to strengthen existing counterterrorism programs, Saudi leaders and policymakers should incorporate women leaders and groups into national security strategies, given their potential to prevent or mitigate the radicalization of family and community members. It is also important for the Saudi government to promote women's participation in military and law-enforcement roles to improve security operations and maximize intelligence gathering. Lastly, to promote accountability, the Shura Council (Consultative Council) should pass legislation requiring a national strategy to promote women's participation in security efforts.

Like women, youths, including university students and non-students, have also been largely marginalized in the counterterrorism strategic scheme. Although youths have composed the majority of the Saudi populace, their essential roles in the society, including in the counterterrorism

programs, have not been widely acknowledged. Although terrorist radicalization can happen at any age, young people in search of a sense of belonging, purpose, and/or identity may be more vulnerable to violent extremism and terrorist radicalization, which is often compounded by negative perceptions of state authorities. Indeed, most government officials and policymakers see youths as part of the problems and not part of the solutions simply because youths have contributed to and become the majority members and sympathizers of extremist organizations and terrorist groupings in some countries.[31] Well, if youths are viewed as part of the problem, consequently, they can also be an essential part of the solution. How can we solve the problem if we do not involve those that are part of the problem?

Rather than viewing young people as a symbol of problems and perils, the government and policymakers, including those of Saudi Arabia, should see them as a promising and potential group. To put it differently, instead of viewing the youths as an object of counterterrorism, the government should see them as a subject of a counterterrorism campaign. In fact, Crown Price Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) himself is a keen young leader who has played a great role in modernizing, moderating, and reforming Saudi cultures and societies, as well as in combating against radicalism and terrorism that threaten and destabilize his country and nation. The Kingdom needs to recruit more and more young people to contribute in all aspects of the society since they have been the dominant group/community in the Kingdom. It is true that the government has maximized their roles through such institutions as the Misk Global Forum or King Salman Youth Center (Thompson 2019) but their involvement

[31] The Saudi government's perception and assumption of (Saudi) youth involvement in terrorist groupings (e.g. ISIL or al-Qaeda) is generally driven by extremist ideologies or improper understandings and exegeses of some Islamic doctrines. Yet, various research studies (e.g. Hoffman 1999; Hwang 2018) indicate that terrorist radicalization and recruitment of youth to violent extremism and terrorism appear, in many instances, based on secular and profane issues or social bonding, not necessarily religious and ideological grounds. Radical ideologies or misunderstanding of religious teachings might contribute to youth's engagement in terrorist activities but these are certainly not the only factor for their involvement in terrorism and jihadism. Young people may initially turn to violent extremist groups to revenge murder of their family members or to find a sense of recognition, fellowship, and identity. Youth may also join these groups because of watching or learning "hate preaching" or extremism from social media platforms or they offer forms of support that meet their material and socio-psychological needs (e.g. money, protection, and solidarity).

and contributions in the Kingdom's initiatives of counterterrorism and anti-terrorism are still inadequate.

Other countries such as Northern Ireland and Indonesia have used the youths as one of the frontline in the combat against terrorism. Indeed, many young people and youth organizations across the globe from the Youth Action Northern Ireland (YANI) in Northern Ireland to the Young Ambassadors for Peace in Indonesia have played a significant role in preventing extremism and countering terrorism (Brewer and Higgins 2014; Brauchler 2011). Based on various facts of youths—supported peace processes in many countries, it can be inferred that while radicalization is often understood and spoken with a negative connotation, it was argued that youth should be radicalized towards peace and nonviolence. Youth should be encouraged to embrace and actively promote tolerance and conciliation although these may be held as radical ideas in their communities (see e.g. Al-Amri 2020a).

The United Nations also see the potential of youths in their roles for combating extremism and terrorism. There are countless youth groups around the world from the Middle East to Southeast Asia that want to promote peace, fight prejudices, and combat radicalism. The need to empower youth figures prominently in the Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. The General Assembly's review of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy encourages countries to include young people in decision-making processes and consider practical ways to involve them in Prevent Violent Extremism efforts. Moreover, the subsequent adoption of UN Resolution 2250 (in December 2015) was a landmark—the first to recognize the important and positive role young women and men can play in maintaining and promoting international peace and security. According to Jan Eliasson (2016), UN Deputy Secretary-General, young people are already at the forefront of efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism. At the Leaders' Summit on Countering Violent Extremism and ISIL, young leaders from across the world prepared and presented a Youth Action Agenda to Prevent Violent Extremism and Promote Peace. They also contributed to the Amman Youth Declaration on Youth, Peace and Security.

Furthermore, a report by Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE 2013) also underscores the significance of youths in the counter-radicalism strategy, in addition to the violent extremism and

terrorism. Although youths have contributed to terrorism, terrorist radicalization among youth can and should be prevented, starting at an early age, in schools and houses. Particular efforts are needed with respect to teenagers, a group that is generally harder to engage with as they have specific interests and may avoid or oppose those they perceive as figures of authority. Informal education plays a key complementary role and youth work by civil society organizations can support peacebuilding and promote peace and tolerance based on positive and enjoyable activities (OSCE 2013: 1–18).

Besides the above, the government also needs to rethink about the concept of terrorism merely as "religious aberration" partly because people involve in terrorist activities are not simple about their "religious erroneousness." In fact, in contrast with the government's or the counterterrorism committees' opinions, many terrorists still believe that what they did (i.e. terrorist acts) are something right or a "correct deed" and as part of jihad against Islam's and Muslim's enemies, which is mandated and sanctioned in the Qur'an, Hadith, and Islamic religion. Additionally, as Gambetta and Hertog (2017) have pointed out terrorism is a multifaceted phenomenon and a complex social fact that requires a comprehensive study and careful assessment.

People—generally, the youth—engaged in terrorist activities have occasionally nothing to do with "religious deviation" or particular ideology (e.g. Islamism) but with terrorists' social mobility or a particular mindset of the doers. As well, people involved in terrorism might be because of retaliation, abuses of social media, friendship networks, or online religious sermons, among others. Because each terrorist might have different rationale and roots for their involvement in terrorist activities, the government needs to use different techniques and approaches to treat, solve, or counter them from one to another depending on their specific cases.

Another issue that needs to be carefully examined, especially in dealing with Islamist terrorists, is about the intellectual levels of these terrorists. Many might be categorized as "ordinary terrorists" having little knowledge about Islam while some others might have strong Islamic intellectual backgrounds and deep knowledge about the Qur'an and Islamic tradition. Some terrorists might be less ideological whereas others embrace a strong ideology of Islamism. Given the different intellectual, educational, and religious settings of the terrorists, the government's rehabilitation and de-radicalization programs might be successful only for ordinary, less intellectual, and ideological terrorists.

More importantly, for some terrorist kingpins, they consider the Islamic scholars and clerics in the Advisory Committees of the counterterrorism program (as well as the Saudi official religious establishment) lack of religious authority and credibility. This issue certainly needs further assessment whether or not the rehabilitation and de-radicalization programs are effective for all terrorists. This fact is also a gentle reminder for the government in order to implement different approaches, strategies, and tactics for each terrorist, for example, between "top commanders," "ideologues," and "ordinary terrorists / fighters."

Conclusion

Ever since the emergence of terrorism in the Kingdom, the Saudi government had certainly made great efforts in countering it. However, it would be more advantageous for the Saudi government to expand its perspectives on youths and women, as well as civil society associations and minority groupings, and add its strategies of counterterrorism by involving them in the campaign. Recent studies (e.g. Spalek and Weeks 2017) also show that many governments around the world start to research for better ways to manage the risk and prevent the perils of terrorist acts by looking to partner with multiple communities and societal groupings in their counterterrorism endeavors. Cooperation and partnership with a large group of societies, community organizations, women, youths, and university students, among others, have been the concern of multiple governments. Additionally, the government also needs to rethink and reevaluate the effectiveness of the soft approach's rehabilitation and de-radicalization programs especially for the "terrorist linchpins" and ideologues since the initiatives might be unproductive for these types of terrorists. In other words, the government might need different models of counterterrorism to deal with them.

It is imperative to notice that besides continuing to use legal frameworks, the governments simultaneously advocate the need to develop stronger relations with wide communities and societal groups. The United Kingdom's most recent counterterrorism strategy, for instance, is built around four key pillars, namely countering extremist ideology, supporting mainstream voices, disrupting extremists, and building more cohesive societies. Only by implementing extensive comprehensive approaches, combining tactical and strategic counterterrorism strategies,

by involving all elements of Saudi society and community, the Kingdom could defeat terrorism and transform extremism into productive peace in the years to come.

References

Abbas, Tahir. 2021a. *Countering Violent Extremism*. London: Bloomsbury.

———. 2021b. "Reflection: the 'War on Terror', Islamophobia and Radicalization Twenty Years On." *Critical Studies on Terrorism*. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2021.1980182.

Al-Amri, Hassan bin Sulaiman. 2020a. "Tackling Terrorist Exploitation of Youth." *Monthly International Reports*, May. Riyadh: The Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition.

———. 2020b. "Lone Offenders." *Monthly International Report*, April. Riyadh: The Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition.

Al-Jundi, Ammar. 2003. "600 Suspects Nabbed in Crackdown, Says Turki." *Arab News*, October 23. https://www.arabnews.com/node/239296. Retrieved June 2, 2020.

Al-Othaimin, Ibrahim. 2017. "Saudi Efforts to Combat Terror Financing." *Saudi Gazette*, September 14. https://saudigazette.com.sa/article/517163. Accessed June 11, 2020.

Al Qurtuby, Sumanto. 2010. "In Search of Socio-Historical Roots of Southeast Asia's Islamist Terrorism." *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 4 (2): 205–239.

Al-Saud, Naef Bin Ahmed. 2009. "Saudi Arabia's Strategy to Combat Terrorism." *The RUSI Journal* 154 (6): 74–80.

Al Zahrani, Hashem Mohammed. 2012. "Saudi Arabia's Efforts and Experience in Counter-Terrorism." Riyadh: Naif Arab University for Security Sciences.

Alyami, Awad M. S. 2015. "The Role of Art Therapy in Counterterrorism: The Saudi Experience." *The Arts in Therapy* 44: 1–10.

Ansary, Abdullah F. 2008. "Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach." *Middle East Policy* XV (2). http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/combating-extremism-brief-overview-saudi-arabias-approach. Accessed September 26, 2015.

Asseri, Ali S. Awadh. 2009. *Combating Terrorism: Saudi Arabia's Role in the War on Terror*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bahgat, Gauwdat. 2004. "Saudi Arabia and the War on Terrorism." *Arab Studies Quarterly* 26 (1): 51–63.

Bigio, Jamille, and Rachel Vogelstein. 2017. "Women Are Key to Counterterrorism." U.S. News, February 2.

———. 2016. *How Women's Participation in Conflict Prevention and Resolution Advances U.S. Interests*. New York and Washington, DC: The Council on Foreign Relations.

Blanchard, Christopher, and Alfred Prados. 2007. "Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues." *CRS Report for Congress*. Congressional Research Service.

Boucek, Christopher. 2008a. "Counter-Terrorism from Within: Assessing Saudi Arabia's Religious Rehabilitation and Disengagement Programme. *The RUSI Journal* 153 (6): 60–65.

———. 2008b. "Saudi Arabia's Soft Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare." Carnegie Papers, No. 97, September. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC.

Brauchler, Birgit. 2011. *Reconciling Indonesia: Grassroots Agency for Peace*. London: Routledge.

Brewer, John, and Garret Higgins. 2014. *Religion, Civil Society and Peace in Northern Ireland*. London: Oxford University Press.

Commins, David. 2009. *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Cordesman, Anthony H. 2006. "Saudi Arabia: Friend or Foe in the War on Terror?" *Middle East Policy* 13 (1): 28–41.

———. 2001. "Islamic Extremism in Saudi Arabia and the Attack on Al Khobar." Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Cortright, David, and George Lopez. 2007. *Uniting Against Terror: Cooperative Nonmilitary Responses to the Global Terrorist Threat*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

———, Melanie Greenberg, and Laurel Stone, eds. 2016. *Civil Society, Peace and Power*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

Dekmejian, R. Hrair. 1995. *Islam and Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Del Cid Gomez, Juan Miguel. 2015. "A Financial Profile of the Terrorism of al-Qaeda and Its Affiliates." *Journal of Perspectives on Terrorism* 4 (4): 1–16.

Farquhar, Michael. 2017. *Circus of Faith: Migration, Education, and the Wahhabi Mission*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Gambetta, Diego, and Steffen Hertog. 2017. *Engineers of Jihad: the Curious Connection Between Violent Extremism and Education*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Gause III, Gregory F. 2004. "Saudi Arabia and the War on Terrorism." In *A Practical Guide to Winning the War on Terrorism*, edited by Adam Garfinkle, 89–102. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.

Gendron, Angela. 2010. "Confronting Terrorism in Saudi Arabia." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 23: 487–508.

Hegghammer, Thomas. 2010a. *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism Since 1979*. London: Cambridge University Press.

Hoeft, Gabriel. 2015. *'Soft' Approaches to Counter-Terrorism: An Exploration of the Benefits of Deradicalization Programs*. Herzliya, Israel: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism.

Hoffman, Bruce. 1999. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press (2nd ed., 2017).

Huq, Aziz. 2016. "The Uses of Religious Identity, Practice and Dogma in Soft and Hard Counterterrorism." University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 610.

Hwang, Julie Chernov. 2018. *Why Terrorists Quit: The Disengagement of Indonesian Jihadists*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Khan, Mehmood-Ul-Hasan. 2014. "Saudi Arabia's Counter Terrorism Law: A Strategic Orientation." *Defense Journal Pakistan* 14 (9): 60–63.

Lacey, Robert. 2009. *Inside the Kingdom: Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia*. London, UK: Penguin Books.

Mahboob, Abdualhafiz. 2017. *al-irhab wa al-sharq al-awosat al-jadeed* [Terrorism and the New Middle East]. London: E-Kutub Ltd.

Mann, Joseph. 2012. "King Faisal and the Challenge of Nasser's Revolutionary Ideology." *Middle Eastern Studies* 48 (5): 749–764.

Matthiesen, Toby. 2015a. *The Other Saudis: Shiism, Dissent and Sectarianism*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Meijer, Roel. 2005. "The 'Cycle of Contention' and the Limits of Terrorism in Saudi Arabia." In *Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs*, edited by Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman, 271–314. London, UK: C. Hurst & Co.

———, ed. 2012a. *Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Indonesia, Algeria and Saudi Arabia*. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'.

———. 2012b. "Saudi Arabia's Religious Counter-Terrorism Discourse." *Middle East Institute's Policy Analysis*, February 15. https://www.mei.edu/publications/saudi-arabias-religious-counter-terrorist-discourse. Accessed June 9, 2020.

Obaid, Nawaf. 2014. "A Saudi Arabian Defense Doctrine: Mapping the Expanded Force Structure the Kingdom Needs to Lead the Arab World, Stabilize the Region, and Meets Its Global Responsibilities." Defense and Intelligence Projects, Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe). 2013. *Youth Engagement to Counter Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Leads to Terrorism*. Vienna: OSCE.

Peterson, J. E. 2003. *Historical Dictionary of Saudi Arabia*. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.

Realuyo, Celina B. 2015. "Combating Terrorist Financing in the Gulf: Significant Progress but Risks Remain." Working Paper, January 26. The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington.

Riedel, Bruce. 2015. "The Prince of Counterterrorism." *The Brookings Essay*, September 29. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. http://csweb.brookings.edu/content/research/essays/2015/the-prince-of-counterterrorism.html. Accessed June 7, 2020.

Rudolph, Rachael. 2006. "Identity, Foreign Policy, and the War on Terrorism in Saudi Arabia." MA thesis, Faculty of the School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC.

———. 2018. *Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia: New Approaches to Radical Threats*. London, UK: I.B. Tauris.

Spalek, Basia, and Douglas Weeks. 2017. "The Role of Communities in Counterterrorism: Analyzing Policy and Exploring Psychotherapeutic Approaches within Community Settings." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 40 (12): 991–1003.

Sreedhar. 1982. *The Gulf Scramble for Security*. New Delhi: ABC Publishing House.

Stern, Jessica. 2010. "Mind Over Martyr." *Foreign Affairs* 89. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/saudi-arabia/2009-12-21/mind-overmartyr.

Thompson, Mark C. 2014. *Saudi Arabia and the Path to Political Change: National Dialogue and Civil Society*. London and New York: I.B. Tauris.

———. 2015. "Saudi Women Leaders: Challenges and Opportunities." *Journal of Arabian Studies* 5 (1): 15–36.

———. 2019. *Being Young, Male and Saudi: Identity and Politics in a Globalized Kingdom*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Trovimof, Yaroslav. 2007. *The Siege of Mecca*. New York: Doubleday.

Weller, Robert P. 1999. *Alternate Civilities: Democracy and Culture in China and Taiwan*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Weston, Mark. 2008. *Prophets and Princes: Saudi Arabia from Muhammad to the Present*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Williams, Michael J., John G. Horgan, and Williams P. Evans. 2016. "The Critical Role of Friends in Networks for Countering Violent Extremism: Toward a Theory of Vicarious Help-Seeking." *Behavioural Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 8 (1): 45–65.

Wright, Rubin. 2001. *Sacred Rage: the Wrath of Militant Islam*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Wynbrandt, James. 2010. *A Brief History of Saudi Arabia*. New York, NY: Checkmark Books.

Check for updates

CHAPTER 4

Saudi Society on Terrorism and Counterterrorism

> The greatest and most appalling of all sins is for anyone to deliberately and premeditatedly shed the blood of innocent people… wreak chaos and havoc and undermine security and stability in order to achieve the evil goals of criminal gangs and sectarian terrorist organizations.[1]
>
> —Sheikh Khalid bin Ali Al-Ghamdi, Imam of the Grand Mosque of Makkah

Introduction

The previous chapters have outlined the history and contemporary developments of terrorist activities in Saudi Arabia as well as the government's understandings and responses to overcome terrorism. This chapter, in particular, will portray and examine Saudi society's views, opinions, understandings, and ideas regarding domestic terrorism as well as suitable approaches of counterterrorism in their home country. The main data and sources of information used in this chapter are primarily derived from Saudi male youths (i.e., below 50s, but some informants were above fifty year) that might offer indispensable, alternative insights on notions about

[1] This statement was delivered during the Friday sermon at the Holy Mosque of Makkah on July 8, 2016. See https://www.arabnews.com/node/950951/saudi-arabia. Retrieved June 13, 2020. See also an official statement of the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC (2019).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022

S. Al Qurtuby, *Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1337-2_4

terrorism as well as strategic ways of fighting it and transforming Islamist terrorists to become tolerant, nonviolent groupings.

The discussion of Saudi society's views is useful and essential to balance or complement standpoints of the government or ruling elites on both terrorism and counterterrorism since their opinions might differ from one another. As well, by presenting their voices, which are often underrated by the government and relevant agencies, the ruling family and policy-makers might take a look at their ideas which, in turn, might be useful to minimize influences of radical ideas in society and prevent them from terrorism.

Moreover, exploring thoughts of the young Saudis, which according to the General Authority of Statistics composes the majority of Saudi population[2] (see also Thompson 2019), is crucial in part because most [Saudi] perpetrators of militant jihadism in places like Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and others, many of which involved in terrorist acts home and abroad upon finishing their jihad warfare, were the (male) youth between 20 and 40s (Hegghammer 2006, 2010; Meijer 2005, 2006; Ansary 2008).

Historically, Saudi young men have been the main target of recruitment of various militant groups and extremist individuals. Saudi supporters of Nasserist ideology, Juhayman al-Otaybi, the Afghan War commanders (e.g. Abdullah Azzam and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf), leaders of Hezbollah el-Hejaz, Osama bin Laden (and other elite members of al-Qaeda) and ISIL fanatics all recruited Saudi young men to join their jihadist movements, violent actions and terrorist campaigns home and abroad (see Chapter 2). The recruitment of young terrorists is not unique to Saudi Arabia. It has become a global phenomenon. Terrorist organizations in Indonesia, Somalia, Uganda, Iraq, Nigeria, and many others have also utilized this method (Al-Amri 2020a).

This is among the reasons why the current Saudi monarch, King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (b. 1935) underscores and is concerned about this youth issue. The king once said, "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is determined, with God willing to strike with an iron fist those

[2] See https://www.stats.gov.sa/sites/default/files/en-demographic-research-2016_2.pdf. Retrieved June 13, 2020.

who target the minds and attitudes of our youth"[3] (The Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United States 2017, 2019). Since the male youth had been the easy target of terrorism, it is therefore essential to present their voices on life-threatening issues of terrorism as well as best ways of combating, overcoming, and preventing it from occurring in the future. According to Hegghammer (2006: 42), with average age between twenties and early forties, members of the QAP were older than those of other terrorist groups in the world. Yet, Indonesia also shares some similarities with Saudi Arabia in which many members of terrorist groups in this archipelagic country are between twenties and forties (see Chapter 5).

The data presented in this chapter were based on findings of questionnaire survey, interviews, and conversations with Saudis from various regions and Muslim groupings (mainly Sunnis and Shiites) in the Kingdom, during the field research between 2016 and 2019. Those interviewed or had conversations with are not ex-jihadists or members/activists of any radical terrorist groups, some of whom are a new vibrant generation of Saudi society. Questions for the research informants and survey respondents include the following: does Islam encourage its followers to commit terrorism? Does terrorism relate to political economic aspects? What factors contribute to terrorist activities in Saudi Arabia? Does Saudi society support counterterrorism? Are the Saudi government's counterterrorism approaches effective to cope with terrorism? What are the strategic ways to combat terrorism and other forms of radicalism in Saudi Arabia?

Due to limited space, I will not be able to present all of the informants' views in the following paragraphs. In addition, there are some similar observations and opinions among the informants. Accordingly, this chapter will only present some of their views to avoid redundancy. As part of the research ethics, I write names of most informants under the pseudonym (anonymous) except with few notable exceptions (i.e. those who allowed me to write their real names). The presentation of informants' views generally uses an emic perspective, meaning that it applies a descriptive method (as what Saudis said and described) with limited analysis to see the informants' original voices and ideas. At the end of the chapter, I provide my comments, assessment, analysis, and criticisms of their opinions.

[3] An official statement of the Saudi Arabian government, see https://www.saudiembassy.net/sites/default/files/White%20Paper_Counterterrorism_April2017_1.pdf. Retrieved June 13, 2020.

Saudi Society's Responses to Terrorism

Saudi voices on terrorism and radical practices vary enormously. While it is accurate to state that, a great number of Saudis, particularly the male youth, had joined various militant, jihadist, and terrorist movements and groupings in their home country or overseas; this certainly does not mean that all or the majority of Saudis, including the youth, are keen supporters of terrorism and extremism. Unlike the ultra-militant Islamists such as fans of al-Qaeda and ISIL that see terrorism as an act of jihad, many Saudis distinguish between jihad and terrorist acts. While jihad movement under certain circumstances can be valid or legitimate according to Islamic doctrines, terrorism found no theological legitimacy and textual foundation in Islam. Even within jihadist camps, there have been serious debate and distinct opinions and views regarding terrorism and the use of terrors in their struggle such as those between Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden (Hegghammer 2015: 103–22) or, in the context of Indonesia, between Ja'far Omar Thalib, a leader of Laskar Jihad, and Abu Bakar Baasyir, a spiritual leader of Jamaah Islamiyah (Al Qurtuby 2016).

Denouncing Terrorism

My teaching and research experiences in the Kingdom as well as my engagement and conversations with countless Saudis demonstrate that many of them are not enthusiasts of terrorism and extremist groupings, contrast with popular opinions and beliefs in the non-Arab world, where they mostly see and believe that Saudis are keen devotees of jihadism, extremism, and terrorism. Likewise, whereas it is true that many Saudis are generally devout Muslim and religiously conservative, as well as embrace and practice a strict form of Islam based on the Hanbali madhhab[4] (Islamic school of thought), this does not automatically mean that they are ardent devotees of terrorist ideology.

Even the radical preacher such as Safar al-Hawali, one of the pioneers of the Sahwa movement who strongly opposed the presence of the American troops in Saudi Arabia during the Second Gulf War, condemned

[4] The Hanbali school (madhhab) is one of four traditional Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh)—the others being the Hanafi, Maliki, and Shafii—and named after the scholar Ahmad bin Hanbal (d. 855), one of the proponents of literalist Islam in the Medieval Islam. The Hanbali school has influenced Saudi Arabia's legal system and practice.

the 9/11 terrorist attacks as a "sinful deviation" from peaceful Islamic propagation (Weston 2008: 399). Another Saudi cleric who demonizes terrorism is Sheikh Khalid bin Ali Al-Ghamdi, the imam and Friday prayers preacher (*khatib*) of the Grand Mosque of Makkah (Masjid al-Haram). The sheikh, who was appointed as the imam by King Abdullah in 2008, considers terrorist acts that kill the innocent, cause destruction, and create chaos is the biggest sin and alien to Muslim societies. A former professor at Makkah's Umm Al Qura University, the sheikh urges Muslim societies across the globe to stand firmly and show unity against terrorism and terrorist groups[5] (*Arab News,* July 9, 2016).

Likewise, Sheikh Hussein bin Abdul Aziz Al-Shaikh, a descendent of the late famous Saudi reformist Sheikh Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab bin Musharraf Tamimi (1703–1792) and the imam of the Prophet's Mosque of Madinah (Masjid Nabawi), denounces terrorism and terrorist organizations. The imam, a professor at the Islamic University of Madinah, said that terrorism is a heinous act carried out by individuals or groups that have deviated from Islamic teachings and left the Muslim community. For him, only enemies of Islam that commit terrorism.[6] In a conversation with me, a noted Shia cleric, Sheikh Mohammed al-Obidan also expressed his strong criticism against terrorist activities and other forms of extremism committed by radical individuals and groupings.[7] Lastly, the Saudi Grand Mufti and the head of the Council of Senior Ulama, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Al-Sheikh, also does not tolerate terrorism that he saw as an evil act and "uncivilized" crime (Weston 2008: 399).

Not only leading authority of Islam, many "ordinary" Saudis also condemned terrorist acts. Various surveys by leading institutions strongly indicate that most Saudis have rejected anything related to terrorism and terrorist groups. One of the examples of survey findings that show Saudi unsupportive attitudes towards terrorism was those conducted by the Terror Free Tomorrow (TFT), a Washington, D.C.-based nonpartisan,

[5] On his statement concerning terrorism, see https://www.arabnews.com/node/950951/saudi-arabia. On his short bio and appointment as the Grand Mosque of Makkah imam, see https://www.arabnews.com/node/1346746/saudi-arabia. Retrieved June 14, 2020.

[6] On his statement concerning terrorism, see https://www.arabnews.com/node/950951/saudi-arabia. In his brief bio, see https://www.von.gov.ng/hajj-2018-saudi-king-names-sheikh-hussain-al-sheikh-for-arafat-khutbah/. Retrieved June 14, 2020.

[7] Interview with Sheikh Mohammed al-Obidan, Qatif, November 2016.

not-for-profit group that researches attitudes towards extremism worldwide. The results of a nationwide public opinion survey of Saudi Arabia conducted by TFT indicate that the majority of Saudi citizens interviewed in a poll overwhelmingly opposed terrorism, al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, Saudi fighters abroad, and anything related to religious radicalism (TFT 2007).

In the survey's "Executive Summary," it states, "The people of Saudi Arabia are now among the most pro-American and anti-terrorist of any in the entire Muslim world" (TFT 2007: 2). The survey findings are still relevant and consistent until now in which the majority of Saudi societies are not admirers of terrorism and terrorist individuals and groupings. Furthermore, according to the survey, only 10% of Saudis have a favorable view of the al-Qaeda terrorist network. The poll also found that 15% of the pollsters have a favorable view of al-Qaeda's leader. The group's president, Kenneth Ballen, said, "I think that the people of Saudi Arabia have so overwhelmingly turned against bin Laden, al-Qaeda and terrorism in general that nine out of 10 of them look at all three unfavorably" (TFT 2007).

The survey also shows that 63% of Saudis oppose their fellow citizens in the combat against Shia militias in Iraq (and 66% against Sunni militias) and a plurality against US-led coalition forces in Iraq starting in 2003. The finding also indicates 69% of Saudis favor Saudi Arabia working with the United States to resolve the Iraq war, and 88% approve of the Saudi military and police pursuing al-Qaeda fighters (TFT 2007). These are just some of the significant findings of an unprecedented and uncensored nationwide public opinion survey in the Kingdom. Pollsters questioned 1,004 Saudi adults in Arabic between November 30 and December 5, 2007, according to the group. The survey had a sampling error of plus or minus 3 percentage points. Terrorism analyst Peter Bergen said a spate of al-Qaeda attacks on Saudi targets starting in 2003 (see Chapter 2) appeared to have turned the Saudi public against the group (CNN 2007).

Interestingly, the outcomes of a simple questionnaire survey I conducted in October–November 2016 have shared in common with those of the Terror Free Tomorrow. The respondents participated in the survey were ninety Saudi young men ($N = 90$), aged between 20 and 30, from multiple regions and Muslim affiliations (Sunnis or Shiites) in the Kingdom. The survey findings show, among others, that the majority of the respondent (82.2%) did not support any act of terrorism. The majority

Table 4.1 A brief summary of survey results on Saudi views of terrorism and counterterrorism

Questions (Samples)	*Responses (in Percentage %)*
Does Islam support terrorism?	Yes (3.3) No (95.5) Maybe (1.1)
Does terrorism relate to Wahhabism?	Yes (17) No (55.5) Maybe (8.8) Not sure (17.7)
Do most Saudis support terrorism?	Yes (3.3) No (91.1) Maybe (2.2) Not sure (3.3)
Does terrorism link to Salafism?	Yes (11.1) No (65.5) Maybe (3.3) Not sure (20)
Does terrorism relate to political economy?	Yes (46.6) No (2.2) Maybe (36.6) Not sure (14.4)
Do Saudis support counterterrorism?	Yes (80) No (2.2) Maybe (13.3) Not sure (4.4)

of respondent (96.7%) also did not agree with the idea that Islamic teachings support terrorism, about 95.5% refuse the notions that try to channel between Islam and violence, and 94.5% of respondent agree that Islam teaches its followers to be peaceful, nonviolent Muslims (see Table 4.1). Respondents that chose "Maybe" or "Not sure" might be uncertain, confused, did not understand the issue, or did not want to express or declare their views and choices for a particular reason (e.g. safety).

Various Responses to Roots of Terrorism

Commenting on terrorism, a Saudi informant said, "Terrorism is one of the biggest problems that the world is facing today and it is getting worse and worse since it does not only take innocent souls, demolish public facilities, and terrify people but also tries to overthrow states and change governments' policies. To counterterrorism, the world needs to build a

strategic collaboration."[8] It is imperative to note that even though most Saudis doomed terrorism as an evil act, they vary in responding to its root causes, especially in their home country. Unlike the Saudi government officials or religious authorities that tend to view terrorism as a religious deviation and see terrorists as deviant Muslims (Meijer 2012), ordinary Saudis' responses and opinions about roots of terrorism lean towards plurality and complexity meaning that terrorism has multiple factors and root causes.

Some Saudis underscore the lack of understandings of "true Islam" or exploitation of religion while others point out secular reasons such as political economy. Yet, some underline the shortcoming of education while others highlight poverty or unemployment as the main roots of youths involved in terrorist activities. Other important factors of terrorism pointed out by Saudi society include mental illness, depression, unfair political decision, ignorance, discrimination, chauvinism, social media, psychological problems, suppression, injustice, friendship networks, nationalism, Western domination, radical ideology, and racism or ethnocentrism, to name a few. In brief, for Saudi society, roots of terrorism are not only religion but also non-religious factors; thereby, terrorism is not simply a "religious aberration" but "social deviation" as well.

In the next paragraphs, I will classify Saudis' views, resulting from informal conversations, into two major clusters, namely "religious factors" and "non-religious factors" (see a brief summary of their opinions in Table 4.2).

Religious Roots of Terrorism

This book understands and defines religion not only related to doctrines, teachings, texts, discourses, values, norms, symbols, practices, or traditions but also refers to religious actors (individuals or collectives such as institutions) or "agency" that produce and reproduce religious knowledge, practices, actions, and habits. Scott Appleby defines religious actors as "people who have been formed by a religious community and who are acting with the intent to uphold, extend, or defend its values and precepts" (Appleby 2000: 9). However, most, if not all, Saudi informants

[8] Conversation with Mohamed Arnous, March 2018.

understand religion as religious doctrines, teachings, or texts, not as a religious agency.

As discussed above, some informants underline the significance of religion while others underscore non-religious factors as the primary factors contributing to terrorism in Saudi Arabia. Some informants argue that religion itself as the primary source of terrorism, others point out person's religious misunderstanding (not religion itself) as the main basis of terrorism. Ali Khalaf, for example, said, "The point here is not to say that religion itself is the primary motivation of people engaged in terrorist activities as many people have assumed. It is about the [particular] person's understanding of the edgy ideas of religion. A misleading religious person is easy to manipulate and has the potential to be fed with aggressive ideas." "Remember," Khalaf said, "world peace is a common message among all religions as far as I know. Hence, religion that is well understood can never lead to terrorism."[9]

Unlike Khalaf, Jawad has a different argument revealing that terrorism is a religious issue par excellent. In other words, religion itself provides sources for the birth of terrorists and is the focal foundation of terrorist activities and any other violent acts. Jawad argued that religion becomes the basis of terrorism because it is intrinsically biased and unjust in which each religion claims to be the true and right one while others are wrong or fake. In Saudi Arabia, he said, many people think and believe in this way. Worse yet, some claim to have right, permission, or "religious duty," to eliminate infidels/unbelievers or *kuffar*[10] in Islam, and any people who disagree with them. Religious schools, sermons, and mosques, Jawad said, have been the main vehicle of inserting or transferring this religious fanaticism that leads to terrorism.[11]

[9] Interview with Ali Khalaf, April 2018.

[10] The term "*kuffar*" (a plural form of "kafir") literally means "infidels" or "unbelievers." The term first applied to the inhabitants of Makah (Meccans) who refused submission to—or a call for—Islam during the Prophet Muhammad's era in the seventeenth century. At present, the term seems to imply an active refusal of divine revelation. According to conservative Muslim groups, all unbelievers are thought to face eternal damnation in the afterlife. Although there is disagreement about whether Jews and Christians are unbelievers, they have generally received tolerant treatment from Muslim governments. For some militant Islamist groups, the term also uses for Muslims who did not adhere to Islamic laws and the Quran or make an alliance with non-Muslim societies. For a modest definition of "kafir," see http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1229. Retrieved June 17, 2020.

[11] Interview with Jawad, May 2018.

Radical Religious Teachers and Clerics

In this regard, it is interesting to see Ridha Alawami's observation. Alawami argued that the main source of terrorism is not religion since there is no religion, including Islam, which teaches terrorism or commands its adherents to commit violence and assassinate innocent people. For him, the main root of terrorism is militant religious teachers or radical clerics/imams that teach and preach hate, intolerance, fanaticism, bigotry, and violence in schools, public places to held sermons, or mosques.

Several years ago, Alawami explained, I often heard some *khateebs*,[12] persons who deliver the sermon or *khutbah* (lit. "narration") during Friday prayers, even in university's mosques, invite Muslim listeners to kill the enemies of Islam and fight non-Muslims on behalf of Islamic religion. Since religious moderation has greeted Saudi Arabia, the current situation is distinct from the previous years, and the Friday sermons nowadays have improved significantly. Ideally, for Alawami, the *khateeb* should use the Friday prayer as an opportunity to share wisdom, morality, or good counsels in the face of a complex life, or reminds Muslim about the Judgment Day or the afterlife, not invites people to murder humans and commits violence.[13]

Religious Misunderstanding

Another informant that emphasizes religious misunderstanding as a focal factor contributing to terrorism is Hasan Shukr Al-Shaikh. "Terrorism mostly generates out of misunderstanding of religion," Al-Shaikh said. Religion, for him, is a guidance of life that provides resources people [its followers] need, consists of useful teachings for those who believe, and gives a rationale behind human's life. Religion could guide its followers to the right direction and prevent them from wrongdoings (*amr ma'ruf nahi munkar*—enjoining right and forbidding wrong) so

[12] The *khateeb* or *hatib* is usually the imam (prayer leader) but the two roles can be played by different people. The majority of Sunni schools and some Shia jurists consider the Friday prayer a religious compulsory. However, they differ in terms of whether its obligation is conditional to the presence of the ruler or his deputy in it (for the Hanafis and the Imams) or if it is *wajib* for Muslims unconditionally (for the Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali schools) (Hashemi 2008).

[13] Interview with Ridha Alawami, December 2019.

that they become a good person. Unfortunately, Al-Shaikh affirms, some people misunderstand religious doctrines and teachings. As a result, religion could drive some of its adherents to become terrorist. Even though Al-Shaikh recognizes other factors leading to terrorism such as abuse of politics and lack of education, he points out religious misunderstandings as the most significant factor that lead people to involve in terrorist activities.[14]

Khalid Almalik also emphasizes religious misunderstanding as the main source of terrorism in Saudi Arabia. "I believe that misunderstanding of religion has been the most important reason for people involved in extremist and terrorist acts in Saudi Arabia. If terrorists understand Islam as a peaceful religion, they will not commit violence of any kind including terrorism." Such misunderstanding, according to Almalik, might be the outcome of ignorance, lack of education, or embellishment in religious practices and thoughts. In the Kingdom, Almalik said, terrorists have used (or abused) religion (i.e. Islam) to cover up their non-religious motives and achieve their political agenda.[15] Echoing Almalik, Ahmad Alkreedees also points out misunderstanding of religion (Islam) and misinterpretation of the Qur'an as the most important factor of the occurrence terrorism in Saudi Arabia mainly because, according to him, the Qur'an clearly instructed Muslims to make Islam as a peaceful and merciful religion.[16]

Abdurrahman Al-Ghamdi also believes that religion, particularly Islam in the context of Saudi Arabia, contributes significantly to the birth of terrorism, in addition to depression and solitude.[17] Al-Ghamdi said, "One of the major factors contributing to terrorism is misunderstanding of Islamic religion and its rules. Most terrorists think that Islam is about sacrificing themselves for God's cause by bombing non-Muslim people that is totally wrong."[18] In this case, Al-Ghamdi might refer to al-Qaeda's

[14] Interview with Hasan Shukr Al-Shaikh, April 2018.

[15] Interview with Khalid Almalik, November 2019.

[16] Interview with Ahmad Alkreedees, December 2019.

[17] Solitude is a state of seclusion or isolation, namely lack of contact with other people. Solitude may stem from bad relationships, loss of loved ones, deliberate choice, infectious disease, mental disorders, neurological disorders, or circumstances of employment or situation. Al-Ghamdi said, "When someone is alone with no one to guide him, it could lead him to harm others." Depression too, for Al-Ghamdi, could drive the depressed people become a suicide bomber.

[18] Interview with Abdulrahman Al-Ghamdi, April 2018.

terrorist activities in the West or ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and Levant) in Iraq that made non-Muslims (e.g. Yazidis or Westerners) as among of their main targets of operation. However, ISIL terrorists did not only target non-Muslims but also Shia Muslims as in the case of Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, or even Iraq (see Chapter 2).

Jaffar Sulail is another informant who considers religion as a focal factor that contributed to the occurrence of terrorist ideology and groups. Sulail affirms that religion is the most effective means to brainwash (or manipulate) people in order to become radicals or terrorists. For him, misapprehension of Islamic laws, values, and teachings or misinterpretation of Islamic texts, especially among uneducated youth, has been a main root cause of terrorism mainly because it led some Muslims, particularly young men, to commit terrorist activities by killing non-Muslims and Muslims alike whom they deemed or accused as "*kuffar*" (pl. infidels) in the name of jihad.[19] Mohammed Tawhari also underscores terrorists' misinterpretation of Qur'anic texts on jihad as the main cause of terrorism. Tawhari said,

> For me, the source of terrorism is very simple, namely the terrorists' misunderstanding of Islam, especially misreading on the concept of jihad in the Qur'an and other fundamental Islamic texts (e.g. Hadith). It is true that Islam and the Qur'an teach about jihad. However, Muslims can only carry out jihad under certain conditions and limitations, and terrorism is not part of jihad. If the terrorists carefully learn the concept of jihad, along with its limits and conditions, and ask noted *ulama* in the Saudi Council for Senior Scholars, they will never become terrorists.[20]

In Islam, jihad is a "slippery concept." A specialist of Islam, Asma Asfarudin defines jihad as "meritorious struggle or effort" in which its exact meaning depends on context. In the West or non-Muslim society in general, jihad has often been erroneously translated as "holy war" against non-Muslims. In the religious and ethical realm, jihad primarily refers to the "human struggle to promote what is right and to prevent what is wrong."[21] However, in contemporary usage, the term jihad

[19] Interview with Jaffar Sulail, December 2019.

[20] Interview with Mohammed Tawhari, December 2019.

[21] See Asfarudin's detailed explanation on jihad at https://www.britannica.com/topic/jihad. Retrieved June 17, 2020.

has multiple meanings depending on Islamists' or Muslims' political, economic, and ideological interests and objectives (see e.g. Hegghammer 2015: 207–28).

Religious Extremism and Exploitation

The contribution of religion in instigating people to engage in terrorist acts has also become Hussein Al-Mousa's concern. Al-Mousa particularly points out religious extremism—not misunderstanding of religion—as the major factor of terrorism. "Terrorists in Saudi Arabia," he said, "are mostly extremist in religious practices and understandings embracing religious fanaticism and Islamic militancy who think and believe that they are the only ones who are on the right path." As well, Al-Mousa continued to say, "They [terrorists] think only them who implement or practice Islamic teachings and the Sunnah[22] of Prophet Muhammad.

Due to this way of thinking, whoever against them, they will dub or accuse him/her as a heretic[23] or the infidel deserved to be killed." Al-Mousa argued that terrorists basically are deceived by extremist religious figures whose Islamic practices and understandings, according to him, far from the real Islam. Nonetheless, Al-Mousa said, the "extremist religious people succeeded in attracting and convincing some young men who are eager to defend Islamic faith. The extremists persuaded youths by false promises in afterlife stating that if they could murder infidels or heretics,[24] they would become a martyr and enter heaven in the next world."

Similar to Al-Mousa, Raed Mughaus also underlines that killing innocent people is part of terrorists' "faith" that could lead its committers into paradise. Terrorists believe that they have the absolute truth; hence, they have the right to kill followers of non-Islamic religions. In essence, Raed

[22] The Arabic word Sunnah (also spelled Sunna), in pre-Islamic era, literally means a body of established habits, customs, or practices that make up a tradition. In the Islamic community, it generally refers to Prophet Muhammad's everyday habitual practices or traditions that constitute a model for Muslims to follow. Along with the Qur'an and Hadith (Prophet Muhammad's recorded sayings), the Sunnah becomes a major source of Sharia or Islamic law. For Muslims, Sunnah and Hadith are often used interchangeably as the latter is the only source for understanding the Sunnah.

[23] Heretic refers to a person believing in or practicing religious heresy or a person who differs in opinion from the well-established religious dogma or an accepted belief/doctrine.

[24] Interview with Hussein Al-Mousa, December 2019.

said, terrorists have exploited religion (Islam) in order to convince, influence, and recruit young people to be a terrorist aka martyr.[25] Abdulaziz Al-Khalaf also considers young people as an easy target of the religious radicals. "When the religious radicals are in charge of teaching religion, they can influence young people's minds and thoughts easily with completely false messages that could turn or transform them to become terrorists."[26]

Fahad Al-Qahtani highlights at least four factors that contributed to terrorism. First, lack of religious awareness, meaning that the terrorists are unaware that Islam is a peaceful religion that outlaws killing innocent people of any religion. Second, the spread of uneducated religious preachers that preach intolerance and radicalism. Third, the distribution of schoolbooks that encourages extremism and fanaticism. Fourth, the development of jihadist ideology to change society by converting non-Muslims and committing violent acts in the name of Islam.[27]

Terrorists' Exaggeration of Religious Practices

Moreover, slightly different from the previous informants, Khaled Al-Mana argued that the main problem of terrorism lies in the terrorists' overemphasis of religion. According to him, devotees of any religion that exaggerate religious practices, think too much about religious beliefs, and spend their whole life only for religious devotion without having relaxing, vacation, enjoying life, engaging others, or working outside could lead them into seclusion, extremism and finally terrorism. Extremist thoughts and activities, Al-Mana said, are the product of loneliness resulting from, among others, exaggeration of religious practices.[28]

Al-Mana could be right. Specialists of terrorism studies recognize "lone terrorists" are one of the most dangerous criminals. In fact, the lone crime and terrorism by lone offenders have been one of the deadliest attacks in the United States such as the 2013 Boston bombings committed Chechen Kyrgyzstani-American brothers Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and Tamerlan Tsarnaev. The term "lone offender" (also called "lone

[25] Interview with Raed Mughaus, April 2018.

[26] Interview with Abdulaziz Al-Khalaf, March 2018.

[27] Interview with Fahad Al-Qahtani, December 2019.

[28] Interview with Khaled Al-Mana, April 2018.

wolf") refers to an extremist who commits violent activities alone or sovereign of any commands or directives from a radical group or terrorist organization. The "lone terrorist" continues to be a dangerous actor and represents a serious test to state authorities, security personnel, and law-enforcement agencies around the world. Lone terrorism is not a new phenomenon in human history. This type of crime has existed for hundreds of years. Yet, it remains a source of great concern until now, especially in areas where "lone" attacks continue to increase. According to a current report by the Islamic Military Counter-Terrorism Coalition, terrorism of a lone offender seems to remain a source of threat as long as violent ideological groups and terrorist organizations depend to a large extent on the attacks carried out by such lone offenders, who are seen as inspiring people (Al-Amri 2020b: 1–10).

Common Issues on Religious Roots of Terrorism

To conclude, it is thus obvious that some Saudis underline religious factors as the root of terrorism. However, they differ in understanding, explaining, and specifying "religious issues" that provide sources for extremism and terrorism. Yet, few common things can be drawn as follows.

- First, religious misunderstanding, particularly misunderstanding of Islam, seems to be common among the informants. They argue that Islam is a religion of peace; thereby terrorism is a deviance from the authentic and true Islam, and a terrorist is a sort of "deviant Muslim."
- Second, some also highlight Islamic militancy, a kind of "sub-Islam" that teaches and allows intolerant and violent practices.
- Third, misreading or misinterpretation of some fundamental Islamic texts terrorists used as a theological foundation of terrorism (for example, texts on *jihad*, *harb, kufr, shirk,* and so forth).
- Fourth, the development of intolerant schoolbooks that teach narrow-mindedness and anti-pluralism.
- Fifth, the spread of militant religious figures (e.g. clerics, preachers, or teachers) that preach and instill bigotry, intolerance, and violence as part of Islamic teachings through mosques, schools, or public gatherings.

- Sixth, religion itself can be a potential source of terrorism since it contains biased teachings and texts that glorify its followers while demonizing others.

Non-religious Roots of Terrorism

In addition to religious factors, Saudis also underline the significance of non-religious factors for the emergence of terrorism in Saudi Arabia. The non-religious factors contributing to terrorism the Saudi informants point out include the following: internet and social media, politics, friendship networks, unemployment, poverty and economic shortcoming, lack of knowledge and education, sociopath,[29] loneliness, mental illness, depression, discrimination, modernization, racism, ethnocentrism, the Western presence in the Middle East, among many others. Let me briefly outline some of their views here.

Internet and Social Media

Ahmad Al-Adwani argued that social media and internet have been among the major roots of terrorism. According to him, there are groups of people that spread abhorrence, intolerance, and terrorist ideology through social media and request others to join them in the name of Islamic jihad. The extremists use social media to influence, convince and recruit young people to be terrorists. To persuade and assure youths, Al-Adwani said, the terrorists used multiple ways. These include the citation of Islamic basic texts of jihad and ideas of martyrdom that would guarantee the martyrs in heaven in the afterlife. Other ways are by exploiting Muslims' griefs and shortages in the Middle East, North Africa, and other Muslim areas as well as by blaming Westerners, non-Muslims, or "un-Islamic" Muslim governments,[30] namely rules based on other means than instruction from God (*al-hukm bi ghayr ma anzala Allah*), as the roots of Muslims' dearth and ignorance.

[29] A sociopath is a term used to depict someone who has antisocial personality disorder (ASPD). According to some sources, people with ASPD cannot understand others' feelings, often break rules, or make impulsive decisions without feeling guilty for the harm they cause. https://www.healthline.com/health/mental-health/sociopath. Retrieved June 20, 2020.

[30] Interview with Ahmad Al-Adwani (pseudonym), October 2019.

Al-Adwani is certainly not alone in pointing out contributions of the internet and social media in the spread of terrorist ideology and the recruitment of new terrorists. A great number of Saudi informants have also shared the same view. "The Internet is highly influential because people nowadays believe anything on the Internet," said Mohammed Al-Shahrani.[31] Indeed, since the discovery of the internet and social media, many radical and terrorist groups across the world have used them as a medium of propagation of radical ideology, proliferation of hoaxes (including fake news, facts, and photos), and recruitment of new terrorist converts.

Each terrorist group usually has a media committee whose primary tasks are to distribute and spread the group's ideas, agenda, propaganda, and ideology, as well as to influence and recruit new members through multiple media platforms, including social media. Previously, they only used telephone or text messages via mobile phone to spread their goals and agenda. With the growth of the Internet and the explosion in popularity of social networking sites all over the world, terrorist groups have added a number of methods to indoctrinate and radicalize new followers by maximizing the internet while continuing traditional approaches. In brief, internet and media are not only a medium of transmission of terrorism but also a strategy and tactics to spread "radical viruses" across the world.

Over the last two decades, the presence of terrorist groups online has greatly increased. In his study on terrorist social networks, Waskiewicz (2012) said that in 1998, there were only 15 web sites associated with terrorist groups on the Internet. However, by 2005, there were more than 4,000 terrorist-related homepages. For safety reasons, terrorists have limited themselves to secret means of communication on the Internet (e.g. password-protected forums) for communicating and disseminating their goals and propaganda. In an effort to adapt with current technology trends and reach larger audiences with their messages, terrorists have taken up the use of social networking sites as a new medium for recruitment, radicalization, and planning.

Abdullah Ansary, an expert of terrorism studies, also recognizes the significance of the internet and social media as one of the most important resources for spreading deviant terrorist ideologies such as *takfir* and jihad

[31] Conversation with Mohammed Al-Shahrani, April 2018.

doctrines to Saudi youth (Ansary 2008). The term "takfir," a theological declaration and a controversial concept in Islamist discourse, usually refers to the pronouncement that a Muslim, including Muslim rulers, has become an apostate or infidel (*kafir*), meaning no longer Muslim mainly because they have conducted things that break God's laws and rules. Certainly, God's "laws" and "rules" which are in accordance with the perspectives of extremists and terrorists.[32]

The concept of *takfir* is a very modern propaganda weapon of such terrorist groups as al-Qaeda, ISIL, Jamaah Islamiyah, and many others. However, its origins date back to the late seventh century, when the early Kharawij sect broke off from Sunni Muslims to commit malevolent *takfir* on elite members and supporters of the Umayyad Caliphate and justify their violence, terrors, and indiscriminate attacks. In the fourteenth century, Salafi scholar Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328) re-popularized the controversial practice of *takfir* in his effort to condemn the Mongol invaders. All of this contested history of the *takfir* concept flows down to our own times. al-Qaeda and ISIL both have applied the ancient Islamic concept of *takfir* to legitimize their objectives, propaganda, and jihadi attacks on Muslims, including Muslim rulers, whom they see as infidel. For the terrorists, these Muslims are foes of Islam who have destroyed the true and authentic Islam and the whole *ummah* (Muslim community of believers); therefore, jihad is warranted and mandated. They defend this position by manipulating passages of the Qu'ran and Hadith (Errico 2018).

It is widely known that al-Qaeda and ISIL have denounced Saudi government officials as infidels to justify their violent and terrorist attacks. To appeal to Saudi youth, the al-Qaeda Media Committee, for example, produces montages of audio and video materials with burning Islamic songs and poems about heroic jihad or martyrdom, and then distributes them in a videotape format over the Internet (via group emails or social media). The committee also makes fake reports and stories, particularly concerning their accomplishments in cells and their terrorist operations in

[32] The Islamist radicals and terrorists used the concept of *takfir* not only to denounce Muslim but also Muslim rulers who are deemed insufficiently religious; thereby, deserve to be killed. The term has become a central ideology of militant groups and ideologues across the globe. Many Islamic scholars have rejected takfir as un-Islamic or religious deviation, marked by bigotry and zealotry. http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2319. Retrieved June 21, 2020.

the Kingdom and elsewhere. Moreover, they distribute *takfir* brochures and alter fatwas declared by the Kingdom's members of the Council for Senior Ulama (Islamic Scholars). Not only distributing these materials on the internet, as Ayad Alturki has said, the terrorists also encourage Saudi young men to wage jihad and fight against infidels home and abroad.[33]

Other media committee members of the terrorist and militant groups trail Western media to update new developments and news concerning Islam, Muslim world, or Western opinions about Islam and Muslim society to seek their weaknesses and unfairness and then use them to brainwash the youth. As well, the terrorists also analyze, publish, and distribute similar reports from their points of view among enthusiastic youngsters. Other unqualified members of the committee use the internet to display and spread fatwas on the religious obligation to kill the apostates, disbelievers, or blasphemous Muslims. Ansary (2008: 4–5) has also noted that other supporters of terrorist ideology have been the vanguard of al-Qaeda or ISIL and assisted these groups to help organize and spread their messages through audiotapes and leaflets that incite hatred against the Saudi official religious establishment, the royal family, and government officials.

Furthermore, still on Internet issues, as Abdullah Al-Ghamdi has noticed, the terrorists also utilize "chat rooms," WhatsApp, or Twitter to share audio, video, and written materials, as well as discuss themes related to economic, social, political, and religious issues.[34] Based on interviews with detainees, Ansary (2008: 5–6) said that fans of terrorist groups could visit extremist websites that comprise perverse books, articles, notes, misleading fatwas, or private interviews with radical clerics who legitimize *takfir* and violence.[35] Not only inciting hate, intolerance, and violence,

[33] Interview with Ayad Alturki, March 2018.

[34] Conversation with Abdullah Al Ghamdi, December 2019.

[35] According to Ansary (2008: 4–6), among the materials circulated by the terrorists on the Internet is an extensive collection of books, notes, and audio and video tapes that authorize killing security forces, infidels, and uprising against Muslim rulers (*khuruj ala al-hakim*) who have been declared as *kuffar* (unbelievers). The materials include Saeed Abdul Ghani's book *Ahl Al-Sunnah Faith in Loyalty and Disassociation Doctrine* and the work of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who has expressed deep hatred of the Kingdom and its religious scholars. Among his notable books are *Clear Evidence of the Infidel Nature of the Saudi State*, *About the Saudi Council of Senior Ulama Fatwa of Killing Mujahideen Al Ulyah*, *Working with Infidel Governments* and *About the Saudi Mufti Fatwa on Martyrdom Operations*.

numerous books (e.g. *How to Make Poisons the Easy Way*) and videotapes contain on how to assemble bombs and other lethal materials.

Due to the vast amount of materials available on the Internet, it is apparent that "self-radicalization" has augmented the traditional process and quickly become commonplace. Through the internet, people now can easily listen to speeches of radical preachers (e.g. on YouTube), learn to create explosives, socialize with others, or make connections with various extremists and jihadists across the globe. To illustrate a process of self-radicalization, Mohammed Al-Shahrani reveals, "When a person reads a tweet on Twitter or receives a message on WhatsApp that says 'fight or kill infidels and enemies of Islam', he/she believes that it is a jihad and heroism and he will die as a *mujahid* (martyr) that would enter paradise in the afterlife. In my view, this is wrong because terrorists kill innocent people that oppose the idea and objective of jihad in Islam."[36]

Friendship Relations and Networks

Another important factor highlighted by Saudi informants is the friendship network. Abdullah Alharbi, for example, said, "Besides internet and social media, friendship linkage has been a significant factor of distribution of terrorist ideology, especially among the youth. In Saudi, friends are important. We [Saudis] share many things—bad or good, right or wrong—with friends, and they could appeal and influence each other on any issues including terrorism. Many times people trust news and information delivered by friends more than those by family. Accordingly, we should be careful who we befriend and be smart to know what is wrong."[37] Again, Alharbi is not the only informant who underscores the vitality of friendship connection in prompting radicalism and extremism in Saudi Arabia. Some informants have shared Alharbi's views.

A number of specialists of terrorism or violence studies have also underscored the role of friendship relations, personal ties, and social networks in shaping pathways towards terrorism and other forms of violence in many places in the world (e.g. Malthaner 2018; Waskiewicz 2012; Hegghammer 2010). Not only a close friend, a "friend of a friend"

[36] Conversation with Mohammed Al-Shahrani, April 2018.

[37] Conversation with Abdullah Alharbi, April 2018.

has also played an important role in influencing other "friends." Waskiewicz (2012: 1–5) said that a "friend of a friend" is an individual that has a friendly relationship with the friend of a person, but that person has no direct connection to that individual. Even though, no direct link between the person and the friend's friend, this is still a vital relationship in which each person can exert a certain amount of influence on one another using the common friend as an intermediary. Ideas, information, behavior, and even feelings can spread through this social network.

In order to reach more friends, the terrorists build friendship relations through traditional and "virtual" way, including using social media platforms such as Facebook. Through Facebook, the terrorists tried to establish a permanent presence by creating virtual communities affiliated with terrorist websites. This method, which is the initial friend of the friendship relations that began to take root, allows the terrorists to bridge the gap between supporters and leadership. Moreover, to reach out to the Facebook users they are trying to recruit, terrorists create Facebook pages and coordinate communication between their websites and Facebook. The terrorists operating on Facebook befriend sympathizers on the fringe and start pedaling their anti-Western sentiment to appeal to their "virtual communities and friends" (Waskiewicz 2012).

It is thus obvious that some studies emphasize how friendship connection has played a major role in the radicalization process and participation in high-risk activism. In the West, for example, as Sageman has argued, jihadist radicalization takes into account its specific micro-mobilization settings. Radicalization, according to Sageman, typically occurs as a process driven by more or less autonomous cliques of like-minded friends in which strong bonds promote loyalty and group-cohesion. These small, tightly knit groups but then gradually withdraw from that environment and become the site of intensive interactions in which extremist ideas and radical perceptions are reinforced. Such small, dense cliques of activist-friends generate trust and strong ties that encourage high-risk activism. In addition, radical milieus serve as relays, providing connections between militant groups and wider movements (Sageman 2004; Bielby 2019).

Ignorance (Lack Knowledge and Education)

Other significant factors according to Saudi informants that contributed to radicalism and terrorism are ignorance. What they meant by "ignorance" is lack of knowledge and education, not only related to religious

knowledge and education but also others. When they said, that terrorists are "ignorant people," they mean "uneducated people." Hasan Al-Shaikh said, "Education is the foundation of a fully civilized human being that would contribute to positive things in the family, community or state. On the contrary, ignorance can lead people making bad and negative decisions in their life including feuds and terrorist acts."[38] "Terrorists are mostly ignorant / uneducated people. This is why they deem all non-Muslims are potential enemies of Islam and Muslim society. Educated people would not say this," said Ahmed Aljallal.[39]

Another informant, Fahd Al-Qahtani also pointed out the lack of education (of any subject) as the important factor of terrorism. He said that most terrorist suspects in Saudi Arabia are high school graduates, while some joined terrorist groups in the middle of the university stage.[40] While it is accurate to say that, most ordinary terrorists lack education, but others are quite well educated. I will explain and analyze later on in this chapter. As well, Majed Alfaydi underlines the contribution of ignorance as one of the major factors contributing to terrorism. "Uneducated people are easier to be tricked or manipulated by extremists to embrace terrorist ideology and to join their radical groups. Moreover, lack of knowledge, skills, or experiences could drive people to terrorist activities especially if they got frustrated due to difficulty of finding a "proper job" that requires education and expertise."[41] Mazen Abualaz was also concerned about education. "I think, terrorism is about a state of mind shaped by many things, most importantly education. What I meant by 'education' here is about not only school or formal education but also any information someone learns from any sources. Because information can be potentially misinterpreted and misunderstood that might lead to wrongdoings, including terrorism, proper education is needed. Accordingly, people with lack of education are easy to become terrorists."[42]

[38] Conversation with Hasan Al-Shaikh, April 2018.

[39] Conversation with Ahmed Aljallal, April 2018.

[40] Conversation with Fahd Al-Qahtani (pseudonym), May 2018.

[41] Conversation with Majed Alfaydi, December 2019.

[42] Conversation with Mazen Abualaz, December 2019.

Anti-western Sentiment and Narratives

Some Saudi informants also underline anti-Western sentiment as one of the "key magnets" terrorists use to influence people. The sentiment might grow because of Western interference on domestic political economic issues of the Middle East or Muslim-dominated countries. Ahmed Aljallal, for example, said, "In the name of spreading peace and democracy in the Middle East and other Muslim regions, some Western countries have actually damaged the areas and societies that drove the emergence of terrorist groups."[43] Mukhtar Alzahrani also underscores the anti-Western sentiment as a medium of recruitment and mobilization of new followers of terrorist ideology. Like Aljallal, Alzahrani argued that terrorists have spread anti-Western sentiment to appeal to people in order to join their groups by referring the Western intervention in the Middle East politics and economy (e.g. American involvement in Iraq) that make local populace suffer. Hence, American political economic interests in the Middle East have served as one of the main reasons for the emergence of terrorist groups in this region.[44] As discussed in the previous chapters, it is valid to state that one of the major factors for contributing terrorism in Saudi Arabia is the American presence in the Kingdom following the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in early 1990s.

Racism and Ethnocentrism

Meshari Alsaadi underlines contributions of racism and ethnocentrism to the rise of terrorism. "I strongly believe that racism[45] is the most crucial factor leading to terrorism in the Muslim world," Alsaadi said. For him, the birth of [Islamist] terrorism in contemporary era because of racism practiced by Westerners. Because of racist ideology, Muslims have been among the target that eventually helped the birth of terrorism in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. The same view has been shared by Abdulaziz

[43] Conversation with Ahmed Aljallal, April 2018.

[44] Conversation with Mukhtar Alzahrani (anonymous), March 2018.

[45] Racism is a "belief or doctrine that inherent differences among the various human racial groups determine cultural or individual achievement, usually involving the idea that one's own race is superior and has the right to dominate others or that a particular racial group is inferior to the others." It also refers to "a policy, system of government, etc., based upon or fostering such a doctrine; discrimination." Another definition, hatred or intolerance of another race or other races. https://www.dictionary.com/browse/racism.

Alomar stating that, "People sometimes committed crimes and terrorism not because of religion but due to racism the terrorists held and believed towards others."[46] Another factor Alsaadi pointed out was ethnocentrism,[47] namely a belief that one's cultural practices are superior to others. "Ethnocentric people tend to believe that their cultures, traditions and practices are better than others that could potentially lead to racism and terrorism."[48] Ahmed Alzahrani also maintained the idea of ethnocentrism as the root causes of terrorism, arguing that, "If people have ethnocentric mindset and points of view, they tend to be selfish, superior, and uncaring about others; thereby, bombing other innocent people make them feel nothing."[49]

Discrimination, Injustice, Hate, Alienation, and Lack Family Guidance

In addition to ethnocentrism, Alzahrani highlights other factors that contributed to terrorism such as discrimination, alienation, and lack family guidance. Terrorism could occur, Alzahrani said, due to parents do not care about—and do not guide—their children's growth, education, or psychological development; accordingly, they become an easy target of radical and terrorist groups. Moreover, Hussain Almahdi emphasizes hatred as one of the roots of terrorism. For Alhamdi, occasionally terrorism takes place not because of things related to religious or ethnic issues but due to terrorists' hate towards others. In addition, Almahdi also points out "mental illness" as another factor contributing to terrorism.[50]

[46] Conversation with Abdulaziz Alomar, March 2018.

[47] Elizabeth Baylor (2016) defines ethnocentrism as "a term applied to the cultural or ethnic bias—whether conscious or unconscious—in which an individual views the world from the perspective of his or her own group, establishing the in-group as archetypal and rating all other groups with reference to this ideal." This form of tunnel vision, according to Baylor, often results in: (1) an inability to adequately understand cultures that are different from one's own and (2) value judgments that preference the in-group and assert its inherent superiority, thus linking the concept of ethnocentrism to multiple forms of chauvinism and prejudice, including nationalism, tribalism, racism, and even sexism and disability discrimination. https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199766567/obo-9780199766567-0045.xml. Retrieved June 23, 2020.

[48] Conversation with Meshari Alsaadi (pseudonym), May 2018.

[49] Conversation with Ahmed Alzahrani, April 2018.

[50] Conversation with Hussain Almahdi, April 2018.

Furthermore, Abdulrahim Alharbi argued that injustice or unfair treatment towards minority groups such as the black people or non-Muslims in the West could transform a person to be a terrorist.

Terrorists' Political Objectives and Ends

Abdulrahman Alghamdi considers politics as the main factor contributing to terrorism in Saudi Arabia. What he meant by "politics" is the terrorists' political objectives and ends (not religious ones) for their violent acts. According to Alghamdi, most, if not all, terrorist groups in Saudi expressed their disloyalty to the royal family through videos and other means urging people not to obey the Saudi government because they deemed the rulers as sinners that could threaten society's customs and religion. In essence, the terrorists use religion as a cloak to cover their political interests, and terrorism is a medium to achieve their goals. This phenomenon, Alghamdi said, not only takes place in Saudi Arabia but other countries in the Middle East as well.

To sum up, as in other countries, there are indeed many non-religious factors contributing to terrorism in Saudi Arabia, expressed by Saudi society. Some informants have contested over several issues. Some Saudis, for example, agree on poverty as one of the root causes of terrorism while others disagree by pointing or providing examples of terrorists who came from middle class or wealthy family like Osama Bin Laden. Due to a limited space, however, I am not able to present all of their assessments and opinions in this chapter (see its short summary in Table 4.2). Yet, suffice to say that terrorism, for Saudis, is not only about "religious phenomenon" but also non-religious one that requires a careful evaluation.

Saudi Society's Responses to Counterterrorism

Now, what are Saudis' opinions concerning ways of countering terrorism and radicalism? Like views of terrorism, those of counterterrorism also vary from one another. In the following paragraphs, I will present, summarize, and select some examples of viewpoints of Saudi societies on how to combat terrorism in the Kingdom.

Table 4.2 A brief summary of Saudi opinions on the roots of terrorism

Religious factors	*Non-religious factors*
• Religious misunderstanding (as for Islamist terrorism, misunderstanding of Islam) • Exploitation of religion (i.e. abuse of Islam for political, ideological, & economic purposes) • Lack of proper religious education • Islamic militancy/radicalism • Misreading or misinterpretation of some fundamental Islamic texts (e.g. on *jihad, kufr, harb*, etc.) • The development of intolerant religious schoolbooks that teach narrow-mindedness and anti-pluralism • The spread of militant religious figures (e.g. clerics, preachers, or teachers) that preach and instill bigotry, intolerance, and violence through mosques, schools, or public gatherings • Religion itself can be a potential source of terrorism since it contains biased teachings and texts that glorify its followers while demonizing others	• Internet & social media • Ignorance & lack of education • Friendship networks • Personal ties • Racism • Ethnocentrism • Hatred • Suppression • Anti-Western sentiment • Discrimination • Alienation • Lack of family guidance • Psychological problems • Depression • Solitude • Economic shortage/poverty • Unemployment • Mental illness • Political issues • Western intervention in the Middle East's domestic political economy Etc

Peaceful Religious Discourse, Respect on Diversity, and Public Awareness

One of the interesting ideas and suggestions about countering terrorism was given by Mohamed Arnous. He pointed out three main issues to overcome terrorism in the Kingdom, namely developing peaceful religious [Islamic] discourses, teaching respect on diversity since middle and high schools, and building a public awareness about the danger of terrorism. "The world cannot counter terrorism by [military] force only," Arnous said. According to him, to effectively combat and avert terrorism, especially religious-based terrorism, the Saudi government should pay more attention to three issues as follows.

First, religious discourse, meaning that the government needs to make sure that any religious figures who speak in public [preacher, *khatib*,

imam, or cleric] must be free from extremist ideology in order to preach peace and discourage violence.

Secondly, respect for heterogeneity should be planted in early stages, for example, in middle and high schools. Students starting from middle and high schools should learn to esteem other people's religions, cultures and ideas no matter how different they are. This, among others, can be achieved by teaching and introducing classes or courses on the study of human cultures, including social sciences and humanities, to the middle and high school students. Not only Arnous, other informants also notify the necessity of introducing and teaching social sciences and humanities, including cultural anthropology classes, for students in middle/high schools to help them learn and appreciate cultural and religious diversity.[51]

Third, creating and mobilizing public awareness on the hazard of terrorism so that they could recognize it and then report to the relevant authorities any suspicious activities and dubious people that might have potential for terrorism and violent extremism. People need to assist the government and law-enforcement forces in order to be more productive in the combat against terrorism and other forms of extremism.[52]

Other informants also shared Arnous' standpoints on the need to create public awareness and educate people related to the danger of terrorism. Ahmed Mohammed, for instance, suggested that in order to make people aware of—or immune from—the threat of terrorism, the government officials, stakeholders, and non-government elite people who are concerned about the Kingdom's safety and security need to train and educate society about this issue.[53] Another informant, Abdulaziz Alkhater, added that such an attempt will also prevent people from being fooled and manipulated by radical groupings.[54]

[51] Saudi public schools, including international schools, have actually incorporated social studies in their curricula but only as a complement. In addition, teaching-learning processes do not guarantee that they respect and appreciate the values of cultural diversity.

[52] Conversation with Mohamed Arnous, March 2018.

[53] Conversation with Ahmed Mohammed, March 2018.

[54] Conversation with Abdulaziz Alkhater, December 2019.

Developing Homeland Security, Society's Active Participation, and Media

Other notions and counsels on combating terrorism came from Abdulaziz Al-Khalaf. Al-Khalaf suggested three issues that need to be dealt with in order to be successful in the fight against terrorism. First is developing homeland security by assigning the right tasks to the right people. In this regard, the government needs to carry out thorough investigation on the previous terrorist attacks in the Kingdom as well as cooperation with other countries that have also suffered from the shameful acts of terrorism since this issue is not only the concern of a particular country but also other nations.

Second, society must also be active in helping government in the struggle of countering terrorism by acting as the "government's eye" to alert and inform the police anything suspicious to foil bad things that might happen. Thirdly, media also play an important role to stop terrorism by publishing news, reports, essays, and other relevant documentations and information that dishearten terrorism, or displaying photos and names of terrorist suspects so that society is aware of their existence.[55]

Concerning the role of media, Mahfood Gubran also underscores the vitality of media in spreading terrorism and counterterrorism alike. He said, "All media outlets, radio stations, newspapers, televisions and so forth that call for or instigate radicalism and terrorism should be banned and prevented from carrying out their work to minimize or stop the multiplying of terrorist ideology."[56] In addition to media outlet, Abdullah Shahi is concerned about producing movies that discourage the practice of terrorism and radicalism and at the same time encourage people to live in peace and harmony in the society.[57]

A great number of the informants underline the need to use internet and media-all kinds of media including radio, television, or social media as a means to confront and antagonize terrorism, propagate peace and security, and proliferate anti-terrorism ideas. Aeyad Alsaadi and Abdullah Al-Adwani, for example, suggested the maximization of internet and social media to hunt down terrorist groups and networks, counter

[55] Conversation with Abdulaziz Al-Khalaf, March 2018.

[56] Conversation with Mahfood Gubran, March 2018.

[57] Conversation with Abdullah Shahi, December 2019.

terrorist ideology and jihadist discourses, as well as introduce and propagate peaceful ideas and harmonious relations with global citizens of multiple faiths and ethnicities. Alsaadi said, "social media is an effective tool to disseminate anti-terrorism ideas since it is fast and many people have access to it."[58] Moreover, Al-Adwani noted, "since terrorists have used social media for their campaigns and propaganda, it is also strategic to use it as a medium to counterterrorism."[59]

Increase Consciousness to Parents and Teenegers

Ahmed Alzahrani put forward the need to develop programs or campaigns to increase consciousness among teenagers in high schools about the hazard of terrorism and any radical ideology and movement. Alzahrani argues that the government must pay attention towards teenagers, as they need adult consultation and malicious people like terrorists always try to deceive young teens to join their violent campaigns. Another important program, according to Alzahrani, is encouraging parents' awareness and guidance on their children's psychological and educational development mainly because parents sometimes are careless about their children so that could lead them to the wrong path, including terrorist activities. In fact, Alzahrani said, it is the parents' duty to have their children matured and aware of the danger of terrorism.[60]

Hussain Al-Alawi, another informant, also pointed out the vitality of parents' roles in countering terrorism by providing a proper education for their children on the significance of Islamic moderation and teachings of peaceful and tolerant Islam that denounces violence in all forms.[61] The emphasis on the parents' role in combating terrorism is also given by Mukhtar Alabdullah. He said terrorism is a set of "build-up" thinking, mindset, mentality, and perception implanted by parents to human minds since childhood. This means, Alabdullah said, the way parents raise and educate their children has significant impact on the children's future view and understanding of many issues including terrorism.

[58] Conversation with Aeyad Alsaadi, March 2018.

[59] Conversation with Abdullah Al-Adwani, April 2018.

[60] Conversation with Ahmed Alzahrani, April 2018.

[61] Conversation with Hussain Al-Mousa, December 2019.

Albdullah gives an example of parents from particular religious group that implant negative views of other religious followers or even within the same religion (e.g. Sunni and Shia in Islam) would influence or effect the construction of children's attitude and mindset to other groups in the future. Terrorists targeting specific religious groups might be the product of intolerant ideas inserted by their parents since their childhood.[62] In short, for some informants, the vitality of parents in introducing and teaching to their children and family members concerning peaceful and moderate Islam and the danger of radical ideas are needed to protect their families from dangerous and extremist thoughts and practices.

Introducing Social Sciences in Schools and Universities

Other interesting ideas and suggestions of counterterrorism strategies were provided by Ali Khalaf. He suggested the government to incorporate courses of social sciences, particularly cultural anthropology, in its schools' curricula since early stages of education aiming at introducing, enhancing, and yielding an open-minded generation that respect other cultures and societies across the globe as well as be familiar with diversity of beliefs, religions, traditions, and cultural practices of foreign societies and nations. This model, according to him, will be able to create a peace-loving future generation that could live in peaceful coexistence with others.[63]

Similar to Khalaf, Hamad Alsayegh put emphasis on the need to study social sciences for all students of university or pre-university levels (middle/high schools) in the Kingdom mainly because, he argues, social sciences are not "one-sided sciences" but rather observe and study subjects and ideas from multiple perspectives. Social sciences, Alsayegh argues, could lead students to become a pluralist generation that respects and be sympathetic with plurality and disagreement.[64] Coincidentally, Alsayegh's observation resembles the studies of Gambetta and Hertog (2007, 2017), outlining the absence of social sciences students (or former students) among terrorists and the presence of technical or engineering students (or former students) among them.

[62] Conversation with Mukhtar Alabdullah, April 2018.

[63] Conversation with Ali Khalaf, April 2018.

[64] Conversation with Hamad Alsayagh, March 2018.

Be Familiar with Non-Muslim Communities

Another possible approach, according to Ali Khalaf, is the introduction of foreign non-Muslim societies to Saudi young generation at an early stage perhaps through exchange educational programs and other means. Again, the point of this model is to make them feel more comfortable with religious differences as well as to avoid ethnocentrism and religious fanaticism. Khalaf gives an example of why there is no a terrorist or extremist mindset among students or alumni of KFUPM[65] (King Fahd University of Petroleum & Minerals).

Khalaf argued that the absence of radical mindset among KFUPM students and alumni because they have got familiar with non-Muslim teachers and professors in the university. Since the early stages of their study in the university, students have interacted and built connection with non-Muslim teachers of foreign nationals (mostly Westerners), and in most cases, friendship relations occur between them even after the course ends. In some occasions, Muslim students visit homes of their former non-Muslim professors comfortably without religious gap or feeling suspicious between them. Such a good relationship is the product of fruitful interreligious interaction and engagement. Khalaf, then, introduces religious pluralism as part of an important subject that needs to be introduced and taught at schools and universities across the Kingdom.[66]

Rewards for Informants, Nationalism, and Foreign Policy

Other informants emphasize and enlarge the government's roles in combating terrorism, for instance, giving rewards for those who give or provide information about terrorists or their cells to attract more

[65] King Fahd University of Petroleum & Minerals (KFUPM), based in Dhahran, has long been recognized as an American model of English-based university in which all teaching instructions, except in Arabic studies, are held in English. Many university professors are expatriates from many countries throughout the world. Students who got admission in the university must take English courses for 1–2 years and have to pass English exams as a preparation before taking undergraduate courses. KFUPM hires many native English teachers, most if all of them are non-Muslim, from the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, and other countries to teach English. This is among the reasons why students have been familiar with non-Muslim teachers since their early study at KFUPM that might shape their future views and understandings towards non-Muslims.

[66] Conversation with Ali Khalaf, April 2018.

people in the combat against terrorism, as expressed by Aeyad Alsaadi.[67] Hasan Al-Sharf suggested the government to spread intensively nationalist ideology to confront terrorist and radical ideology developed by extremist groups, in addition to tackling unemployment issues that might cause people to commit terrorist activities.[68] Another informant, Abdul-Rahman Saeed, suggested the government to improve its foreign policy especially in dealing with Saudi's neighbors such as the Gulf countries or even with Iran. "Building a good relationship with the neighbors will bring more advantages than disadvantages and reduce defense costs," Saeed said.[69]

Combating Extremist Ideas and Cleaning up of Public Spheres from Radical Voices

Furthermore, Hussain Almahdi said that the government should not allow radical voices in schools, mosques, campuses, and other public domains of Saudi Arabia. A number of informants have shared similar thoughts underlining the need to "keep an eye" or get rid of radical voices from public spheres. Almahdi and others suggested the government take control of the production and proliferation of Islamic discourses in society to make sure that the discourses are fine and on the right track. On the other hand, Almahdi said, the religious people need to be responsible for their voices that might result in destructive effects in Saudi society. "Religious preaching that instructs Muslims to kill innocent peoplenon-Muslim or Muslim–will make Islam looks bad for others and does not help improve the image of this faith."[70]

Abdulaziz Dumyati also suggested the government to expand its effort in fighting terrorism by exposing terrorists' "real" ideology and purposes on public so that people become aware of their danger in the society. For Dumyati, terrorism is not about a person but an idea; thereby, fighting terrorism is not fighting against a person but against an idea. "If combating a person," Dumyati said, "terrorism had disappeared long time

[67] Aeyad Alsaadi for example said, "Giving rewards will encourage society to be more active in finding terrorists or reporting their activities and nests." Conversation Alsaadi, March 2018.

[68] Conversation with Hasan Al-Sharf, December 2019.

[69] Conversation with Abdul-Rahman Saeed, December 2019.

[70] Conversation with Hussain Almahdi, March 2018.

ago."[71] By revealing their actual motives and purposes, he argued, terrorists will not easily attract and influence youngsters and ordinary people in general. In addition, Dumyati suggested other means of combating terrorism such as cutting terrorists' financial sources and channels, monitoring internet and websites that promote radicalism and terrorism, as well as rising and educating people on the peril of terrorism.

The notion that "fighting terrorism is fighting an idea" also expressed by Khalid Al-Rashidi because he, like Dumyati, also believes that terrorism is about a notion. He said, "Fighting killing with killing is wrong." What he meant is combating terrorists who killed people with a method of killing them is incorrect. For Al-Rashidi, the best way to combat terrorism is by sitting and talk with the terrorists or by helping not eliminating them because if you kill one person, next they will kill two or more people. Al-Rashidi quoted a saying that states, "Ideas do not die by bullets" and "because terrorism is about an idea, not a person, we cannot kill an idea by killing a person."[72]

Explaining the Merits of Social Changes

Furthermore, another informant such as Hussein Al-Alawi emphasizes the significance of spreading the benefits of social changes taking place in Saudi Arabia. For him, terrorism and other forms of extremism occur because the terrorists or extremists disagreed and frustrated with social and religious changes taking place in the Kingdom and society that oppose their understandings and beliefs about the "true" and "authentic" Islam. Based on these reasons, according to Al-Alawi, it is important to explain the merits and positive aspects of such changes and the rationales why [Saudi] society needs a change.[73]

[71] Conversation with Abdulaziz Dumyati, December 2019.

[72] Conversation with Khalid Al-Rashidi, December 2019.

[73] Conversation with Hussein Al-Alawi, December 2019.

Equality and Other Crucial Matters

Another informant, Ahmed Alturki,[74] suggested several things to combat terrorism in the Kingdom. These include (1) give equal access and opportunity to all societies and tribes, (2) make court system independent, (3) punish unjust people, (4) build an agency to incorporate citizens' needs and respond their wants, (5) provide good religious schooling, and (6) educate people that not all innovations are unlawful. Mohammed Almuhanna also gave other interesting suggestions such as (1) change book/textbooks that do not explain proper understandings or discriminate Shia religious community and (2) create laws that criminalize those who spread hate, intolerance, and discrimination towards other societies.[75]

Multiple Voices of Combating Terrorism-A Brief Summary

To conclude, there are many opinions, views, and suggestions from Saudi informants on how to employ best ways in combating terrorism. There are some disagreements among the informants on best ways of fighting against terrorism. For example, few informants underline ineffectiveness of using military forces by killing terrorists since terrorism is not simply about a person but a notion. However, it seems there are some general agreements or common consensus among the informants about effective approaches to counterterrorism. These include, for instance, the need to expand counterterrorism approaches beyond well-established military or security methods by boosting creative non-military models of counterterrorism and anti-terrorism. Moreover, a great number of informants also highlight the role of schooling since early stages (e.g. middle/high schools) by (1) creating anti-terrorism curricula, (2) writing tolerant school textbooks, (3) teaching respect on diversity of people's religions and cultures, (4) introducing social sciences, or (5) building healthy interreligious relations.

A brief summary of the informants' points of view can be seen in Table 4.3.

[74] Conversation with Ahmed Alturki (anonymous), November 2019.

[75] Conversation with Mohammed Almuhanna (pseudonym), December 2019.

Table 4.3 A brief summary of Saudi opinions on counterterrorism

- Strengthen the presence of security personnel in all checkpoints
- Reinforce military and investigation units
- Arrest those who commit terrorism and spread radical ideas
- Cut terrorists' financial sources
- Improve foreign policy by building productive relations with Saudi's neighbors
- Oversee and catch social media users that provoke terrorism
- Develop peaceful religious [Islamic] discourses
- Teach people's cultural diversity since middle and high schools to make students respect other cultures and practices
- Introduce religious pluralism and interreligious relations since early stages
- Spread nationalist ideology and strengthen "Saudi-ness"
- Create public/community awareness
- Insert cultural anthropology course in curricula of schools and universities
- Improve homeland security
- Involve society in counterterrorism initiatives
- Intensify war on terror by expanding war on idea
- Maximize the role of all types of media (print, electronic, audio)
- Ban media that provoke radicalism
- Increase consciousness among teenagers
- Strengthen family role
- Replace intolerant schoolbooks with tolerant ones
- Keep an eye on closed minded people
- Familiarize with non-Muslims since teens/youth
- Present social sciences courses at schools and universities
- Provide rewards (bounties) for those supply information about terrorists or their cells
- Intensify the use of internet & social media
- Produce movies on the danger of terrorism
- Create laws that criminalize those who spread hatred and intolerance
- Display other societies and countries damaged by terrorists to make Saudis aware of negative effects of terrorism

Assessment and Analysis: Comments on Saudis' Opinions

In the following paragraphs, I will briefly analyze and assess the informants' points of view on terrorism and counterterrorism. Even though in general, their opinions on roots of terrorism are valid, some views need for further examination such as the following.

First, the notion of poverty and unemployment as the roots of terrorism seems inapt in the context of Saudi Arabia. A great number of

informants said and believed that poverty (and joblessness) contributed to the appearance of terrorism and the intensification of terrorist activities in the Kingdom and beyond; thereby, they suggested the government to boost economic sectors and create more jobs for the youths. Contrary to the informants' views, a study by Thomas Hegghammer, a specialist of Saudi Arabia's terrorism and jihadism studies, suggests that the idea that the economic shortage as the root causes of the Kingdom's terrorism is not convincing and lack of empirical grounds.

In his study that draws on 240 biographies of Saudi militants, Hegghammer said that the radicals in the Kingdom generally do not come from areas that are commonly considered poor or rural such as the far south or the far north but from the Riyadh region. According to Hegghammer (2006: 43), Riyadh was the residence of more than half of the militants before they joined QAP (al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula), as opposed to only 21% of the population. The data, hence, do not support an assumption or hypothesis that suggests Saudi militancy as a reaction of "neglected peripheries" to the economic or political domination of the Najd. In terms of socioeconomic background, Hegghammer notifies that the vast majority of QAP militants belong to the middle class or lower middle class (ibid.: 44). These facts suggest that extremism and terrorism in Saudi Arabia are not about socioeconomic issues dealing with, for instance, joblessness or economic shortage. While issues of poverty and unemployment maybe correct as the root causes of terrorism in other countries, such matters do not seem accurate in Saudi Arabia.

Second, the lack of religious (Islamic) knowledge of the terrorists. A large number of the informants underscore terrorists' deficiency of Islamic knowledge and understandings of the true Islam led them to terrorist acts. In other words, terrorism is the fruit of religious ignorance and misunderstanding. For them, the comprehension of Islam (Islamic doctrines, teachings, texts, or narratives) can prevent Muslims from terrorism and other forms of extremism. Some informants also pointed out terrorism as the product of misinterpretation towards (some) Qur'anic passages such as verses on jihad, infidelity (*kufr*), or war (*harb*). Whereas the assumption of terrorists' lack of religious (Islamic) knowledge might be accurate for some "ordinary radicals" (although this assumption is not always correct), this statement seems inapt for terrorist ideologues, learned militants, or "hardcore radicals" who have thorough understandings of Islamic teachings and the Qur'an (see e.g. Meijer 2005, 2006, 2012). In fact, some Islamist terrorists in both Saudi Arabia and Indonesia or elsewhere were

knowledgeable in Islam and were graduated from noted Islamic educational institutions. Accordingly, claims made by informants above are only partially true since they do not reflect the diversity of terrorists' religious knowledge backgrounds.

Third, terrorism is the outcome of religious exploitation or religious abuse. This view is also partially problematic or oversimplified mainly because a number of Islamist terrorists do not consider their violent acts as a religious misuse or exploitation but rather as a way to defend or erect true, pristine, and authentic Islamic teachings in the society. Many also consider terrorism as part of jihadism sanctioned in the Qur'an or Hadith. This is to say that religious motives of terrorism are a fact since many terrorists, according to their claims, use (not abuse or exploit) religious texts, teachings, and discourses to justify their violent actions. In other words, whereas for most informants, the terrorists' religious motives are a mantle to conceal their non-religious purposes (e.g. political economy), for the terrorists, by contrast, the religious motives are not a camouflage for their acts. Few informants actually notify the issue saying that religion itself is actually problematic since it contains biased or ambiguous teachings, texts, and discourses (see e.g. Appleby 2000).

It is true and factual that terrorist actors vary, including concerning rationales and motives of their engagement in terrorism. Some might be driven—or motivated by—secular factors (politics, economy, or vengeance), others by religious factors. However, as for Islamist terrorists, many involved in terrorist activities are actually due to factors related to religious belief (Islamic faith and principle). For example, some Islamist terrorists are willing to be suicide bombers and eager to be dead as martyrs partly due to they believed and convinced that this act could bring them to the Heaven.

While the informants argued that religion (Islam) is used (by terrorists) only as an instrument to attain political and economic aims (or say, the creed is used to conceal the greed), for (some) Islamist terrorists, religion does matter in terrorism and contributes to influencing terrorists on the ground. Interpretations and reinterpretations of Islamic narratives and discourses produced and reproduced by elite members of Islamist terrorists and religious militants in any country (including Saudi Arabia and Indonesia) could influence, shape, and reshape radicalism and terrorist actions.

Fourth, arguments that terrorism was rooted in terrorists' ignorance, inexperience, or lack of education also need to reassess or, perhaps,

are only partially true. In fact, not all terrorists are ill-informed, inexperienced, or lack education. In other words, a number of terrorists are experienced, knowledgeable, and educated.[76] Studies conducted by Diego Gambetta and Steffen Hertog (2007, 2017) and Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1982) on profiles of Egyptian terrorists and militants do not support claims that terrorists lack of knowledge and education. According to these studies, Egypt's three of the significant violent and terrorist groups, namely al-Takwir wa al-Hijra, the Military Academy Group and al-Jihad, were founded and led by individuals who had a technical education and so did many of their members. Shukri Mustafa, an agricultural engineer, founded al-Takfir wa al-Hijra, Salih Siriyya, a doctorate in the teaching of science, established the Military Academy Group, and finally Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj built al-Jihad. Engineers were also present in another radical group, namely Al Gama'a al-Islamiyya, which had about forty members, among them Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was later to gain worldwide notoriety as Osama bin Laden's associate and al-Qaeda's spiritual leader.

The sociologist Saadedin Ibrahim, arguably the first sociologist to study the early violent Islamists and radicals, interviewed 34 members of the Military Academy Group and al-Takfir wa al-Hijra, who were jailed in the late 1970s, in which he found that 29 of them were either graduates or university students. Ibrahim also found engineers, doctors, agronomists, or pharmacists among the militants (Ibrahim 1982). Drawing from their studies of members of Egyptian terrorist groups, Gambetta, Hertog, and Ibrahim concluded that many Islamic radicals in Egypt are not economically dispossessed, are often better educated than their peers, and many of them are engineers (Gambetta and Hertog 2007, 2017; Ibrahim 1982). The evidence of this puzzling link is actually not only limited to such notorious cases as that of Mohammad Atta, the 9/11 mastermind who trained as an architectural engineer, but also is found in other cases of terrorism and radicalism across the world from Egypt to Indonesia, as discussed in the next chapters.

[76] Hegghammer's assessment on the Saudi militants' biographies seems to support the informants' opinions noting that a number of QAP members are only educated at high school level or less while some started university studies but dropped out. Nevertheless, it is difficult to state whether they are educated above or below the Saudi average (Hegghammer 2006: 44). In other words, the terrorists' educational backgrounds might be common for—or similar to—the majority of Saudi citizens in the past. But why did other Saudis having similar educational training not engage in terrorist activities?

Apart from the debate on the accuracy (and inaccuracy) about issues of unemployment, poverty, ignorance, inexperience, lack of education, or religious deficit and misuse of Saudi Arabia's terrorists, the informants have provided helpful information on the origins and factors contributing to the birth of terrorism in the Kingdom. One of the common information provided by the informants is about the acknowledgment of religious and non-religious factors that drove some Saudi citizens or residents[77] into terrorist and radical activities. This information is certainly useful to confirm that terrorism, including "Islamist terrorism," is not only a religious phenomenon, and religion is undoubtedly not only a fundamental ground of terrorism. The mixture of religious and non-religious factors for the rise of terrorism also helps to manage and create productive strategies and tactics to overcome and prevent it from reoccurring in the future. The informants' views, furthermore, help to rethink terrorism in the Kingdom as a "religious [Islamic] aberration" as commonly believed by the Saudi government, authorities, clerics, scholars, or counterterrorism experts.

More importantly, perhaps, the informants' views show that not all Saudis (or even Wahhabis) are extremist or supporters of extremism as many have assumed. There is tendency in the literature on Saudi radicalism and terrorism that suggest Wahhabis and Saudi society as keen devotees of extremist and terrorist ideology and movement. If Wahhabi religious tradition has direct link to—or the primary cause of—terrorism why not all Wahhabis commit terrorism? Such advice and analyses rely on the assumption that there is something about the religiosity in Saudi society that predisposes Saudis for radicalism. However, this supposition, again, does not explain why some Saudis engage terrorist activities while others do not. There have notably been few attempts at understanding the dynamics and patterns of radicalization or "militanization" inside Saudi Arabia, which is beyond the scope of this book. The Saudi informants that I dealt with are profound supporters of counterterrorism and antiradicalism.

As for the informants' opinions and suggestions for combating terrorism, many of which have been practiced by the Saudi government

[77] Hegghammer (2006: 42) noted that between 5 and 10% of the QAP members were foreigners from countries such as Yemen, Morocco, Syria, Chad and Mauritania. He also noted that practically no South Asian (or Southeast Asian) expatriate workers seem to have joined the QAP.

(see Chapter 3). However, few things might be useful to summarize, add, or strengthen the government's existing counterterrorism programs and initiatives. It is imperative to underline that the majority of the informants endorsed a combination of hard and soft approaches of counterterrorism, combining military and non-military models to fight against terrorists and their underlying ideology and motives. As discussed in the previous chapters, the Saudi government for the most part has conducted these extensive tactical and strategic counterterrorism approaches since the late King Abdullah. The Saudi authorities have indeed adopted the "security strategy" (implemented by security/military forces and relevant agencies) and "advocacy and advisory strategy" (implemented via the counseling programs and dialogue as well as advocacy and advisory campaigns).

A large number of the informants suggested the government to squeeze radical voices from public domains (mosques, schools, campuses, and others) that encourage or instigate terrorism (or extremism in general), intolerance, and prejudice. Some informants supported the use of security forces to eliminate terrorist groups. Others, however, put emphasis on non-military approaches by focusing on "war on ideas" to "mummify" terrorist ideology and limit terrorists' movements while acknowledging limited security measures. Again, the Saudi government has also realized that the emphasis on the annihilation of terrorist groups (rather than on their militant ideology and ideas in general) is counterproductive or misguided.

Concerning the "war on ideas" or "battle of thoughts," the informants advised the government to maximize the use of internet and media (especially social media) to confront terrorism/radicalism and disseminate ideas of tolerance and peace. The Saudi government has indeed used the internet and social media as one of the main battlegrounds in the struggle against terrorist groups through such programs as the "Tranquility (*sakinah*) Campaign" operated by a small group of volunteers. The usage of internet and social media is apt and strategic mainly because many terrorist groups have used them to propagate their ideologies and goals. Reportedly, as of 2008, there were more than 1,500 websites operated by terrorist and radical groups worldwide. al-Qaeda has also created a number of websites such as Alsahab, Sawt al-Jihad, or al-Fajr.

Moreover, a great number of informants also highlighted the vitality of parents in their contribution in the combat against terrorism. Parents, for them, are the nucleus of society that play a great role in educating and

overseeing their children's education, religious understanding, and socio-physiological development. Many informants pointed out terrorism is the fruit of the parents' negligence in supervising, instructing, and educating their children.

Another interesting suggestion from the informants is the need to introduce social sciences, especially cultural anthropology, curricula, courses, and textbooks since the middle/high schools to make students aware of religious and cultural diversity and prepare them to become open-minded world citizens. Some of them also suggested the government to replace religious (Islamic) schoolbooks that teach (or encourage) hate, violence, and intolerance to other religious and minority groups with those that instill love, peace, and tolerance with other people's beliefs and cultural practices in order to create mutual respect and cross-cultural understandings among diverse communities and religious groups. All of these suggestions and notions are without doubt useful for both the Saudi government and society that nowadays are struggling to transform Saudi Arabia to become a peaceful, moderate, and tolerant Islamic Kingdom.

References

Al-Amri, Hassan bin Sulaiman. 2020a. "Tackling Terrorist Exploitation of Youth." *Monthly International Reports*, May. Riyadh: The Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition.

———. 2020b. "Lone Offenders." *Monthly International Report*, April. Riyadh: The Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition.

Al Qurtuby, Sumanto. 2016. *Religious Violence and Conciliation in Indonesia*. London: Routledge.

Ansary, Abdullah F. 2008. "Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach." *Middle East Policy* XV (2). http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/combating-extremism-brief-overview-saudi-arabias-approach. Accessed September 26, 2015.

Appleby, R. Scott. 2000. *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Baylor, Ellizabeth. 2016. "Ethnocentrism." https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199766567/obo-9780199766567-0045.xml. Accessed June 23, 2020.

Bielby, Kylie. 2019. "The Making of a Terrorist: How Radicalize You." *Homeland Security Today*, May 29. https://www.hstoday.us/channels/global/the-making-of-a-terrorist-how-friends-radicalize-you/. Accessed June 20, 2020.

CNN. 2007. "Poll: Most Saudis Oppose al-Qaeda." *CNN*, December 18. http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/12/17/saudi.poll/index.html. Accessed June 13, 2020.

Errico, Francesco Bergoglio. 2018. "The Road to Daesh: The History of the Takfir and Its Interpretation." https://eeradicalization.com/the-road-to-daesh-the-history-of-the-takfir-and-its-interpretations/. Accessed June 20, 2020.

Gambetta, Diego, and Steffen Hertog. 2007. "Engineers of Jihad." Sociology Working Paper 10. Oxford University's Department of Sociology, Oxford, UK.

———. 2017. *Engineers of Jihad: The Curious Connection Between Violent Extremism and Education*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hashemi, Kamran. 2008. *Religious Legal Traditions, International Human Rights Laws and Muslim States*. Leiden: Brill/Nijhoff.

Hegghammer, Thomas. 2006. "Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia." *Middle East Policy* 13 (4): 39–60.

———. 2010. *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism Since 1979*. London: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2015. "Classical and Global Jihadism in Saudi Arabia." In *Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Social, Political, Economic and Religious Change*, edited by Bernard Haykel, Thomas Hegghammer, and Stephane Lacroix, 207–228. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. 1982. "Egypt's Islamic Militants." MERIP Reports, No. 103, February, pp. 5–14.

Malthaner, Stefan. 2018. "Spaces, Ties, and Agency: The Formation of Radical Networks." *Perspective on Terrorism* 12 (2): 32–42.

Meijer, Roel. 2005. "The 'Cycle of Contention' and the Limits of Terrorism in Saudi Arabia." In *Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs,* edited by Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman, 271–314. London, UK: C. Hurst & Co.

———. 2006. "Re-reading of al-Qaeda Writings of Yusuf al-Ayiri." *ISIM Review* 18: 1–2.

———, ed. 2012. *Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Indonesia, Algeria and Saudi Arabia*. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'.

Sageman, Marc. 2004. *Understanding Terror Networks*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

TFT (Terror Free Tomorrow). 2007. "Saudi Arabia Overwhelmingly Reject Bin Laden, al-Qaeda, Saudi Fighters in Iraq, and Terrorism; Also Among Most Pro-American in Muslim World: Results of a New Nationwide Public Opinion Survey of Saudi Arabia." Washington, DC: The Center for

Public Opinion. http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/TFT%20Saudi%20Arabia%20Survey.pdf. Accessed June 13, 2020.

Thompson, Mark C. 2019. *Being Young, Male and Saudi: Identity and Politics in a Globalized Kingdom*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

The Embassy of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the United States. 2017. "Saudi Arabia and Counterterrorism." An Official Report, April. https://www.saudiembassy.net/sites/default/files/White%20Paper_Counterterrorism_April2017_1.pdf. Accessed June 13, 2020.

———. 2019. "Saudi Arabia Counterterrorism." An Official Report, March. https://www.saudiembassy.net/sites/default/files/SAUDI%20ARABIA%20AND%20COUNTERTERRORISM.pdf. Accessed June 7, 2020.

Waskiewicz, Todd. 2012. "Friend of a Friend Influence in Terrorist Social Networks." https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Friend-of-a-Friend-Influence-in-Terrorist-Social-Waskiewicz/d7c798764c632e33675ef3b18594b08e40f94393. Accessed June 20, 2020.

Weston, Mark. 2008. *Prophets and Princes: Saudi Arabia from Muhammad to the Present*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Part II

CHAPTER 5

Terrorism in Indonesia

Akhi (my brother), fill your life with the murder of *kuffar* (infidels). Has not Allah ordered you to kill them all, as they have killed our fellow Muslims? Teach your children and grandchildren to become executioners and terrorists for all unbelievers. If you hate and oppose the titles bestowed on us by the enemies of Allah, then by what other path will we enter heaven?[1]

—Imam Samudra, The "field commander" of the 2002 Bali bombings

Introduction

This chapter intends on analyzing the origins, genealogy, historical dynamics and contemporary developments, as well as the shifting patterns of terrorism in Indonesia. Even though this chapter emphasizes the discussion on "Islamist/jihadist terrorism," it will also highlight other forms of terrorism, especially those committed by non-state actors. Some intriguing questions in which the chapter tries to find answers are as follows. Is terrorism in Indonesia a local or global phenomenon or a mixture of the two? Have Indonesian terrorist groups established connection and networks to transnational terrorist organizations? Is terrorism in the country a side effect or the product of international/transnational

[1] This excerpt was from Imam Samudra, one of the terrorist perpetrators of the 2002 Bali bombings (cited in Solahudin 2013: 1).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022

S. Al Qurtuby, *Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1337-2_5

terrorism or home extremism? Why and how did Indonesian Islamist terrorist groups adopt, implement, and practice doctrines, teachings, and interpretations associated with al-Qaeda's/ISIL's ideology? Why and how do terrorism patterns shift before, during, and after the New Order?

In brief, this chapter examines local and global factors that contributed to and changed faces of Indonesia's domestic terrorism. As depicted earlier, the book aims, among others, at revisiting ideas, arguments, and theoretical frameworks set forth by the so-called international terrorism experts that overemphasize "the al-Qaeda factor" concerning the rise of domestic terrorism phenomena in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. Indeed, before the rise of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) or ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and Levant),[2] specialists of international terrorism studies have argued that terrorists in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, have strong ties with Afghanistan's jihadists and al-Qaeda terrorists (see e.g. Abuza 2002, 2003; Gunaratna 2002; Rabasa 2003). With the rise of ISIL in public, Afghanistan-based al-Qaeda's role in establishing international networks seems obsolete, replaced by this Middle East-based terrorist organization. al-Qaeda itself is still active now, albeit its roles in international networks are no longer significant than before when Osama bin Laden still lived. Nowadays, al-Qaeda's terrorist operations are mostly limited to Afghanistan and neighboring countries such as Pakistan and some countries in Central Asia. However, as this chapter points out, Indonesian terrorism is not only about ISIL or al-Qaeda.

While acknowledging contributions of global and international issues in shaping the plurality and complexity of Indonesia's terrorism, this chapter emphasizes local and national factors. The chapter affirms that while al-Qaeda (or ISIL) factor of Indonesian Islamist terrorism and jihadism is certainly noticeable, such analyses tend to ignore the international, regional, and local agencies outside al-Qaeda (or ISIL) as well as local political dynamics and socio-historical grounds that contributed to the appearance of the country's terrorism and its changing phenomena. In fact, the presence of terrorist ideology, movements, and actors in Indonesia and elsewhere in the world (including Saudi Arabia) cannot be avoided from local socio-cultural, economic, religious, and political factors in the countries. To borrow Roland Robertson (2012)'s words,

[2] This book uses ISIL or ISIS interchangeably for a terrorist group headquartered in Iraq and Syria but has committed operations in several parts of the world, including Saudi Arabia and Indonesia.

terrorism in Indonesia (in fact, terrorist acts in any nation) can be a "glocalization phenomenon," a mixture of both universalizing (global, international) and particularizing (local) tendencies, or purely a local occurrence.

The Bali Blasts and Forms of Indonesian Terrorism

On 12 October 2002, Indonesia witnessed the most spectacular terrorist attack in the modern history of this archipelagic country, namely the Bali bombings. Two powerful bombs ripped through the busiest nightspots in the Kuta area of the Indonesian tourist island of Bali. Known as "Indonesian Hawaii," "the Paradise of Indonesia" or "the Island of Gods" (*Pulau Dewata*), Bali has also never had a bitter experience of such vast terrorist attacks in its modern history, albeit in the past centuries it has experienced major violent acts. The historian Geoffrey Robinson (1995), for example, has vividly analyzed the history of ruthless violence and carnage in Bali from the Dutch colonial time to the New Order era that demolishes the fiction of the "peaceful Balinese" that pervades academic and popular literature. However, the terrorist bombing was new to Bali, and the perpetrators and masterminds of the 2002 Bali bombings were neither Balinese nor Hindus but Muslims of Javanese or Malaysian origins.

Reportedly, the blasts killed some 202 people and injured more than 300 hundred people, making the tragedy the largest terror attack in Southeast Asian history. Among those killed at Paddy's Irish Bar and the nearby Sari Club in the resort of Kuta were people from 24 countries, including 88 Australians, 38 Indonesians, 28 Britons, and the rest from other nationalities. Ever since the tragedy, the Indonesian government has taken serious steps to combat terrorism in the country by combining military and non-military approaches. The government, for instance, established Counterterrorism Special Detachment 88 (known as Densus 88), a national police counterterrorism squad, and the National Counter Terrorism Agency (known as BNPT–Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme), a non-ministerial government department that works to fight against terrorism (see Chapter 6).

Furthermore, the Indonesian authorities have captured, jailed, sentenced, executed, or killed all the individuals (perpetrators, planners, or recruiters) responsible for the Bali blasts. The authorities had executed Abdul Aziz (better known by his alias, Imam Samudra), Amrozi Nurhasyim, and Ali Ghufron (Mukhlas) for planning, coordinating, and

committing the attacks as well as killed Dulmatin for preparing the attacks and Azahari Husin (a Malaysian who was allegedly to be Jamaah Islamiyah's top bomb-making expert) for assembling the bombs. Another alleged bomb maker of Malaysian origins, Noordin Mohammad Top, was shot dead in a raid in 2009. Ali Imron was jailed for life for his part in the attacks. The authorities also sentenced Umar Petek to 20 years in prison for participating and helping in making the bombs.[3]

The terrorists chose Bali merely because the island was frequented by Americans, and since they considered the attacks as part of a jihad to defend Afghanistan's Muslims from the United States, Bali was the right choice. However, the fact that more Australians and Indonesians died than Americans prompted speculation that the plotters were ignorant, poorly informed, or manipulated by other interested people. In his 2003's unpublished manuscript, *Jihad Bom Bali* (*the Bali Bombings Jihad*), Ali Ghufron or Mukhlas, who described himself as "Salafi Jihadi," had indeed described the Bali bombings as an act of jihad. Imam Samudra, the "field commander" who announced the plan to bomb Bali in a meeting in Solo of Central Java, also admitted the Bali bombings as terror attacks (Samudra 2004). In other words, for the Bali bombings terrorists, terrorism is part of jihad struggle against what they termed foes of Islam and Muslim society.

In spite of the fact that Indonesians had shocked with the massive Bali blasts, the 2002 Bali bombings were certainly not the first terrorist attack, committed by either Islamist jihadists or other groups, in the country's modern history. As this chapter makes it clear, terrorism—whatever its forms and underlying factors—occurred long before the Bali blasts. It took place during and before the New Order government. There are fundamental differences of terrorist acts between before and after the 2000s in terms of intensity, scale, target, actor, orientation, tactic, objective, or motivation. As well, terrorism that happened between 2000 and 2009 has different dynamics from that from 2010 to 2019. These facts imply that Indonesia's terrorism is indeed not static but has evolved from past to present. The evolutionary nature of terrorism is certainly not only unique in Indonesia but in other countries as well (see e.g. Chenoweth and Lowham 2007).

[3] See "The 12 October 2002 Bali Bombing Plot" at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19881138. Retrieved July 1, 2020.

The Indonesian history has noted that, after the country gained its independence in 1945, various radical groups and individuals from multiple backgrounds with multiple interests, motives, and objectives had committed terrorist attacks involving shootings or bombings. These groups included the Indonesian Communist Party, Darul Islam, the Princess Justice Legion (Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil), Free Aceh Movement, Free Papua Movement, Jamaah Islamiyah, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, Jamaah Ansharud Daulah, East Indonesia Mujahidin, KOMPAK, Ring Banten, Fretilin, radical leftists, anti-Suharto factions, among others. Occasionally, the terrorist acts were also carried out by "lone terrorists" (or "lone wolf") having nothing to do with any radical group. They committed terrorism—such as bombings—because of, for instance, business competition or vengeance, not to establish an Islamic state or toppling the rulers. In other words, forms of terrorism vary (see Table 5.1). Interestingly, however, although Indonesia has suffered from terrorist attacks from various radical groups such violence has not reached the scale or persistence of terrorist violence in the Middle East, North Africa, or South Asia.

Concerning Indonesia's terrorism, scholars generally focus on either "Islamist terrorism" committed by various Islamist groupings (e.g. Gunaratna 2002; Rabasa 2003, 2007; Barton 2004; Hastings 2010;

Table 5.1 Indonesia's multiple terrorisms

Perpetrators (among others)	*Motives/objectives (among others)*
Darul Islam	Founding an Islamic state (e.g. Negara Islam Indonesia)
Komando Jihad	Toppling the ruling governments
Jamaah Islamiyah	Replacing Indonesian ideology (Pancasila) and Constitution (UUD 1945)
Jamaah Ansharud Daulah	Forming an Islamic governance within an existing nation-state
Jamah Ansharut Tauhid	Implementing Sharia law
Mujahidin Indonesia Timur	Separatism (establishing a state separated from the Republic of Indonesia)
Mujahidin Indonesia Barat	Taking revenge
Leftists (e.g. Indonesian Communist Party, People's Democratic Party)	Business competition
Separatists (e.g. Fretilin, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Gerakan Papua Merdeka)	Spreading fears
Anti-Suharto factions	Anti-non-Muslims/non-Islamic symbols
Gerakan Pemuda Kabah	Anti-Westerners/Western symbols
Shiites	Anti-secular and liberal ideas and practices
Lone offenders (lone wolves)	
Anarchists	

Ramakrishna 2005, 2014; Ismail 2007; Conboy 2009; Karnavian 2014) or "state terrorism" by Suharto and his security forces and state apparatus (e.g. Bhakti 2001; Colombijn and Linblad 2002; Bertrand 2004; Kingsbury 2005). The terrorism studies expert Rohan Gunaratna said, "Terrorism and religious extremism are interlinked and they present a growing threat to social stability around the globe," as shown by such terrorist and militant groups as al-Qaeda, ISIL "and other country-focused groups such as the Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban and the Philippines Abu Sayyaf Group among others" (Gunaratna 2017: 1).

In fact, Indonesian terrorism is a complex phenomenon in which its perpetrators came from various personal, ideological, professional, political, and religious backgrounds. Islamist groups and the New Order were indeed among the offenders of terrorist acts so did other non-state groups and individuals. There are at least four types of terrorism in the country. First, state terrorism or political terrorism committed by the New Order dictatorial government. Numerous studies have discussed this issue (e.g. Colombijn and Lindblad 2002; Kingsbury 2005; Sidel 2006). Second, left terrorism (*terorisme kiri*) committed by the supporters of the Communist ideology (see e.g. Abiyoso and Herfanda 1995; Susanto 2007; Sarwono 2012). Third, right terrorism or *terorisme kanan*, committed by Islamist jihadist groups affiliated to the Darul Islam, Jamaah Islamiyah, and other militant factions (van Dijk 1981; Solahudin 2013). I term these two types of terrorism—left terrorism and right terrorism—as an ideological terrorism. The fourth category of terrorism is non-ideological terrorism committed by, for instance, lone offenders or unprofessional terrorists.

There are sharp differences between ideological terrorism and non-ideological terrorism. The distinctions, for example, while ideological terrorism committed by radical terrorist groups that have a strong ideological commitment and motivation for their terrorist acts (e.g. to erect or defend ideologies of Communism or Islamism), non-ideological terrorism conducted by terrorists that do not have specific ideological grounds and promise for their actions. Non-ideological terrorism might be committed by "lone terrorists" (lone wolf) or unprofessional militants who conducted terrorist attacks, for instance, for revenge, business competition, creation of public anxiety, "entry tickets" to Heaven, implementing their beliefs or conviction about particular doctrines, and other purposes.

However, unfortunately, it is difficult to find details of terrorist incidents, especially before the New Order period (r. 1966–1998), due to the scarcity of accurate and reliable information on this issue. Newman (2007) also notes that the exact data on terrorist attacks in general are questionable, given that public databases maintained by scholars and think tanks are often less accurate than classified files maintained by national intelligence and police agencies. In Indonesia, this is especially the case for the data of terrorist activities from the period 1949–1970, where no readily accessible information on terrorist incidents is available. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland only cover data of terrorist attacks since 1970s. The databases, for instance, enlist 114 terrorist incidents for the period 1978–1997 and 220 incidents for the period 1998–2004[4] (Bertrand 2009). Notwithstanding difficulties to find a detailed data of terrorist incidents during the Old Order and early New Order, it is obvious that some types of terrorism also took place during that period.

The Local Roots of Jihadism and Islamist Terrorism

While it is a challenging task to examine the beginning of terrorist activities in Indonesia, it is obvious that since the country gained its independence in 1945, there have been several attempts to change the newly established government of the Republic of Indonesia by forcible means, through either an uprising, coup, or even terror. As well, since there was no clear indication of, for instance, the use of bombings in radical acts during the pre-New Order era, which is different from contemporary terrorism, it is difficult to trace the origins of terrorism in Indonesia. The only case of recorded bombing attack in the pre-New Order period was in 1962, when DI militants tried to assassinate President Sukarno in the complex of Perguruan Cikini, Jakarta. Another problem is about classical debate whether the radical groups in the pre-New Order Indonesia were terrorists, separatists, gangsters, or freedom fighters.

[4] Information on the Global Terrorism Database can be accessed at https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.

However, if terrorism defined loosely as the deliberate usage of violence, coercion and intimidation by individuals or groups to make terror and create fear in a society in order to achieve particular ends, some social, political and ideological groups in the post-independent Indonesia had indeed conducted terror attacks. The revolutionaries, hoodlums, communists, or Islamists all had conducted terror attacks against their rivals to achieve their ends through various means of violence such as kidnapping, shooting, ruthless killing, sabotage, assaults, among others. Some scholars such as the historian Robert Cribb, for instance, have documented a series of brutal terrors and violent acts from 1945 to 1949, committed by various political and radical groups (Cribb 2008).

The Communist Party and the Darul Islam

The political and ideological groups that committed violence and terrorism since the Indonesian independence included the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI for short) and the Darul Islam[5] (DI). A number of studies have underlined the Indonesian communists as an object rather than subject of violence and terrorism by the political authorities, the military, and anti-leftist groups (e.g. Swift 2011; Robinson 2019). In fact, the communists themselves had committed a sequence of terrors and attempts of rebellion targeting Muslims, particularly traditionalist Muslims affiliated to Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and modernist or reformist Muslims linked to Masyumi and others, since the Indonesian independence, which resulted in massive "reprisal raids" in 1948 and 1965 (e.g. Sarwono 2012). The 1948 Madiun Unrest and the 1965 anti-communist massacre were the product or the peak of prolonged tensions, conflict, rivalries, and violence between the communists and their opponents (Ricklefs 2007, 2008; Latif 2014).

The Kanigoro incident was a small example of terror attacks against Muslims, especially activists of the Indonesian Islamic Student Association (Pelajar Islam Indonesia, one of Masyumi wings), committed by the

[5] Darul Islam (Arabic *dar al-Islam*) means literally the "Adobe of Islam." The term refers to "the territory of Islam" in which the Islamic faith and the observance of Islamic law and regulations are obligatory. The opposite of Darul Islam is the Darul Harb, which literally means "house of unbelievers" or "the territory of war." In Indonesia, the words Darul Islam are used to describe the post-1945 movements which tried by force to realize the ideal of a Negara Islam Indonesia or Islamic State of Indonesia (van Dick 1981: 10).

communist partisans. For some observers, the Kanigoro case that took place in Kediri of East Java on January 13, 1965, was more shocking than the 1984 Tanjung Priok tragedy. The communist carnage resulted in the Muslim retaliation headed by Gus Maksum, the son of KH Jauhari, a local noted cleric from Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) (see e.g. Abiyoso and Herfanda 1995; Susanto 2007). However, it is imperative to note that the relationship between Islam and Communism in Indonesia is not always antagonistic. The two sometimes had merged against their common enemies such as the 1926 Banten revolt and the 1927 Silungkang unrest in which Muslims and the PKI activists joined forces against the Dutch colonizers. In fact, a number of Muslim leaders and scholars in pre-independence Indonesia became elites, activists, or supporters of PKI such as Haji Misbach, Haji Achmad Khatib, and Ahmad Basaif (Arab origins), among others.

Whereas the ideological basis of PKI's struggle was Communism, that of DI's movement was Islamism or Islamist ideology. Since the book's focus is on Islamist terrorism, this chapter will pay attention in particular to discussions on terrorist acts committed by DI. Some scholars identified DI as an embryo of Islamist terrorism and the forerunner of radical jihadism or Salafi Jihadi movement in contemporary Indonesia that has shaped future generations of jihadist and Islamist terrorists, especially those associated with Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), Southeast Asia's most dangerous terrorist organization (Barton 2004; Solahudin 2013; Hwang 2018).

JI is undoubtedly a by-product of DI. The creators of JI came from DI and those who departed for jihad in Afghanistan during the Afghan War against the Soviets in the early 1980s were part of DI. Two JI notorious figures, Abdullah Sungkar (1937–1999) and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir (b. 1938), drew inspiration from the DI, in addition to Afghan jihadism. Ba'asyir was inspired by the DI rebellion in West Java; thereby, he fully endorsed DI's political agenda. Abdullah Sungkar, the first *amir* of JI, was a former officer of the Tentara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Army), DI's military wing (Kingsbury 2005: 75–103). Hence, it is impossible to have a broad picture of all modern-day Indonesia's jihadist movement and terrorism without looking at DI's history.

This, however, does not mean that DI was the only source of inspiration and roots of contemporary (Islamist) terrorism. The Australian scholar of Indonesian Islam Greg Barton, for example, said that the origins of terrorism and jihadism can be traced back to the founding

of Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII—the Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication), besides the Darul Islam movement. Muhammad Natsir (1908–1993), a prominent reformist Islamic scholar, Masyumi activist and admirer of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan Al Bana (1906–1949), established the organization in 1967. According to Barton, DDII's initial objective was "to act as a vehicle for advancing the interests of conservative Islamist politics and blocking Christian expansion" (Barton 2004: 90–1). DDII is a re-embodiment of Masjumi, an Islamist political party during the Sukarno era that supported the implementation of Islamic Law within Indonesian Constitution and the establishment of an Islamic state in the country. In 1960, President Sukarno banned the party because some of its leaders were involved in a revolt against the central government (van Bruinessen 2002).

Even though parties, organizations, or groups such as Masjumi, DDII, Hizbullah, or al-Irsyad had definitely contributed to the birth of jihadism, Islamism, and militancy, their role in terrorist acts are not as blatant as DI whose radical activists were clearly engaged in various acts and forms of terrorism since its inception in 1948/1949. Against this backdrop, it is thus crucial to discuss and comprehend DI that laid the foundation for the rise of JI and other future Islamist groups. Founded in 1948/9, DI and its military faction called Tentara Islam Indonesia (henceforth TII–Indonesian Islamic Army), thereby, known as DI/TII, was an Islamist radical group led by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo (1905–1962) that sought to establish an Islamic State based on sharia law.

The Key Role of Kartosuwirjo

Arguably, Kartosuwirjo was the first Indonesian figure who introduced the term "*dar al-Islam*" and equated with an "Islamic state." Kartosuwirjo declared himself as an *imam*, a highest political authority or a sort of supreme political leader (Soebardi 1983; Formichi 2013), albeit he did not comprehend Islamic knowledge and Qur'anic interpretation. Singh (2004: 50–1) said that DI was initially established by radical factions of Hizbullah (lit. God's Army), a militia group created by the Japanese during the occupation of the country in 1942 to fight against the Allies. Headquartered in West Java, Kartosuwirjo refused to place his military units under the command of the regular army and proclaimed the founding of an Islamic State named Negara Islam Indonesia (NII–Indonesian Islamic State) (see e.g. Horikoshi 1975; Dengel 1986).

Hiroko Horikoshi argued that the DI movement was the product of three main factors as follows. First, the long-standing failure of Islamic political parties and factions to achieve an Islamic state or to give united leadership to Muslim community. Second, the chain of historical events centering on the nation's rise to independence. Third, the personal ambition and the charismatic leadership of the DI leader Kartosuwirjo (Horikoshi 1975: 60). Other important factors contributing to the DI movement included Kartosuwirjo's dissatisfaction and frustration toward his Muslim fellows of various organizational, ideological, and political backgrounds who endorsed the founding of non-Islamic government and supported the secular state ideology of Pancasila. Kartosuwirjo also frustrated with the power of Socialist and Communist groups within the newly established government. Last but not the least, the unstable and fragile politics during the early formation of the nation-state provided political opportunities for Kartosuwirjo to emerge as a leader in the Indonesian political stage.

Kartosuwirjo and other DI activists had indeed disagreed with the form of the newly established government (Republics of Indonesia) and Pancasila, the country's philosophical and foundational ideology,[6] which they saw lacked an Islamic foundation. Moreover, Kartosuwirjo formulated a doctrine of jihad and other principles (e.g. *takfir*, *fa'i*, apostasy, and others) that shared a number of significant elements with contemporary Salafi Jihadism that formally introduced later by JI militants in the 1990s. DI also condemned Muslims and the government officials who rejected Islamic law as apostate or infidel, thereby, war or jihad against them to be obligatory for each Muslim (*fard 'ain*).

Furthermore, DI militants also legalized terror attacks against civilians—Muslim or non-Muslim communities—and other groups including the government officials and security forces who did not support their ideas of Islamic state and political movement (Solahudin 2013: 3). In particular, Kartosuwirjo accused Muslim moderate factions (e.g. Nahdlatul Ulama), modernist groups (e.g. Muhammadiyah), reformist blocs (e.g. Masyumi), and largely secular nationalist leaders, including the first president and vice president, namely Sukarno (1901–1970) and

[6] The state ideology of Pancasila, derived from Sanskrit words meaning "five pillars," consists of five principles, namely (1) Belief in the Almighty God, (2) A just and civilized humanity, (3) The unity of Indonesia, (4) Democracy, led by collective wisdom in representation, and (5) Social justice for all of the people of Indonesia.

Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980), of committing crimes against Islam as they had rejected this faith as the sole foundation of the Indonesian state (Schwarz 1999: 169). In fact, Kartosuwirjo sent his loyal cadres to kill President Sukarno but failed.

From where Kartosuwirjo obtained notions of jihad, *takfir* and the founding of Islamic state remains an intriguing question mainly because his educational background was not in religious studies. The ideas of jihad or Islamic state Kartosuwirjo absorbed definitely did not come from books of the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) or the Indo-Pakistani Abul A'la Maududi (1903–1979) that commonly used by contemporary radical Islamist groups. Although Kartosuwirjo was one of the founding members of the Masyumi party (stands for Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia), a major Islamist political party during the Liberal Democracy era, he differed substantially from other noted figures in the party that had thorough knowledge on Islam such as most notably Mohammad Natsir (1908–1992), a leading Islamic thinker and reformist scholar. Although Masyumi initially did not support the DI revolts, some of the party's elite members supported and involved in the 1958 rebellion and separatist movement in Sumatra by the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia), which resulted in the prohibition of the party in early 1960s.

Born in Cepu of Central Java, Kartosuwirjo did not receive a well training in Islamic education, except for a brief period in West Java in the 1930s where he studied with some Muslim teachers from traditionalist and Sufi backgrounds. He also did not understand Arabic text. Kartosuwirjo completed his formal education at Dutch schools, thanks to his father who worked as a Dutch colonial government official in the opium distribution system. After finishing his high school at Europeesche Legere School (European Primary School), Kartosuwirjo continued his study in medicine at the Nederlandsch Indische Artsen School (Netherlands Indies Medical School). However, the Dutch later expelled him from the school due to possessing Socialist and Communist books he obtained from his uncle Marko Kartodikromo, one of renowned Communist figures (Horikoshi 1975: 22–3; Solahudin 2013: 28–9).

Although Kartosuwirjo had lack of knowledge in Islamic studies, he was active in political organizations such as Jong Java, a nationalist organization for Javanese youths, and Jong Islamieten Bond (JIB), Java's Muslim youth organization. Through JIB, Kartosuwirjo knew some noted Muslim leaders of the Indonesian nationalist movement such as

Agus Salim (1884–1954) and Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto (1882–1934), leading figures in the Partai Syarikat Islam (PSI), a significant Muslim political party in pre-independent Indonesia (van Dick 1981; Soebardi 1983; Dengel 1986; Formichi 2013). It was Tjokroaminoto, PSI chair, who later brought Kartosuwirjo's fortune. Tjokroaminoto asked Kartosuwirjo to be his personal secretary, and around a year later, Kartosuwirjo was appointed as PSI's secretary-general in a congress in Pekalongan, Central Java, which led him to a national figure. It was during his tenure at PSI, Kartosuwirjo started learning Islam, either from some Islamic teachers in West Java or from Islamic books of Dutch or Indonesian languages since he did not comprehend Arabic.

PSI was keen to implement Islamic law in the government and society, or even was eager to establish an Islamic government or Islamic state in Indonesia (Al Chaidar 1999; Gonggong 2004). Indeed, PSI's struggle for founding an Islamic state had later inspired Kartosuwirjo to form DI in the aftermath of the Indonesian independence. Kartosuwirjo genuinely translated a classical Islamic idea of *dar al-Islam* (lit. the Adobe/House of Islam) into Indonesian socio-political context to become "*negara Islam*" (Islamic state). Moreover, PSI was influenced by global pan-Islamic notions that searched for uniting the entire Muslim community into a single caliphate system against the Dutch colonial rule, which it dubbed as "infidel rulers."

Indonesian hajj pilgrims initially brought and shared the global ideas of a sort of "pan-Islamism" to the country's Muslim society. During the Dutch colonial government, Makkah had become a melting pot of Muslims from many countries around the world, some of which had the same experiences with those of Indonesia, namely colonialism. In fact, since the Dutch were suspicious or even banned any political meetings in Indonesia (previously, Hindia Belanda, Dutch East Indies, or Indies for short), various Indonesian Muslim leaders met in Makkah to discuss any issues related to strategies and tactics to free the archipelago from the Dutch and later the Japanese (Al Qurtuby 2019). One of the possibilities to free the Indies was by waging the spirit of pan-Islamism meaning using Islam as a medium of the struggle against the colonizers.

Like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, PSI (or later renamed PSII–Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia) was also enthusiastic to restore the Ottoman Caliphate following its fell in 1924 by forming a caliphate committee. However, PSI's eagerness of pan-Islamic goals deteriorated due to a number of factors including the death of its charismatic leader

Tjokroaminoto and the internal conflict within the party's leaders that led into some factions such as those of Agus Salim (1884–1954) versus those of Abikusno Tjokrosujoso (1897–1968), Tjokroaminoto's younger brother. Although at first Kartosuwirjo sided with Abikusno, later he was involved in conflict with him due to the party's decision to join the Indonesian Political Federation. Because of his antagonism, the party dismissed Kartosuwirjo in 1939. It is important to notice that even though Indonesian Muslim leaders had the same spirit to free the archipelago from colonialism, they had different strategies and ideological backgrounds. While PSI leaders used pan-Islamism, others employed Communism (e.g. Haji Misbach) or Nationalism (e.g. Sukarno).

Kartosuwirjo's dream of establishing an Islamic state came again following the Japanese occupation beginning in 1942. For Kartosuwirjo, the Japanese occupation brought a good chance and a new hope mainly because they allowed and supported Muslims to form armed militia groups—named Hizbullah (God's Party) or Sabilillah (in the Path of God)—to assist them fight against the Allies. Having long awaited the opportunity to establish his own armed wing, Kartosuwirjo was enthusiastic to lead, train, and arm Muslim youths and his followers that later he named them Tentara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Army) that became DI's military organization. Kartosuwirjo led Hizbullah militia groups in the combat against the Dutch and others. Moreover, under the auspices of Darul Islam Heroes (Pahlawan Darul Islam), he ordered terror attacks, murders, or kidnap to all traitors against Islam (Solahudin 2013: 34–5).

As for ideas of jihad, Kartosuwirjo perhaps learnt from several booklets or fatwas on jihad that were famous during the revolutionary era. These included handbooks authored by M. Arsjad Thalib Lubis (1908–1972), Medan-based Islamic scholar, or Muhammad Hasbi Ashshiddiqiy (1904–1975), a well-known religious scholar and prolific writer from Aceh, or "jihad fatwas" issued by various Muslim organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama, Masyumi, Jamiyatul Washliyah, among others. In 1940s, Lubis wrote a famous booklet on jihad titled *Guidelines for Holy War* (*Tuntunan Perang Sabil*) while Ashshiddiqiy authored *Military and State Defense Science in Islam* (*Ilmu Pertahanan Negara dan Kemiliteran dalam Islam*).

When Indonesia gained its independence from the Japanese in 1945, Kartosuwirjo continued his struggle and principle to build an Islamic

state. His dissatisfaction with the newly established Indonesian government that, according to him, were controlled by the secular nationalists, Socialists and the Communists, added with the government acceptance of the Renville Pact of 1948, drove Kartosuwirjo to proclaim Darul Islam, declare himself as Imam (leader), and officially build an Indonesian Islamic State (Negara Islam Indonesia or NII for brief).

Kartosuwirjo also composed the NII Criminal Code by the name of KUUHPNII (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana Negara Islam Indonesia) that contained punishments to a catalogue of crimes including consuming alcohol, murder, adultery, theft, robbery, or even abandoning prayer. The code (Chapter 2, Articles 2–3) also criminalized and punished four categories of people as the following. First, those who did not abide by the NII laws. Second, the hypocrites, namely those who actually supported the Republic of Indonesia, albeit received training about NII and verbally said to obey NII. Third, those who understood Islamic law but did not carry it out (meaning did not comply with NII). Fourth, those who assisted the enemy (of Kartosuwirjo and NII).

Interestingly, in this code, Kartosuwirjo drew upon the notion of "*takfir*"—the proclamation of a Muslim as an apostate or infidel. It is clear that in the Criminal Code (Chapter 3, Article 10), it states that whoever rejects the laws of Islamic state (i.e. NII), even if he/she was born a Muslim from Muslim parents, he/she is an apostate that deserves for death penalty. Kartosuwirjo's insistence on this takfir idea was proved by his attack against his former teacher, Yusuf Taudjiri, owner of Cipari Boarding School, because of his refusal to obey and acknowledge Kartosuwirjo as the NII Imam.

Uprising Against the Sukarno Government

Furthermore, driven by a dream to establish an Indonesian Islamic state, from its inception until 1960s, DI radicals waged rebellions against the Indonesian government under President Sukarno mainly in West Java, the group's main headquarter, but later spread in other areas. Starting in West Java, where Kartosuwirjo proclaimed the founding of NII on August 7, 1949, the DI movement subsequently spread to other parts of the country including South Kalimantan (Borneo), South Sulawesi (Celebes), and Aceh. Even though not well-developed, Darul Islam activity was also reported in the Lesser Sunda Islands, the Moluccas and Halmahera.

In total, DI ultimately established nine political and military commands in Aceh, Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, East Java, Central Java, and Jakarta, as well as in the DI's strongholds in West Java, namely West Priangan and East Priangan (van Dijk 1981). However, although DI had several political branches and armed commands in various regions, the large-scale revolts only took place in West Java, Aceh, South Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan. Influenced by Kartosuwirjo's movement, some local rebels and political leaders in Aceh, South Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan joined DI and waged jihad wars against the central government. In Aceh, the revolt was led by Daud Beureueh (1889–1987), in South Sulawesi by Kahar Muzakkar (1921–1965), and in South Kalimantan by Ibnu Hadjar (d. 1965). The insurgents admitted Kartosuwirjo as their highest authority, albeit in practice it was almost impossible at that time to coordinate DI guerrillas in three different provinces in three distinct islands of Java, Sumatra, and Sulawesi, where communication and transportation technologies were not developed yet.

Although quite slow, President Sukarno finally successfully cracked down the insurgencies: West Java and Aceh in 1962, Kalimantan in 1963, and South Sulawesi in 1965. The revolt in Aceh ended with a negotiated truce. Unlike in these areas, in the remaining regions, the central government did not take quite as long to suppress the rebels. In Central Java, for instance, the violence ended around 1955. The DI-led mutinies took years because the central government in the 1950s was still weak and fragile, and the military response was uncoordinated allowing the group to flourish, controlling around one-third of West Java's villages and governing them in accordance with its understanding of Islamic law, and even launching raids as far as the outskirts of Jakarta.

The 1957 martial law declaration and the establishment of *Demokrasi Terpimpin* (Guided Democracy)[7] by President Sukarno proved to be

[7] Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*) was a political system introduced in Indonesia by President Sukarno from 1957 to 1966 aiming at bringing about political stability. Sukarno believed that the parliamentary system implemented during the liberal democracy period was ineffective, indicated by multiple rebellions and major conflicts of various religious, ideological, and political factions due to Indonesia's divisive political situation at that time. To make social conditions stable and the country's political system effective, Sukarno sought a system based on the traditional village system of discussion and consensus, which occurred under the guidance of village elders. During this period, Sukarno introduced a threefold blend of nationalism, Islam, and Communism that was intended to appease the nationalists, Islamists, and communists.

a turning point for DI's fortunes. The military introduced an effective "fence of legs" method (Indonesian: *pagar betis*) to encircle the guerrillas' mountain bases and cut off their supply and escape routes, forcing the rebels to surrender. Kartosuwirjo responded by declaring total war in 1961, in which DI guerrillas increasingly used terror tactics and banditry against civilians. The revolts ultimately failed also due to DI's lack of necessary financial resources, which led its members to resort to its armed robberies, looting and various taxes levied on the villages the rebels controlled to fund its operations (Hwang 2018: 23). DI justified and considered armed burglaries (*fa'i*) and looting as *halal* (permissible/lawful) and part of jihad movement which later followed by other terrorist and radical factions as a method to collect funds for their operations.

In 1962, DI radicals, instructed by Kartosuwirjo, reportedly conducted bombing attacks in the complex of Perguruan Cikini, Jakarta, in an attempt to kill President Sukarno, but failed. In the same year, the government captured and executed Kartosuwirjo. Since then, a number of surviving DI elite members surrendered and renounced their jihad struggle and pledged loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia in return for amnesty. For the moment, DI went quiet. However, in the 1970s, some DI surviving members invigorated the movement.

Terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s: Darul Islam and Other Radical Groups

Although Kartosuwirjo was sentenced to death by firing squad and in theory DI movement ended, the group's Islamist ideology and premise survive. Kartosuwirjo and its DI have influenced future Islamist militant groupings (e.g. Komando Jihad), becoming heroic symbols of Islamist struggles against the country's government and foundational ideology (Pancasila) which they saw or dubbed secular or un-Islamic. In the 1970s, ex-DI figures revived the movement, inspired by Kartosuwirjo's final message that considered the struggle was entering a stage of what he called "*hudaibiyah*." The name "*hudaibiyah*" refers to a treaty or cease-fire (known in Islam as Hudaibiyah Pact) reached in 628 between Prophet Muhammad (571–632), along with his early Muslim followers, and their opponents of Makkah's Quraish tribe before his ultimate conquest of this

area.[8] This final message of "*hudaibiyah*" indicates that (1) Kartosuwirjo perhaps imagined himself as Prophet Muhammad, (2) the capture was considered only temporary or in transition, and (3) the triumph would soon come into reality like Muhammad's victory in Makkah.

Kartosuwirjo's imagination proved wrong, however, since he died and his imagination to build NII has never come into being. Nevertheless, attempts at establishing an Islamic state (NII) did not die following the death of Kartosuwirjo. The idea to found an imagined Islamic state did not disappear from the heads of the DI remaining followers. Sukarno's general amnesty had actually benefited many DI activists. The Indonesian government also tried to find ways to help the DI remaining admirers re-integrate in the society and "return to normal life" by introducing several programs including finding them jobs in businesses or even in the security and intelligence bodies. During the New Order, moreover, Suharto used them as "attacking dogs" against the Communists, one of his main rivals, during the anti-Communist brutal campaigns in 1965–1966. Suharto also co-opted some DI elite members by including them in Golkar, the New Order's ruling party.[9]

Nonetheless, apart from internal disputes and disagreements between pragmatic and idealist factions within the remaining DI activists, notions to build an imagined Islamic state continued to persist among some idealists within the group. After several unsuccessful meetings to reunite and regroup the movement, in 1974, some DI elite members[10] from Java, Sulawesi, and Sumatra finally successfully agreed to appoint Daud

[8] The Pack of Hudaibiyah reached in a place outside Makkah called Al-Hudaibiyah was a declaration of 10-year truce in which Muḥammad and his followers agreed to abandon his *umrah,* on the condition that they be allowed to enter Makkah the following year for performing umrah. In addition, provision was made for the return of any Makkah residents who might flee to Madinah (Medina) without permission from his guardian. Finally, the various Arab tribes could ally themselves with either the Makkah people or the Muslims, as they wished.

[9] Golkar stands for Golongan Karya (Functional Group), a social and political organization that evolved or transformed into an official political party in 1999 (becoming the Golkar Party) following the downfall of Suharto's New Order. Initially it was founded as the Joint Secretariat of the Functional Group (Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya or Sekber Golkar for short), built by a group of army officers in 1964. During the New Order, Suharto never said Golkar as a political party but a social group instead, albeit it became one of the contestants in every general election.

[10] This included Aceng Kurnia (West Java), Gaos Taufik (Medan), Rifa'i Ahmad (Lampung), Bardan Kindarto (Palembang), Ali Achmad Thalib (Sulawesi), among others.

Beureueh (1899–1987), a military Governor of Aceh and a popular reformist preacher, as the DI new spiritual leader, due to his seniority and reputation. Daud Beureueh was not new to the DI movement. In the 1950s, on behalf of DI, Beureueh engaged in insurgency against the central government, driven by his disappointment with Jakarta's decision that included Aceh into the province of North Sumatra. A champion of a modern form of Islamic school, Beureueh was also concerned about the moral decadence of the Acehnese due to the growing industrialization and modernization and lack of the implementation of Islamic law in the society. For Beureueh, it was impossible to apply a full and formal Islamic law in Aceh's legal and political system while Indonesia was under Sukarno's rule. The only way was to make Aceh separate from the Republic of Indonesia. These mixed issues led him to rebel against Jakarta under the banner of DI (Reid 1975, 2005; Siegel 2000).

To achieve this goal, Beureueh, along with other DI loyalists and senior leaders, recruited remaining the group's cadres, activists, followers, members, and sympathizers in Sumatra, Java, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan. In addition, Beureueh tried to look for supports of funds and weapons from Libya, which previously helped Muslim rebels in Mindanao against the Philippine government, through the channel of Hasan Tiro (1925–2010), who later became the founder of the separatist group, Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka). However, the Indonesian government knew their efforts and attempted uprisings resulting in the capture of a large number of DI members. Several DI leaders and activists were able to escape the detention, however. The large-scale arrests took place in 1977 when DI activists started openly carrying out terrorist acts ahead of the general election (named Pemilihan Umum or Pemilu for short), including the bomb attack in Mosque Nurul Iman, Padang of West Sumatra. In this period, the DI group in North Sumatra, under the headship of Gaos Taufik, also carried out several terror acts targeting churches and entertainment venues (Hwang 2018: 25).

The Emergence of Komando Jihad and Non-DI Radical Groups

The massive seizure forced the group to shift its strategy from an open conflict to a clandestine struggle. The New Order government labeled the new DI group involved in the planned revolts as the Komando Jihad (KJ, the Jihad Command). The capture did not make the remaining DI members give up, however. In fact, in late 1970s, there were several

attacks in Jakarta (one in the complex of the Mosque Istiqlal area) by using Molotov bombs and TNT (Trinitrotoluene) to distract the General Session of the People's Consultative Assembly. In the aftermath of the arrest, the DI militants and loyalists once again tried to reorganize as well as changed the group's movement strategies and tactics. In 1978, after the seizure, some DI elite members started reorganizing its leadership because the government had placed Beureueh under house arrest. For the moment, Aceng Kurnia and Adah Djaelani led the movement. At the same time, DI (alias KJ) continued to commit various forms of violence such as killing, attempted murder, robbery, and bombing. One of the notorious DI/KJ–led incidents during this period was so-called "*Teror Warman*" (the Warman Terror), namely a series of terrorist activities headed by Warman (his real name was Warsa).

Warman and his radical group staged several strikes targeting various groups of people and objects. They, for example, were accused of hurling a grenade at a Qur'an reading competition (known as MTQ–Musabaqah Tilawatil Qur'an) in North Sumatra and detonating an explosive at a mosque in West Sumatra. They also burned several churches (Conboy 2009). Warman and his gangs were also notorious for committing robberies, including stealing faculty salaries at an Islamic university in Yogyakarta, to fund their operations, justifying these criminal acts (called *fa'i*) as lawful (halal) because, they claimed, that the funds are used for jihad against the enemies of Islam. This is certainly ironic given that some of their targets were Muslims and their properties. The authorities finally captured Warman (then jailed and shot dead in 1981) and other DI/KJ members.

The apprehension of Warman and other gangsters did not make terrorist acts quit. In 1980, KJ members, armed with machine guns and dynamites, hijacked a Garuda jet and forced it to fly to Bangkok. They demanded the Indonesian government to release DI/KJ political prisoners, expel 'Jewish officials,' and provide funds for them. However, the Indonesian Army Special Forces (known as Kopassus–Komando Pasukan Khusus) stormed the plane and succeeded in handling the hijackers. Some said that Ali Mortopo (1924–1984), President Suharto's close associate, set up the hijack.[11]

[11] See https://www.smh.com.au/national/soehartos-komando-jihad-chickens-come-home-to-roost-20021014-gdfq1h.html. Retrieved July 9, 2020.

Following a series of violent acts, the New Order cracked down KJ and jailed or killed some KJ activists. Others such as Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, JI's future leaders of Yemeni origins, fled to Malaysia in 1985, accompanied by a number of the "Ngruki Network" such as Fikiruddin, Agus Sunarto, Rusli Aryus, Mubin Bustami, Fajar Sidiq, Muzahar Muhtar, and Agung Riyadi. Later, Sungkar and Ba'asyir sent them to Afghanistan to join the Mujahidin in the Afghan War. They claimed that their departure for Malaysia is not to avoid (re) arrestment, but rather to do a religiously-inspired *hijrah* (emigration) to escape from the enemies of Islam, similar to the Prophet Muhammad's *hijrah* from Mecca to Medina in the early seventh century (Rabasa 2003; Abuza 2003).

In Malaysia they met an Indonesian Afghan War veteran known as Abu Jibril[12] (alias Fikiruddin Muqti or Muhammad Iqbal), with whom they established the Pesantren Luqmanul Hakiem, a clone of Solo's Pondok Ngruki, in Ulu Tiram, Malaysia's Johor state, as a base for indoctrination and operations. In addition, Ba'asyir and Sungkar met Abdul Wahid Kadungga, the son-in-law of Kahar Muzakkar, Sulawesi-based DI. Part of the DI network, Kadungga fled to Europe in 1971 and later founded the Muslim Youth Association of Europe.

Furthermore, due to a leadership vacuum (i.e. there was no chosen Imam yet), the remaining DI leaders, furthermore, selected Syahirul Alim as its new Imam at a meeting held in Yogyakarta in 1982. Under new leadership, since the 1980s, the movement has become more violent and radical than in the 1970s. Syahirul suggested the movement should engage in various armed resistance and attacks by using multiple means including explosives, not only to target Suharto and his New Order but also enemies of Islam–Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The 1980s were also marked by the emergence of other political and radical groups outside DI. These included the Petisi 50 (Petition of 50), a group of elite figures, including HM Sanusi, AM Fatwa, HR Dharsono, who criticized Suharto's manipulative policies; the Gerakan Pemuda Ka'bah (the Kaaba Youth

[12] Born in Indonesia's East Lombok, Abu Jibril became well-known preacher at the Sudirman Mosque in Yogyakarta in early 1980s. Malaysian authorities captured him in 2002. Abu Jibril, a member of Indonesian Mujahidin Council, also appears on a tape recruiting volunteers to fight in Maluku during the Muslim–Christian violence started in 1999 and lasting for more than five years.

Movement), a youth wing of the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, an Islam-based political party, Shia faction, and radical leftists among others.

These varied groups had shared some objectives with DI, e.g. toppling the New Order government. Triggered by the 1984 Tanjung Priok incident, Indonesia witnessed a series of terrorist attacks, committed by various militant groups. These included multiple bomb attacks at various branches of Bank Central Asia in 1984; a bomb attack at the complex of Seminari Alkitab Asia Tenggara (Southeast Asia Gospel Seminary) in Malang of East Java in 1984; a bomb attack on Borobudur Buddhist temple in Magelang, Central Java; and a bombing at a Pemudi Express Bus in Banyuwangi, East Java. In 1986, bombs also exploded in various locations in Jakarta targeting housing compounds and hotels, reportedly committed by a group called Brigade Anti Imperialis Internasional (Anti-international imperialist brigade).

In the 1980s, DI had undergone significant ideological, structural, and methodological development, strength, and shift such as the following.

- First, the introduction and incorporation of ideas of two leading Islamist thinkers and ideologues, Egyptian Sayyid Qutub (1906–1966) of the Muslim Brotherhood and Indo-Pakistani Abul A'la Maududi (1903–1979) of the Jamaat-e-Islami, into DI ideological frameworks. Syrian Sa'id Hawwa (1935–1989) of the Muslim Brotherhood was another Islamist thinker that attracted some DI elite leaders. Aceng Kurnia, one of the group's senior members, in particular was instrumental in this effort. Since the 1970s, several books of these activist-scholars have been translated into Indonesian languages. Their particular ideas that interested Aceng Kurnia are as follows. First, the doctrine of *tauhid* (i.e. the divine oneness of God manifested in the dictum, "No gods except God") and its political implication for governance. Second, the concept of *hakimiyah*, namely "the idea that there is no other valid political and legal authority other than Allah (God) and any form of earthly government would be judged solely by the criteria of whether it applied Allah's laws" (Solahudin 2013: 77).
- The second marker of development and change was about the expansion of recruitment method that targeted Muslim communities outside the movement, including youths, activists, university students, and faculties, as well as local Islamic leaders from various backgrounds. The recruitment method actually started from the late

1970s but was more extensive in the 1980s. The majority of recruits during this period came from modernist and reformist Muslim circles such as Muhammadiyah, Pelajar Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Students), and Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation), thanks to the addition of the *tauhid* concept into DI's frameworks so that enabled its core members to appeal them.

- Third, the introduction of the usrah system (Arabic: *nizam al-usar*), a small religious study group, headed by an instructor called *naqib,* which met regularly every week to discuss social and religious issues. Influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood method, the *usrah* system was not just a religious activity. It was also functioned to strengthen relationships as well as indoctrinate DI members and new recruits with the main goal of toppling the government and building an Islamic state.
- Fourth, the structural transformation from a military command to a sort of social organization by changing names of those in charge in the structure becoming director, coordinator, and so forth. DI members also conducted their activities covertly (*tanzim sirri*). The change was to camouflage and secure the movement from the authorities.
- Fifth, the period also marked the introduction of *hijrah* concept, referring to Prophet Muhammad's migration to Madinah (and other places) to avoid coercion from Makkah leaders and continue his *dakwah* movement or Islamic propagation. Due to the massive arrest of its activists by the New Order, DI members temporarily migrated (*hijrah*) to other places to evade the government's crackdown, secure its members, and rethink its tactical strategies and tactics.
- Sixth, the reformulation of the *takfiri* concept. Before the 1980s, DI conceptualized and labeled *takfiri* to anyone, including civilian Muslims, who refused the notion and the founding of an Islamic state and the implementation of Islamic law in the country. In the 1980s, conversely, the concept referred solely to the New Order government, along with its agencies and state apparatus, while civilian Muslims were the victims of the "anti-Islamic government," not apostates or infidels. The 1984 Tanjung Priok massacre by the security forces that killed dozens of Muslims (see e.g. Bhakti

2001) provided an impetus and rationale for DI's anti-New Order movement.
- Seventh, the collaboration with outside groups and individuals having similar concerns and goals (e.g. toppling Suharto and the New Order rule) such as Habib Husein bin Abu Bakar al-Habsyi, head of Shia-linked Yayasan Pendidikan Islam, an Islamic boarding school in Bangil of East Java, or anti-Suharto factions of any ideological, political and religious backgrounds.

The DI's change in the 1980s, it should be noted, was not only influenced by the country's internal political dynamics but also international political developments such as the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the Afghan War from 1979–1989.

International Dimension of Local Jihadism and Terrorism

As depicted in the beginning of this chapter, Indonesia's terrorism and jihadism are the fruit of local and international factors. The international roots of the country's radicalism and terrorism included the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Afghan War, the emergence of al-Qaeda, the Deobandi education, and the rise of the Mindanao radical groups, among others, which took place since 1979 or early 1980s.

The Iranian Revolution (or Iranian Islamic Revolution) refers to a series of events from 1978 to 1979 that culminated in the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1919–1980) and the replacement of his government with an Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Khomeini (1902–1989). The successful revolution had indeed influenced political activists in some countries not only Indonesia but also Saudi Arabia and others. In Saudi Arabia, the revolution had indeed influenced—and gave a new energy for—some Arab Shia groups to wage protests against the ruling family (Matthiesen 2010, 2015).

The revolution also inspired DI and other political activists in Indonesia, albeit they were neither Shia nor Muslim. They were enthused by Khomeini-led successful political movement, not by Shia theological discourses and religious practices. Perhaps, they imagined that they could adopt the Islamic revolution movement into Indonesian political context to overthrow the dictatorial Suharto regime as Iranian Shiites who

successfully overthrew the Pahlavi regime. The revolution also inspired few Indonesia's Shia scholars and activists to take violent actions against the government as in the case of the 1985 Borobudur bombing.

Some radical Islamist individuals—Sunni or Shia—espoused Khomeini's anti-American, Christian, and Jewish rhetoric campaign blaming or arguing that Suharto was part of Judeo–Christian global conspiracy to demolish Islamic world. Their plan for an armed revolt was accelerated in 1984 after the Tanjung Priok bloody incident between Muslims and the security forces. Coincidentally, the armed forced commander at that time was a Christian by the name of Leonardus Benjamin Moerdani (1932–2004) so that contributed to perceptions of anti-Muslim plot, albeit the Tanjung Priok case had different dynamic (Bhakti 2001).

Several weeks after the tragedy, the militants took revenge by blasting bombs in various locations. To avert the revolution's political influence in Indonesia, Suharto took firm steps by overseeing, controlling, or forbidding any discussion related to Iran and Shia, besides forbidding books authored by Shia scholars—Iranian or other nationalities—such as Muhammad Husain Tabatabai (1904–1981), Morteza Motahhari (1919–1979), and Ali Shariati (1933–1977), among others.

Similar to the 1979 Iranian revolution, the Soviet–Afghan War in Afghanistan since late 1979 or early 1980 also drove the attention of many Muslims in the world, including those of Indonesians. Some Muslim-majority countries such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan supported directly the Mujahidin's struggle against the Soviets, others only condemned the Red invasion and intervention of Afghanistan's internal politics. In Indonesia, the government did not directly support the Afghan Mujahidin. However, some Islamist organizations sent their members to Afghanistan.

Indonesian Fighters During the Afghan War

Reportedly, DI also sent around 350 fighters, while the Indonesian government contends that hundreds of Indonesian citizens were sent to receive combat training in Pakistani and Afghan camps (Hastings 2010). Although the exact number of fighters sent by the radical groups was difficult to obtain, it is certain that various Islamist militant organizations had sent their members to Pakistan or Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s. Some scholars said that Indonesian militants first journeyed to northern

Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1980s, just a year after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan (Barton 2004; Thayer 2005; ICG 2008).

In Afghanistan or Pakistan, they received combat training from international jihadists. Imam Samudra, one of the 2002 Bali bombers, expressed his experiences of warfare trainings and meetings with various international jihadist groups in Afghanistan as follows. "I did target practice with Kalashnikovs, M16s, handgun shooting, anti-tank grenade practice, grenade throwing and making bombs…I met with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian Islamic Group, the Egyptian Jihad group and so forth" (Neighbour 2004: 85; Hwang 2018: 28).

Furthermore, Gaos Taufiq, Sumatra-based DI leader, revealed that Abdullah Azzam (1941–1989), a Jordanian member of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood and one of Muslim militia commanders during the war, in a sermon in Mecca in the early 1980s, invited worldwide Muslim jihadists to come to Afghanistan to do jihad against the Communist regime and the Soviet Union. A number of Indonesian jihadists who heard Azzam's sermon promised him that they would get more recruits in Indonesia, especially from DI and other groups such as the Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia Indonesian (Muslim Youth Movement). In Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Indonesian jihadists, many of them later joined JI in the 1990s, came into contact with Abdullah Azzam, who was the key of the founding members of present-day International Legion of Islam, an umbrella organization of worldwide jihadist movement (Isma'il 2007: 3–10).

The Founding of al-Qaeda

When the war ended in late 1980s with the defeat of the Soviets, some elite members of the Afghan Mujahidin, particularly Abdullah Azzam, formulated the founding charter of al-Qaeda, perhaps in early 1988, shortly before the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. Azzam, Bin Laden's former mentor, envisaged al-Qaeda (originally al-Qaeda al-Sulbah—the "Solid Base") as an organization that would channel the energies of the Afghan Mujahidin into fighting on behalf of, according to him, worldwide oppressed Muslims (Rashid 2001, 2008).

In short, the formation of al-Qaeda was to serve as a new vanguard group for Muslim communities. Azzam envisioned a revolutionary Muslim vanguard (i.e. al-Qaeda) because he envisaged that it would overturn un-Islamic regimes in the Arab and the Middle East and establish an

Islamic rule. This means that al-Qaeda, initially, was not a terrorist group utilizing suicide bombings to blow up secular buildings and target innocent civilians of non-Muslims of the western or eastern origins. Instead, the foundation of this organization was to set up to do jihad in the sense fighting against those who invaded Muslim territory or those who repressed Muslim communities. In brief, the origin of the establishment of al-Qaeda was to conduct defensive jihad (see e.g. Hegghammer 2010).

Although Azzam was the ideological father of al-Qaeda and the creator of MAK (Maktab al-Khidmat or Service Bureau), it was Bin Laden who gradually transformed leadership of the organization. Toward the end of the anti-Soviet-Afghan campaign, Bin Laden's relationship with Azzam deteriorated. The peak of the conflict between Azzam and Bin Laden was when Azzam supported the "Lion of Panjshir" Ahmad Shah Massoud (1953–2001) while Bin Laden preferred Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (b. 1947), one of the most controversial of the Mujahidin leaders who once had been accused of spending more time fighting other Mujahidin than killing Soviets. Finally, the conflict between Azzam and Bin Laden had been resolved, not by democratic and peaceful means, but by the assassination of Azzam in 1989 (Gunaratna 2005; Rabasa 2007; Abuza 2003).

Following the death of Azzam, Ayman Zawahiri (b. 1951), an Egyptian Islamist radical, took the position of al-Qaeda's spiritual leader as well as became the group's new ideologue and the new mentor of Bin Laden.[13] Since then, al-Qaeda has shifted to a new form of jihadism and has turned to become an agent of global terrorism that spread terrors across the world. Under Zawahiri's leadership, the new ideology of al-Qaeda was marked by enthusiasm to carry out armed struggle against all who they perceived to be the adversaries of Islam and Muslim societies (Gunaratna 2005; Abuza 2003). Worldwide radical jihadist Islamist

[13] Bin Laden was an activist or donor (of Mujahidin or al-Qaeda). He was neither a scholar nor an ideologue; accordingly, he always sought for a mentor to provide some advice about Islamic teachings. Ahmad Rashid, expert on the Taliban and al-Qaeda, writes, "Arab Afghans who knew him [Bin Laden] during the jihad say he was neither intellectual nor articulate about what needed to be done in the Muslim world. In that sense, he was neither Lenin of the Islamic revolution, nor he the internationalist ideologue of the Islamic revolution such as Che Guevara was to the revolution in the third world. Bin Laden's former associates describe him as deeply impressionable, always in need of mentors, men who knew more about Islam and the modern world than he did" (Rashid 2001: 136).

groups from the Arab Middle East and Africa to South and Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, echoed this new ideology.

It was Zawahiri and certainly Bin Laden, who articulated the doctrine of global jihad that was later implemented by (1) al-Qaeda through a series of spectacular terrorist attacks on the US targets culminating with the 9/11 and (2) al-Qaeda's networks across the globe, including Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. The 2002 Bali bombings and the 2003 Riyadh bombings are the product of this shifting ideology of jihadism and radicalism. Both Bin Laden and Zawahiri have the same passion: transforming al-Qaeda into a global jihadist terrorist group to drive out secular regimes and western infidels alike in the name of Islam.

In August 1996, Bin Laden issued a Declaration of Jihad whose goals were "to drive U.S. forces out of the Arabian peninsula, overthrow the Saudi government, and liberate Islam's holy cities of Mecca and Medina, as well as support revolutionary groups around the world" (Esposito 2002: 20–1). The declaration states: "The walls of oppression and humiliation cannot be demolished except in a rain of bullets."[14] Since the declaration, al-Qaeda shifted its focus and meaning of jihad from the "near enemy" (i.e. enemies within their countries) and defensive jihad to the "far enemy" and offensive one: war against the Americans and their 'infidel' allies (see e.g. Gerges 2005).

In 2000, Bin Laden announced the shape of the World Islamic Front for the jihad against Jews and Crusaders, un umbrella group of Islamist radical movements across the world, and issued a fatwa obligating all Muslims to kill Americans and their allies that formed what he called a Judeo-Christian conspiracy (Esposito 2002: 21; Juergensmeyer 2003). At the same year, interestingly, Indonesia's JI created Rabitah al-Mujahidin (Legion of Mujahidin), an umbrella organization of Southeast Asian Islamist groups engaged in armed struggle. Members of this terrorist–jihadist division included Legion of Mujahidin were MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front), Free Aceh Movement (known GAM—*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*), Rohingiya Solidarity Organization, Araken Rohingiya Nationalist Organization (Myanmar), and Jemmah Salafiya (Thailand) (Gunaratna 2002, 2005).

[14] See the full text of the declaration in the following link https://ctc.usma.edu/harmony-program/declaration-of-jihad-against-the-americans-occupying-the-land-of-the-two-holiest-sites-original-language-2/. Retrieved July 12, 2020.

Sending Indonesian Militants to the Deobandi Schools

Not only sending militants to Afghanistan, DI and "its progeny" such as JI sympathizers also sent the radicals from various networks and groups to Pakistan-based Deobandi madrasas. Deobandi madrasas became a favorite destination for religious training and indoctrination of Indonesian jihadists mainly because these schools have been the hub of the dissemination of religious militancy and radical Islamism. Founded in 1867 in the North Indian town of Deoband by Muhammad Qasim Nanautavi (1832–1880), an eminent Sunni Hanafi scholar, the Deobandi began in the Indian subcontinent as a reformist and revivalist movement.

The Deobandi gained considerable strength during the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad mainly because Zia-ul-Haq (1924–1988), Pakistan's president from 1978–1988, encouraged the establishment of Deobandi madrasas for Afghan refugees as well as Pakistanis. At that time, Zia-ul-Haq was afraid that the Soviets would expand their invasion to Pakistan, thereby, he fully supported any effort to fight against them, including allowing his territory for building camps, trainings, and schools of Mujahidin (or future jihadist) cadres. As a result, since the 1970s onward, the Deobandi madrasas have been the training ground for al-Qaeda and radical Islamists. The Deobandi's political expression and ideology, furthermore, were transformed within Pakistan's Jamiyyat-i-Ulama-i-Islam, a religious party headed by Fazal-ur-Rehman (b. 1953) with a rigid, militant, anti-American, and anti-non-Muslim culture (Rashid 2008: 53; Esposito 2002: 16).

In the Deobandi schools, Indonesian jihadists formed al-*Ghuraba* (the "foreigners") cell whose leader was Ba'asyir's son, named Abdul Rohim. During university break, some members of the group went to Afghanistan for a course in urban warfare. They also traveled to Pakistan-controlled parts of Kashmir where Lashkar-e-Toiba, a guerrilla movement affiliated with al-Qaeda, gave them a month of physical and military training. One of the group's members was Abu Dzar whose father was a long-time colleague of Hambali. Two of Abu Dzar's uncles are also JI members in which one of them, Muhammad Isma'il Anwarul, also attended an al-Qaeda training camp in Kandahar in 2001. Abu Dzar's sister had been married to Masran bin Arshad, the leader of Khalid Syeikh Muhammd's alleged suicide cell. Another cell member was the Malaysian Muhammad Ikhwan, whose father, Abdullah Daud, attended an al-Qaeda surveillance course in Kabul in 2000 (Ismail 2007; ICG 2002a, b).

Indonesian Terrorist Networks and the Mindanao Camp

If Pakistan-based Deobandi-affiliated schools and cells became a center for religious indoctrination, the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) camps, especially Camp Hudaibiyah, in Mindanao had been for military training. Following the end of the Afghan War, JI also built a military base in the region of Mindanao of southern Philippines. Later, veterans of the Afghan War, alumni of the Deobandi, and former trainees of the Mindanao training, many of whom were admirers or fans of DI, were involved in various forms of terrorist attacks in Indonesia, and became al-Qaeda's channel in the country. Riduan Isamuddin alias Hambali, for instance, was reported to be the operational chief and conduit for funds from al-Qaeda to JI. Reportedly, Hambali was the only non-Arab member of the *shura* (council) of al-Qaeda that provided a critical link between the Indonesian terrorist and Islamist militant groups of the Ngruki network and Bin Laden as well as al-Qaeda.[15]

Through his contact with JI leader, Abdullah Sungkar, in 1986, Hambali was invited to go to Afghanistan for both training and helping the Mujahidin. While Hambali spent the next two months in Karachi, he met a number of individuals from Indonesia including Zulkarnaen, who also became close to al-Qaeda. Prior to his death, Abdullah Sungkar resent Hambali to Afghanistan to meet with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the 9/11 operation, and several important al-Qaeda

[15] Hambali played a central role in a number of terrorist bombings and violent acts in Indonesia and the Philippines. Since he held both al-Qaeda and JI appointments, he also became a major link between the two terrorist organizations. Hambali's role was not only to channel both groups but also to funnel some funds from al-Qaeda to JI. From 1998 to 2001, Hambali funneled some US$12,000 to the MILF and some US$18,000 to Muslim fighters in Indonesia's Ambon. He also provided al-Qaeda funds to bomb specified targets in Southeast Asia including the Bali Blasts of 2002. Because of ongoing investigations in Indonesia and Malaysia, Hambali and his wife left Malaysia and traveled to Afghanistan via Bangkok (Hambali used his true name of Malaysian passport). After arriving in Karachi, they proceeded to Kandahar where they stayed for one month. While in Afghanistan, Hambali's primary contacts included Mohammed Atef, the military commander of al-Qaeda (killed in November 2001) and Khalid Syeikh Mohammed. To assist al-Qaeda's Anthrax program, Hambali recruited Yazid Sufaat, a US-trained biochemist and a former Army Captain from Malaysia, who came to Afghanistan in June 2001. Yazid participated in a one-month training course and then began working with Hambali supporting the Anthrax program in Kandahar. The Thai authorities arrested Hambali upon his return to Malaysia and Indonesia (ICG 2002a, b, 2008).

members including Wali Amin Khan Shah, who worked with Ramzi Ahmed Yousef to destroy 12 US airliners over the Pacific.

However, the attack was thwarted. The purpose of the meeting was to strengthen the already established ties with al-Qaeda and arrange for JI members to travel to Afghanistan to receive training. In addition to several journeys to Afghanistan, Hambali reportedly made two trips to Pakistan in 1999. In the first journey, he was alone while in the second trip was accompanied by Faiz Bafana, a JI member of Singaporean origin (Rabasa 2007; Abuza 2002, 2003). Hambali also reportedly traveled several times to Mindanao in the Southern Philippines in the early 1990s. In Mindanao, he met Syamsuddin, an Indonesian who subsequently brought him to the MILF Camp Abu Bakar, where he met MILF leader Hashim Salamat.

JI elite members, especially Sungkar, Ba'asyir, and Hambali always established contacts and maintained relationships with the Mujahidin leaders in Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan War. This encounter opened the gateway for JI members to become even more politicized and radicalized. In Afghanistan, as DI members, JI recruits also received military training and were exposed to the ideology of armed jihad. It was in the camps of the Afghan Mujahidin leader Abdul Rasul Sayyaf (b. 1946) that JI radicals developed *jihadist* passion, global contacts, and deadly skills (Gunaratna 2005; ICG 2003).

The connection between the leaders of JI and al-Qaeda did not cease by the end of the Afghan War. They reportedly visited one another. In the mid-1990s, al-Qaeda's spiritual leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, for instance, visited and spent time engaging the JI leadership in Malaysia. In the second half of the 1990s, Sungkar and Ba'asyir visited Pakistan, where they met Bin Laden occasionally (Sidel 2006). In brief, the relations between al-Qaeda and Afghan Mujahidin with Indonesian jihadist terrorists were not only limited to a "professional relationship" but also "emotional relationship" to build friendship and strengthen the movement.

Terrorism in the 1990s: The Rise of Jamaah Islamiyah

As described earlier, many JI elite members were DI activists or sympathizers. However, because of internal conflict, some DI elites broke up and established their own organization named Jamaah Islamiyah (JI).

Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, in particular, pioneered the founding of JI in 1993 (officially used in 1995), after a dispute between him and the DI/NII leader Ajengan Masduki. Later, after Sungkar's death in 1999, JI members were also involved in disputes over Ba'asyir's leadership. Some supported Ba'asyir but others disagreed with his vision, mission, and strategy regarding the movement (see below).

Muhammad Tito Karnavian, a former chief of the Indonesian National Police (Polisi Republik Indonesia) who has long led a battle against Indonesia's terrorist groups (now Karnavian is the Indonesian Interior Minister), said that there were at least two versions that caused the split among DI leaders. The first version said that the conflict was due to a dispute over DI's theology and ideology. For Sungkar and Ba'asyir, DI/NII teachings were not a reflection of a "true" or pristine Islam since the group incorporated mystical dimension which they considered idolatrous and unlawful practice. Karnavian argued that such ideological and theological argument was the product of the interaction between Sungkar/Ba'asyir and the Afghan Mujahidin and al-Qaeda.

The second version, according to Karnavian, was about a financial dispute. After living in Malaysia around the mid-1980s, Sungkar and Ba'asyir started to collect donations or funds for the group's operations from Malaysia, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere including al-Qaeda and Mujahidin. Obviously, both Sungkar and Ba'asyir wanted to directly control the flows of funds from various sources without reporting to Ajengan Masduki as the DI/NII leader (Karnavian 2014: 47). Sungkar (and Ba'asyir) looked to make a clean break from DI by adopting a different ideological, organizational, and structural framework of JI. To strengthen JI's ideological concept and framework, the group's elite members incorporated ideas from worldwide radical ideologues including Mohammad al-Faraj (Egypt), Abdullah Azzam (Palestine/Jordan), and Ayman al-Zawahiri (Egypt), besides Sayyid Qutb and Abul A'la Maududi (Conboy 2009: 33–4).

There are some "theories" or hypotheses concerning the origins and roots of JI. First, JI was a DI offshoot created to continue its struggle through a new organization following its suppression by the Sukarno regime. Second, JI was a DI offshoot that emerged as a consequence of power struggle within the group. Third, JI was part of a "black operation" by the Indonesian military under the Suharto regime that went out of control. Fourth, JI was a front of al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, founded by various veterans of the Afghan War. Whatever the hypotheses on JI's

origins, it is obvious that, like al-Qaeda, JI is initially a secretive organization whose structure is very systematic.[16] Moreover, JI was set up as a clandestine group whose long-term objective was to establish a transnational Islamic state (*Daulah Islamiyyah*) comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, and the southern Philippines (Rabasa 2007: 31).

This is among the reasons why JI operations were not only limited in Indonesia but also in other countries in Southeast Asia. In December 2001, for example, about three months after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Singapore authorities arrested fifteen Muslim militants suspected of working with al-Qaeda who planned to bomb a shuttle bus service carrying US military personnel and US naval vessels in Singapore. Later, a videotape found in Afghanistan confirmed the "Singapore connection." Thirteen of the Singapore detainees, eight of which reportedly had training in Afghanistan's al-Qaeda camps, were said to be JI members. In a speech in May 2002, the late Lee Kuan Yew (1923–2015, often referred to by his initials LKY), Singapore's respected leader, states:

> Interrogation [of the suspects detained in Singapore] disclosed that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the [former] leader of the Indonesian Mujahidin Council in Indonesia, was the overall leader of the JI organization, which covered both Malaysia and Singapore. He was a member of Darul Islam, which aimed at the violent establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia since the late 1940s. He was in Malaysia for 14 years to avoid detention by the Suharto government and returned in 1999 after Suharto fell from power. (ICG 2002a, b)

Most, if not all, JI members were Afghan War veterans. Indeed, the Mujahidin's victory over the Soviets was a watershed event for JI and other radical groups in Indonesia and other Southeast Asia countries. The Afghan jihad undoubtedly increased JI's military capabilities, their access to financial and other resource networks, and perhaps more importantly, their sense of belonging to an international Islamic brotherhood. The experience involved in the Afghan War in general and their contact with al-Qaeda in particular boosted their desire for jihad against what they

[16] JI was headed by an *amir*, a supreme leader who, in theory, has absolute authority. JI's HQ consisted of a religious council that drafts the group's regulations, a central leadership council that manages the group's governance, a fatwa council that provides counsels to the *amir*, and a disciplinary council that oversees all activities (Karnavian 2014: 52).

saw as the enemies of Islam and Islamic *ummah*, namely the Crusaders, the Zionists, as well as the apostates and secular Muslim rulers. Unlike other Southeast Asian Islamist groups, JI at this stage was, to borrow Gunaratna's term, "an ideological hybrid" (Gunaratna 2005: 75).

Since the collapse of Taliban and al-Qaeda, JI continued the tasks of jihadist movement and terrorism in Indonesia (and Southeast Asian regions generally). JI has the capability to restore losses through continued recruitment from its network of Islamic schools and its growing linkages with domestic and regional extremist groups. JI's regional network that includes access to training facilities in the southern Philippines (Mindanao) has functioned to maintain the continuity of terrorism in the region. In Indonesia, JI also actively recruited new recruits from multiple groups, organizations, factions, and networks. This fact suggests that Indonesia's terrorism, particularly that affiliated to JI, must be redefined referring to a terrorist group that is regionally networked, with intermittent international linkages, capable of conducting high profile attacks using conventional explosives resulting in scores, if not hundreds, of casualties (Thayer 2005; Kingsbury 2005).

Furthermore, despite its roots in Southeast Asia, JI's ideological viewpoint became increasingly "Arabized" and developed a strong orientation toward the Middle East, most notably Saudi Arabia and Egypt. More specifically, JI began to incorporate the ideologies of the Egyptian al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah, a breakaway faction of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwanul Muslimin) committed to armed struggle, as well as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad into its own thinking (Hefner 2005: 292). The fact that Sungkar and Ba'asyir gave their new group as "Jamaah Islamiyah" reflects their inspiration toward the Egyptian al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah.

In order to preserve the Islamist movement, the group was tied by ideology, training, and a complex network of marriages among their families. Such inter-marriage helped JI members have a depth of leadership that provided a capacity for regeneration[17] (Ismail 2007: 1–11) as

[17] In his study on kinship and family links of Southeast Asia-based terrorist groups, Noor Huda Ismail discovers interesting findings of common inter-marriage among the members of jihadist groups. Abdullah Sungkar, for instance, married two of his stepdaughters to senior jihadists; they are Ferial Muchlis bin Abdul Halim, a head of the Selangor JI cell, and Syawal Yasin, a prominent South Sulawesi figure and former trainer in Afghanistan. Sungkar himself had been the celebrant at the 1984 marriage of future Mantiqi 4 leader (Mantiqi refers to the "regional division" of JI) Abdul Rohim Ayub and the Australian Rabiyah (ICG 2003). Harris Fadhilah, one of DI militia leaders who

well as a means of maintaining their identity and continuation of their groups. Joining the jihad was a three-pronged process of social affiliation (social bonding) involving membership in small-world groups based on friendship, kinship, and discipleship. The British social anthropologist Abner Cohen (1974) once said that groups in modern societies utilized symbols linked to kinship, friendship, and ritual to further and maintain their economic and political interests. Using Cohen's theoretical frameworks, JI (and other terrorist organizations) can be included as "interest groups" that preserve and develop its communities and mission through a complex mixture of kinship, comradeship, relationship, discipleship, religious ritual, association, education, informal mechanism, and so forth in order to safeguard not only political and economic interests but also ideological concerns.

The Split of JI

After the death of JI leader Abdullah Sungkar and Ba'asyir took the lead of JI as *amir*, JI members began to split. The younger member of JI such as Hambali, Imam Samudra, Ali Gufron, and Amrozi (the three latter were trio Bali bombers and again the Afghan War veterans who were shot by a firing squad) saw Ba'asyir as "too weak, too accommodating, and too easily influenced by others" (ICG 2002a, b). They also viewed the formation of MMI (the Indonesian Mujahidin Council), an umbrella organization of Islamist groups whose primary objective was to campaign for the enforcement of Shari'at in Indonesia, by Ba'asyir and Irfan Awwas in 2000 as a betrayal of Sungkar's original plan for JI to remain underground in its struggle to set up a global Islamic caliphate. JI's radicals objected to working with Muslim political parties that advocated Islamic law through elections and parliament because they saw this as an accommodation with non-Islamic (Indonesian) state that would contaminate the faithful and was therefore forbidden (Al Qurtuby 2010).

Ba'asyir himself after the founding of MMI in August 2000 became so involved with MMI and he turned over day-to-day running of JI to Abu Rusydan. Due to internal conflict, in 2008, Ba'asyir and his son, Abdul Rohim Ba'asyir, founded a new group named Jaringan Ansharut Tauhid

died during the Ambon wars of 1999–2001, arranged the marriage of his daughter, Mira Agustina, to Indonesia-based al-Qaeda operative Omar Al-Faruq (see more Ismail 2007: 1–11).

(JAT) whose members reportedly involved in some operations including the Church bombings in Solo, Ba'asyir's hometown. In 2014, Ba'asyir declared allegiance to ISIL that, once again, resulted in the split of the group. Those who disagreed with Ba'asyir's decision, including his sons (Abdul Rohim and Rosyid Ridho), founded a new group named Jamaah Ansharusy Syariah (JAS), led by Muhammad Achwan.[18]

Following the huge detainment of the terrorists by Indonesian government and other rulers in Southeast Asia, added by internal conflicts, today's JI has become badly fractured organization in disarray. Nasir Abbas, former JI regional leader and "whistleblower" of JI networks, says "JI is in ruins now…no management, no administration anymore" (Thayer 2005: 26). The terrorism studies expert, Sidney Jones, said that in the post-Bali bombings, JI has been seriously hurt due to the massive arrest by the Indonesian authorities. Of the 250-odd people under arrest in Indonesia alone for actions related to terrorist activities, Jones has noted, about half of them are JI. As Jones has argued, "the blow that these arrests have dealt to the organization has apparently led to some serious introspection among top JI leaders and a decision to more formally distance the organization as a whole from the actions of its most hardline members, exemplified by the two Malaysian nationals, Noordin Mohammed Top and Azhari Husin" (Jones 2005: 53). The vast capture, added with the internal conflict, also led to the founding of smaller organizations and ad hoc networks Jones (ibid.) refers to as the "new" JI.

Apart from the internal dynamics and conflict within JI, since early the 1990s until the New Order's collapse, Indonesia had witnessed a series of bombings and terrorist attacks. These terrors were committed by either JI or other political and militant groups such as Fretilin (the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor), radical leftist groups (e.g. those linked to People's Democratic Party), or lone offenders, among others. The terrorist acts in this period included the 1991 and 1997 bombings in Demak, Central Java, carried out by pro-independent East Timorese youths. Xanana Gusmao (b. 1946) of Fretilin (the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) said to be responsible for the blast.[19]

[18] See https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/08/13/sons-top-aides-abandon-ba-asyir-over-isil-form-new-jihadist-group.html. Retrieved July 16, 2020.

[19] See http://www.tempo.co.id/hg/timeline/2004/04/17/tml,20040417-01,id.html. Retrieved July 17, 2020.

In 1991, a bomb exploded in Hotel Mini, Surabaya of East Java, probably committed by "lone offenders". In early 1998, a bomb detonated in a housing compound (Rumah Susun Tanah Tinggi), Jakarta, allegedly committed by a member of Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Demokrasi (Indonesian Student Solidarity for Democracy), a student wing of leftist Partai Rakyat Demokrat (People's Democratic Party). In February 2008, a bomb also exploded in Kampung Batik Sari, Semarang, but the suspect was unclear. These series of bombing attacks indicated that terrorist acts during the 1990s, as in the 1980s, were committed by various radical and political groups.

Terrorism in the Post-New Order, 1998–2019

Trends of multiple forms of terrorism continued in the post-New Order era. Because of the economic and financial crisis that hit Asia in the mid-1990s, the New Order collapsed in May 1998. The "people power" demanded Suharto to end his power. Finally, the long-ruling president, Suharto, who had been in power for 32 years, stepped down from his throne, replaced by his long close civilian associate, B.J. Habibie (1936–2019).

Since the final years of Suharto, Indonesia had experienced a series of multiple violent acts such as terrorism, communal riots, pogroms, separatist movements, or sectarian conflict that took place across the archipelagic country (Bertrand 2004; Sidel 2006; van Klinken 2007). At that time, Indonesia was in a political transition and in a position of a fragile weak state that lacked solid foundations in almost all aspects—politics, economy, security, and so forth. It is hence reasonable if during this period, the country experienced multiple forms of violence as a variety of groups tried to control and dominate power and resources, or take opportunity during the transition.

As for terrorism cases, perpetrators of the terrorist acts varied. Some terrorist acts carried out by Islamist radical groups (or individuals) of Indonesian or Malaysian nationalities linked to international terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda or ISIL, others by local Islamist, separatist, or political militants having no connection with foreign groups. There were also terrorist cases that were committed by non-Islamist/ideological individuals or groups such as a bomb that exploded at the Atrium Pasar Senin, Jakarta's entertainment building, on December 11, 1998. The suspects, motivated by business competition, were VM Rosalin Handayani

and Yan Pieterson Manusama. The defendants also exploded a TNT bomb at the Toserba Ramayana, a supermall in Jakarta, on January 2, 1999.

The January of 1999 also marked the beginning of the Maluku Christian–Muslim violence that took thousands of casualties (Wilson 2008; Al Qurtuby 2016). In the following month (February) of that year, a bomb also exploded at the Kelapa Gading Supermall in Jakarta. This time, the perpetrator was unclear. Other terrorist bombings that blasted in 1999 were those carried out by members of a group named Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara (Islamic Mujahidin Forces of Indonesian Archipelago), led by Eddy Ranto. The group, whose root can be traced to the DI movement, detonated bombs at the Istiqlal Mosque complex and the Plaza Hayam Wuruk, both in Jakarta.[20]

In 2000, at the turn of the twenty-first century, Indonesia witnessed a number of terrorist acts targeting churches, hotels, embassies, attorney general offices, or business institutions. Of these terrorist attacks, three cases are important to highlight due to their scales and number of victims. First, the car bombings at the Jakarta Stock Exchange (Bursa Efek Jakarta) building that killed and wounded teens of people. An Indonesian court sentenced two persons for 20 years in jail for their part in the bomb attack.[21] There was no clear motive for the attacks. Second, the bombing that detonated outside the official residence of the Philippine ambassador to Indonesia, Leonides Caday.[22] The Indonesian authorities said the attack was mounted to avenge an assault the previous year in which the Muslim separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front were ousted from their camps in Mindanao, southern Philippine (*The Guardian* 2004).

Third, a series of coordinated Christmas Eve bombings, allegedly committed by JI members, in which more than 30 bombs were delivered to churches (both Catholic and Protestant) or priests/pastors in eleven Indonesian cities across six provinces, all wired to explode around

[20] As for timeline of bomb attacks since 1999, see https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/09/indonesia. Accessed July 14, 2020.

[21] See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1500327.stm. Retrieved July 14, 2020.

[22] The perpetrators committed the attacks at the Philippine ambassador's house were Abdul Jabar bin Ahmad Kandai, Fatur Rahman Al Ghazi, and Edi Setiono, while those of the Christmas Eve were Hambali, Zoefri, Abdul Jabar, Edi Setiono, Asep, Musa, and Dani (Irawan 2018).

the same time[23] (ICG 2002b). The bombing in the house of the Philippine ambassador's house resulted in 2 deaths and 21 injuries, including the ambassador, while the Christmas Eve bombings killed 19 people and wounded 120 people (ICG 2002a, b). Commenting on the Christmas Eve bombings, the late Indonesia's President Abdurrahman Wahid (1940–2009) called for calm, accusing his opponents of trying to destabilize the country. "Their steps are to destabilize the government and create fear and panic," said President Wahid, who is under pressure to resign because of the worsening political and economic situation in the country.[24]

In addition to various bombings, in 2000, Indonesia also witnessed a sequence of terrors and tragic attacks known as the Walisongo school massacre, namely a series of attacks by Christian militia groups upon several predominantly Muslim villages in Poso, Central Sulawesi, killing hundreds of villagers, including students of the school. The carnage is named for the Pesantren Walisongo (Walisongo Islamic boarding school) in Sintuwu Lemba where the most tragic murder occurred. In 2006, the Indonesian authorities arrested and executed Fabianus Tibo, a Catholic migrant from Flores, and other two leaders of local Christian militia groups (Dominggus da Silva and Marinus Riwu) for ruthless crimes committed during the bloodshed (HRW 2002; Gross 2016: 136; Bonner 2006).

A series of sporadic terrorist attacks continued in the following years. In 2001, a year when al-Qaeda blasted the World Trade Center and the Pentagon of the United States, a number of terrorist bombings and sporadic attacks took place in various areas, mostly Jakarta but also in other areas. As in the previous years, terrorist attacks in 2001 targeted various places including market (e.g. Pasar Minggu or the Sunday Market), hospitals (e.g. Saint Carolus Hospital), organization offices (e.g. the Iskandar Muda Student Welfare Foundation), churches (e.g. the Santa Anna Church), malls and entertainment venues (e.g. Plaza Atrium), and so forth. A variety of groups and individuals, not only those linked to Islamist radicals, carried out the attacks. However, these groups had certainly played an important role in some of the terrorist

[23] See at https://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=81856&page=1. Retrieved July 14, 2020.

[24] See at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1087598.stm. Retrieved July 14, 2020.

attacks. Apart from the bombings, other forms of violence (e.g. riots, killings) continued, especially in "trouble spots" such as Ambon, Poso, Halmahera, Tobelo, and others (Bohm 2005; Wilson 2008; Duncan 2013).

In 2002, Indonesia witnessed a major terrorist attack, namely the Bali bombings. On October 12, two almost simultaneous bombs exploded in a tourist district of Kuta, Bali, killing 202 people, most of them foreign tourists. Around thirty-three alleged JI operatives have been convicted in relation to the blasts; some have been jailed, others sentenced to death or shot dead by the authorities in raids (BBC 2003). About the same time, a bomb also detonated near the American Consulate in Denpasar, Bali's provincial capital. As well, on the same day, a bomb exploded in a complex of the Philippine Consulate in Manado, North Sulawesi. It was unclear who carried out the Manado bombing.

However, the Bali bombings were not the only JI-related terrors in 2002. In December, JI-linked radicals reportedly exploded bombs outside a McDonald's restaurant in Sulawesi, killing three and injuring eleven people (*The Guardian* 2004). Still, in 2002, the bombing blasts took place in various locations such as a restaurant (e.g. Ayam Bulungan Restaurant, Jakarta), a parking area of Hotel Jayakarta (Jakarta), and supermalls (in Jakarta, Bandung, and Makassar West Java), among others. The terrorist suspects included activists of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, known as GAM) and lone offenders.

Terrorist bombings continued to occur in 2003, and in this year, the bombings were more sporadic and widespread taking place in various places across the country from Aceh to Ambon and were also carried out by a variety of militant groups and individuals not only those linked to JI. The targets of terrorist attacks at this time were also more diverse including a police housing complex, company, airport, market, parliament building, and hotel, among others. Of these incidents, the JW Marriot Hotel bombing in Jakarta became the most popular one and received a wider public attention. On August 5, a car bomb blasted in front of the JW Marriott Hotel, in central Jakarta, killing 12 people and injuring 150, besides damaging the hotel, cars, and other properties.

The perpetrators of the JW Marriot Hotel bombing were the same with those of the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings and the 2002 Bali bombings, namely from the JI syndicate. As for the JW Marriot Hotel bombing, the authorities arrested fifteen suspects for various roles over the attack. Another damaging bombing but received less attention from the public

occurred on December 31 in which a bomb detonated during a concert in Aceh, killing at least ten people, including children, and injuring 45 others. The Indonesian authority blamed GAM members for the attack (*The Jakarta Post* 2004).

Trends of terrorist bombings continued in 2004 and 2005, albeit their scales tended to decrease. In 2004, several bombings blasted in Medan (North Sumatra), Poso and Palopo (central Sulawesi), and Jakarta. GAM activists were responsible for the Medan bombing. For the bombings in Poso and Palopo probably by local Muslim militias. The Poso case (known as the Poso bus bombing), killing six Christians and wounding three others, targeted a bus traveling to Christian areas[25] (*Asia News* 2004), whereas the Palopo bombing targeted a karaoke café (*The Guardian* 2004). Poso is Central Sulawesi's worst battleground of warfare between Muslims and Christians from 2000 to 2002 claiming at least 1,000 lives (ICG 2007).

Of these terrorist bombings, a suicide bombing that took place at outside the Australian embassy in Jakarta on September 9 obtained a larger public attention. At least nine people were killed (including the suicide bomber) and around 150 wounded. JI claimed responsibility for the attack arguing that the blast was part of suicide operations against Australians whom they dubbed among enemies of God and Islam due to their support of American invasion in Iraq.[26] In 2005, furthermore, there were at least three big bombing cases, two bombings blasted in Central Sulawesi (one in Palu and another in Tantena) and one bomb in Bali. The bomb in Tantena took 22 lives and wounded 40 people,[27] while the Palu bombing killed 8 and injured 53.[28] In Bali, a series of suicide bombs and car bombs exploded at two sites of the famous tourist destinations, namely Jimbaran and Kuta. The terrorist attacks killed around 25

[25] See the http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Bomb-against-minibus-in-Poso,-two-young-men-detained-1943.html. Accessed July 15, 2020.

[26] See http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/09/09/indonesia.blast/. Retrieved July 15, 2020.

[27] See http://www.nbcnews.com/id/8010669#.Xw6HQSgzY2x. Retrieved July 15, 2020.

[28] See https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-12-31-indonesia-blast_x.htm. Retrieved July 15, 2020.

and injured around 100 people.[29] Some said this tragedy was the second bombings in Bali (the first bombings took place in 2002).

From 2006 to 2008, there were no terrorist bombing attacks so far but the bombing recurred in 2009. The bomb explosions rocked the Ritz-Carlton Hotel and JW Marriott Hotel, both located in the Mega Kuningan District, one of Jakarta's Golden Business Triangle areas that hosts the multinational corporations, embassies, and shopping malls. These suicide bombings killed around seven people and wounded around 55 others, both foreigners and Indonesians. The bombings, added with the discovery of a plot to assassinate the Indonesian president (at that time Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono), were a watershed of JI's misfortunes. Since the tragedy, JI has suffered profoundly, indicated by no major terrorist attacks by JI militants.

The Death of Noordin M Top and the Rise of Non-JI Terrorist Groups

More specifically, JI virtually died after the Indonesian security forces shot dead Noordin Mohammad Top (known as Noordin M Top or NMT for short) in 2010. An Islamist extremist of Malaysian origins, Noordin, along with Azahari Husin (also a Malaysian that was shot dead in 2005), was one of JI's significant members who was responsible for various bombings in Indonesia, including the 2009 Ritz-Carlton-JW Marriot bombings, since the 2002 Bali blasts. NMT was dubbed as a recruiter, bomb maker, trainer, or even financer. Indonesia's terrorism studies expert, Sidney Jones, said that NMT, before his death, had been the only leading militant leader in Indonesia who had still been campaigning for implementation of Osama bin Laden's 1998 fatwa on killing Westerners (Reuters 2009; ICG 2006).

Accordingly, his demise was a huge blow for JI. The Indonesian security forces, especially via their anti-terror squad known as Densus 88, have hunted down the terrorists, particularly those associated with JI, and destroyed their cells and networks since the 2002 Bali bombings. Although the decease of NMT had certainly grieved JI's existence, this does not mean, unfortunately, that the problem of terrorism in the country is over. In fact, in 2011 onward, a series of terrorist attacks still occurred. However, the features of the terrorist attacks in the aftermath

[29] See https://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/10/01/bali.blasts/. Retrieved July 15, 2020.

of the 2009 Ritz-Carlton and JW Marriott bombings differed substantially from the previous ones, especially in relation to Islamist terrorism. For example, the perpetrators of Islamist terrorism in this period mostly, if not all, came from outside JI organization and its networks, or at least did not officially declare as JI members. Since 2012, ISIL has played some influences on Indonesian radicals but their operations were sporadic and unsuccessful, especially compared with al-Qaeda-linked JI.

Moreover, targets of the terrorist attacks in the post-2009 terrorist bombings were also different from JI's that mostly targeted Western symbols (Western hotels, embassies, or café). In the post-2009 bombings, terrorists generally targeted police personnel and their properties (e.g. offices) and occasionally mosques, churches, or terminals. Other characteristics deal with Islamist terrorists' organizational affiliation and ideological base. To make it clear, the post-2009 Islamist terrorism was marked by the lack of ideological foundation and organizational association of the terrorists since some of them acted alone becoming "lone wolves" for non-ideological purposes and commitment such as the founding of an Islamic state.

Some terrorist acts, especially bombings (excluding sporadic shootings against the police), in the post-2009 period included the following. A suicide bombing in Cirebon, West Java, in April 2011, targeted a mosque in a local police headquarter, wounding around 28 people (mostly police officers), including the Cirebon Police Chief Herukoco, who conducted Friday prayer.[30] On March 15, 2011, an unknown culprit sent a package of explosive devices, hidden in a book and was intended to be delivered to Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, a progressive Muslim scholar and pioneer of the Liberal Islam Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal).

The bomb, known as "Bom Buku" (the Book Bomb) exploded once the Gegana anti-bomb squad tried to defuse the device.[31] Furthermore, on September 11, 2011, a suicide bomber detonated in Gereja Bethel Injil Sepenuh (Full Gospel Bethel Church) in Solo, Central Java. The blast killed the bomber and wounded 14 Christian worshipers.[32] Perpetrators

[30] See http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/update-explosion-was-suicide-attack-indonesian-police-say/435587. Retrieved July 15, 2020.

[31] See https://news.detik.com/berita/d-1592601/-bara-teror-bom-untuk-ulil-tindakan-biadab-yang-tidak-bisa-ditolerir-. Retrieved July 15, 2020.

[32] See https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/multimedia/2011/09/110925_foto_bom_solo.shtml. Accessed July 15, 2020.

of the terrorist attacks in the post-2009 bombings varied including those attributed to Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT, Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia, based in Poso of Central Sulawesi), Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (MIB, Mujahidin of Western Indonesia, based in Jakarta and West Java[33] (Jones and Solahudin 2014), and Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), among others.

Excluding some sporadic shootings targeting the police or security forces, there were no recorded bombings from 2012 to 2015. However, in 2016, terrorist bombings resumed one in Jakarta and another in Samarinda, Kalimantan. On January 14, some terrorists detonated multiple explosives near a Starbucks café and Sarinah shopping mall in central Jakarta. One blast went off in a Burger King restaurant outside the mall. Terrorists also destroyed a nearby police post with grenades. The terrorist attacks killed eight people (including four terrorists) and injured around 23 people. Gunfire ensued when police arrived shortly afterwards.

The Indonesian authorities stated that Aman Abdurrahman and Bahrun Naim, claiming to be the leaders of the Indonesian branch of ISIL-affiliated Jamaah Anshorud Daulah (JAD), were the masterminds of the attack. Even though Islamist in nature, JAD differs significantly from JI (see Table 5.2). In 2018, the South Jakarta District Court found Aman Abdurrahman guilty of inciting several terror attacks in the country and sentenced the radical cleric to death.[34] The court also made a ruling that outlawed the organization, allowing the arrest of all its members and organizers.

Moreover, in late December 2017, Bahrun Naim, who lived in Syria to join ISIL along with his wife and daughter, reportedly died by US drone attacks.[35] In his blog, Naim celebrated the attacks (known as the Sarinah attacks or the Thamrin bombings) and offered encouragement and advice to those who have declared allegiance to ISIL. Naim said, "Be lone wolves [lone terrorists] by whatever means you can. Bamboo

[33] The two terrorist organizations, MII and MIB, were alliances that included splinter groups of DI, and defectors from JAT, but the two were not formally linked. MIT perhaps still survives and operated secretly but MIB had been largely crushed (Jones and Solahudin 2014).

[34] See https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/06/22/pro-is-cleric-gets-death-for-inspiring-terror-attacks-in-indonesia.html. Retrieved July 16, 2020.

[35] https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1049969/ciia-bahrun-naim-tewas-di-suriah-juga-anaknya-yang-kurang-gizi/full&view=ok. Retrieved July 15, 2020.

Table 5.2 Comparison between Jamaah Islamiyah and Jamaah Ansharud Daulah[36]

Jamaah Islamiyah (JI)	*Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD)*
International network: al-Qaeda	International network: ISIL
Organizational structure: more organized and systematic	Organizational structure: less organized and less systematic
Targets: mostly Western symbols (embassies, hotels, cafes, or restaurants etc.), Westerners, or Christians and their properties (e.g. churches)	Targets: police officers and their properties (e.g. offices), in addition to churches, housing complex, and civilians
Perpetrators: all males	Perpetrators: males and females
Movement: well-organized	Movement: sporadic
Action: in group	Action: in group or lone offenders (lone wolves)
Membership's experience: having experiences in foreign combat zones: Afghanistan, Mindanao, Thailand	Membership's experience: lack of experience in combat zones
Bomb strengths: huge	Bomb strengths: small
Years of active operation: 2000–2009	Years of active operation: 2016–2018

sticks, lighters, sand, knives, glass and even stones will demand you act out on your pledge of allegiance. The earth and sky will witness if you were honest in your pledge or not."[37] Furthermore, on November 13, 2016, a terrorist (named Juhanda) exploded a Molotov bomb in front of Oikumene Church in Samarinda, East Kalimantan. Some toddlers were reportedly killed or injured.[38]

The Emergence of Female and Family Terrorists

In 2018, Indonesia was shocked by the appearance of female terrorists or family terrorists, in which two family members—husbands, wives, and children—were all involved in terrorist attacks in various locations in East Java. On 13 May, suicide bombers comprising one single family of six

[36] See also https://tirto.id/polri-sebut-perbedaan-jamaah-islamiyah-dan-jamaah-ansharut-daulah-edok. Accessed July 17, 2020.

[37] See https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35316915. Retrieved July 15, 2020.

[38] See https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3344053/terjadi-ledakan-di-depan-gereja-oikumene-samarinda. Retrieved July 15, 2020.

(a husband, a mother, two sons, and two daughters), bombed three churches in Surabaya (Diponegoro Indonesian Christian Church, Santa Maria Catholic Church, and Surabaya Center Pentecostal Church), killing and injuring dozens of people. Later that day, a bomb shook an apartment complex in Sidoarjo, killing at least three of the same family.

Next day, 14 May, suicide combers comprising a family of five rode two motorbikes to the entrance of Surabaya police headquarters (Polrestabes) where they blew themselves up. The suicide bombings wounded around 10 people, both police officers and civilians. Four suicide bombers were killed. The eight-year-old daughter of the suicide bombers, who had no explosives strapped to her, was flung off the motorbike and survived. These were the first time in Indonesia's modern history in which suicide bombings involve women and young children, thus marking a new *modus operandi*.

The police, at first, assumed that the family members involved in the bombings were terrorist returnees from Syria (or Iraq), where hundreds of Indonesians have traveled to join ISIL, but later the police clarified the assumption. However, the authorities were convinced that perpetrators of the Surabaya and Sidoarjo bombings were linked to ISIL-affiliated JAD, albeit they did not join ISIL in the battlegrounds of Syria or Iraq. As discussed earlier, following the ISIL's terrorist attacks in Syria and Iraq, some Indonesian radicals supported—while others declared their affiliation to—the notorious terrorist group. ISIL itself, through its Amaq media agency, claimed responsibility for the attacks. The police also reported that the family who died in the Sidoarjo bombing, the family that carried out the Surabaya church bombings, and the family that attacked the police headquarters (Polwiltabes) in Surabaya were friends.

Kirsten Schulze, an expert of Indonesian politics, said that the 2018 tragedies in Surabaya and Sidoarjo were the first successful series of ISIL-inspired bombings in Indonesia since the January 2016 attacks in Jakarta's Thamrin business district (the Sarinah attacks or the Thamrin bombings). Equally important, the Surabaya and Sidoarjo cases were also Indonesia's first successful suicide bombing by a female and the first bombings carried out by whole families, including their young children. Actually, female would-be suicide bombers are not new to Indonesia. In December 2016, Indonesian authorities detained Dian Yulia Novi and Ika Puspitasari, who had volunteered for suicide missions. However, the Surabaya and Sidoarjo attacks are the first time female suicide bombers have successfully detonated devices in Indonesia. Nevertheless, Schulze reminds us,

this increased capability is "not necessarily indicative of a greater capacity across Indonesia's pro-Islamic State network and the involvement of whole families reflects a broadening participation in Indonesian jihadism rather than a complete departure" mainly because this case is locally rooted (Schulze 2018: 1–6).

Since the 2018 Surabaya and Sidoarjo bombings, the latest recorded bombing attack so far was on November 13, 2019, targeting Medan Police HQ in North Sumatra that injured six people.[39] It was unclear who the perpetrators of the attack were, either GAM, JAD, or lone offenders. Whoever the culprits of the Medan Police HQ bombing, one thing that is clear is that the phenomena of terrorism in Indonesia are not simply about international influences since many local factors contributed to the rise of individuals and groupings. Furthermore, Islamist terrorism is also not the only form of terrorist attacks in the archipelagic country of Indonesia.

Glocal Elements of Multiple Terrorisms: Concluding Remarks

The description sketched earlier clearly shows the links between some Indonesian Islamist terrorist individuals (and groupings) and foreign terrorist and jihadist groups such as the Mujahidin, al-Qaeda, ISIL, MILF, or ASG (Abu Sayyaf Group). However, linking Indonesia's terrorism merely to international jihadist/terrorist organizations is overemphasized and tends to undervalue local factors. Such paradigm tends to ignore the various forms of terrorist acts and the complexities of the roots of terrorism in the country. This view also tends to neglect various agencies, ideologies, schools of thought, resources, motives, and objectives of the terrorists. As depicted in this chapter, in addition to foreign influences and roots, Indonesia's terrorism is deeply rooted within the country's local dynamics, socio-history, and politics.

In other words, domestic terrorism of Indonesia (and elsewhere including Saudi Arabia, see Chapter 2), to borrow Roland Robertson's (2012) concept, is a mixture of global (international) and local (national) phenomena or "glocal phenomena." Robertson defines glocalization as a refinement of the concept of globalization, which is generally understood

[39] See https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/11/13/six-injured-in-suicide-bombing-at-medan-police-hq-national-police.html. Retrieved July 15, 2020.

as a process of domination of one (or some) societal culture over many or all others in the world. Unlike globalization that tends to understand cultural spread as a homogeneous phenomenon, glocalization affirms the development of culture as a heterogeneous phenomenon involving both international and local aspects, roots, and factors. With this glocalization paradigm, it is also obvious that the emergence of contemporary Islamist terrorism in Indonesia, especially since the 1990s onward, cannot be separated from global and local factors.

Some scholars also acknowledge the glocal dynamics of Indonesia's domestic terrorism. The Dutch scholar and anthropologist, Martin van Bruinessen, for instance, said that the origins of post-Suharto Indonesia's Muslim radical groups are two relatively 'indigenous' Muslim political movements (i.e. DI and Masyumi), added with some contemporary transnational Islamic networks. Giving the emphasis on the local politics and history of Indonesia as the nature of recent Muslim political movement, van Bruinessen argues that transnational networks, along which people, ideas, and money move, have become extremely important but "they are not the sole determining factor" (van Bruinessen 2002: 118, 149). Another scholar of Indonesian politics, Kirsten Schulze, also admits glocal aspects of (Islamist) terrorism in the country arguing that Islamist terrorists such as those who claimed having connection with al-Qaeda or ISIL are "firmly anchored in the local context," albeit there are some foreign roots. Schulze pointed out that the terrorism draws upon local grievances, feeds off local debates on what it means to be a good Muslim, and pursues the same local aims (Schulze 2018: 3–4).

It is true that some Indonesian militants had traveled to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mindanao, or Iraq and Syria for armed training or joint forces with foreign jihadists and terrorists such as al-Mujahidin, Qaeda, ISIL, MILF, ASG, and others. For example, hundreds of Indonesian militants, mostly linked to DI or JI, especially in the 1980s and 1990s journeyed to Afghanistan (or Pakistan borders) to receive military training, techniques of making bombs, and indoctrinations in the Mujahidin/al-Qaeda camps and cells. Since late 1990s, some Islamist radicals also made trips to Mindanao to join MILF or ASG. Furthermore, data from the Indonesian counterterrorism body shows that, between 2012 and 2018, around 779 Indonesians went to Syria and Iraq to join ISIL. Of these, 103 are known to have been killed. Some 539 Indonesians tried to go to Syria but were deported, mostly from Turkey (Schulze 2018).

This fact is certainly a marker of foreign roots and influences of the country's (Islamist) terrorism. In fact, some terrorist groups had indeed claimed to have a linkage with al-Qaeda (e.g. JI) or ISIL (e.g. NII, MIT, MIB, JAT, JAD, Tauhid wal Jihad). Yet, even though they might claim their relationship, directly or indirectly, with foreign terrorist/jihadist organizations, they cannot avoid the fact that their movements were deeply rooted within Indonesia's local political context and dynamics. Taufik Andrie, executive director of Jakarta-based Institute for International Peacebuilding, even said that there are actually no direct links between Indonesian militants with ISIL. Those who claimed to be affiliated with ISIL were self-proclaimed, indicating by, for instance, little financial support coming in from Syria or Iraq to Indonesia for terrorism activities. However, Andrie has noted, remnants of JI—outlawed in Indonesia since 2008—still remain with a clear organizational structure and key figures implementing their strategies covertly.[40]

However, it is also important to note that Indonesia's terrorism is not only a glocal phenomenon mainly because forms of terrorism vary in the country. While it is true that some Islamist terrorist groups such as JI, JAT, or JAD have both global and local roots, others, especially non-Islamist and non-ideological terrorists such as separatist movements (e.g. GAM), political factions (e.g. GPK), leftists (e.g. Communists and PRD), militant groupings (e.g. anti-Suharto factions), or lone offenders, seem to lack foreign influences and roots. Even supporters of an Islamic state like DI (or KJ) or radical factions of Masjumi emerged in the stage of Indonesian politics as a deeply local phenomenon or limited foreign influences as in the case of Masjumi, there were some influences of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. In brief, while some terrorist groups are a "glocal phenomenon," others are a local phenomenon.

Ideas of radical Islamism as the roots of modern Islamist terrorism, it should be noted, found "home" in Indonesia were not only introduced or brought by foreign agents but also by local brokers. In other words, the ideas of (Islamist) extremism travel to Indonesia, not only from the Middle East or South Asia ("international travel") but also from local Indonesia itself ("domestic travel"). Various agents and actors—both organizations and individuals—had been the carriers, transmitters, and transformers of these ideas. The late Edward Said (1935–2003), in

[40] Interview with journalist Ismira Lutifa Tisnadibrata, see https://www.arabnews.com/node/1251291/world. Accessed July 17, 2020.

his traveling theory, said that the notions—like people and schools of thought—travel "from person to person, from situation to situation, and from one period to another" (Said 1983: 226).

Traveling idea of Islamist radicalism, furthermore, has pursued what Said (ibid.) called the "phases of acceptance, modification, and a new interpretation" due to different social-political settings as well as individual interests and objectives. Within the context of Indonesian history, the idea of Islamist extremism has also undergone a process of modification and interpretation of meanings. While DI' radicalism, for instance, aimed at the opposition to the Sukarno's 'Old Order' regime and the establishment of an Islamic state separated from the newly Indonesian country, KJ's terrorism and violence emerged on the scene of Indonesian history and politics was merely as a manifestation of resistance against Suharto-led dictatorial New Order. The same dynamics also happened within other radical groups, for example, between DI and JI, JI and JAT, JAT and JAS, JI and JAD, and so forth. This shifting phenomenon did not only take place within Indonesian terrorist groups but also other militants of any country.

Moreover, contemporary Islamist terrorists such as JI, JAD, and others appeared as the confrontation against what they vaguely called the enemies of Islam. The definition of the enemies of Islam definitely differs from one group to another depending on cultural, political, and economic interests of each Islamist group. The above depiction suggests that the process of knowledge production and cultural reproduction of Islamist radicalism taking place in different time, space, and social settings (Indonesia, Afghanistan, Syria, the Philippines, and others) has different meanings, interpretation, and implementation.

These Islamist groups, however, have shared the same values, i.e. the use of religiously inspired violence, including terrorism, a sort of "sacred bitterness," to achieve their symbolic, political, and economic interests. Yet, it is imperative to notice once again that terrorism in Indonesia is not only about Islamist terrorism since there have historically been multiple types of terrorism, and this trend will seemingly continue and reemerge in the future depending on global, local, or "glocal" factors. Last but not the least, the chapter shows that terrorism is not fixed or solid. It is fluid and shifting.

References

Abiyoso, Anis, and Ahmadun Y. Herfanda. 1995. *Teror Subuh di Kanigoro*. Yogyakarta: Yayasan Bentang Budaya.

Abuza, Zachary. 2002. "Al-Qaeda's Asian Web of Terror." *Time* (Asia) 160 (22): 38–40.

———. 2003. *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Al Chaidar. 1999. *Pemikiran Politik Proklamator Negara Islam Indonesia SM Kartosuwiryo*. Jakarta: Darul Falah.

Al Qurtuby, Sumanto. 2010. "In Search of Socio-Historical Roots of Southeast Asia's Islamist Terrorism." *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 4 (2): 205–239.

———. 2016. *Religious Violence and Conciliation in Indonesia*. London: Routledge.

———. 2019. *Saudi Arabia and Indonesia Networks: Migration, Education and Islam*. London, UK: I.B. Tauris & Bloomsbury.

Asia News. 2004. "A Bomb Against Minibus in Poso, Two Young Men Detained." November 19.

Barton, Greg. 2004. *Indonesia's Struggle: Jamaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam*. Sidney: University of New South Wales Press.

BBC. 2003. "Bali Death Toll Set at 202." February 19. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2778923.stm. Accessed July 14, 2020.

Bertrand, Jacques. 2004. *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Bertrand, Julia Lau. 2009. "Analyzing Terrorism Trends and the Effect of Political Transition on Terrorism in Indonesia, 1949–2008." Paper presented at the 50th Annual International Studies Association Convention, New York, February 15.

Bhakti, Ikrar Nusa. 2001. *Militer dan Politik Kekerasan Orde Baru*. Bandung: Mizan.

Bohm, C. J. 2005. *Brief Chronicle of the Unrest in the Moluccas, 1999–2005*. Ambon: Crisis Centre Diocese of Amboina.

Bonner, Raymond. 2006. "Indonesia to Execute 3 for Roles in Riots that Killed Hundreds." *The New York Times*, August 11. https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/11/world/asia/11indo.html?_r=1&ref=asia. Accessed July 14, 2020.

Chenoweth. Erica. and Elizabeth Lowham. 2007. "On Classifying Terrorism: A Potential Contribution of Cluster Analysis for Academics and Policy-makers." *Defence & Security Analysis* 23 (4): 345–357.

Cohen, Abner. 1974. *Two-Dimensional Man: An Essay on the Anthropology of Power and Symbolism in Complex Society*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Colombijn, Freek, and J. Thomas Lindblad, eds. 2002. *Roots of Violence in Indonesia*. Leiden: KITLV Press.
Conboy, Ken. 2009. *The Second Front: Inside Jemaah Islamiyah, Asia's Most Dangerous Terrorist Network*. Sheffield, UK: Equinox Publishing.
Cribb, Robert. 2008. *Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People's Militia and the Indonesian Revolution, 1945–1949*. Sheffield, UK: Equinox Publishing.
Dengel, Holk. 1986. *Darul Islam dan Kartosuwirjo*. Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan.
Duncan, Christopher. 2013. *Violence and Vengeance: Religious Conflict and Its Aftermath in Eastern Indonesia*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
Esposito, John L. 2002. *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Formichi, Chiara. 2013. *Islam and the Making of the Nation: Kartosuwiryo and Political Islam in 20th Century Indonesia*. Leiden: Brill.
Gerges, Fawaz A. 2005. *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Gonggong, Anhar. 2004. *Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar: Dari Patriot Hingga Pemberontak*. Jakarta: Ombak.
Gross, Max L. 2016. *A Muslim Archipelago: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia*. Scotts Valley, CA: CreateSpace Publishing.
Gunaratna, Rohan. 2002. *Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*. Columbia, NY: Columbia University Press.
———. 2005. "Al-Qaeda's Ideology." In *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, edited by Fradkin Hillel, Hussain Haqqani, and Eric Brown. Washington, DC: Hudson Institute.
Hastings, Justin. 2010. *No Man's Land: Globalization, Territory and Clandestine Groups in Southeast Asia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Hefner, Robert W. 2005. "Muslim Democrats and Islamist Violence in Post-Suharto Indonesia." In *Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, and Democratization*, edited by Robert W. Hefner, 273–301. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Hegghammer, Thomas. 2010. *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism Since 1979*. London: Cambridge University Press.
Horikoshi, Hiroko. 1975. "The Dar-ul Islam Movement in West Java (1948–62)." *Indonesia* 20: 58–86.
HRW (Human Right Watch). 2002. "Breakdown: Four Years of Communal Violence in Central Sulawesi." https://www.refworld.org/docid/3e3141720.html. Accessed July 14, 2020.
Hwang, Julie Chernov. 2018. *Why Terrorists Quit: The Disengagement of Indonesian Jihadists*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

ICG (International Crisis Group). 2002a. "Al-Qaida in Southeast Asia: The Case of the 'Ngruki Network' in Indonesia." ICG Asia Briefing.
———. 2002b. "Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyyah Terrorist Network Operates." ICG Asia Report No. 43.
———. 2003. "Jamaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous." Asia Report No. 63.
———. 2006. "Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's Networks." Asia Report No. 114, May 5.
———. 2007. "Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge." Asia Report No. 127, January 24.
———. 2008. "The Philippines: Counter-Insurgency versus Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao." Asia Report No. 152, May 14.
Irawan, Irsad Ade. 2018. "Pergeseran Orientasi Terorisme di Indonesia." *Kumparan*, May 17. https://kumparan.com/erucakra-garuda-nusantara/pergeseran-orientasi-terorisme-di-indonesia-2000-2018/full. Accessed July 1, 2020.
Ismail, Noor Huda. 2007. "Al-Qaeda's Southeast Asia, Jamaah Islamiyah and Regional Terrorism: Kinship and Family Links." *Japan Focus*, January 8.
Jones, Sidney. 2005. "The Changing Face of Terrorism in Indonesia: Weaker, More Diffuse and Still a Threat." Proceedings of the ASPI Conference. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Barton, Australia.
———, and Solahudin. 2014. "Terrorism in Indonesia: A Fading Threat?" *Southeast Asian Affairs*: 139–147.
Juergensmeyer, Mark. 2003. *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Karnavian, Muhammad Tito. 2014. *Explaining Islamist Insurgencies: The Case of al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah and the Radicalization of the Poso Conflict, 2000–2007*. London, UK: Imperial College Press.
Kingsbury, Damien, ed. 2005. *Violence in Between: Conflict and Security in Archipelagic Southeast Asia*. Clayton and Singapore: Monash Asia Institute and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Latif, Busjarie. 2014. *Manuskrip Sejarah 45 Tahun PKI, 1920–1965*. Bandung, Indonesia: Ultimus.
Matthiesen, Toby. 2010. "Hizbullah al-Hijaz: A History of the Most Radical Shi'a Opposition Group." *The Middle East Journal* 64 (2): 179–197.
———. 2015. *The Other Saudis: Shiism, Dissent and Sectarianism*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Neighbour, Sally. 2004. *In the Shadow of Swords: How Islamic Terrorists Declared War on Australia*. Sydney: HarperCollins.
Newman, Edward. 2007. "Weak States, State Failure and Terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19 (4): 463–488.

Rabasa, Angel. 2003. *Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals, and Terrorist*. London: Routledge.

———. 2007. *Beyond Al-Qaeda: Countering Terrorist and Other Non-Traditional Threats*. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation.

Ramakrishna, Kumar. 2005. "Delegitimizing Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 27 (3): 343–369.

———. 2014. *Islamist Terrorism and Militancy in Indonesia: the Power of the Manichean Mindset*. Berlin, Germany: Springer.

Rashid, Ahmad. 2001. *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*. Yale: Yale University Press.

———. 2008. *Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*. New York: Viking Penguin.

Reid, Anthony. 1975. *The Blood of the People: Revolution and the End of Traditional Rule on Northern Sumatra*. Singapore: NUS Press.

———. 2005. *An Indonesian Frontier: Acehnese and Other Histories of Sumatra*. Singapore: NUS Press.

Reuters. 2009. "Q+A: Noordin Mohammad Top and Islamic Militancy in Indonesia." *Reuters*, September 17. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-militants-qanda-sb/qa-noordin-mohammad-top-and-islamic-militancy-in-indonesia-idUSTRE58G2OR20090917. Accessed July 15, 2020.

Ricklefs, M. C. 2007. *Polarizing Javanese Society: Islamic and Other Visions (c. 1830–1930)*. Singapore: NUS Press.

———. 2008. *A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200*. Stanford, CA; Stanford University Press.

Robertson, Roland. 2012. "Globalization or Glocalization?" *The Journal of International Communication* 18 (2): 191–208.

Robinson, Geoffrey. 1995. *The Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence in Bali*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

———. 2019. *The Killing Season: A History of Indonesian Massacre, 1965–66*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Said, Edward. 1983. *The World, the Text, and the Critic*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Samudra, Imam. 2004. *Aku Melawan Teroris*. Solo: Al Jazeera.

Sarwono, Sarlito Wirawan. 2012. *Terorisme di Indonesia dalam Tinjauan Psikologi*. Ciputat, Indonesia: Pustaka Alvabet.

Schulze, Kirsten E. 2018. "The Surabaya Bombings and the Evolution of the Jihadi Threat in Indonesia." *CTC Sentinel*, July, pp. 1–6.

Schwarz, Adam. 1999. *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability*. St. Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin.

Sidel, John. 2006. *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Siegel, James T. 2000. *The Rope of God*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Soebardi, S. 1983. "Kartosuwiryo and the Darul Islam Rebellion in Indonesia." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 14 (1): 109–133.

Solahudin. 2013. *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jema'ah Islamiyah*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Susanto, Budi. 2007. *Sisi Senyap Politik Bising*. Yogyakarta: Kanisius.

Swift, Ann. 2011. *The Road to Madiun: The Indonesian Communist Uprising of 1948*. Sheffield, UK: Equinox Publishing.

Thayer, Carlyle A. 2005. "Leadership Dynamics in Terrorist Organizations in Southeast Asia." Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Center for Defense Leadership Studies.

The Guardian. 2004. "Timeline: Bomb Attack in Indonesia." September 9. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/09/indonesia. Accessed July 14, 2020.

The Jakarta Post. 2004. "Deadly Blast, Accident Mar New Year's Eve." January 2. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2004/01/02/deadly-blast-accidents-mar-new-year039s-eve.html. Accessed July 14, 2020.

Van Bruinessen, Martin. 2002. "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia." *South East Asia Research* 10 (20): 117–154.

Van Dick, Cees. 1981. *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Van Klinken, Gerry. 2007. *Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia*. London and New York: Routledge.

Wilson, Chris. 2008. *Ethno-Religious Violence in Indonesia: From Soil to God*. London: Routledge.

Check for updates

CHAPTER 6

Indonesian Government and Counterterrorism

> Indonesia is now far better off in security terms than it was years ago, because of rapidly improving law enforcement, hundreds of arrests, better understanding of the scope of the problem, and clear public outrage over the bombings that have taken place. Jones (2005: 53)
>
> —Sidney Jones, Terrorism expert and Director of the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, Jakarta

Introduction

Ever since the vast Bali bombings that blasted on October 12, 2002, killing and wounding hundreds of people, the Indonesian government began to take serious measures to combat terrorism and extremism in general. The deadly blasts were a wakeup call for Indonesian government and society that terrorism has indeed threatened the country's national political security and social stability. This chapter is intended to describe and analyze the Indonesian government's counterterrorism approaches, strategies, tactics, programs, policies, and practices from the Old Order and the New Order to the Reformasi Era[1] (after 1998) as

[1] The Reformasi (Reformation) Era refers to an era of a political economic transition from Suharto's New Order dictatorial regime to the present-day that began in 1998, when people power forced Suharto to step down from his throne.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022

S. Al Qurtuby, *Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1337-2_6

well as examines their strengths and weaknesses in combating, countering and preventing terrorism and radicalism from happening in the future. The chapter also discusses obstacles the government has faced in an attempt to combat terrorism. Although terrorism is a global threat for humanity, some individuals and groups in Indonesia, in reality, do not always support anti-terrorism and counterterrorism programs.

Some questions that the chapter tries to answer are as follows. What are the forms of counterterrorism approaches and programs that the Indonesian governments—the Old Order, the New Order, and the Reformasi regime—have and use to combat terrorism? How do the government implement these approaches and programs? What are the underlying rationales of the approaches and programs? Are the approaches and programs successful in overcoming terrorism and radicalism? What kinds of barriers do the government have and how do they overcome them? What are the resemblances and differences in ways of combating terrorism between the governments of the Old Order, the New Order, and the Reformasi Era?

As discussed earlier, there are at least two principal models of counterterrorism (also known as anti-terrorism), namely hard approach (also known as military or tactical approach) and soft approach (also known as smart, non-military, or strategic approach). Some scholars added an operational counterterrorism approach to the list (e.g. Gunaratna 2017; Gunaratna et al. 2011). Tactical (and operational) counterterrorism models generally emphasize reactive or responsive means to exterminate, punish, and apprehend terrorists as well as disrupt and extinguish their bases, cells, and operations by using military measures.

On the contrary, strategic counterterrorism method is both preventive and corrective by using non-military measures through, for example, community engagement to build social resilience and counter-extremism as well as rehabilitation and reintegration to de-radicalize terrorists and extremists (Cortright and Lopez 2007; Boucek 2008a, b; Rudolph 2018). Community engagement, according to Gunaratna, is "the component to prevent and curb religious extremism," while rehabilitation and reintegration are "the tools to de-radicalize terrorists and insurgents" (Gunaratna 2017: 1). Scholars and practitioners have generally agreed that a strategic counterterrorism approach is indispensable to assist, support, and sustain tactical (and operational) counterterrorism measures.

The Indonesian government, especially in the aftermath of the 2002 Bali bombings, has done an enormous effort in fighting against

terrorism, through multiple strategies and tactics of both hard and soft approaches. According to Hamli, a senior member of the Indonesian police and the Prevention Director of BNPT, the government's counterterrorism agency, the Indonesian government in particular used the terms "*penindakan*" (action/reaction) and "*pencegahan*" (deterrence/prevention). The *penindakan* refers to a legal approach (*pendekatan hukum*) and direct action following terrorist acts that usually involve killing, detention, suppression, sentence, and other military measures. The anti-terror police squad, Densus 88, usually carried out this task. The *pencegahan*, conversely, refers to a preemptive approach to prevent terrorist acts in the future by conducting non-military measures—both online and offline—such as capacity building trainings, counter-narratives or discourses against terrorism, spread of alternative ideas related to peace and other relevant issues, rehabilitation programs, and so forth.[2]

The *penindakan* method had resulted in the massive arrests of the terrorists. According to Hamli, since 2000, the police and the authorities had arrested and detained over one thousand terrorist suspects. In 2019 alone, in the aftermath of the Medan Police HQ bombings on November 13, 2019, as stated by Idham Azis, head of the Indonesian National Police (now retired), the anti-terrorism security forces have captured around 74 terrorist suspects.[3] The seizure continues until now. In May 2020, the authorities arrested several terrorist suspects in multiple places including Batam of Sumatra-based—Katibah Gonggong Rebus, a terrorist group that, in 2016, planned to attack the Mariana Bay of Singapore.[4] Moreover, the government has created anti-terror units and agencies as well as produced counterterrorism and anti-terrorism regulations to omit or at least minimize the impacts of terrorism in the country. Through various bodies and departments, the Indonesian government has also implemented various approaches of counterterrorism and anti-terrorism combining hard and soft models of combating and averting terror and extremism.

[2] Online interview with Hamli, July 23, 2020.

[3] Idham Azis said the number of detained terrorists in 2019 in a hearing session with the parliament members. See https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/4115842/densus-88-tangkap-pasutri-terduga-teroris-gunungkidul. Accessed July 18, 2020.

[4] See https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/05/23/densus-88-antiterror-squad-arrests-16-year-old-in-batam.html. Accessed July 18, 2020.

Examples of the Indonesian government's efforts of counterterrorism and anti-terrorism are as follows. In 2003, the government created the Counterterrorism Special Detachment (known as Densus 88), an Indonesian National Police counterterrorism squad, and in 2010, it founded the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme or BNPT for short). Moreover, the following are examples of counterterrorism and anti-terrorism regulations. In 2002, the government issued the Regulation in Lieu of Law (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang or Perppu for short) No. 01 on Combating Criminal Acts of Terrorism.[5] In addition, the government also issued the Perppu No. 2/2002 on the Implementation of Perppu No. 1/2002 on Combating Criminal Acts of Terrorism in relation to the Bali bombing of October 12, 2002.[6]

On October 22, 2002, just days after the issuance of the Perppu, the government issued the Presidential Instruction (Instruksi Presiden or Inpres) No. 4 that instructed or mandated the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Human Rights Affairs to draft a national policy strategy for overcoming terrorism. In the following year, in 2003, the government issued Laws (Undang-Undang or UU) No. 15 on Combating Terrorism. In 2011, Indonesian government issued a regulation (Law No. 17/2011) concerning state intelligence and its role in intercepting and conducting surveillance on any kind of suspicious communication it deems potentially endanger and threaten national security. Furthermore, in 2013, the government issued UU No. 9 on Prevention and Eradication on Terrorism Financing Criminal Acts, and in 2018, it issued UU No. 5 on Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism,[7] a revised version of the 2003 law.

Even though the Indonesian government has conducted various attempts at countering terrorism, this, however, does not mean that the country is now entirely safe or secure from terrorist and extremist threats.

[5] The regulation can be accessed at https://www.hukumonline.com/pusatdata/detail/17264/nprt/38/peraturan-pemerintah-pengganti-undangundang-nomor-1-tahun-2002. Accessed July 18, 2020.

[6] The Perppu can be accessed at https://www.hukumonline.com/pusatdata/detail/17264/nprt/38/peraturan-pemerintah-pengganti-undangundang-nomor-1-tahun-2002. Accessed July 18, 2020.

[7] The law can be accessed at https://www.hukumonline.com/pusatdata/detail/lt5b31feb350abd/undang-undang-nomor-5-tahun-2018. Accessed July 18, 2020.

In fact, until 2019, terrors still took place in some areas targeting multiple buildings (religious and secular alike) and people (Muslims and non-Muslims, security personnel or civilians) (see Chapter 5). During the COVID-19 pandemics, there is no record of terrorist (suicide) bombings but other forms of terrorist activities and violence exist, resulting in the continuous arrest of the radicals. It is hence imperative to look at and reexamine the government's approaches of combating radical and terrorist groups and individuals. Although the primary focus of this chapter is examining counterterrorism efforts in the post-New Order's governments, it will also briefly explore the counterterrorism endeavors during the Old Order (under Sukarno, r. 1945–1966) and the New Order (under Suharto, r. 1967–1998).

Combating Terror During the Old Order and the New Order

Since the Old Order era, the Indonesian government has actually steered various efforts to eradicate radical and terrorist groups. However, it was only in the aftermath of the first Bali bombings in 2002 that the Indonesian government started developing robust counterterrorism and anti-terrorism methods comprising military (hard) and non-military (soft) approaches. During the Old Order and the New Order, the governments, for the most part, relied on a traditional hard approach of tactical assaults, coercion, pressures, strict controls, punishment, and detention. One of the hard approach's main features is the use of the military models of combating terror such as killing the terrorists (typically by shooting); capturing, sentencing, and sending the culprits to jail; pressing and tormenting the extremists; and destroying the terrorists' bases, cells, and networks.

Different Use of "Hard" (Military) Approaches

Although the two regimes applied the hard approach method in combating terrorism, both tended to use it differently. While the Old Order, for the most part, used an open military battle technique, the New Order employed a secretive intelligence operation to annihilate the radicals, in addition to an open clash. This clandestine method of combating the militants is especially true since the 1980s when Suharto implemented a notorious killing method called Petrus (stands for *Penembakan*

Misterius or mysterious shooting). The Petrus refers to a series of extra-judicial executions against people what the government dubbed as street gangsters, terrorists, and other radicals.

Through the Petrus operations, covert snipers mysteriously shot to death thousands of criminals (the actual death toll or the degree of the killings remains a mystery today) without undergoing a trial. The dead bodies were then placed in public places to terrorize the populace (Colombijn and Thomas Lindblad 2002; Sidel 2006). The Petrus operations were initially to reduce the crime rate and number of criminals (known as "*gali*"). As the crime rate dropped significantly, Suharto continued and expanded the operations.

In the early period of the country, the government did not have yet a regulation on how to handle terrorism and radicalism. The first law that regulates combating extremism, including terrorism, emerged in 1963 with the issuance of a government regulation, Penetapan Presiden (presidential assignment) No. 11 (Law No. 11/PNPS/1963) on *Pemberantasan Kegiatan Subversi* (the Eradication of Subversive Activities).[8] After the issuance of this law, Sukarno's Old Order used it as a legal justification to purge the "subversives," including insurgents, extremists, terrorists, anarchists, dissidents, or even critics.

When Suharto took over the power, he initially did not use this law but in 1969, he scaled up the legal status of the Penetapan Presiden to become Undang-Undang (i.e. Undang–Undang No. 11/PNPS/1963) to strengthen the legal basis for eliminating and marginalizing his rivals and enemies. Literally, the English word subversion means the turning over of something, but the Indonesian term *subversi* means "an illegal act to overthrow a legitimate ruler."[9] The law states clearly that subversive acts are dangerous for the nation's security and safety.

[8] The anti-subversion law can be accessed in the following site: https://www.hukumonline.com/pusatdata/detail/lt59dc8cf94ab6c/node/38/penpres-no-11-tahun-1963-pemberantasan-kegiatan-subversi. Accessed July 19, 2020.

[9] See https://kbbi.kemdikbud.go.id/entri/subversi. Retrieved July 19, 2020. The English word "subversion" means "the process of trying to destroy the authority of a political, religious, etc. system by attacking it secretly or indirectly" or "an act of changing something to its opposites, especially when this challenges fixed ideas or expectations." See https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/subversion?q=subversion. Accessed July 19, 2020. The Miriam-Webster dictionary defines subversion as "a systematic attempt to overthrow or undermine a government or political system by persons working secretly from within".

Anti-subversion Law

Yet, in reality, the government used the term *subversi* to eliminate any actions that, according to the rulers, tend—or are potential to—destabilize the country, disturb civic peace, disrupt social stability, and certainly endanger the government, either the acts are violent (using physical force) or nonviolent (e.g. criticism). The 1963 anti-subversion law was a "rubber rule" that can be used to curtail and eliminate anyone or any group the government dubbed perilous for the state and society. In Article 1 of the law, it states and explains a variety of activities—conducted covertly or openly—that are categorized as subversive.

These subversive activities included the following. First, any act that aims or intends to (1) subvert and divert the state ideology of Pancasila, (2) overthrow and corrode the state authority and the government's prestige, and (3) spread enmity, chaos, fears, disunity, and discomfort in the society or disrupt economic life and stability. Second, any act that shows sympathy toward foes of the Indonesian state. Third, any act that devastates private or public buildings and properties. Fourth, spy activities. Fifth, sabotage.

Those charged with committing subversive activities by the government can be sentenced to death, life imprisonment, or sentenced for several years up to 30 years in a jail, depending on the levels of guilt. Looking at closely to articles in the 1963 anti-subversion law, including its explanation, it is obvious that any activities conducted by either individuals or groups can be easily classified as subversive by the government and deserved for punishment as long as these acts have fulfilled one, some or all criteria stated in the law, as mentioned above. Based on this law, subversive activities are not only actions intended to topple the government or the legitimate state of the Republic of Indonesia, or distract the country's national security but also disturb society's comfort. Terrorist acts have undoubtedly fallen into this category, thereby the government used this law to curb terrorist threats and crack down terrorist and militant groups.

Since the law loosely defines the term subversion, the rulers, especially Suharto but also Sukarno during the "second phase" of his rule after the implementation of the Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*) from

1957 to 1965,[10] considered or categorized a strong criticism against the government, although without involving physical violence, as "*tindakan subversi*" (subversive acts) that deserved to be punished. Later, after the collapse of the dictatorial New Order, the new Indonesian government, under the late B.J. Habibie, issued Lembaran Negara No. 73/1999[11] that outlawed the anti-subversion law (Law No. 11/PNPS/1963) because it was considered to be irrelevant with the spirit of democracy, human rights, and political reformation.

Sukarno's Guided Democracy and Dictatorship

The late Miriam Budiardjo (1923–2007), a noted Indonesian political scientist, said there were several characteristics of the Guided Democracy such as (1) the dominant role of the president, (2) the limitation of the roles of the legislature and political parties, and (3) the increase of the army as a social-political force. These features were a sign of Sukarno's path toward dictatorship that marked a significant difference from his previous rule during the Liberal Democracy or Parliamentary Democracy in which the parliament had a dominant authority to control the government (Budiardjo 1972). Sukarno's authoritarianism during the Guided Democracy can be seen from his various army-backed policies.

These included (1) the dismissal of the existing parliament, replaced by his favored the Gotong Royong Legislature; (2) the establishment of the Temporary People's Consultative Assembly and the Temporary Supreme Advisory Council; and (3) the recruitment or inclusion of the army into government becoming ministers, regional heads, and other political and governmental posts. It was also during the Guided Democracy that Sukarno banned the Masjumi Islamist political party in 1960

[10] Guided Democracy was a political system that emerged as an "antithesis" of the Liberal Democracy. Sukarno believed that the Liberal Democracy, implemented in Indonesia since it gained independence in 1945, was ineffective, indicated by the rise of revolts and political chaos. Accordingly, in 1957, Sukarno introduced and proclaimed the Guided Democracy in which he (and the army) that in reality "guided" (controlled) democracy to end the social and political disturbances by proposing a threefold blend of nationalism, religion, and communism in his new political and governmental system. Under this system, there was no more 1955-style free parliamentary election in the country. Scholars considered Guided Democracy as Sukarno's brainchild (Ricklefs 2008).

[11] See https://ngada.org/uu26-1999.htm. Accessed July 19, 2020.

because of accusation of its (some) political leaders' participation in the PRRI rebellion in Sumatra (Budiardjo 1972; Maarif 1996; Ricklefs 2008).

There were some fundamental reasons that drove Sukarno to introduce Guided Democracy in 1957 (but officially in 1959) and issued the anti-subversion law in 1963. These included the unconducive and chaotic situations in the newly established country, indicated by the rise of several uprisings from the separatist groups and the parliament's dominant power that could anytime delegitimize the government, president, and its cabinets (as in the case of the minister Djuanda Kartawidjaja, 1911–1963).

Indeed, during the Sukarno era, various separatist and ideological groups such as PKI, DI, PRRI, Permesta, APRA,[12] among others emerged and tried to overthrow the existing government as well as replace the nation's ideological and philosophical foundation by waging revolts, violence, terrors, and various forms of political movement. Sukarno successfully cracked down the movements and rebellions such as the Communist revolt in Madiun of East Java, the Daud Beureueh-led uprising in Aceh, the Abdul Kahar Muzakkar movement in South Sulawesi, the PRRI insurgences in Sumatra, the Permesta rebellion in Sulawesi, the Kartosuwirjo's DI/TII insurrections in West Java, and so forth.

Since there are no specific laws that legalize the fight against the insurgents and extremists, Sukarno relied on his decisions based on political advice and security considerations, which are necessary in building a stable nation-state. The issuance of the 1963 anti-subversion law made Sukarno easier to clear-out his rivals, which was later followed by Suharto. However, Sukarno (again, Suharto as well) implemented a "bamboo split" political strategy (*strategi politik belah bambu*) by elevating his favored groups while cracking down others (Maarif 1996).

The government's counterterrorism agency, BNPT, in its official website, states clearly that the 1963 anti-subversion law was the legal basis for combating any activities that the rulers considered endangering the nation's sovereignty, including terrorism. The law also became the

[12] APRA stands for Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil (the Prince Justice Legion), PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia or the Revolutionary Government of Republic of Indonesia), Permesta (Perjuangan Rakyat Semesta or the Universal People Movement), DI (Darul Islam, the Adobe of Islam), and PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia—the Indonesian Communist Party).

legal foundation of the hard approach used by the Old Order's (and the New Order's as well) state authorities and security forces to overcome terrorist perils by military measures.[13] During the Old Order, according to Suhardi Alius, former BNPT chief, terrorism is connected to—or walking hand in hand with—separatism. At that time, he said that terrorist acts were motivated by "spirit of terrorism" or coup d'état against the legitimate government. A senior member of the Indonesian Police, Alius, has noted that although there were religiously–motivated movement and terrorism committed by such groups as DI, their underlying motives were separatism, namely to establish a distinctive state by overthrowing the existing government. The Old Order government handled all of these movements, Alius said, with a hard approach by using open armed confrontation and military forces.[14]

Limited Soft Counterterrorism Approaches

Although for the most part Sukarno's Old Order regime used a hard approach, military measures, or tactical counterterrorism method, it had also employed a limited soft or strategic counterterrorism approach such as accommodation (compromise/settlement), co-optation, or government amnesty. Although the Communists had involved in rebellions against the newly established state of Republic of Indonesia (e.g. the 1948 Madiun revolt), Sukarno accommodated them into a new ruling alliance called Nasakom, which stands for Nasionalisme (Nationalism), Agama (meaning here Islam), and Komunisme (Communism), since late 1950s until mid-1960s during the Guided Democracy era.

Later, in the 1960s, when the Communists engaged in terror acts (e.g. the Kanigoro incident), Sukarno did not disengaged with the leftists but defended them instead. Sukarno's idea of Nasakom emerged when he was disappointed with the Parliamentary Democracy system that, according to him, endangered the government, besides was controlled by elite members of the capitalist and bourgeoisie class (Maarif 1996). The Nasakom was actually a coalition of the nationalists (represented in the Indonesian National Party, Sukarno's political party), Islam (represented

[13] See the official website of BNPT at https://damailahindonesiaku.com/terorisme/sejarah-terorisme.

[14] Conversation with Suhardi Alius, Jakarta, July 2018.

in the Nahdlatul Ulama Party and the Masyumi Party but later in 1960 Sukarno prohibited Masyumi), and the Communists (represented in the Indonesian Communist Party). These political parties were the big four in the 1955 election (Ricklefs 2008).

Moreover, Sukarno also gave an amnesty (a presidential pardon) to the remaining DI rebels. On August 1, 1962, as a condition to obtain an amnesty, Sukarno required DI elite members to sign the Joint Pledge (*Ikrar Bersama*) of loyalty and allegiance to the Republic of Indonesia and admit the group's misguided movement and erroneous action away from fundamental Islamic doctrines, teachings, and practices. Around twenty-two DI' key figures signed the pledge. Later, it was apparent that the signing the pledge was only to receive pardon and safe from punishment (either imprisonment or death penalty) because in the following years they returned to "normal activities"—committing violence and terrorism to topple the ruler and found an imagined Islamic state (see Chapter 5).

However, DI leader Kartosuwirjo was sentenced to death in 1962 with charges of waging coup d'état, rebellion against the legitimate authorities, and assassination attempts toward President Sukarno. Reportedly, DI militants tried several times to assassinate President Sukarno. Kartosuwirjo himself sent twice to murder Sukarno, one of which by blasting bombs in the complex of Perguruan Cikini (Cikini School), Jakarta, in 1957. There were at least seven failed attempted murders of President Sukarno from 1957 to 1964, either by shootings or by bombings (detonating grenades).[15]

Although some DI elite members were disappointed and criticized those who surrendered and signed the pledge such as Ahmad Sobari who declared the founding of Negara Islam Tejamaya (Tejamaya Islamic State) in Tasikmalaya of West Java, many of Kartosuwirjo's remaining followers benefited from the government's general amnesty. Following the official pardon, the government started conducting various initiatives to rehabilitate, reeducate, pacify, and de-radicalize the DI militants as well as help them to reintegrate into society. These initiatives included transmigration, rehabilitation, pacification, reeducation, reintegration, or co-optation within the government's body.

[15] See https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3638320/bung-karno-selamat-dari-tujuh-kali-upaya-pembunuhan. Accessed July 22, 2020.

Transmigration as One of Counterterrorism Approaches

One of the government's pilot programs to combat terrorism through non-military measures is transmigration, an act or process of migrating or moving people from one area (usually densely populated area) to another region (usually sparsely populated region) within the country aiming at, in theory, helping reduce population density.[16] What I meant by the transmigration program is the migration process of DI activists from their main bases (e.g. West Java) to other areas in Indonesia, including Lampung of Sumatra. In the new transmigration areas, they received a modest house and piece of land provided by the government for farming and started new living.

The government-sponsored transmigration initiative is certainly for not only the militants but also non-militants. Equally important, transmigration is not only the government's program but also society's initiative (voluntary transmigration). Later, when Suharto took over the Old Order government through a bloody military revolution in the mid-1960s, he continued and developed a more robust program.

As the transmigration program expanded vastly from Java to other areas in the country during the Suharto regime, the initiative caused conflict and tensions with native populace. This is because they viewed and accused the transmigration as a process of "Javanization" or "Islamization" especially in Christian-majority areas such as Papua and Maluku that could endanger the locals' religions, beliefs, traditions, cultures, and economic sources. Some scholars also view the transmigration as part of the government's strategy to weaken separatist groups (MacAndrews 1978; Hardjono 1988).

In the transmigration areas, furthermore, the government amalgamated DI members with other migrants and trained them various skills including those related to the agricultural system. The government also sent moderate, non-militant (and pro-government) Islamic preachers

[16] Transmigration is an old technique of moving people from one region to another implemented by many regimes. However, in Indonesia, the transmigration program was initially introduced by the Dutch colonial government in the early nineteenth century to reduce crowding and provide a workforce for plantations in Sumatra Island. Later, after Indonesia gained its independence, the initiative was continued by the Indonesian government to move landless people from densely populated areas of Indonesia (especially Java) to less populous areas of the country (e.g. Sumatra, Papua, Maluku, and Kalimantan among others) (MacAndrews 1978; Hardjono 1988).

(*dai*) and clerics to the transmigration areas to guide, educate the militants, and lead religious activities of the migrants. Moreover, the government built schools in the regions for the migrants' children.

In short, the transmigration program for the radicals was not only to help improve the quality of their economic living and religious understanding but also to assist them reintegrate into society as well. Reintegration of the militants into society is a gradual and uneasy process that is not always brought into success. In fact, the program might be successful to pacify some militants but not always the case. Some radicals re-engaged in violent activities as in the case of the notorious "Warman Terror," a series of violence and robbery for terrorist operations carried out by a group led by Warman alias Warsa. As a result, in 1977, the security forces arrested around 300 DI members in the transmigration area of Lampung (Solahudin 2013).

Rehabilitation and Re-education Programs

Moreover, the government required "DI mid-career professionals" and elite members such as the battalion commanders and above to undertake rehabilitation and reeducation programs by the Siliwangi Regional Military Command (Komando Daerah Militer Siliwangi, known as Kodam Siliwangi), an Indonesian Army regional/provincial division, in West Java. In the Kodam Siliwangi, the radicals received training that emphasized the significance of nationalism or reintegration to the Republic of Indonesia.

The authorities also assisted them to find jobs, offered employment opportunities, or gave some funds to start small businesses. A scholar of terrorism studies, Solahudin also noted that one of DI elite members, Ules Sujai, became a staff member at the Kodam Siliwangi to administer the rehabilitation program. Other senior cadres, Ateng Djaelani and Adah Djaelani, became kerosene distributors in Bandung and Jakarta Solahudin (2013: 47).

Using Terrorists to Fight Communists

When Suharto led the army to topple Sukarno through anti-Communist campaigns since 1965, he also utilized DI militants to help him fight against the Communists. In West Java, DI militias under the command of the Kodam Siliwangi (especially H. R. Dharsono and Aang Kunaefi) and the National Intelligence Coordination Agency (Badan Koordinasi

Intelijen Nasional known as BAKIN), particularly its key senior members such as Yoga Sugama and Ali Moertopo, fought against PKI members and sympathizers. Since they had anti-Communist views, some DI key leaders (e.g. Dodo Darda, Danu Hasan, and Adah Djaelani, among others) agreed to collaborate with the army and BAKIN to mobilize their militant networks in West Java and Central Java to assault the Communists.

When the anti-Communist bloody campaign of 1965–1966 ended, relations between the Indonesian authorities (especially the military forces) and some DI key leaders grew even closer. The authorities provided DI activists with various payments for their services, including business concessions. One of DI senior members, Ateng Djaelani, became the head of Bandung's branch of the Union of Oil and Gas Firms (Gabungan Perusahaan-Perusahaan Minyak dan Gas), with the support of the Kodam Siliwangi. Ali Moertopo, a senior member of BAKIN, recruited Danu Muhammad Hasan to work for his intelligence body becoming a sort of whistleblower. BAKIN provided him with an official car, a house, and a monthly salary. Prior to the 1971 elections, the New Order's first election, the Kodam Siliwangi and BAKIN also approached and requested several DI leaders to mobilize their members and followers in order to support and channel their political aspirations via Suharto's electoral vehicle, the Golongan Karya (Golkar).

Some DI senior members (e.g. Danu Hasan and Ateng Djaelani) conducted a joint declaration with Kodam Siliwangi and BAKIN affirming their loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia and willingness not to support other political parties (other than Golkar). In the aftermath of the joint pledge, several DI senior members requested financial support from BAKIN stating that the funds will be used for holding a reunion of DI members. They tried to convince BAKIN that the DI proposed public gathering can be used to mobilize and convince DI members in order to cast their votes for Golkar in the election.

Not only supporting the public event, BAKIN also continued to provide financial assistance for DI other activities, thanks in particular to Danu Hasan whose personal and close relationship with the BAKIN deputy, Ali Moertopo, made this continuing support possible. Suharto himself, at first, had intended to demolish all of his enemies and potential enemies that could endanger his power not only the Communists but also other groups including DI radicals. However, Ali Moertopo succeeded in convincing him that DI militants could be utilized as "foot soldiers" to fight against the Communists.

Indeed, BAKIN and the military during Suharto's New Order had long worked with some factions within DI. For those benefiting from the military's largesse and the BAKIN support, aspirations for founding an imagined Islamic state became doubtful, as expressed by Adah Djaelani, "At that time, we had no thoughts at all of reviving the DI movement" (Solahudin 2013: 49). Looking at the history of the military–terrorist close relations it is understandable why the terrorism studies expert Sidney Jones said, "I don't think you can look at radical Islam in Indonesia without looking at manipulation by the [government] security forces" (Dahlby 2005: 142).

The late Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid also pointed out that "[One of the] causes of the 'paralysis' in dealing with terrorism was the very good connection between the security apparatus with terrorists and street hoodlums" (Wahid 2006: 292). Interestingly, while BAKIN and the military forces (especially the army) could work hand in hand with some factions of the DI movement, they were not able to join forces with other radical groups, including (ex)-PKI members.

Refuse to Work with the Government

Even though some factions and elites within DI had supported the New Order and enjoyed some privileges, this, however, does not mean that all DI leaders, senior members, and activists were willing to work or collaborate with the New Order, BAKIN, or the Kodam Siliwangi. In fact, some DI leaders and activists continued to wage rebellion and carried out terrorist acts in various places of Java and Sumatra (see Chapter 5). Equally important, although the co-optation, de-radicalization, and rehabilitation methods set forth by the New Order regime might brought some success (e.g. pacifying or de-radicalizing some members and senior leaders of the movement and other radical groups), these models certainly were not able to end terrorist activities.

In fact, since late 1970s, sporadic terrorist acts reemerged targeting multiple objects and people such as the 1981 Garuda hijackings and the 1985 Candi Borobudur bombings. DI militants and other terrorist groups obtained a new momentum of their operations in the late 1970s or 1980s following the Iranian Islamic Revolution, the Afghan–Soviet war, and the Tanjung Priok incident (see Chapter 5). The 1980s also witnessed the rise of the Komando Jihad (Jihad Command) and in the 1990s, the

country saw the birth of the Jamaah Islamiyah, both were a sort of "reincarnation" of the DI movement, which also committed a series of terrors and other violent acts.

In brief, the New Order's policy on combating terrorism and extremism was a mixture of military, hard approach, and some forms/extents of non-military, soft models. For the most part, however, Suharto used military measures (by killing or sending the culprits to jail) to deal with those having potential to destabilize the country as well as threaten his power and the existing government. Yet, Suharto offered a limited compromise or concession for his rivals (including radicals) as long as under his control and they could benefit the government. This model generally calls co-optation, namely a taking over or appropriation of something for a new or different purpose aiming to assimilate, take or win over into a larger or established group.

Suharto in general did not care about religion or any cultural products as long as their followers and enthusiasts did not use them to challenge his political power. Thus, what Suharto cared about was power! To defend his power, Suharto was willing to cooperate with other groups of any religion and political faction on condition that they are willing to be controlled under his command and auspices. Another non-military technique Suharto used to pacify and defuse the radicals was through the channels of transmigration initiatives or rehabilitation programs in a specific penitentiary or Lembaga Pemasyarakatan (a societal correctional institution). The more robust and humane approaches of counterterrorism took place since the collapse of Suharto's New Order in 1998.

Counterterrorism in the Post-new Order Government, 1998–2021

On May 21, 1998, Suharto, Indonesia's tyrant for more than three decades, was forced to step down from his throne after weeks of the national massive protests and deadly riots due to economic and financial crisis that hit the country and other nations in Southeast Asia, resulting in major changes—either good or bad—in the country. The period after Suharto's collapse—known as the "*Era Reformasi*" (the Reformation Era)—marked the end of the authoritarian rule and the reintroduction of real democracy along with major social, legal, political, and economic reforms (Mujani and William Liddle 2009; Kunkler and Stepan 2013; Menchik 2016).

Two Main Features of Counterterrorism Approaches

There are at least two main features of the counterterrorism approach implemented by the post-Suharto's New Order Indonesian government. First, law-enforcement approach (or *pendekatan hukum*) by giving tasks to the police with countering the threat rather than rely on a military in the combat of terrorism. Second, a preemptive approach (known as *pendekatan pencegahan*), emphasizing such programs as terrorists' de-radicalization, rehabilitation, or re-education.

The law-enforcement approach is mainly handled by Densus 88 (Detasemen Khusus or Special Detachment 88), the Indonesian National Police' (Polri) special counterterrorism squad. The preemptive method, moreover, has been carried out the government's Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT, the National Counter-Terrorism Agency). In brief, the government holds public trials for terrorism suspects (except those shot dead in a raid by the police) and attempts to rehabilitate convicted terrorists in prison.

Several Anti-terror Units

It is worth mentioning that Densus 88 is not the only anti-terror unit in the country. There are other anti-terror squads within the country's armed forces (Army, Navy, Marine, and Special Forces) and intelligence body (BIN).[17] In 2015, Indonesia's Armed Forces (TNI) also launched a new counterterrorism squad, combining all military divisions, called the TNI Joint Special Operations Command[18] (known by its Indonesian acronym, Koopsusgab–Komando Operasi Khusus Gabungan). Stationed in Sentul, West Java, Koopsusgab comprises 81 trained counterterrorism personnel derived mainly from the Army, the Navy's special forces (Denjaka) and the Air Force's Bravo 90 special forces unit.

[17] Other anti-terror squads includes Detasemen C Gegana Brimob (Mobile Brigade C Gegana Detachment), Detasemen Penanggulangan Teror (Dengultor) TNI AD (the Army Detachment for Extermination of Terror), Detasemen 81 Kopassus TNI AD (Special Forces Command Detachment 81), Detasemen Jala Mengkara (Denjaka) Korps Marinir TNI AL (Marine Corps Jala Mengkara Detachment), Detasemen Bravo 90 (Denbravo) TNI AU (Air Forces Bravo 90 Detachment), and Satuan Antiteror BIN (the National Intelligence Agency of Anti-Terror).

[18] See https://jakartaglobe.id/news/armed-forces-start-counterterrorism-squad/. Accessed August 8, 2020.

TNI Commander, General Moeldoko (now retired and joins President Joko Widodo as Chief of Staff of Presidency), said that the squad is ready to combat terrorism at any second and protect civilians. He, furthermore, pointed out that Koopsusgab was prepared to fight against any act of terrorism and radicalism that threatened Indonesian sovereignty as well as help boost further to existing counterterrorism efforts initiated by the police and the government. The group, an elite, inter-service military team, is expected to respond to terrorist threats in any place in the country as quickly as possible. Ever since the founding of this squad, Densus 88 has committed to work together with Koopsusgap in combating terrorism, albeit it was still unclear mechanisms of the cooperation. Polri and TNI have also signed an agreement to help train young police/military officers in terrorism prevention and terrorist obliteration as well as boost ties between the two security groups.

While the founding of Koopsusgap evidently illustrates the government's determination to eradicate radicalism and terrorism threats, some observers worried about the military's growing role in the country. They said that the initiative is a marker that the military is looking to gain control of the counterterrorism realm from Polri, thereby intensifying and escalating turf battles between the two security forces and undermining efforts (e.g. Parameswaran 2015). Given the rivalry of authority between the two, some analysts such as the terrorism expert, Sidney Jones, suggested to assign counterterrorism to Densus 88 in place of Koopsusgap and other military-based anti-terror units. However, even though there have been some anti-terror units, it is Densus 88 that has actually proved its ability and success in handling terrorism.

The Abolition of the Anti-subversion Law

Moreover, within the spirit of the *reformasi*, the new parliament issued a law, UU No. 26/1999, which officially abolished the anti-subversion regulation (UU No. 11/PNPS/1963) that had formerly been used by Sukarno and Suharto to crack down their rivals, potential enemies and the extremists. The Law of 26/1999 states that the abolition of the 1963 anti-subversion law mainly because it contradicts (1) the spirit of human rights and genuine democracy that guarantee civil liberty and (2) the principle of Indonesia as a *rechtsstaat* (state law or *negara hukum*) that is built based on the rule of law, not of man. According to the 1999 law, human rights is a God's gift intrinsically attached within each human covering

rights to express opinions, make associations, or have an equal access to law.[19]

Nonetheless, despite productive legal, social, political, and economic changes, the fall of Suharto also caused negative things such as the rise of anti-pluralist movements, intolerant actions, and multiple forms of violence such as terrorism, sectarian conflict, communal riots, secessionism-driven violence, pogroms, violent jihadism, and vigilanteism, committed by a variety of actors (political, ethnic, or religious groupings and individuals). Concerning terrorism, as discussed in Chapter 5, this period witnessed the emergence of widespread terrorist bombing incidents carried out by Islamist and non-Islamist individuals and groups alike.

According to Hamli, a senior member of the police, because of the escalation of the terrorist bombings, one of the most infamous ones was the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings (known as "Bom Natal"), the Criminal Investigation Agency (Bareskrim) of Polri created a "Satgas Bom", a task force that focused on the investigation of the bombing incidents. This Satgas Bom, Hamli said, was the embryo of Densus 88 in which Hamli was part of the team.[20] Moreover, the post-New Order transitional governments (under Presidents B. J. Habibie, r. 1998–1999, Abdurrahman Wahid, r. 1999–2001) were difficult to overcome terrorism mainly because the 1963 anti-subversion law was erased in 1999 and the new governments did not issue yet a specific law to combat terrorism. As a result, combating terrorism in the political transition era relied on the police.

The Tipping Point of Counterterrorism Approach

The turning point of the counterterrorism approach in the post-New Order (*Reformasi*) period was the 2002 Bali bombings, the most spectacular terrorist bombing incident ever in the history of modern Indonesia in terms of the casualties, the bombing strength, physical damages, and people involved in the operation. Following the shocking tragic event, the Indonesian government (at the time under Sukarno's daughter, President

[19] See rationales for issuing the 1999 law at https://ngada.org/uu26-1999.htm. Accessed August 4, 2020.

[20] Online interview with Hamli, July 24, 2020.

Megawati Sukarnoputri, r. 2001–2004) responded quickly by creating anti-terrorism and counterterrorism regulations and Densus 88. The regulations included Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang No. 1/2002 (Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 2002 No. 106) that later was transformed to become Undang-Undang (Law) No. 15/2003 (Lembaran Negara Tahun 2003 No. 46) on the Eradication of Criminal Terrorist Acts[21] (known as Anti-terrorism Law or *UU Antiterorisme*).

The law regulates conditions of terrorism, forms of terrorist activities, and types of materials usually used for terrorism (e.g. chemical weapons, bombs, and so forth). The law also rules sorts of sentences for terrorist suspects including death penalty, life imprisonment, or minimum of 4 years in a jail, all depend on the extents of terrorists' contributions and roles in their violent acts. Since the issuance of this law, the government used it as a legal basis for fighting against terrorism. Besides the 2003 law, Megawati also issued Instruksi Presiden (Presidential Instruction) No. 4/2002 that gave a mandate to the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security Affairs (Menteri Koordinator Bidang Politik dan Keamanan), Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), to make a strategy and national policy on countering and overcoming terrorism and terrorist threat. The coordinating minister, hence, issued a decision letter No. 26/Menko/Polkam/11/2002 on the founding of Desk Koordinasi Pemberantasan Terorisme (the Coordinating Desk for the Extermination of Terrorism).

The Creation of Densus 88

Furthermore, formed in the wake of the first Bali bombings, which firmly placed Indonesia as a frontline state in "war on terror," Megawati also created an elite police unit called Densus 88,[22] an anti-terror squad aims

[21] The law can be accessed at https://www.hukumonline.com/pusatdata/detail/13284/undangundang-nomor-15-tahun-2003. Accessed July 26, 2020.

[22] For the terrorist suspects the name Densus 88 reflects the foreign control in which the number 88 was derived from the number of the Australian victims in the 2002 Bali Bombings (which is coincidentally also 88). Others (e.g. Conboy 2009) said that the name was a result of a senior Indonesian police mishearing the English word "ATA" (an acronym of Anti-Terrorism Assistance of the US Department of State) in a briefing between Polri (the Indonesian national police) and officials from the US Department of State's Anti-Terrorism Assistance program. For those who are not masters in English, the

to track and apprehend suspected terrorist operatives. Initially, Densus 88 was within or under the Bareskrim (Criminal Investigation Agency) of Polri but in 2004 it was directly under the Indonesian Police. Since its inception in 2003, Densus 88, the heavily armed black-clad anti-terror police officers, has established itself as one of the world's best counterterrorism units and won praise for cracking down terrorists and militants behind a string of deadly attacks.

Densus 88 grew as an exemplary and applauded unit within Indonesia and Southeast Asia more generally, especially for anti-terrorist and anti-militant groups, because of its increasing success in apprehending terrorists and radicals throughout the country (Friedman 2016; Caruso 2018). The unit, in particular, has steadily hammered the jihadist terrorist cells linked to al-Qaeda (such as JI), ISIL (such as JAD), and other Islamist radical factions and cliques. Since its founding, Densus 88 has indeed apprehended hundreds of suspected terrorists and Islamist militants, including top commanders, masterminds, or elite members of various terrorist organizations.

Densus 88 detained or shot dead almost all those involved in the Bali bombings (planners, committers, financers, recruiters, bomb makers, and forth). In 2005, the unit killed Azahari Husin, a Malaysian and the bomb maker of the first Bali bombings whose nickname was the Demolition Man, in a police raid on his hideout in Malang of East Java. In 2007, Densus 88 successfully apprehended Abu Dujana, one of key leaders of JI's military wing. In 2009, the squad also successfully shot to death another JI's key elite members, Noordin M Top of Malaysian origins, dubbed as the recruiter and bomb expert, who was involved in various deadly terrorist attacks in Indonesia before and after the Bali bombings. In 2016, the force also shot dead Santoso, one of the country's most-wanted jihadist and terror leader who had pledged loyalty to ISIL. Densus 88 also arrested (and later the court sentenced him to death in 2018) Aman Abdurrahman, the ideological leader of JAD, one of ISIL's affiliated organizations in Indonesia. The unit's impressive attainment continues until nowadays.

Police methods used in the *Reformasi* Era differ significantly from those of the New Order, at least not as brutal as before under the late Suharto, when the police were the junior arm or the "poor cousins"

pronunciation of ATA is close to 88. Coincidentally, the senior police also considered 8 is a lucky number in Indonesia; thereby, the name Densus 88 is a good fit.

of the armed forces (formerly ABRI, now TNI). The government has taken careful steps to minimize the heavy-handed nature of Densus 88, the police in general, and TNI aims at generating and keeping popular support and esteem for law enforcement. In fact, with help from local and international agencies, Densus 88 do not only use repressive military technique but also apply DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) analysis and other forensic science, as well as communications monitoring, aiming at tracing leads from the bombings to hidden JI cells, bases, networks, and associated movements across the country. In addition, Densus 88 was also able to mount successful preventive strikes across Java, Sumatra, and Sulawesi in particular to foil new attempts of terrorists to assemble bomb materials and plan attacks.

Because of the squad's fruitful attainment in capturing and killing Islamist terrorists as well as destroying their cells, the Islamist militants and terrorists accused Densus 88 of being anti-Muslim and Western-funded force. Conversely, for Indonesian police internal perspective, Densus 88 was a continuation and an extension of Satgas Bom (Satuan Tugas Bom or Bomb Task Force, founded in 2000), a unit comprising well-experienced and trained police officers, nothing to do with the Western countries, whose primary aim was to investigate terrorist bombings. In other words, the founding of Densus 88 was based on the local need and demand, not because of international pressure or request.

A senior police and Prevention Director of BNPT, Hamli, pointed out that the international support from the United States or Australia was not in the form of funds but in relation to technical assistance, anti-terror trainings, or joint drill on combating terrorist threats such as the collaboration with the Australian Federal Police or US Department of State's Anti-Terrorist Assistance Program.[23] Hamli, moreover, said that following the deadly Bali terrorist attacks, the Indonesian authorities needed to expand functions and tasks of Satgas Bom to be a well-trained specific and professional counterterrorism squadron, primarily because the Bali blasts were extraordinary and exceptional in terms of the bombs' strength and the number of casualties. This is among the rationale for the transformation of Satgas Bom to become Densus 88.

[23] Online interview with Hamli, July, 2020.

Contributions of the United States and Australia

Nonetheless, according to Greg Barton, a specialist of Indonesian studies and global Islamic politics from Deakin University, the governments of the United States and Australia, following the shock of the 2002 Bali blasts, poured hundred million dollars into counterterrorism capacity building, police reforms, and professional training in Indonesia. As part of this attempt, Barton said, a bilateral initiative involving Polri and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) led to the founding of Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) that has served as a regional rallying point for much-needed counterterrorism capacity development and collaboration across governments of Southeast Asian countries in particular. In other words, JCLEC, established in 2004, is a specialist institution for providing training of counterterrorism and counter-radicalism for police, government officials, and relevant agents throughout Southeast Asia and beyond, which worked in parallel with the expansion of Densus 88 (Barton 2018).

As an outcome, as noted by John Coyne, a senior analyst at Australian Strategic Policy Institute, since its inception, JCLEC has grown into one of the world's most vigorous counterterrorism training facilities, delivering workshops and trainings on issues around terrorism (or radicalism in general) and counterterrorism to more than 20,000 officials from 70 countries (Coyne 2017). The Densus 88 itself has doubled in size to thousands of well-trained police officers equipped with Western-standard counterterrorism weapons, along with specially trained snipers and breach squad teams.

Barton (2018) has also noted that the American government, through its Department of State's Diplomatic Security Services and Anti-Terrorism Assistance program, provided Densus 88 with training and support for technical experts such as specialists in explosives and post-blast forensics. Other scholars have also acknowledged the US support on Indonesian counterterrorism programs. For example, in the aftermath of the 2002 Bali bombings, US Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, promptly responded by coordinating a $50 million counterterrorism aid package (Robison and Hadiz 2004: 263).

With support and resources from both American and Australian governments, President Megawati made three astute decisions. First, the establishment of a counterterrorism apparatus that was built as a law

enforcement entity rather than the military mainly because of TNI's negative image and reputation during Suharto's despotic rule. This is among the reason why Densus 88 was formed from Polri not TNI. Second, the reformation of the country's intelligence body (BIN) that allowed the government (especially the Ministry of Home Affairs) and Densus 88 to leverage relevant local stakeholders and leaders by advancing an enormous and effective human intelligence network to early detect terrorist activities before carrying out attacks (Sebastian 2005). Third, the willingness to embrace support from other countries due to the lack of capability concerning technical expertise of the security forces (Caruso 2018).

Coordination with Grassroots and Stakeholders

It is imperative to note that the achievement of Densus 88 does not only rely on its modern hard power and tactical capacity per se. The force also relies on its superb proactive intelligence work, building on a productive collaboration with the Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs (through its "Early Warning System" program or *Sistem Peringatan Dini*) to select local youth, community and religious leaders, scholars, and activists. The main tasks of the local stakeholders and grassroots peacebuilding practitioners are to gather relevant information on suspected terrorist activity and report it to local representatives of Polri, TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia or the military), and certainly BIN (Badan Intelijen Negara or the Indonesian intelligence body). They then supply the information to Densus 88 for further necessary action. By building fruitful partnership with patrons or societies at the local level across the country, Densus 88, the government and state apparatus have built one of the world's most proactive intelligence networks (Caruso 2018).

Criticism Toward Anti-terror Units

Even though many have praised Densus 88 for its feat in combating terrorism, few groups have criticized the squad. In addition to suspected terrorists, especially Islamist terrorists, that certainly disparaged the force since they became the main target of operations, human rights activists such as those of Imparsial (the Indonesian Human Rights Monitor) or Komnas HAM (Komisi Nasional Hak Azasi Manusia—the National Human Rights Commission) also belittled the counterterrorism squadron, particularly concerning its security approach. Few fanatical

Muslim clerics, scholars, leaders, or politicians have also unwelcomed toward Densus 88's struggle in the combat of Islamist terrorist and religious militant groups. Moreover, some academics suggested the government to curb terrorist and radical threats without becoming a national security state or extinguish the country's fragile reborn democracy (Sebastian 2003).

More specifically, the human rights activists said that with the operations of Densus 88 through its intelligence work and military measures, the government intends to control political practice and limit civil liberty that in turn could disrupt the democratization process. Security approach, for them, should not sacrifice human rights and freedom. In other words, the combat of terrorism should respect human rights (of terrorists). As well, by proposing the Anti-Terrorism Law and the Intelligence Law, the activists accused that Megawati's civilian government had been controlled by the military elites who wanted to come back to the national political stage, regain economic resources, and cleanse their negative image.

The human rights activists also argued that the aforementioned anti-terrorism law (the 2003 law) was potential for bringing military back in as in Suharto's era, besides pessimistic as a legal basis to prevent subsequent terrorist acts (Tim Imprasial 2003, 2004). Some articles in the anti-terrorism law that could open the doors of "unlimited authority" (or wide power) for law enforcers and the security forces (military and police alike), thereby, criticized by human rights activists and legal practitioners, include the following. First, Article 20 stating that anyone can be put in jail up to 15 years if she/he uses violence or violent threat toward investigators, prosecutor, judge, and other law enforcer. Second, Articles 26 and 28 state that an investigator could use an intelligence report as an early evidence to chase, arrest, and sue the terrorist suspects. These articles, according to Todung Mulya Lubis, a noted advocate, lawmaker, and human rights practitioner, are potential for abuse of power, particularly from the country's intelligence body within both Polri and TNI (Lubis 2004).

The heated debate against Densus 88 peaked in 2007 in the wake of so-called "Tragedi Tanah Runtuh," a tragedy in the village of Tanah Runtuh in Poso of Central Sulawesi in which, based on a leaked video, the squad's officers seemed to torture local militants after they surrendered following hours of fire-fighting. Additionally, the unit's members occasionally undertook counter-terrorist operations in retaliation for attacks on local police. Poso is one of trouble and fragile areas in Indonesia

following Christian–Muslim communal violence since Suharto's collapse. Formally, the violence ended with the signing of the Peace Accord (Malino I) in 2001 but since then radical militias of both sides (either ex-combatants or victims of the atrocities) occasionally attacked the opposing group.

Interestingly, even though human rights activists affiliated with Komnas HAM or Imparsial criticized Densus 88's operations that included an oppressive approach, especially in the Poso incident, they were reluctant to recommend abolishing or undertaking robust reform of the squad. A former commissioner of Komnas HAM, M. Imdadun Rahmat, said that the dismissal of Densus 88 would be an error since it might be seen as a victory to the extremists and terrorists. It is the terrorists, not Densus 88, which need to be disbanded actually.[24]

Accordingly, instead of proposing the closure of Densus 88, the human rights activists proposed a recommendation (later the Indonesian Legislature endorsed the proposal) that the unit's operations should be more closely monitored to ensure and guarantee stricter adherence to its regulations of engagement and to human rights, albeit it did not specify who would commence such monitoring (Lamchek 2019: 262–4). As a result, despite its findings of violations, it only led to minor reforms such as reducing the number of the unit's officers and placing all members of the squad under the direction and command of the national (no longer assigned to provincial) police headquarters in Jakarta (known as Mabes Polri or Markas Besar Polri).

Densus 88 and the Decline of Terrorists

Apart from criticism (of alleged human rights abuses) against Densus 88, the number and scale of such violations have declined significantly when compared with those during the New Order regime. In fact, Densus 88 already incorporated human rights and rule of law values in their operations against radicals and terrorists, albeit in some cases it might transgress them or be too quick to use lethal force in violent confrontations against the extremists. Still, Indonesian government's approach to counterterrorism, embodied primarily by Densus 88 and BNPT, with few notable

[24] Conversation with M. Imdadun Rahmat, Jakarta, 2016.

exceptions, was actually much more "humane" than that of other countries (e.g. Yemen, Pakistan, Egypt, and others) that include the use of missiles, military deployment, or airplanes to eradicate terrorists and their nests.

Furthermore, regardless of minor voices, Densus 88's effective and successful attempts at combating terrorists and countering terrorism offer solid evidence that other countries can learn and take lessons from Indonesia's thoughtful choices in establishing their own anti-terrorism and counterterrorism agencies as well as obtaining support from allies where needed. Although hated by Islamist terrorist groups and criticized by human rights activists, Densus 88 officers have proven effective and fruitful at using soft interview techniques to establish relationships and build trust with many of suspected terrorists and militants they have detained. While in prisons, the officers, many of whom Muslims, together with the convicts, prayed or listened to sermons from moderate religious scholars that could lessen terrorists' extremist thoughts. "The biggest challenge is to deal and engage with the ideologues and hardcore terrorists that requires a specific and tactical approach," said Suhardi Alius, an elite member of Polri and former head of BNPT.[25]

The Australian scholar Greg Barton argues that Densus 88 has succeeded in winning over many members of terrorist networks because of using sophisticated psychological methods and the assistance of parents, wives, or family members of the radicals, and backed by Islamic scholars with thorough knowledge in Islam. This nuanced approach is a distinctive strength of Densus 88 and, in tandem with other components of intelligence gathering, has enabled it to disrupt developing terrorist plots with remarkable consistency. Barton has noted that since its inception, Densus 88 officers, thanks to vigorous intelligence work, have arrested over 1,200 terrorist suspects, with most resulting in successful prosecutions. Since 2010 alone, the unit is credited with disrupting more than 80 terrorist plots (Barton 2018).

The Role and Contributions of BNPT

As mentioned earlier, whereas Densus 88 has been responsible for a law-enforcement approach in the combat of terrorism, BNPT is the government's institution for countering terrorism and radicalism through preemptive method. Realizing that terrorism is more varied

[25] Conversation with Suhardi Alius, Jakarta, July 2018.

and complex (concerning terrorist organization, network, recruitment, operation, and so forth), and a law-enforcement approach with security measures through Densus 88 is not enough to combat it, the government thought there is a need to implement another model of counterterrorism by using non-military measures (soft approach) and involving relevant governmental agencies.

As an outcome, in 2009, the government (through its Coordinating Ministry for Politics, Legal and Security) held a meeting with the Parliament (through its "Commission 1") to discuss this issue. The Legislature agreed and responded positively to the proposal. After having consultation with and approval from the Parliament, President SBY issued a regulation (Peraturan Presiden No. 46 Tahun 2010) that gives a mandate to establish BNPT, which was developed from the Coordinating Desk for Eradication of Terrorism (Desk Koordinasi Pemberantasan Terorisme, known as Anti-Terror Desk) in the Coordinating Ministry for Politics, Legal and Security (Menkopolhukam).

The founding of BNPT in 2010, now headed by Boy Rafli Ammar, marked a new phase in the combat of terrorism. Unlike Densus 88, BNPT fully applies a soft approach in counterterrorism efforts. In its official website, it states that the agency emphasizes integrative and comprehensive attempts as well as prioritizes persuasive counterterrorism models by developing relevant initiatives and programs to find "wise" and best solutions of underlying roots of terrorism such as ideology, social, economy, and injustice. In its homepage,[26] BNPT is defined as a non-ministerial government institution (Lembaga Pemerintah Non-Kementerian) that carries out government's tasks in the area of counterterrorism.

In the implementation of its programs, BNPT collaborates and involves governmental and nongovernmental institutions and individuals making it as a leading sector that coordinates with the country's potential components in combating and countering terrorism and other forms of extremism. To promote and socialize its programs to broader society and encourage citizens' participation in counterterrorism endeavor, the agency has established Forum Koordinasi Pencegahan Terorisme (FKPT, the Coordinating Forum for Terrorism Prevention) in many areas of the country. The founding of FKPT also aims at obtaining supports

[26] See https://bnpt.go.id/tupoksi. See also another homepage of BNPT at http://damailahindonesiaku.com/terorisme/sejarah-terorisme.

from public and local governments (*pemerintah daerah*) in attempts of countering terrorism based on local values and wisdoms of each region.

Coordinated under the Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Legal, and Security, BNPT's main tasks, as stated in its homepage, include the following. First, formulating, coordinating, and implementing national policies, strategies, and programs on counterterrorism, especially in those related to alertness, counter-radicalization, and de-radicalization. Second, coordinating inter-law enforcers on counterterrorism. Third, formulating, coordinating, and implementing national policies, strategies, and programs on international cooperation of counterterrorism. Fourth, composing and assigning national policies, strategies, and programs on counterterrorism. Fifth, holding coordination (with relevant departments and agencies) of national policies, strategies, and programs on counterterrorism. The agency's vision is to actualize counterterrorism and counter-radicalism through building synergetic efforts between government and society in relation to prevention, protection, action, and de-radicalization as well as escalating national alertness and international collaboration for the country's security.[27]

According to Hamli,[28] who directed programs on prevention, protection, and de-radicalization at BNPT, the main tasks of this government's counterterrorism agency include such programs as restoration, identification, pre-emption, protection, de-radicalization, rehabilitation, re-education, and reintegration of terrorists into society. In order to make and implement the programs successfully, Hamli said, BNPT has an authority to compose regulations, make policies, arrange strategies, and direct or organize other relevant departments and agencies in the combat of and countering terrorism. The counterterrorism policies and strategies, Hamli pointed out, should be effective, efficient, integrated, measurable, and well-coordinated across relevant agencies and departments in the government that are concerned about countering and preventing terrorism. The counterterrorism policies cover prevention of the spread of radical and terrorist ideologies, groups, and networks.

The first step BNPT applies is identifying terrorists to document and understand the extent of their capacity, experience, involvement, knowledge, and other relevant information and issues, and then classifying and

[27] https://bnpt.go.id/visi-dan-misi.

[28] Online Interview with Hamli, 23–24 July, 2020.

grouping them based on these categories. The aim of such identification and classification, Hamli pointed out, is to offer suitable and best approaches in dealing with offenders as well as to place and distribute the terrorists in prisons based on the same category. In other words, "ordinary terrorists" (e.g. executors) will not have the same prison with "middle" or "high-rank" terrorists such as ideologues, leaders, and linchpins. "It would be dangerous to mix ordinary terrorists with "terrorist elites" in one prison since they have the capacity to influence and radicalize people," said Hamli.

The program initiated by BNPT also includes counter-radicalism through offline and online media tools by spreading Islamic moderation, challenging radical ideas, and providing alternate discourses on religious pacification and tolerance. To achieve this goal, BNPT builds collaboration with moderate Islamic scholars and clerics from various Muslim organizations and educational institutions such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, as well as Islamic universities/institutes, especially State Islamic Universities/Institutes (known as UIN/IAIN). The selected scholars and clerics have engaged in BNPT-supported various counterterrorism programs held inside and outside prison (known in Indonesia as Lapas–Lembaga Pemasyarakatan) in the forms of sermons, discussions, workshops/training, or consultations. Topics introduced include nationality and nationalism (*wawasan kebangsaan*), religious moderation and pluralism (*moderasi, kebhinekaan*), and entrepreneurship (*kewirausahaan*), among others.

Deradicalization and Rehabilitation Programs

The agency also carries out the de-radicalization program inside and outside Lapas for not only suspected terrorists but also their family members (wives, brothers, sisters, and so forth). The inclusion of terrorists' family members in the program to avert the spread of radical ideas and ideologies that might influence them. In fact, some family members (especially wives and brothers/sisters) occasionally support and assist indirectly terrorist activities by providing logistics, communication channels, backing, or encouragement, although others (especially mothers) discourage and condemn terrorism.

Once terrorists have been able to be deradicalized, BNPT involves or encourages them to participate in the de-radicalization program aiming at influencing, inspiring, or encouraging their peers to repent and quit

their terrorist activities. Hamli has noticed that the involvement of the ex-terrorists in the program is often more fruitful. Hundreds of ex-terrorists have actively participated in the program, influencing their (former) peers not to engage in terrorism including Abdurrahman Ayub, Nasir Abbas, Sofyan Tsauri, Ali Fauzi Manzi, Ali Imron, among others.

Moreover, the de-radicalization and rehabilitation programs include giving financial assistance to ex-terrorists and their families to help the tuition of their children or start opening small businesses. In this regard, BNPT has established coordination with relevant governmental departments, businesspersons, or private companies. BNPT also helps ex-terrorists find jobs, including the possibility to work in the government and its agencies as a civil servant that triggered protests among citizens due to the enormous unemployment issue in the country. Previously, Densus 88, BNPT, and Lapas run their own programs of de-radicalization, but since 2018, following the revision of the 2003 anti-terrorism law, they collaborate to handle rehabilitation process of the terrorists.

There are at least seven purposes of the de-radicalization programs as follows. First, to give counsel and forge suspected terrorists in order to leave their radical views, ideas, thoughts, and activities. Second, to share moderate, tolerant, and peaceful religious knowledge, interpretations, and understandings, as well as ideas of the significance of nationalism and pluralism. Third, to provide training on specific skills, expertise, and entrepreneurship. Fourth, to prepare terrorist suspects with mentality and other provisions prior to returning to their societies. Fifth, to advise terrorists' families and society in general to welcome suspected terrorists once they return to society after completing a sentence in prison. Sixth, to empower ex-terrorist prisoners and their family members with helpful social, religious, economic, cultural, and educational resources. Seventh, to give provisions to society not to influence radical views.[29] In the implementation of its programs, BNPT bases primarily on four fundamental principles, namely (1) supervision and counter-propaganda, (2) alertness/awareness or early warning mechanism, (3) repudiation/refutation from radical thoughts and ideology, and (4) protection.

[29] See https://damailahindonesiaku.com/deradikalisasi. Accessed August 7, 2020.

Multiple Agencies of Counterterrorism Programs

Even though BNPT has been officially assigned by the government to carry out de-radicalization, reeducation, and rehabilitation programs, there are other agencies and institutions that conduct such initiatives such as the Ministry of Social Affairs (Kemensos), local governments, educational institutions (formal or informal), and nongovernmental organizations. These include Pondok Pesantren Al-Hikam in Depok of West Java, Pondok Pesantren Al-Hidayah in Deli Serdang of North Sumatra, Kampung Damai, Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian in Lamongan of East Java, Panti Sosial Marsudi Putra Handayani, Yayasan Amanah Poso, and C-SAVE (Civil Society Against Violent Extremism) (Ansari et al. 2019: 28), and Yayasan Putra Persaudaraan Anak Negeri, among others.

Some of these institutions were built or supported by BNPT while others are autonomous. Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian (the Foundation of Peace Circle), for example, in the implementation of its programs were supported by BNPT or Kemensos. This foundation was established by Ali Fauzi, a former member of JI and a bomb maker as well as instructor of Mujahidin in Mindanao of the Philippines. Since released from the prison, Fauzi has been working to help jihadists and terrorists leave terrorism and radicalism as well as to end new recruits from joining the next wave of radical and terrorist groups in Indonesia. He realizes and acknowledges that recruitment (of people to commit terrorist acts and join terrorist groups) is much easier than rehabilitation and de-radicalization of (ex-) terrorists.[30] Through this foundation, Fauzi educates or teaches nonviolent Islam toward wives and children of suspected terrorists or former terrorists.

According to Hamli, up to 2017, the police have arrested around 1.400 terrorist suspects, of which around 800 detainees have been released from prison and the rest are still in jails or awaiting legal process to determine their guilt or unguilt. Hamli also admits that the process of de-radicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration of suspected terrorists into society are uneasy and take time. "The programs have not always been successful," Hamli said. Some ex-terrorists return to their old terrorist networks and violent activities because of several reasons. These include family or societal denial (not all family members of terrorist suspects and societies are willing to accept or welcome (ex-) terrorists),

[30] See https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51907603. Accessed August 9, 2020.

the development of radical religious sermons (offline or online through various social media platforms particularly YouTube), provocation from terrorists' old friends and networks, the influence of social media, as well as violence against Muslim in other countries.

Impediments of Combating Terrorism

Combating and countering terrorism are certainly not an easy task. Indonesia has faced several hindrances on the implementation of effective counterterrorism initiatives. The obstacles can be in the forms of limited regulations, inefficient bureaucracy, inadequate equipment and resources, or unsupportive (some) elite members and factions in the government, parliament, society, or even security forces. It is true that not all Indonesians, including bureaucrats and politicians themselves, agree and support antiradicalism and counterterrorism initiatives.

This is among the reasons why revisions of the 2003 law (UU No. 15/2003 on the Eradication of Terrorist Acts, known as the anti-terrorism law) took longer than expected. In 2018, after more than two years of heated debates and deliberations with pros and cons among legislators, government officials, security forces (military and police), human rights activists, organizational and religious leaders, and the publics, the House of Representatives finally approved revisions of the 2003 law.

Publics argued that the revision took longer because some elite members in the revision team or leadership of the parliament came from Islamist and anti-government political parties. However, the majority of the high-rank government officials, the security forces, and publics thought that the 2003 anti-terrorism law needed to be revised because of some weaknesses such as inability to capture or proceed committers of hate speech, provocateurs of enmity and hatred, or jihadist returnees from the battlefields in overseas. As well, the need to revise the law because of the growth of new extremist groups in the country such as those linked to ISIL as well as the increasing threat of global radicalization and terrorism. The revision is also significant to prevent the hazard posed by Indonesian returnees after engaging in battlegrounds and violent acts with foreign terrorists in Iraq, Syria or the Philippines.

A specialist of terrorism studies, Bilveer Singh (2016), said that although the government has done a marvelous job in combating terrorism and reinforcing the legal framework to overcome terrorist menace since 2002, following the Bai blasts, the law enforcement regime

is still fragile and weak. It is therefore logical if some elements of the country pressed the parliament to revise the 2003 anti-terrorism law. Singh said, "Indonesia would be in a much stronger position to deal with national and international terrorism if its anti-terrorism laws had stronger teeth.

The aim is to give the Indonesian police and its anti-terrorist apparatus powers to act before terrorist violence had taken place rather than after" (Singh 2016: 1). Singh also argues that the anti-terrorism laws need to be fortified and strengthened with preemptive powers such as those practiced in Singapore and Malaysia. The public pressure to revise the law itself has gained momentum following the terrorist attacks in Jakarta in 2016 (known as Bom Thamrin or Bom Sarinah, see Chapter 5). The attacks, allegedly committed by cheerleaders of ISIL, were the first since the 2009 bombings of the Ritz Carlton and Marriott hotels in Jakarta and were also President Joko Widodo's first experience of a terror attack since he took office in 2014.

The New Law and Regulation on Combating Terrorism and Radicalism

The revised and approved law gives new ammunitions for the authorities to tackle the peril of terrorism and radicalism. The new law includes some important points[31] including "preventive measures" such as inclusions of terrorist actions and threats that cover terrorist motives and objectives related to ideology (i.e. to replace the state ideology of Pancasila), politics (e.g. to topple the government), and security disruption (e.g. create chaos), as well as "verbal violence" (e.g. hate speech). Previously, the 2003 law only included "action" as a punishable act excluding motives and verbal violence.

The new law also provides a legal basis to charge Indonesians who joined—or made an affiliation with–ISIL terrorist organization returning to their home country. Under the new law, the state authorities could also detain temporarily (up to three weeks) without charge of the terrorist returnees (from joining terrorist groups in Syria, Iraq, or the Philippines' Mindanao) and hold them up to 200 days after they are officially

[31] Some important new changes in the revised law can be seen at https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/isi-lengkap-uu-antiterorisme/full. Accessed August 8, 2020.

charged with terrorism. In 2015, BNPT recorded around 500 Indonesians in Syria, albeit it was unclear whether they joined ISIL. In 2016, Polri claimed around 200 Indonesians joined ISIL in Syria. Furthermore, in 2017, Densus 88 recorded around 671 Indonesians joined ISIL in Syria and Iraq comprising 524 males and 147 females. Of these, around 43 returned to Indonesia (Ansari et al. 2019: 29).

Moreover, the revised law has granted TNI a greater role in combating terrorism. To make the military's role in counterterrorism stronger, the Indonesian government is drafting a presidential rule (Peraturan Presiden or Perpres) on the military involvement in counterterrorism and terrorism eradication, as mandated by UU No. 5 / 2018.[32] TNI itself has re-activated Koopsusgab, a joint special operations command of antiterrorism and counterterrorism whose membership came from the Army, Navy, and Air Forces. Yet, it remains unclear whether this counterterrorism military squad succeeds in handling or tackling terrorist threat and how this unit coordinates with Densus 88 in the combat of terrorism.

What is obvious is that the post-New Order governments, especially since presidents Megawati Sukarnoputri, SBY, and Joko Widodo, have improved significantly counterterrorism and antiradicalism policies, approaches, strategies, and tactics by strengthening legal foundations, law-enforcement, capacity building, skills, and expertise, as well as hard and soft models in the combat and counterterrorism and other forms extremism. This story certainly contrasts with previous eras of the New Order or the Old Order governments.

Concluding Remarks

Based on the depiction sketched earlier, few conclusions can be drawn as follows. Concerning counterterrorism issues, there are some similarities and differences between the Old Order (under Sukarno, r. 1945–1966), the New Order (under Suharto, r. 1967–1998), and the governments in the *Reformasi* Era (from 1998 onwards).

The similarities include the use of both hard and soft approaches in the combat of terrorism, albeit the scope and extent of counterterrorism models, policies, strategies, and practices differ significantly from

[32] https://nasional.okezone.com/read/2020/07/29/337/2254121/pemerintah-kebut-perpres-pelibatan-tni-dalam-penanggulangan-terorisme?page=1. Accessed September 18, 2020.

one another. Both the Old Order and the New Order governments put much emphasis on the military-typed hard counterterrorism approach such as coercion and repression of the radicals or destruction of the militant bases. Whereas the Old Order typically used "open war," the New Order employed "silent war" (e.g. via intelligence operations) against the convicts with some notable exceptions (e.g. the Tanjung Priok case).

Although limited, the two regimes also implemented non-military soft counterterrorism techniques such as transmigration, rehabilitation, or co-optation of the terrorist suspects. Moreover, the counterterrorism law is extremely limited. The governments of the Old Order and the New Order only relied on the 1963 anti-subversion law to crack down the terrorists or potential terrorists and militants. This law was composed following the Cikini bombing tragedy in 1962 that targeted President Sukarno. Initially, the law was made as a legal basis to fight against separatist and rebellious movements (e.g. DI/TII) that utilized some violent forms of terrorism but later it was used to ambush any radical (or potential radical) groups and individuals as well as anti-government factions. Additionally, there was no specific counterterrorism agency at that time. The military (and the intelligence body) were mainly responsible for combating terror.

The governments in the *Reformasi* Era (post-New Order), following the 2002 Bali blasts, have developed a counterterrorism approach vigorously—both hard and soft methods—particularly since President Megawati Sukarnoputri. The governments assigned the hard method (or law-enforcement approach) primarily to Densus 88, Polri's elite counterterrorism squad, even though Indonesia's Armed Forces or TNI (the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Special Force) and the intelligence body (BIN) have also had specific counterterrorism units. Since its inception in 2003, Densus 88 has an impressive record in hunting down culprits resulting in killing or capture of thousands of suspected terrorists. The governments and the parliament have also issued a number of anti-terrorism and counterterrorism laws as a legal foundation for fighting, countering and preventing terrorism.

The soft non-military approach, furthermore, was assigned mainly to BNPT, although some governmental departments (e.g. the Ministry of Social Affairs) have programs or initiatives relevant for this approach (e.g. those related to rehabilitation and de-radicalization of the offenders). As for the soft approach, BNPT has initiated and advanced various creative programs ranging from disengagement and de-radicalization to rehabilitation and reintegration of terrorist suspects (known in Indonesia as

"napiter"—*nara pidana terorisme*) into society. In the implementation of the programs, BNPT has involved, directed, and coordinated with other relevant and concerned departments and agencies in both government and society. The programs have resulted in hundreds of disengaged and deradicalized terrorists who, in turn, help BNPT (and the government) rehabilitate and de-radicalize other terrorists who still hold radical views and ideology.

Notwithstanding with a robust counterterrorism initiative, some scholars and activists have criticized the government for not fully respect human rights of the terrorists because of using oppressive military measures through Densus 88 in particular in the combat of radicalism and terrorism. Others criticized the government for giving too much power for the police, military, and intelligence bodies in the existing counterterrorism laws. However, others criticized the counterterrorism laws because of "too weak" contrast with those of Singapore or Malaysia. Still, others disparage BNPT for not having a long-term measure and perspective in the implementation of its counterterrorism programs.

Nonetheless, apart from criticism and weaknesses, the post-New Order government has made effective and applicable choices in formulating and implementing its counterterrorism approach and strategy. Formulating and implementing appropriate counterterrorism models in Indonesia are not an easy task mainly because the country embraces democratic systems and mechanisms that allow and esteem multiple voices including those of radicals. This condition certainly differs from Saudi Arabia, Singapore, or Malaysia, which do not embrace or follow a full democratic system. This means that the impediment and challenge in formulating counterterrorism and anti-terrorism models, policies, and strategies in Indonesia are much more complicated than those of non-democratic countries.

However, the evidence shows that the Indonesian government could manage terrorism issues quite nicely indicated by the decline of terrorist groups and acts. This might prove that Indonesia's democracy can be a force for good against terrorists and radical ideology. As some other countries and international communities have struggled to solve (wisely) the problem of religion-inspired terrorism and extremism, Indonesia can be a good paragon the world can learn lessons about how to defeat terrorists on one hand and build democracy on the other.

References

Ansari, Muhammad Hassan, et.al. 2019. *Memberantas Terorisme di Indonesia: Praktik, Kebijakan dan Tantangan*. Jakarta: The Habibie Center.

Barton, Greg. 2018. "How Indonesia's Counter-terrorism Force Has Become a Model for the Region." *The Conversation*, July 2. https://theconversation.com/how-indonesias-counter-terrorism-force-has-become-a-model-for-the-region-97368. Accessed August 3, 2020.

Boucek, Christopher. 2008a. "Counter-Terrorism from Within: Assessing Saudi Arabia's Religious Rehabilitation and Disengagement Programme. *The RUSI Journal* 153 (6): 60-5.

———. 2008b. "Saudi Arabia's Soft Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare." Carnegie Papers, No. 97, September. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC.

Budiardjo, Miriam. 1972. *Dasar-Dasar Ilmu Politik*. Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama.

Caruso, Phil. 2018. "Indonesia and Terrorism: Success, Failure and Uncertain Future." *Middle East-Asia Project*. https://www.mei.edu/publications/indonesia-and-terrorism-success-failure-and-uncertain-future#_ftn2. Accessed August 6, 2020.

Colombijn, Freek, and J. Thomas Lindblad (eds.). 2002. *Roots of Violence in Indonesia*. Leiden: KITLV Press.

Conboy, Ken. 2009. *The Second Front: Inside Jemaah Islamiyah, Asia's Most Dangerous Terrorist Network*. Sheffield, UK: Equinox Publishing.

Cortright, David and George Lopez. 2007. *Uniting Against Terror: Cooperative Nonmilitary Responses to the Global Terrorist Threat*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Coyne, John. 2017. "The Future of the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation." *The Strategist*, February 21. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/future-jakarta-centre-law-enforcement-cooperation/. Accessed August 4, 2020.

Dahlby, Tracy. 2005. *Allah's Torch: A Report from Behind the Scenes in Asia's War on Terror*, New York: Harper Perennial.

Friedman, Uri. 2016. "How Indonesia Beat Back Terrorism—For Now." *The Atlantic*, September 25. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/09/indonesia-isis-islamic-terrorism/500951/. Accessed August 6, 2020.

Gunaratna, Rohan. 2017. "Strategic Counter-Terrorism: A Game Changer in Fighting Terrorism?" *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 9 (6): 1–5.

———, Jolene Jerard, and Lawrence Rubin, eds. 2011. *Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalization*. London, UK: Routledge.

Hardjono, J. 1988. "The Indonesian Transmigration Program in Historical Perspective." *International Migration* 26 (4): 427-39.

Jones, Sidney. 2005. "The Changing Face of Terrorism in Indonesia: Weaker, More Diffuse and Still a Threat." Proceedings of the ASPI Conference. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Barton, Australia.

Kunkler, Mirjam and Alfred Stepan. 2013. *Democracy and Islam in Indonesia*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Lamchek, Joyson S. 2019. *Human Rights-Compliant Counterterrorism: Myth-making and Reality in the Philippines and Indonesia*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Lubis, Todung Mulya. 2004. "Pasal-Pasal Rawan dalam Undang-Undang No. 15 & 16 tahun 2003." *Tempo*, August 29, p. 4.

Maarif, Ahmad Syafii. 1996. *Islam dan Politik: Teori Belah Bambu Masa Demokrasi Terpimpin, 1959–1965*. Jakarta: Gema Insani Press.

MacAndrews, Colin. 1978. "Transmigration in Indonesia: Prospects and Problems." *Asian Survey* 18 (5):458-472.

Menchik, Jeremy. 2016. *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mujani, Mujani and R. William Liddle. 2009. "Muslim Indonesia's Secular Democracy." *Asian Survey,* 49 (4): 575-590.

Parameswaran, Prashanth. 2015. "The Trouble with Indonesia's New Counterterrorism Command." *The Diplomat*, June 11. https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-trouble-with-indonesias-new-counterterrorism-command/. Accessed August 7, 2020.

Ricklefs, M. C. 2008. *A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200*. Stanford, CA; Stanford University Press.

Robison, Richard and Vedi R Hadiz. 2004. *Reorganizing Power in Indonesia: the Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets*. London: Routledge.

Rudolph, Rachael. 2018. *Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia: New Approaches to Radical Threats*. London, UK: I.B. Tauris.

Sebastian, Leonard C. 2005. *Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia's Use of Military Force*. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.

———. 2003. "The Indonesian Dilemma: How to Participate in the War on Terror Without Becoming a National Security State." In *After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, edited by Kumar Ramakhrisna and See Seng Tan, 357–382. Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies.

Sidel, John. 2006. *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Singh, Bilveer. 2016. "Revising Indonesia's Anti-Terrorism Laws." *RSIS Commentary* No. 057: 1-3.

Solahudin. 2013. The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jema'ah Islamiyah. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Tim Imparsial. 2003. *RUU Anti Terorisme: Antara Kebebasan dan Keamanan Rakyat*. Jakarta: Imparsial.

———. 2004. *Catatan HAM 2004: Keamanan Mengalahkan Kebebasan*. Jakarta: Imparsial.

Wahid, Abdurrahman. 2006. *Islamku Islam Anda Islam Kita: Agama Masyarakat Negara Demokrasi*. Jakarta: The Wahid Institute.

CHAPTER 7

Indonesian Society on Terrorism and Counterterrorism

> Terrorism was born in contemporary Indonesia because some people have chosen a shortcut to retaliate presumed infidel oppressors, terminate alleged socio-political injustice, as well as become a martyr and a resident of Heaven in the next world. This happened mainly because of their unpreparedness in grappling a new complex, challenging world that, in turn, resulted in anxiety, fear, hate, and insecurity. Terrorism, hence, is the product of the losers.[1]
>
> —Komaruddin Hidayat, Rector of International Islamic University of Indonesia

Like Saudi society's responses to terrorism and counterterrorism described earlier (see Chapter 4), Indonesians' opinions to these issues also vary considerably. The variation does not only take place among non-radical groups. Among the militant Islamist groups, they have also different views and ideas about definition, interpretation, motives, underlying factors, and justification of terrorism. Some agree with violent acts as a medium of Islamic proliferation (*da'wa*) in the society while others disagree with direct physical violence. Still, some agree and legalize the use of bombing as a tool of jihadism while others disagree and delegalize it, preferring other vehicles and violent forms in the jihad action. It is true that while rejecting and condemning terrorist bombing, some

[1] Online chat with Komaruddin Hidayat, August 2020.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022

S. Al Qurtuby, *Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1337-2_7

radical factions undertake and justify other forms of violence such as vigilantism—i.e. the private, violent enforcement of public moral or legal standards or the act of enacting perceived justice immediately without legal authority[2] (Kowalewski 2003: 339–49; Sidel 2006). Whereas some Indonesians—individuals or groupings—have committed terrorism and other types of violence and extremism (see Chapter 5), the majority of Indonesians (like Saudis) certainly denounce them since they could bring the country and society into despair. Nevertheless, their opinions also differ from one another concerning factors contributed to terrorism and fruitful ways to counter it.

This chapter sketches and analyzes pros and cons of notions of Indonesian societies regarding (1) terrorist acts that happened in their country and (2) best or appropriate approaches to counterterrorism. The purpose of this chapter is to understand Indonesians' views that might offer different assessments and perspectives from those of the government, state authorities, and relevant agencies (e.g. BNPT or Densus 88) in the combat of—and approach to—terrorism (see Chapter 6). Accordingly, their opinions might be advantageous as resources for combating terrorism, making pertinent policies on counterterrorism, as well as transforming terrorists and radical groupings into nonviolent peaceful individuals and groups.

The chapter is based on my virtual interviews (e.g. through Zoom and other platforms), online chats (e.g. via WhatsApp or Messenger), public responses of my Facebook posts, and email correspondence to over one hundred Indonesian informants of multiple religious, educational, and professional backgrounds. The informants (male and female, Muslim and non-Muslim alike) include academic, bureaucrat, politician, activist, journalist, entrepreneur, practitioner, religious scholar, clerics, and community leader, among others. The majority of the informants are between 20 and 50-year-old (like those of Saudi society). As well, the informants whom I interviewed (as well as the survey respondents) never involved in terrorist activities. However, I occasionally quoted views of terrorists or former terrorist suspects, derived from their work such as *Aku Melawan Teroris* (*I Am Against Terrorist*) by Imam Samudra and *Ali Imron Sang*

[2] Indeed, since the past centuries, Indonesia is home to a number of vigilante groups (including Islamist vigilantes and street hoodlums), namely a self-appointed group of Indonesians who committed vigilantism including, among others, riots, tortures, persecution, maltreatment, and expulsion, against specific individuals or communities they deemed deviant or erroneous (Sidel 2006).

Pengebom (*Ali Imron: the Bomber*) by Ali Imron, both were the 2002 Bali bombers, as well as Solahudin's (2013) and Hwang's (2018) books. The latter two books comprise direct quotations from either active terrorists or disengaged/deradicalized terrorists and jihadists.

In addition, I cited some opinions from Facebook users who responded to my Facebook post on June 12–14, 2020. In the post, I wrote a brief note as follows: "I am completing a book manuscript on terrorism and counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, and for this purpose, I request responses from Indonesians–home and abroad—on terrorism and effective ways of overcoming terrorism in Indonesia. I would very much appreciate it if you could respond positively to my request." Around 340 Facebook users responded directly to my post, while some responded through Messenger's inbox. I then selected and quoted some useful and relevant comments in this chapter. I also asked Facebook users to be volunteers to respond to my research questions through an email that they responded enthusiastically. I then selected around 60 Facebook users (based on their brief biographical sketch) that I plan to send questions through email correspondence. Of 60 people, 58 responded to my emails.

The questions to informants and respondents are very basic such as the following: What is your opinion about terrorism? What are the main factors that contributed to terrorism in Indonesia? Is there connection between terrorism and religion? What is the best way to counter terrorism and prevent it from occurring in future? Are the Indonesian government's counterterrorism policies sufficient to overcome terrorist threats? What do you suggest to the government and relevant agencies such as BNPT concerning strategies and approaches to combat terrorism and radicalism?

Due to limited space, this chapter does not include all ideas, arguments, and opinions of the informants related to terrorism and counterterrorism, selecting only those considered fruitful, thoughtful, and convincing. I used a pseudonym for informants who are unwilling to mention their real names. This chapter ends with my brief comments and analyses on their opinions.

Indonesian Society's Responses to Terrorism: Religious and Non-religious Factors

Terrorism—its scope, networks, actors, root causes, and implications—is certainly a complex phenomenon that cannot be understood under a single framework. The complexity and density of terrorism are reflected

Table 7.1 A brief summary of Indonesian opinions on the roots of terrorism

Religious factors	*Non-religious factors*
• Terrorism is a form of religious confrontation or theological resistance against critical, liberal, and secular voices coming from external and internal forces including Westernization, modernization, secularism, liberalism, globalization, Western control over Muslim world, and others • Terrorism is a sort of "Islamo-fascism"—using Islam (religious sentiment) as a medium to dominate and rule societies through violent acts • The product of superficial understanding and monolithic viewpoint on Islamic teachings, discourses and narratives • The outcome of narrow-minded perspectives, compulsive over-interpretations, and excessive understandings of religious texts and doctrines • Lack of understanding of the essence of religion • Religious misunderstandings and misuse • Religious fanaticism, radicalism, and intolerance • Religious ignorance or lack of religious knowledge • Religious indoctrination through various institutions (schools, organizations) and forums • The fruits of textual, literal, rigid, and excessive understandings of Islam • The absence of intellection on reading and interpreting religious (Islamic) scriptures • Terrorism is the fruit of the spread of foreign/Middle Eastern-funded mosques and Islamic centers that are used to preach fanatical religious sermons	• Social disengagement (anti-social life) on the part of terrorists • The outcome of majoritarianism (i.e. feeling and claiming to be the majority that have the rights to determine the direction of the country and society in future) • The product of the country's lengthy local history of terrorism and radicalism since the Dutch colonial time • Terrorism has been programed and designed in humans' DNA (and blood type) —as a "human's book of life"—of future radicals and terrorists before they were born • Terrorism is deeply rooted in terrorists' economic difficulty and mental-psychological factors • Terrorism is the tip of the iceberg—the fruit of long-lasting discrimination, hate, and disrespect toward humans • A social product, namely the outcome of cultural, economic, and political unfairness • A global conspiracy of the powerful invisible hands that have controlled the world's economy and politics • Indonesia's terrorism as the outcome, side effect, or contagion of transnational or international terrorism and extremism • Retaliation of unpleasant historical past • Ideological competition (e.g. between Islamism versus secularism, nationalism, capitalism, or communism) • Having a feeling of insecurity • Victims of propaganda and brainwashing • The results of unhealthy environments and communities infected by radicalism, intolerance, and bigotry • The product of Muslim's unreadiness and unpreparedness in dealing with many problems and difficulties facing Muslim societies as well as in coping with modernity and a new complex global world. In other words, terrorism is the fruits of the losers

in outlooks of Indonesians described in the following paragraphs (see a brief summary of their opinions on the roots of terrorism at Table 7.1).

Terrorists as Actor and Victim

Let me begin with the viewpoints of Ida Rsi Wisesanatha, a Balinese religious leader and Hindu High Priest. According to Wisesanatha, Indonesia's terrorism is like the tip of the iceberg—the fruit of people's long-lasting views and acts that full with hate and discrimination.[3] It is also the product of people's lack of respect toward others and inhuman behavior that maltreated other people considering them as deviant, erroneous, or infidel, which do not deserve to be respected. "They deserve to be killed and their bloods are lawful (*halal*)" are the common words or phrase terrorists (or militants more generally, in Indonesia and other countries) said toward people whom they dubbed or accused as unbeliever and abhorrent.

Such bad character and manner, Wisesanatha said, were implanted, influenced, and preserved by powerful authorities (including "invisible hands"), both formal and informal leaders, which brainwashed, provoked and agitated people that later became radicals and terrorists. In this case, for Wisesanatha, terrorists are both perpetrators and victims or object and subject at the same time. A Spiritual Master of the Forum Studi Majapahit through which he has guided many of his disciples to serve people, restore the spirit of Dharma,[4] and help find ways of enlightenment, Wisesanatha said that the brainwashers, provocateurs, and agitators can be motivated by religious or political orientations, or controlled by more powerful and influential actors and agencies.

Terrorism as a Social Product and Global Trend

Sudhamek, a noted Buddhist leader and a member of the Advisory Council of the government's Badan Pembinaan Idiologi Pancasila (Agency for the Development of Pancasila Ideology), underlines terrorism as a social product and a common social problem of transnational

[3] Online chat with Ida Rsi Wisesanatha, August 2020.

[4] The Sanskrit "dharma" or Pali "dhamma" is a key religious concept with multiple meanings in native Indian religions (i.e. Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism). In Hinduism, the concept is a religious and moral law that governs individual conduct. In Buddhism, dharma is the universal truth common to all individuals at all times. In Jainism, dharma is a moral virtue or an eternal substance. See https://www.britannica.com/topic/dharma-religious-concept. Accessed August 16, 2020.

countries and societies across the world. Since terrorism has become a shared problem of multiple countries, it also becomes responsibility of many countries to overcome and prevent it from recurring in future. Whether terrorism as a product of global conspiracy or of a genuine local phenomenon, Sudhamek said, it has become obvious that the presence of social injustice as well as religious fanaticism, radicalism, and intolerance have been the seeds for the growth of terrorism.[5]

Views of terrorism as a global trend are also given by KGPH Dipokusumo, a civic leader and a prince from the Keraton Surakarta Hadiningrat, a palace in Central Java. He stated that Indonesia's terrorism is not a local but a global phenomenon instead involving multiple interests of multiple societies, communities and countries. Dipokusumo provides an example of the phenomena of global terrorism in the country by referring to such infamous groups as Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) that built connection with al-Qaeda and other local Islamist groups that vowed allegiance with ISIL. For Dipokusumo, terrorism, by using violence and threat that frighten society, is only a medium to achieve those interests and purposes such as transforming Indonesia to become an Islamic state in accordance with terrorists' views and beliefs so that they could control human and economic resources and implement a complete system of national ideology, politics, economy, socio-culture, defense, and security. Moreover, factors contributing to terrorism can be socio-political-economic injustice, vengeance of unpleasant historical past, or a belief that terrorist activities can be an entry ticket to Heaven.[6]

Ahmad Suaedy, dean of the Graduate School at Jakarta's Universitas Nahdlatul Ulama Indonesia, also admitted the global or international nature of Indonesia's local terrorism, stating that the domestic terrorism in the country is only a part of global phenomena and a side effect or "contagion" of international or transnational terrorism. A member of Ombudsman[7] of the Republic of Indonesia, Suaedy, gave an example of the perpetrators of the Bali bombings in which most of them were alumna of jihad trainings in Afghanistan's camps and some were veterans

[5] Online conversation with Sudhamek, August 2020.

[6] Online conversation with KGPH Dipokusumo, August 2020.

[7] Ombudsman is a government-appointed official to investigate citizens' complaints against businesses, financial institutions, government departments, and other public entities, and then try to resolve the complaints, by either mediation or making recommendations.

of the Afghan War during the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan since early 1980s. Suaedy has also noticed that regional conflicts in Southeast Asia such as Mindanao of the southern Philippines and the Pattani region in the far south of Thailand also influenced the rise of terrorism in Indonesia. Certainly, there are some local factors contributing to terrorism such as economic shortage but for him the global trends of the domestic terrorism seem to be more dominant.[8]

Indonesia's Dometic Terrorism as a Local Phenomena

Unlike Dipokusumo and Suaedy that emphasize a global phenomenon of local terrorism, Y. W. Junardy, a businessperson and President of Indonesia Global Compact Network, outlines Indonesia's domestic terrorism from a historical perspective within the country.[9] He pointed out that terrorism phenomenon is not new to Indonesia, tracing back its roots to the Dutch colonial time before the country was born in 1945. Junardy classifies terrorist acts in the form of, not only bombing but also other types of violence such as killing, shooting, coercion, and kidnapping among others. Various mass killings by the Dutch colonizer (e.g. massacres by infamous brutal officer Raymond Westerling) and Dutch cruelties during the Cultivation System[10] (*Cultuurstelsel* or *Tanam Paksa*) in the mid-nineteenth century, Junardy said, were part of acts of terror. According to Junardy, terrorism also took place during the Old Order and the New Order rulers, committed by either state apparatus or nongovernmental groups and agencies, for example, brutalities against presumed adversaries and "intruders" of the country's stability, security and sovereignty such as political activists, insurgents, radicals, or thugs (see Chapter 5).

[8] Online conversation with Ahmad Suaedy, August 2020.

[9] Online conversation with Y. W. Junardy, August 2020.

[10] The *Cultuustelsel* or the Cultivation System (Indonesian: *Tanam Paksa* literally means "Enforcement Planting") was a Dutch government policy, implemented since the 1830s onwards in Indonesia (formerly, Dutch East Indies or Indies) under the direction of General Governor Johannes van den Bosch. The system required all villages in the Indies to provide at least 20% of their land to be planted as an export commodity such as coffee or sugar cane (for Dutch's benefits). Villagers who did not have land were obliged to work in Dutch plantations.

Junardy, furthermore, said that in the Reformasi Era, following Suharto's collapse in 1998, intolerant extremist groups that usually carried out terrorism, using religion as a "mask" to justify their violent acts and conceal their non-religious motives. On behalf of religion or purification of religion, terrorists labeled other followers of religions and local beliefs, including Muslims having different understandings and practices from them, as aberrant; thereby, deserved to be terminated and murdered. Whatever types of terrorist acts, Junardy argued, terrorism is essentially a political movement aiming at overthrowing NKRI (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia or the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia), replacing the state's ideology and forms of government with those of terrorists (e.g. Islamic state or Caliphate system), and destroying the country's harmony and plurality. To achieve these goals, they committed various acts of terror and violence.

Multiple Underliying Factors of Indonesian Terrorism

A detailed overview of contributing factors to terrorism was provided by Siti Darojatul Aliah, a researcher of terrorism and the founder of Society against Radicalism and Violent Extremism Indonesia (abbreviated SeRVE Indonesia).[11] While recognizing the plural and complex motivations of people joining terrorism, she underlines five common driving factors (and rationales) that contributed to terrorism in Indonesia as follows.

- Ideological reasons meaning that terrorists assumed and believed that (1) Islam and Muslims worldwide have been an object of coercion, tyranny, and subjugation of infidel rulers and powers (of both natives and foreigners) and (2) Indonesia is governed by "*taghut*"—a Godless tyrannical power—not by sharia law and Islamic principles.
- Political reasons (e.g. terrorists felt as causalities of discrimination and oppression of Suharto's New Order and post-New Order governments).
- Cultural and religious reasons (e.g. Indonesians practice deviant un-Islamic or irreligious traditions, customs, and cultures).

[11] Email correspondence with Siti Darojatul Aliah, June 2020.

- Psychological reasons (e.g. feeling guilty, being sinners, depressed, isolated, and seeking identity, among others).
- Economic reasons (e.g. unemployment, poverty, social gap, economic injustice, among others).

Accumulations of these factors, Aliah said, had driven and led some people to become terrorists and commit violent acts aiming at the following: (1) liberate Muslims from infidel's domination and tyrant's suppression (ideological objective); (2) establish an assumed idealized Islamic state or sharia-based government (political objective); (3) purify Islam and Muslim societies from irreligious (un-Islamic) cultural practices (cultural and religious objective); (4) release from psychological problems and burdens (psychological objective); and (4) achieve economic welfare and justice (economic objective).

Terrorism as an "Islamofacism"

An interesting opinion of Indonesia's terrorism is specified by Ade Muhammad, an expert member of the Nasional Democrat political party (known as Partai Nasdem, led by a noted media baron Surya Paloh). Muhammad bears a resemblance of Indonesia's (Islamist) terrorism to Europe's fascism. In particular, he pointed out that terrorism is a sort of "Islamofascism" or Islam-based fascism.[12] Derived from the Italian word "*fascio*" (pl. "*fasci*") meaning "bundle" (i.e. the "bundle of people"), fascism came to prominence in the early twentieth century. It refers to a political philosophy, ideology, or mass movement usually typified by despotism, ultra-nationalism, and often racism. According to Muhammad, the difference between fascists and terrorists lies in the basis and objective but their essence is in reality the same.

Muhammad underlines the similarities and differences between fascism (and fascists) and terrorism (and terrorists). The similarities of the two include having the same character of inferiority complex. The two groups also use violence and terror to achieve their main goals—the hegemony of power, either by democratic or autocratic way. Whatever the path they used, once they grasp the power, they would rule it through a despotic way. Fascism is a political and ideological tool fascists used to establish a dictatorial power such as in Italy under Benito Mussolini (1883–1945)

[12] Email correspondence with Ade Muhammad, June, 2020.

and Germany under Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) that can be used to suppress their rivals and control society. Similarly, (Islamist) terrorism, for Muhammad, is also a medium to acquire an absolute political power that can be utilized to rule society in accordance with Islamist terrorists' political agenda as well as their rigid understandings and interpretations of Islam, along with its fundamental doctrines and texts.

Although having the same goal and tool, foundations of fascism and (Islamist) terrorism differ from one another. While fascism is based on secular/non-religious ideas (say, secularism) (Islamist) terrorism is rooted in Islamist religious notions (say, Islamism). Fascism, moreover, used racial sentiments to mobilize masses (e.g. German Nazism used a slogan "*Deutschland uber alles*" or Germany above all), terrorism employed religious sentiments (e.g. al-Qaeda used a jargon of Islamic purification) to convince people (Muslims in particular) in order to support their goals, missions and propaganda. Muhammad also gave examples of Nazi Party in Germany (which was part of fascist groups) and Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) in Indonesia in which the two exploited masses, provoked hatred, and incited public sentiments as a ladder to gain a political power. While the Nazi Party was based on the ideology and practice of Nazism (National Socialism), the basis of PKS is Islamism (a political ideology that strives to derive legitimacy from Islam).

A specialist in defense studies and a former expert staff of various senators and legislators, Muhammad, furthermore underscores common features of people involved in terrorist activities. These characteristics include lack of religious (Islamic) knowledge, feeling of insecurity, victims of propaganda and brainwashing, product of "infected milieus" (with religious militancy), and seeking a homogenous community (i.e. a community having similar thoughts and practices with them). Muhammad, likewise, consider terrorism as a process starting from intolerance and radicalization. Terrorism, hence, is a final product—or the tip of the iceberg, to borrow Wisesanatha's views described earlier—of a process of intolerance, fanaticism, and radicalism.

Terrorism as a Form of People's Movement

Another informant, Ira Indrawardana, an academic at the Padjadjaran University in West Java, has different opinion about the phenomena of terrorism in Indonesia.[13] For him, terrorism is a kind of mass or people's

[13] Online conversation with Ira Indrawardana, August, 2020.

movement typically covered by political religious orientations aiming at (1) subverting the country's national stability, security, and sovereignty and (2) substituting the Indonesian state ideology with that of terrorists. A follower of a local belief, Adat Karuhun Sunda Wiwitan (Agama Djawa Sunda), Indrawardana provides an explanation of why religion becomes a significant contributing factor for the birth and growth of terrorism.

Religion, he said, is a main foundation for people's behavior in their daily life; thereby, it is much easier to influence people who have a lack of religious knowledge through the medium of religion. This is to say, Indrawardana reaffirms, terrorism will be much easier to effect and develop among societies with religious ignorance but having ultra-fanaticism (religious fanatics). However, religion is not only a tool but also an end to terrorist acts. In other words, terrorists used religion, on one hand, as a vehicle to achieve their objectives but also the objective itself (e.g. the establishment of a government or state based on terrorists' religious understandings).

Terrorism as the Product of Superficial Understandings of Religion (Islam)

The emphasis on religion as the underlying factor for the rise of terrorism in present-day Indonesia was also expressed by Ida Widyastuti, a spiritualist and head of Nusantara Kita Foundation, stating that terrorism is the fruit of superficial understandings of religious doctrines and teachings. Terrorists (or religious radicals in general), for her, are a group of people that only understand the surface (outer) of religion not its inner fundamental essence, namely humanity. Why are terrorists willing to kill innocent people despite the fact that they claimed to be devout believers? This is because, Widyastuti argued, terrorists, basically, are "inhuman human," a product of failure in understanding the spirit or the soul of religion.

More or less similar with Widyastuti's views, Akhmad Basuni, a specialist of Islamic studies, pointed out three essential factors contributing to Indonesia's terrorism. First, indoctrination in religious (Islamic) schooling considers non-Islamic faiths as false and aberrant religions and labels their followers (non-Muslims) as infidel. Second, literal or textual understanding of Islamic scriptures (i.e. the Qur'an and Hadith) without trying to understand the socio-historical contexts of the

texts. Third, shallowness in understanding the complexity and plurality of Islamic doctrines, discourses, texts, and practices.[14]

Basuni's overview is similar to that of John Titaley, Berkeley's Graduate Theological Union-trained theologian and an emeritus professor at the Universitas Kristen Indonesia Maluku (the Maluku Indonesia Christian University) in Ambon. Titaley argued that terrorism is the fruit of narrow-minded perspectives, compulsive over-interpretation, and excessive understandings of religious texts, teachings, and doctrines. Titaley wrote, "Any religious adherent, including Christians, can become militant and terrorist if they have embraced and held such viewpoints, interpretations and understandings."[15]

Terrorism as the Fruit of Socio-Political Injustice

Komaruddin Hidayat, Rector of International Islamic University of Indonesia, did not reckon religion as the main root of terrorism in Indonesia. Hidayat said, "The main root and foremost factor of terrorism in Indonesia is social and political injustice."[16] Some secondary complementary factors contributing to terrorism, according to Hidayat, include people's unreadiness and unpreparedness in grappling a new world that is becoming more complex, global, plural, and capitalistic, making them feel insecure, terrified, and hatred. Because of feeling insecurity, fear, and abhorrence, some people tried to make or build a shelter as an ideological home—an adobe for a specific ethnic or religious group. Hate and feeling defeated in the contest over—and struggle for—politics, economy, and others, Hidayat said, could harden, intensify and radicalize some people who, in turn, become terrorists. Terrorism, hence, is the fruit of the losers.

A noted Muslim scholar, Hidayat, moreover, said that religion, particularly Islam, could encourage, change, or transform the pessimistic and defeated people (i.e. the losers) to become courageous and optimistic ones because it provides rewarding eschatological promises (e.g. entry to Heaven or happiness and tranquility in the afterlife world) for those waging jihad against (presumed) injustice and infidels. For terrorists,

[14] Email correspondence with Ahmad Basuni, June 2020.

[15] Online conversation with John Titaley, August 2020.

[16] Online chat with Komaruddin Hidayat, August 2020.

Hidayat said, terrorism is a shortcut to become a martyr and a Paradise's resident.

In line with Hidayat's comment, Imam Samudra, a field commander of the 2002 Bali bombings, once wrote, "The aim of these suicide bombs is to add the fear in the hearts of unbelievers and the hearts those we consider enemies and to give enthusiasm to Muslims to struggle for Islam. [We] want them to be brave like the courage of the individuals who perpetrate the suicide bombings" (cited in Solahudin 2013: 187). Samudra (executed by a firing squad) pointed this out in a meeting among JI members prior to the Bali blasts. In his autobiography, *Aku Melawan Teroris* (I am Against Terrorist), Samudra also believed his terrorist operations as an "entry ticket" to Heaven; thereby, he was smiling when a firing squad shot him to death.

The Significance of Economic and Mental-Psychological Factors

Similar to Hidayat's point of views, Ali Makhrus, a doctorate student at Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, argues that the main root of terrorism is not religion. However, unlike Hidayat that emphasizes social inequality and political unfairness, Makhrus, while notifying the contribution of religion, underscores a combination of economic and mental-psychological factors that actually led some people to be terrorists and radicals. He wrote,

> To my knowledge, the majority of terrorists and extremists have unpleasant backgrounds: economic difficulty as well as psychological and mental problems, added with partial and superficial understanding of religion (Islam) with a monolithic perspective. Terrorists (and radicals) are a collection of isolated, closed minded and anti-social people. It is difficult to communicate and engage with them. This condition made them easily frustrated and mental ill particularly when they did not find a satisfactory solution towards social, political and economic issues they have faced in the society. Sadly, they influenced by and then joined Islamist militant people, organizations, and networks that proposed an assumed ideal sophisticated socio-political-economic order to solve those problems. At this point, they became terrorists because they believed that terrorism can be an effective medium to achieve these objectives.[17]

[17] Email correspondence with Ali Makhrus, June 2020.

Majoritarianism and Terrorism

Unlike other informants, Alissa Wahid, National Coordinator for Indonesia Gusdurian Networks, said that the main roots of terrorism in the country is majoritarianism.[18] The daughter of the fourth president of Indonesia, the late Abdurrahman Wahid (known as Gus Dur, 1940–2009), Wahid argued that terrorism emerged in contemporary Indonesia because terrorists, as followers of Islam, felt to be a majority, and therefore, felt to have the right to determine the direction of the country and society. A political philosophy, majoritarianism refers to the idea that the numerical majority of a populace, based on either religion, ethnicity, or other identifying factors, should have primacy in a given society over others (i.e. assumed minorities) and have the right to make final decisions that affect the society. In Indonesian context, Wahid said, Muslims are the majority, and therefore, they (say, some of them) thought to have the final say in determining the outcome of a decision. In reality, however, she said, terrorists themselves are the minority group.

Terrorism as a Theological Resistence

Terrorism as a form of religious or theological resistance was expressed by Mukhsin Jamil, an academic and vice rector of the Walisongo State Islamic University.[19] Jamil said that terrorism is a sort of "theological confrontation" against critical and liberal voices that undermine and challenge terrorists' conservative and radical religious understandings. In addition, for Jamil, terrorism can also be seen as an escapement due to terrorists' incapability in facing and countering modernity as well as a product of rigid, closed-minded understandings of religion and the absence of freedom and reasoning or intellection in reading and interpreting religious texts.

According to Jamil, terrorists used violent means because "these are the only way they can do to resist anti-conservative and radical voices, fight against opposing groups, escape from modernity, and release from frustration and powerlessness." Certainly, Jamil said, there are some conditions and "indirect factors" that contributed to transforming or shifting some people to be terrorists. These include unpleasant social, cultural,

[18] Online chat with Alissa Wahid, August 2020.

[19] Online conversation with Mukhsin Jamil, August 2020.

economic, and political development; the absence of assistance from government and society to solve and rescue their difficulties; and unsupportive surroundings (e.g. having radical milieus and neighborhoods), among others.

Biological and Genetic Contributions to Terrorism

It is important to underline that, for Indonesians, terrorism is not simply about cultural and religious factors but biological and genetic factors as well. The reason of biological and genetic factors of terrorism was given by specialists of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) and blood group, Eva Dipanti and Piter Randan Bua, both from the ABO Center Indonesia, a nongovernmental institution dedicated to the study of DNA and blood type and their effects for human character, thought and behavior.[20] Both Dipanti and Bua pointed out that character, thought, and behavior, including radical ones, have been programmed and recorded in each DNA of human societies. According to them, DNA is "a book of life" resembling a black box or a flight recorder—an electronic recording device placed in an airplane for the purpose of facilitating the investigation of aviation accidents and incidents. Like the black box, DNA also records all humans' physical and non-physical information since they were in the womb.

In this regard, from the genetic studies perspective, terrorism is the fruit of radical and intolerant teachings, ideas, and practices (e.g. about hatred, killing unbelievers, martyrdom, and so forth) that terrorists received (or chronicled) from their parents and milieus since they were still an embryo. Nonetheless, although some people have inherent negative genetics, they do not automatically become a terrorist when they were born on earth without the intervention of a third party such as brainwasher, agitator, provocateur, influencer, and so forth through offline or online tools. Particular societal environment, social experiences, economic shortage, religious sermons, writings, news and others could also influence, open up and transform the negative genetic holders to be terrorists. Dipanti and Bua have argued that even though some people hold genetics that have destructive components and character, they could become less radical (or even anti-radical) if there are no such contributing factors.

[20] Email correspondence with Eva Dipanti and Piter Randan Bua, June 2020.

To sum up, Indonesian public opinions, perceptions, and assumptions on terrorism—its concepts, roots, and aims—are varied and multilayered. As for its concepts, some said that terrorism is a form of people (mass) movement while others define it as a political act. Furthermore, some viewed terrorism as a kind of escapement from helplessness, incapability, and powerless in the face of the flows of powerful modernity and globalization. Still, some argued that Indonesia's local terrorism is as part of a global phenomenon. In other words, terrorism taking place in Indonesia and elsewhere is a sort of "glocalization" process combining global and local ingredients. Moreover, as its root causes, terrorism can be driven by factors related to religion (i.e. religious doctrines, teachings, texts, narratives, symbols, and discourses, as well as religious actors, institutions, and networks) and non-religion (e.g. social, biological, and political economic matters). Indonesian views on the aims of terrorist activities also vary, including as a medium to do the following (among others):

- To wreak their dissatisfaction with social, political, and economic phenomena.
- To subvert the country's national security and social stability.
- To replace the Indonesian nation-state's philosophical foundation, the country's ideology of Pancasila, and the state constitution.
- To build an ideological home for a specific religious community.
- To control economic and human resources.
- To apply a complete system of a terrorist's desired ideology.
- To overthrow NKRI (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia–the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia).
- To create a homogeneous community or environment comprising Muslims from the same views as those of terrorists.
- To free Muslim communities from the control and dominance of the "infidels"
- To establish an assumed idealized Islamic caliphate, state, or government.
- To purify Islam and Muslim societies from irreligious (un-Islamic) cultural practices, traditions, and beliefs.

Indonesian Society's Responses to Counterterrorism

Indonesians' opinions on approaches to counterterrorism (or counter-radicalism more generally) vary noticeably. While some underline the need to apply "hard ways," others emphasize "soft methods" (see a brief summary of their views in Table 7.2). However, they are in general aware of the difficulty and complexity in handling terrorism or extremism more broadly. A researcher of terrorism, Dete Aliah, wrote,

> "Overcoming terrorism is an uneasy task in Indonesia mainly because there are some Islamist organizations and ambitious groups of people that

Table 7.2 A brief summary of Indonesian opinions on counterterrorism

- Develop a balanced counterterrorism model—between hard/security and soft/non-security approaches
- Society's active participation and involvement in combating terrorism, including local religious and community leaders
- Train local people (i.e. grassroots) to be the "government's eyes" to report terrorist activities, the "watchdogs" of terrorists in their neighborhoods, and "the wise people" to accept deradicalized terrorists who wanted to reintegrate into society
- Changing perspective and practice of religious education from a faith-based to knowledge-based learning
- Stop spending the government's funds for weapons expenditure and military equipment since arms cannot defeat terrorist ideology and mindset
- Focusing on interreligious humanitarian work by involving radical groups
- Introducing anti-terrorism school curricula, textbook, and learning process in universities and pre-university schools
- Involving students and younger generation in the campaign against terrorism and radicalism
- The need to maximize the role of Nahdlatul Ulama's pesantren (Islamic boarding school) institutions and networks
- Cross-cultural visits to Muslim-minority areas (Indonesia and abroad) so that Muslims, including Islamist militants, could feel how to be a minority group in other places
- Proliferate religious moderation and pluralism in mosques and other institutions
- Avoid "war" on religious verses and texts and pay attention to terrorists' grievances and enabling environment that caused and triggered terrorism
- The necessity to create good governance and law enforcement
- Developing counterterrorism approaches pertinent to terrorists' blood type since each blood type tends to have a different character
- Instilling positive deeds and teachings in the families and schools to implant and influence the development of positive DNAs

> still want to change Indonesia to become an Islamic state or a caliphate in which sharia can be officially and fully implemented throughout the country. Other factors that make efforts of combating terrorism tougher include the existence of social gap, economic disparity, political unfairness, economic sources unequal distributions, poverty and employment. Such conditions make the ambitious, greedy or militant people easier to manipulate, influence, convince and mobilize masses and ordinary religious groups, especially those psychologically fragile and intellectually weak and uncritical to support terrorism and radicalism as a way to achieve an imagined idealized political and economic system. Against this backdrop, eliminating terrorism can be partial. It needs a comprehensive approach and involves a large segment of society.[21]

Different Approach to Different Terrorist

Giving the different backgrounds of those joined terrorist groupings, Aliah suggested the government and concerned people to approach them differently, which are coherent with their pathways toward terrorism. Similarly, because there are multiple roots of terrorism, the government need to develop various apt counterterrorism and antiradicalism methods. More importantly, the counterterrorism and terrorist eradication efforts have to involve society because terrorists are generally "allergic" and hesitant to talk with government officials and state apparatus, which is different from societies whom they consider to be relatively neutral with no political interest. In this case, Aliah affirms, the role of civilian groupings are significant to bridge between the government and suspected terrorists. As well, involving local societies is imperative because they are the first group of people who know "strangers" and identify suspicious behaviors in their neighborhoods. Hence, society can play a role as the first alarm.

However, unfortunately, according to Aliah, many people are not aware of terrorist clandestine activities. Accordingly, the government and relevant agencies have to train and provide them with relevant necessary skills so they could become the "government's eyes" having ability to make a report to the police and pertinent agencies or even generate a suitable decision to handle suspicious acts in the society. Indeed, the

[21] Email correspondence with Dete Aliah, June 2020.

task to recognize terrorists and their activities have become more difficult because, on many occasions, terrorists conceal their radical identities and actions by performing good and nice things in the society and their neighborhoods. It is also imperative to state that, Aliah added, local societies have to be trained to become not only the "watchdogs of terrorists" in their areas but also the "wise people" who could accept ex-terrorists (deradicalized terrorists) that try to reintegrate into society. Aliah made an important point because not all people are willing to receive terrorist reintegration for fear of being polluted by radical ideology, thought, and practices. The problem is if societies refuse to accept ex-terrorists, they could rejoin their former extremist groups and networks.

The Need to Create Healthy and Good Governance

Jacklevyn "Jacky" Manuputty, a secretary-general of the Communion of Churches in Indonesia (Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia) and the recipient of the 2011 "Peacemaker in Action Award" from New York-based Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding, recommended the government to create healthy and good governance.[22] For him, approaching terrorism through hard military method or law enforcement is necessary but not enough to eradicate and deter terrorism in the society. In many cases, he said, terrorism is only a canal to achieve a political power and once terrorists succeeded in attaining the power, terrorism would stop. In this regard, it is important for the rulers to make good governance, leaving no room for radicals to exploit power. "If a government goes wrong–e.g. practicing political injustice, economic inequality, corruption and others–terrorists will find a legitimate rationale to overthrow it by using violent acts, including terrorism," said Manuputty. A respected pastor of the Moluccan Protestant Church, Manuputty has played an important role in Christian—Muslim reconciliation and intergroup peacebuilding processes in the Moluccas and other areas in the country that plagued by communal violence by promoting interdependent society, strengthening communal bonds, and facilitating public initiative and participation.

[22] Online conversation with Jacky Manuputty, August 2020.

Listening to the Grievances of Terrorists and Their Sympathizers

The second point Manuputty highlighted is the need to listen to the grievances from terrorist actors and sympathizers. A co-founder of the Maluku Interfaith Institute, Manuputty affirms that there are reasons for individuals involved in perilous terrorist activities that need to pay attention to those concerned with peacebuilding and counterterrorism. Manuputty argued that in some cases, religious and theological explanation carried out by moderate religious clerics and scholars or proponents of counterterrorism to correct terrorists' ideological, theological, and religious understandings and interpretations are ineffective because terrorists have their own beliefs, convictions, and principles on the right religious practices. They also have their preferred religious texts as well as favorite clerics, scholars, and imams; thereby, in some instances, it is useless or waste of time to conduct "war on verses" (*perang ayat*)—countering particular religious verses and texts used by terrorists to legitimize their actions with other verses and texts held by moderate religious scholars and clerics.

Changing Models of Religious Education

Another informant, Deva Alvina, a researcher in the Research and Development Agency of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, suggested two counterterrorism models to be implemented in Indonesia, namely (1) re-orientation and change of religious education from a faith-based to knowledge-based learning and (2) the need of societal participation in terrorist rehabilitation and de-radicalization programs. Alvina said that religious education generally aims to introduce, develop, and strengthen students' faith not to seek, learn, and comprehend religious knowledge of any faith. Religious education is more or less like religious indoctrination that at the end produces closed-minded, fanatical people. If religious education is designed as a knowledge-based learning, she argued, it would generate open-minded, tolerant people.

The Need for Societal Participation

Equally important, according to Alvina, society needs to be involved actively in rehabilitating, reeducating, and de-radicalizing terrorists and radicals aiming at transforming them to become peace and tolerance

loving people. Alvina provides an example of the case of Tuanku Imam Bonjol (known also as Muhammad Syahab, Malim Basya, or Peto Syarif, 1772–1864), one of the most popular radical Islamist-reformist leaders in the Padri movement in Sumatra, who later became less radical and less violent after living in an exile in North Sulawesi's Manado–Christian dominated area. This is because, Alvina said, local people were active in building friendship, relationship, and communication with Bonjol.[23] It was the Dutch that sent and isolated Bonjol in Manado of North Sulawesi. Besides Bonjol, the Dutch also exiled Kiai Mojo (1764–1849, his real name was Muslim Muhammad Khalifah), a prominent and influential Muslim cleric from Central Java who waged jihad against the colonial rulers to establish an Islamic government (Kingdom) in Java, in the region of Tondano, North Sulawesi. Jeanne Tulung, a North Sulawesi-based Christian theologian, confirmed that, based on local stories and oral traditions developed in North Sulawesi's society, Bonjol and Mojo changed their militant views and Islamist perspectives after being involved with local people of multiple faiths and cultures.[24]

A number of informants have indeed underscored the necessity to involve local societies in the rehabilitation of terrorists and prevention of terrorism. Ahmad Suaedy, the director of Institute for Southeast Asian Islam at Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, Yogyakarta, admitted the government's success in executing security approach but failed in countering discourses of terrorism and radicalism. This happens because, he argued, the government put much more emphasis on hard, military approaches by the police and other security forces. It does not fully endorse and continuously support civilian participation. In this regard, Suaedy suggested, the government need to involve large segment of societies including members and networks of pesantren, Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, Islamic universities and other moderate Muslim elements in the country in developing moderate, peaceful, and tolerant Islamic thoughts and discourses that respect and value the country's rich ethnoreligious diversity.[25] Another informant, Yulianto Purwo also wrote,

[23] Email correspondence with Deva Alvina, June 2020.

[24] Online chats with Jeanne Tulung, August 2020.

[25] Online conversation with Ahmad Suaedy, August 2020.

"Society need to be proactive in combating and foiling terrorism and that must begin from the smallest units of local neighborhoods to detect as early as possible symptoms of radicalism."[26]

Engaging the Radicals

A more persuasive story on the significance of society's active participation in the combat of terrorism came from Paulus Hartono, a Mennonite pastor in Central Java, who shared his compelling experience in shifting and transforming radical ideologies. A co-founder of the Forum for Peace across Religions and Groups, Hartono, has been working for humanitarian services for many years with elite members and activists of Hizbullah Front and other militant organizations in his area, Solo of Central Java, to transform destructive behavior of the radicals to become productive peacemakers and humanitarian activists. Hartono calls this technique "humaneness dialogue".

Hartono, through his Mennonite Diakonia Service, invited the militants (that later they accepted the call) to work together for humanity, along with Christians and various Muslim groups, to assist victims of the Tsunami in Aceh, the Merapi Mount eruption in Yogyakarta, the flooding in Papua and many others. This method, he said, is effective to deradicalize the militants and minimize misunderstandings among differing groups. Hartono said that during their peacebuilding and humanitarian work, they often live and eat together in tents or rented houses along with other groups of Christians and Muslims.

Based on his fruitful experiences of engaging with radicals, including suspected terrorists, Hartono encouraged the government to stop spending money to purchase weapons and other military equipment in the combat of terrorism and militancy while at the same time to focus on sustainable and accountable humanitarian services-related initiatives, economic development, justice and law enforcement, and other nonviolent approaches. "Spending money to buy weapons is ineffective in combating terrorism. Besides, it would consume and drain the government's funds because arms technology has always developed from time to time," Hartono wrote. It is thus more productive if the government, in its

[26] Email correspondence with Yulianto Purwo, June 2020.

attempts to counter terrorism, use its funds for non-weapons expenditure sectors.

Hartono cited such eminent figures as Nelson Mandela, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Mother Theresa among others, who combated radicalism by employing non-weapon powers as a weapon. In addition, Hartono advised the government to focus on involving youths or "millennial generation" in countering terrorism and radicalism because they have been the main targets of recruitment from the militant groups. Since many youths have been the perpetrators of terrorism, Hartono pointed out, it is thus fruitful to involve younger generation as the actors of counterterrorism.[27]

Combating Terrorism Needs Firm Actions and Resolute Phases

A president of Asia Marketing Federation Foundation, Y. W. Junardy, has slightly different opinions from Hartono or Manuputty described earlier in the combat of terrorism. Junardy emphasized firm actions and resolute steps in attempts at fighting and countering terrorism. The government, stakeholders and state apparatus cannot let terrorists and radicals spread and ruin the country and society. Junardy wrote, "There is no need for the government to consider or use arguments of democracy and human rights for militants and terrorists since they have committed brutal violence that caused countless casualties, suffered and traumatized many people, destabilized the nation, and destroyed society's peaceful coexistence."

Junardy suggested the government and relevant agencies to be courageous and assertive in eradicating terrorist groups and their movements, ideology, cells, and networks by, for instance, seriously implementing law enforcement. In addition to the hard approach, Junardy advised the government to create good government, minimize social gaps, generate social justice and economic equality, protect minority groups and susceptible communities, provide good services for the poor, and produce job opportunities for unemployed people, among others. It is also important for the government, Junardy said, to develop activities and programs that focus on developing character and nation building, as well as pride and a sense of belonging as Indonesians toward their rich cultures, tradition and wisdom.

[27] Online chats with Paulus Hartono, August 2020.

Siti Musdah Mulia, chair of the Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace, has put emphasis on the need to respect the country's diversity and heterogeneity for all Indonesian citizens, regardless of their ethnic, political, and religious affiliations. A daring advocate of human's and women's rights, Mulia, maintained that because of the nature of Indonesia as a deep plural country, each citizen should embrace and develop tolerant, inclusive, pluralist, open-minded, and peaceful behaviors, thoughts, and practices. Otherwise, the country would fall into human disaster in which each individual and group would engage in conflict and violence against one another. Accordingly, "Those who committed intolerant and anti-pluralist acts such as terrorists and other extremist groups that threaten the existence of ethno-religious peace and pluralism need to be punished and wiped out from the nation," said Mulia, who was the recipient of the International Women of the Courage Award from the US Secretary of State.[28]

Various Tactical Approaches

Muhammad Thohiri Habib, a religious and Arabic teacher at East Java's Islamic schools, has several suggestions on strategic ways of countering terrorism in the long-term. First, developing anti-terrorism education at schools, colleges, and universities in the forms of curricula, textbooks, courses, and others. Second, preaching and spreading ideas of peaceful and tolerant Islam, particularly in areas where conservative and militant groups have lived. In the digital era, the government and committed persons need to promote and spread these notions through the Internet and social media. Third, the government should pay attention to society's well-being. Fourth, the government must involve pesantren (Java-style Islamic boarding school) in counterterrorism initiatives since this religious institution has long played a significant role in teaching and spreading moderate and peaceful Islam in the society. He observed the government does not so far seriously involve thousands of pesantren networks and institutions across the country in its efforts of combating terrorism.[29]

While Habib advised the government to involve Nahdlatul Ulama's traditional pesantren educational institutions and their key elite members,

[28] Online conversation with Siti Musdah Mulia, August 2020.

[29] Email correspondence with Muhammad Thohiri Habib, June 2020.

such as kiai (clerics and scholars) and santri (students of pesantren), Siti Fatimah suggested the ruling authorities to approach and include charismatic and influential local religious leaders as well as those from modernist Muhammadiyah in counterterrorism efforts. An academic staff at Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Fatimah also gave a recommendation to the government and relevant groups to initiate a sort of cross-cultural and religious visit programs by involving the militants such as visiting areas (in Indonesia or abroad) where Muslims become a minority group so they could feel how to live in Muslim-minority regions or countries.

Involving Students of Universities and High Schools

While praising the government for having fruitful counterterrorism initiatives, Fatimah suggested the authorities give more roles for students of universities and high schools in countering extremism because they have been an easy object of radical groups. Having a doctorate from the University of Tehran, Fatimah has experience in conducting a series of Focus Group Discussion (FGD), in association with the government and relevant social organizations, on counterterrorism and anti-radicalism. From her experiences in conducting FGDs, Fatimah realizes that combating terrorism need smooth and cultural approaches by optimizing the roles of religious and millennial groups as active agents of counterterrorism.[30]

The Role of Pesantren (Islamic Boarding School)

Nurul Huda Haem, the founder of Pesantren Motivasi Indonesia, has also appreciated the government for its success and seriousness in the fight against terrorism. However, while notifying the government's and state apparatus' feat in combating terrorism, he has observed that it tends to let other forms of violence and extremism such as vigilantism, persecution, hate speech, intolerant acts, and communal riots occur in the society without proper and serious handling. Law enforcement, he argued, is only for terrorism not for other types of radicalism that could be fertile sources for future's terrorism. Consequently, eradicating and thwarting terrorism per se would not bring into lasting success without serious

[30] Email correspondence with Siti Fatimah, June 2020.

efforts to combat and counter multiple forms of non-terrorist violence. As Habib's opinions depicted earlier, Haem also encouraged the government to involve pesantren institutions and use them as one of the backbones in counterterrorism and antiradicalism efforts since they have massive networks and grassroots actors throughout the country.[31]

Introducing Local Wisdom, Values, and Cultures

Other informants underscore the necessity to introduce, spread, and strengthen Indonesia's rich local wisdoms, cultures, and traditions that teach peace, harmony, broad-mindedness, and pluralism. Putri K. Wardani, a member of the Presidential Advisory Council, for example, pointed out that militants need to be taught about the essence of Pancasila (Indonesia's foundational ideology) and Bhineka Tunggal Ika (i.e. the national motto, meaning "Unity in Diversity") which are strongly rooted within the country's history. Wardani argued that both Pancasila and Bhineka Tunggal Ika were derived from principles and values in the Books of Sutasoma (written by Mpu Tantular) and Nagarakertagama (authored by Mpu Prapanca) since the Majapahit Kingdom, a great Javanese Hindu-Buddhist empire (c. 1293–1517). Wardani has reminded us that Pancasila and Bhineka Tunggal Ika are apt for Indonesia as a deep plural country, and historically the two have been able to solve ethnoreligious differences and heterogeneity.

However, the emergence of the religious zealots (and other extremist ideological groupings) has threatened and challenged the existence and persistence of Pancasila and Bhineka Tunggal Ika. In this regard, Wardani held that it might be fruitful to introduce and instill Indonesia's various local heartening wisdoms, values, and cultures—both material and nonmaterial cultures—for younger generations and in particular for radicals and terrorists so they could love and be proud of the great legacy of their ancestors, and ultimately leave radical ideologies and terrorist activities.[32] More or less similar to Wardani, Ira Indrawardana of Padjadjaran University also underlines the significance of instilling local cultures and wisdoms in children, youths, and radicals so they could have a sense of belonging to the cultural inheritance implanted by their predecessors. By

[31] Online conversation with Nurul Huda Haem, August 2020.

[32] Online conversation with Putri K. Wardani, August 2020.

having a sense of belonging to their shared cultures, Indrawardana said, it is hoped that terrorists would rethink destructive behaviors and acts that could destroy their cultures and traditions.[33]

The critical question is certainly: do terrorists care about Indonesia's local cultures and wisdom of their ancestors' inheritance? Most, if not all, Islamist terrorists have been brainwashed by their ideologues and leaders that local cultures, traditions, and customs are irreligious, un-Islamic, deviant, and sinful, away from Islamic teachings and doctrines. Instead of following and conducting local cultural practices, terrorists would be keen to omit, change, or transform them to become Islamic cultures by cloaking them with a religious garb. As well, rather than implementing values and principles of Pancasila and Bhineka Tunggal Ika, terrorists would be eager to replace them with Islamic ideology and sharia. It is exactly one of the fundamental problems of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia since the era of Darul Islam. As long as they have embraced Islamism as their faith, it is difficult to shift their beliefs and convince them of the vitality and value of local cultures. Perhaps, due to this reason, Komarudin Hidayat, rector of Indonesia International Islamic University, gave more emphasis on implanting correct religious understanding that values humanity, peace, love, and plurality, in addition to actualizing social, political, and economic justice in the society.[34]

Five Interrelated Models of Counterterrorism

Galih Iman, University of Indonesia-trained lawyer, suggested five interrelated models of counterterrorism. First, preventive models. These models include (1) strengthening educational system that based on critical thoughts, etiquettes, morals, and civility, (2) sending moderate ulama and respectful clerics in the society, (3) preventing intolerant and violent Islamic propagations in mosques, TV channels, radios, and other tools and places, (4) screening radical behaviors and thoughts of the government's employees, and (5) scaling up society's literacy. Included in the preventive method is the introduction of nationality and insertion of pride as an Indonesian to younger millennial generation. Second, legal approach, namely there is a need to make regulations and laws easier to

[33] Online conversation with Ira Indrawardana, August 2020.

[34] Online conversation with Komarudin Hidayat, August 2020.

ensnare terrorism and radicalism such as those to catch up suspicious persons having radical ideology. Third, grassroots participation model. Local societies have to be involved actively in countering terrorism by providing them with relevant skills, antiradicalism trainings, or funds to finance programs or activities related counterterrorism and counter-radicalism (such as those in the preventive model). Fourth, repressive model. The government should create anti-terror agencies or teams in all villages and the grassroots levels throughout the country to prevent the potentials of radicalism as well as get rid of radical and terrorist groups.[35]

The Role of DNA in Counterterrorism Approach

Informants do not only suggest cultural approaches in countering terrorism but also genetic models of counterterrorism. Peter Randan Bua, author and DNA researcher, for example, suggested the government and society in general pay attention to terrorists' DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) since all human behaviors and characters—including radical ones—are recorded in their DNAs as the "book of life." Bua put forward the idea that since DNA could record all information happening in the society—bad or good—before humans were born, it is necessary for all societies and families to be careful about religious and non-religious teachings as well as their deeds—speeches, actions, manners, and so forth. Therefore, all humans when they were born could be free from radical influences (teachings, doctrines, conducts, and others). Efforts of counterterrorism, Bua said, should begin from a smallest unit of society, namely family. Parents should teach and instill their children about the significance of love, peace, deference, care, humanity, tolerance, pluralism, and other good things; thereby, children would get familiar with positive teachings and deeds from earliest days.

The next step, Bua said, schoolteachers are also responsible to educate their students with constructive and encouraging things to follow and practice as well as destructive and discouraging things to circumvent and combat in their everyday life so they would cultivate and develop as good persons. Bua wrote, "Formal education should be designed as a learning institution to open students' positive DNAs as well as a 'laundry machine'

[35] Email correspondence with Galih Iman, June 2020.

to clean up negative DNAs as an outcome of adverse and bad teachings in the family, religion or neighborhoods hoping that they are able to grow as humane, tolerant and peaceful individuals in the future." Whereas Bua emphasizes the contributions of DNA, Evan Dipanti, a specialist of blood type studies, advised the government and relevant agencies to have and carry out counterterrorism programs in relation to terrorists' blood types. Each blood type, Dipanti has argued, has specific characters and behaviors (e.g. bad-tempered, volatile, gentle, compassionate, and so forth), and consequently, needs specific treatments. For example, terrorists having O blood type should use counterterrorism approaches relevant to O blood group, do not use those of other blood types. "If we use counterterrorism approaches different from terrorists' blood types, they would not work," Dipanti said.[36] Moreover, some informants such as Mariya Mubarika, a medical doctor, encouraged the government to apply perspectives from neuroscience[37] in the counterterrorism initiatives such as omitting "radical nerves" in terrorists' brains through nerve surgery, and if need be, replace them with peaceful ones. For her, such a technique is more effective, efficient, and fruitful.

In brief, Indonesians have different, varied opinions and suggestions about effective models of counterterrorism and antiradicalism. Their diverse views indicate the complexity of terrorism and hardness of countering terrorism and extremism effectively in the society. Although Indonesian informants have various viewpoints on the efficacy of counterterrorism, they generally agree that the government has quite successful in implementing hard, military counterterrorism approaches while not yet fruitful in developing preemptive, soft, and nonmilitary models of combating and preventing terrorism and radicalism.

Assessment and Analysis: Concluding Remarks

Based on the depiction sketched earlier, few conclusions can be drawn as follows. Indonesian public opinions on terrorism vary sizably concerning its root causes and purposes. Some highlight religious ignorance, Islamic misunderstandings, and misinterpretations of the Qur'an as the main

[36] Online conversation with Eva Dipanti, June 2020.

[37] Neuroscience (neurobiology) is the scientific study of the nervous system (its function and structure).

sources of terrorism while others point out political and ideological rivalry. Still, some underline (or blame on) poverty or economic dearth as the primary roots of terrorism (see a more detailed description in Table 7.1). Regarding terrorism's aims, some said to build an Islamic state while others to destabilize national security, among many others. Their views on strategies and tactics to combat terrorism also differ from one another. Some put emphasis on military measures as a best way to eradicate terrorism whereas others suggest nonmilitary models (see a more detailed depiction in Table 7.2).

Apart from diverse public opinions about—and attitudes toward—terrorism, some common views need to reexamine due to lack of data accuracy and intellectual ground. One of the general opinions was about terrorism as a religious phenomenon, more specifically, Islamic phenomenon. As a result, they understand—or refer to—terrorists as Islamic (Islamist) groups that have specific features and behaviors such as violent, militant, radical, close-minded, inhuman, intolerant, and anti-pluralist, among others. Due to their views that terrorism is linked to Islamic religion and grouping, they generally denote terrorists such as notorious individuals like Imam Samudra or Abu Bakar Baa'syir as well as infamous radical groups like Jamaah Islamiyah, Jamaah Ansharud Daulah, and Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, among others.

Although Islamist terrorism is a common phenomenon in Indonesia these days (in fact across the world), history has noted that terrorist activities in the country were not only committed by militant Islamist individuals and groups but also secular and non-Muslim communities and individuals. I have explained this phenomenon in Chapter 5; thereby, there is no need to discuss in this chapter. Suffice to say that Indonesia's cases of terrorism are not only marked by Islamist terrorism but also other forms of terrorism—including "secular terrorism." In this regard, actors of terrorism (both individuals and groups) also vary not only Muslims and devotees of Islamism.

Moreover, Indonesians in general have also viewed and believed that terrorists' main goals are to replace the country's foundational ideology, governmental system, and national constitution with Islamic ideology, government, and sharia law. Again, this view is valid as long as related to Islamist terrorism and actors. However, since Indonesia's terrorism is not only about Islamist terrorism, such observation is only partially true. In fact, terrorists' goals and motives differ from one another including taking revenge, business competition, or creating socio-political disruption and

chaos in the society. Some terrorists have separatist motives while others wage terrorism to fight against the government officials, security forces, or business rivals.

A great number of Indonesians also believed that such terrorists are the fruits of Islam-based radical ideology, misunderstandings of religion (Islam), misinterpretations of religious (Islamic) texts, or miscomprehends of religious (Islamic) teachings and discourses. This standpoint, once again, contradicts the facts of the plurality of terrorist forms in the country. Those who underscore poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy as the primary roots of terrorism also oppose to the facts that a number of terrorists came from a middle-class family and had received sufficient educational training. It is correct that in reality, as discussed in Chapter 5, Indonesia's domestic terrorism and terrorist actors are deeply complex away from being the monolith.

As for the counterterrorism approaches, Indonesians have also had various views and advices ranging from hard/military approaches to soft/nonmilitary methods, some of which—such as de-radicalization and rehabilitation programs—have been implemented by the government and state apparatus through such bodies as BNPT or Densus 88 (see Chapter 6). Yet, the tones or narratives of approaches to counterterrorism they suggested tend to overcome Islamist terrorism. In other words, counterterrorism approaches they suggested are essentially counter-Islamist terrorism models that neglect other forms of terrorism. Nonetheless, some suggestions are important to underline and take further actions such as the incorporation of neuroscience, DNA and blood type in counterterrorism and antiradicalism initiatives that are absent from counterterrorism programs initiated by BNPT. The agency generally emphasizes cultural aspects without paying much attention to genetic and biological dimensions in the fight against extremism and terrorism.

Some informants also criticize the government's neglect on nonterrorist forms of violence (or other types of terrorism) which are widespread in the country such as vigilantism, collective riots, persecutions, and hate speeches that could produce future's generations of extremist terrorist groups. Other significant standpoints highlighted by Indonesian citizens are the need to firmly regulate, limit, or eliminate radical discourses spread through religious sermons, which are conducted either offline (e.g. via mosques or Islamic centers) or online (on YouTube and other social media platforms, TV channels, and radios). Informants also suggested the government to revise and reform educational

systems (curricula, courses, teaching–learning mechanism, objectives, and so forth) that are in-line with the spirits of antiradicalism, anti-terrorism, pacifism, pluralism, and the like.

Last but not the least, concerning Indonesians joining or returning from joining terrorists' organizations overseas (the returnees), such as Mindanao, Iraq, and Syria, informants also vary. Some agreed to revoke their citizenship while others suggested the government give a chance to reintegrate into society. Still, other informants recommended the government to supervise them strictly and provide them with special training to make sure their willingness and commitment to reintegrate or reunite with Republics of Indonesia as well as take out radical ideas, thoughts, and ideologies. Further assessment on both terrorism and counterterrorism are discussed in Chapters 8–10.

References

Hwang, Julie Chernov 2018. *Why Terrorists Quit: The Disengagement of Indonesian Jihadists*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Kowalewski, David. 2003. "Vigilantism." In *International Handbook of Violence Research*, edited by Wilhelm Heitmeyer and Johan Hagan, pp. 339–49. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Sidel, John. 2006. *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Solahudin. 2013. The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jema'ah Islamiyah. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Part III

Check for updates

CHAPTER 8

Comparing Terrorism: Saudi Arabia and Indonesia

> Terrorism is the fruit of narrow-minded perspectives, compulsive over-interpretation, and excessive understandings of religious texts, teachings and doctrines. Any religious adherent, including Christians, can become militant and terrorist if they have embraced and held such viewpoints, interpretations and understandings.
>
> —John A. Titaley, A Protestant pastor, former rector, and an Emeritus Professor of Theology, Universitas Kristen Indonesia Maluku, Ambon.

Previous chapters (Chapters 2–7) have described and discussed broadly terrorism and counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia but there is not enough room yet to connect, compare, and contrast these issues in the two countries. Comparing and contrasting terrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia are interesting because, despite having some similarities, terrorism in these two countries takes different forms, roots, and dynamics. This chapter is intended to discuss and analyze issues of terrorism from a comparative perspective by looking at similarities and differences related to terrorism (e.g. its factors, roots, objectives, groupings, networks, and so on) in these two nations, along with their underlying factors and rationales.

Some guiding questions of this chapter are as follows. What are the resemblances and differences between Saudi Arabia and Indonesia concerning issues of terrorism? What factors contributed to these similarities and differences? What make, if any, Saudi Arabia or Indonesia unique

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022

S. Al Qurtuby, *Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1337-2_8

or distinctive with regard to terrorism? Is there connection among Saudi and Indonesian terrorist groups and individuals? Is there influence of Saudi Arabia toward Indonesia or vice versa concerning ideas, thoughts, or funds that contributed to terrorist activities? If so, how and under what circumstances do such connection and influence take place?

To begin with, lets first make it clear that both Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have suffered from terrorism that have taken place since several decades ago. In other words, for both countries, terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, as highlighted in this book, the two countries have encountered various terrorist activities long before the 9/11 tragedy, committed by a variety of militant groups, either secular or religious ones. Islamist terrorist organizations are only one of them. Like other forms of terrorism, Islamist terrorism in the two countries also preceded the 9/11 attacks, albeit its appearance to be more noticeable and ubiquitous after the tragedy. Why these radical Islamist terrorist groups targeting Saudi Arabia and Indonesia remain an intriguing question to study mainly because both terrorists and the ruling governments have shared the same faith. But one of the important reasons is because the Islamist terrorist groups consider the two nations are "not enough Islam" or "infidels–controlled Muslim countries." This is another reason why they proposed a more Islamic and autonomous form of governmental system and institution.

Until now, although for the moment both countries are quite peaceful and free from terrorism, the two are not immune from acts of terrorism and are still struggling for fighting against militant terrorists. Interestingly, although both Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have been the "home-grown" of radical terrorists, the two countries have different dynamics and development pertaining to terrorist actors (individuals, groups, agencies, and organizations), activities, motives, tactics, and objectives, or to counterterrorism and anti-terrorism policies, strategies and approaches. I will compare, contrast, and analyze issues related to counterterrorism in the two countries in Chapter 9.

Similarities: Some Notes and Assessments

I have identified at least nine similarities between Saudi Arabia and Indonesia in relation to terrorism including, but not limited to, the following. First, lengthy experiences of terrorism which took place

long before the 9/11. Second, a variety of forms, rationales, objectives, or actors of terrorism. Third, foreign influences of global jihadism and terrorist organizations. Fourth, relations between terrorism and domestic/local factors (social, economic, political, and religious issues). Fifth, internal dynamics and changes within terrorist groups. Sixth, various targets and casualties of terrorism. Seventh, the role of youth in terrorist activities. Eighth, the use of *amal* (charitable funds) for activities related to terrorism. Ninth, terrorism is an urban phenomenon. Let me briefly highlight and analyze these resemblances.

First, the two countries have long had experiences with and struggled for issues of extremism and terrorism. As discussed in the previous chapters, modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has recorded a series of terrorist acts at least since the 1960s (see Chapter 2), while the modern country of the Republic of Indonesia has encountered terrorism since late 1940s (see Chapter 5), albeit the case of terrorism in this archipelagic country had occurred since the Dutch colonial time.[1] Such a prolonged experience with terrorism has debunked worldwide public perceptions that terrorism in both countries arouse following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. Similarly, this fact also raises some critical queries concerning the interconnectedness between terrorism and political shift and uncertainty. Some scholars (see e.g. Chenoweth 2004; Margulies 2004; Elshtain 2007; Schmid 2011) relate the occurrence of (non-state) terrorism to the country's political shift, regime change, and future unpredictability, meaning that terrorism is the product of such conditions and environments.

Another important lesson from this fact is that different types and characters of the governmental and political systems of the two countries, namely one country (Saudi Arabia) follows a monarchical system that limits civil liberties while the other (Indonesia) embraces a democratic system that allows freedom and expressions of civil rights, do not prevent the two nations from terrorism and extremism. Furthermore, the fact that terrorism has always emerged in various different situations provides evidence that terrorism has nothing to do with issues of state instability or government fragility. In fact, terrorism took place when the two countries had been in stable or instable conditions, as it occurred in both (liberal) democratic and (illiberal) less-democratic countries.

[1] Officially, the Republic of Indonesia was born in 1945. The name of the territory which is now the Republic of Indonesia was known as East Indies or Dutch East Indies.

In this regard, opinions or theories that propose the links between failed states and the rise of terrorism (e.g. Rotberg 2002) seem inapt or at least partially true in the context of Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. It is correct to say that terrorism can be the outcome of a failed state or a failed state could trigger terrorist acts but in the cases of Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, terrorism has nothing to do with a failed state since it took place in various situations. Likewise, ideas that suggest the implementation of democracy or democratization can be potential panaceas for terrorism (e.g. Chenoweth 2004) seem unfit, particularly looking at the contemporary experiences of terrorism in the post-New Order Indonesia, in which terrorism has grown even if the country's democratization process has improved significantly.

As explained before (see Chapter 5), terrorism in Indonesia did not only occur during the fragile political transition from the New Order authoritarian government to the Reformation Era that took place in the late 1990s but also happened long before and after that phase. By the same token, if democracy and democratization were a "good medicine" for terrorism, it would not occur in such democratic countries as the United States, New Zealand, Canada, or countries in Europe. Nonetheless, unfortunately, terrorism has no borders (see Chapter 1). Theories or thoughts that suggested the connection between failed states or political transitions and terrorism were mainly based on non-state terrorist cases in Latin America such as Chile, Argentina, Guatemala, Peru, among others, in which political opening by some dictatorships coincided with a series of waves of non-state terrorism.

Additionally, Chenoweth (2004) contends that terrorism happened in Indonesia because of state weakness and permissive conditions during periods of political instability and transition. In reality, however, as discussed in Chapter 5, terrorist acts took place in Indonesia not only in times of political transition, instability, or uncertainty, following the fall of Suharto's dictatorial regime in 1998, but also when the country has significantly improved and developed its democracy and democratization process or even during the New Order government when politics and security were relatively stable. Moreover, when Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (r. 2004–2014) accommodated conservative and radical elements within his government, terrorism, and radicalism were still widespread. This trend also happened in Saudi Arabia in which terrorist acts did not only occur in times of political unsteadiness. These phenomena suggest that, first, terrorism has indeed nothing to do with

political change, transition, and instability, even though they might contribute to—or trigger—terrorist acts, and second, the implementation of democracy and democratization do not guarantee the absence of terrorism and any forms of radicalism.

Second, the variety of forms, aims, actors, and reasons of terrorism. Both Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have experienced religious and secular terrorism. In this regard, Islamist terrorism is not the only form of terrorism taking place in both countries. But unlike Saudi Arabia, Indonesia's terrorism is more complex and manifold (further explanations on this issue will be discussed in next paragraphs under sub-heading "Differences"). Terrorism has also had multiple objectives. One of the common objectives of terrorism, particularly Islamist terrorism, is to topple the governments that Islamist terrorists considered as secular, not Islamic enough, or controlled by the Western "infidel" regimes. Equally, terrorist groups and organizations in the two countries also vary. But again, Indonesia's terrorist organizations are far more complicated (see next subtitle).

Even though Saudi Arabia's terrorist actors are not as varied as Indonesia, they came or comprised from various backgrounds (e.g. secular and religious, educated and uneducated, middle class and ordinary masses) and socio-religious groupings (e.g. Sunnis, Shiites, unaffiliated Muslims, and non-Muslims, as in the case of Indonesia). The two countries have also shared in common regarding the terrorists' age in which those aged between 30 and 50 took part in terrorist activities. However, unlike Indonesia, there are no terrorist teenagers and women in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, reasons for committing terrorism are also multifaceted. This tendency is not only for Islamist terrorists but also other types of terrorists. As for Islamist terrorists, for instance, committing terrorism was not only driven by the desire and eagerness to establish an Islamic state (or government), certainly in accordance with Islamist terrorists' understandings and interpretations of Islam, the Qur'an and other Islamic basic sources (e.g. Hadith) but also (among others) to give warnings for Western governments.

Third, foreign influences of global jihadism and international terrorism. For example, both Afghanistan and Syria (or Iraq) have shaped domestic terrorism and terrorist groups in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. Both al-Qaeda and ISIL have branches and networks in the two countries (e.g. al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula for Saudi Arabia and Jamaah Islamiyah or Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid for Indonesia). Numerous cases of terrorist

onslaughts have been carried out by these organizations and networks (see Chapters 2 and 5). In recent years, Saudi Arabia has been the target of terrorist attacks carried out by Yemen's Iran-backed Houthi militants and the Iranian government (e.g. the attacks on oil-processing facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais in 2019). Moreover, numerous terrorist assaults (usually using missiles) by the Houthi Shia militia group targeted Saudi's airports, government buildings, industry facilities, oilfields, and natural gas liquids plants, among others.

Historically, Iran also contributed to the emergence of terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. Several terrorist assaults committed by the Hezbollah el-Hijaz in Saudi Arabia or some radical Muslim groups in Indonesia had been influenced or inspired by the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979. While in Saudi Arabia the Iranian revolution had influenced some Shia radical factions[2] (Matthiesen 2010, 2015), in Indonesia, it influenced and motivated non-Shia militant cliques and Suharto's opponents to overthrow his rule from power. The revolution also inspired a Shia militant cleric, Husein Ali al-Habsyi, the head of an Islamic boarding school in East Java, who, along with other militant elites, was accused of masterminding a series of terrorist operations in the 1980s, including the 1985 Borobudur Temple bombing[3] and church bombings in East Java (Crouch 2002; Solahudin 2013).

The only difference, perhaps, Saudi Arabia's terrorist groups, unlike those of Indonesia, had also been shaped by Bosnia's or Chechnya's jihadism. In fact, a great number of young Saudi jihadists traveled to Bosnia (or Chechnya), which they described as a war between Muslims and the West (Hegghammer 2010; Urban 2015). Although issues of wars between Muslims and non-Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina and

[2] Some (Arab) Shia groups in Saudi Arabia, including elite members of this religious community, have supported Iran while others not. Many of them have supported the Saudi government, especially since the late King Abdullah, who began to initiate numerous productive efforts and reforms to build good connection with Shiites.

[3] The 1985 Borobudur Temple bombings refer to the blast of nine bombs detonated at the historic Borobudur Buddhist temple in Magelang, Central Java, as a retaliation of the infamous Tanjung Priok massacre in 1984. Although no human casualties in the attack, the bombs damaged some stupas (i.e. a mound-like or hemispherical structure containing relics used as a place of meditation). Several perpetrators of various Islamic factions contributed to the attacks, including a Shia cleric Husein Ali al-Habsyi, who was sentenced for life imprisonment but later was pardoned and released by President Habibie in 1999.

Chechnya had emerged and spread for a while in Indonesia in the early 1990s but their direct influences on the country's terrorism and terrorist organizations were unnoticeable. It is also unclear whether or not some Indonesian Muslims departed for Bosnia or Chechnya to join international jihadist groups, as they did in Afghanistan. Similarly, Mindanao had contributed to Indonesia's terrorism but not for Saudi Arabia. In fact, relations between Mindanao and Indonesian terrorist groups are quite intense. They have made contact usually through the islands of Sulawesi and Sulu. In contrast, there is no supporting evidence that Saudis went to Mindanao to wage jihad against the Philippines Catholic authorities.

Fourth, relations between terrorism and domestic (local) social, political, and religious factors. To some extent, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia have shared in common concerning "internal dynamics" in relation to social, political, economic, and religious issues that that in turn contributed to the rise of terrorism. In other words, foreign factors (e.g. global jihadism as depicted earlier) are not the only factor contributed to domestic terrorism in the two countries. Equally important, local factors are also significant. The local / domestic factors contributed to the emergence of terrorism include, but not limited to, the following such as, in the case of Saudi Arabia, the overimplementation of modernization (liberalization) policies, the presence of foreign (Western) workers in major companies and American military forces in the Arabian Peninsula, the incorporation of Islamist radical faction in the government system, or the militanization process of Muslim societies. Furthermore, as for Indonesia, the domestic factors include the exclusion of some Islamist factions within the government body; the secular forms of state, government, economic, and political systems; and the deep radicalization and "aliranization" process of Muslim communities; among others. Whatever forms of domestic factors in the two countries, they did contribute to the appearance of terrorist acts.

Fifth, internal dynamics and changes within terrorist groups. Another similarity relates to the internal dynamics and changes within terrorist individuals and groupings. Terrorists, like other groups, are not a collection of dead stones but a living organism that tends to change from one form to another due to various reasons. Certainly, the form and process of change differ from one terrorist to another. Some changes took place in a brief period while others took longer. Small numbers of "hardcore terrorists" are difficult to change. But such shifting phenomena has been common among terrorists in the two countries (and elsewhere).

One of the main factors contributed to this change is the government-sponsored de-radicalization programs. Some deradicalized terrorists have been involved by the government in the de-radicalization programs.

Sixth, a variety of targets and casualties of terrorism. Although Indonesia's targets and victims of terrorism are more complex and diverse, the two has some similarities in which Western people (Westerners), Western and Saudi governments' officials and properties (embassies / consulates, companies, government offices, housing complexes, police stations, and so forth) as well as security forces (the police) had been the targets of Islamist terrorism. This fact is an indication or evidence that terrorism does not only target "far enemies" of Western societies or non-Muslim-majority countries but also "near adversaries" of non-Western societies, Muslim-dominated nations, and local governments.

Seventh, the role of youth in terrorist activities. It is striking to find the fact that the youth (aged between 20 and 45) have generally been common players of terrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. They usually played as "foot soldiers," namely those who operated in the field, either as bombers or other roles. The youth domination in terrorist activities are not unique to Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. Other countries also have similar trends. The involvement of young generations in the terrorist activities are not strange mainly because this group is usually active in radical acts and movements. They are also an easy target of terrorist campaigns and recruitment. The Saudi and Indonesian jihadists who went to Afghanistan (and other areas such as Bosnia or Chechnya for Saudis), which later became Islamist terrorists in their home countries, also consisted of young people.

Eighth, the use of *amal* (charities) for activities related to terrorism. The use of charitable donations (*amal*), either for individual donors or Islamic social organizations, for financing terrorist activities has been one of the common methods used by the Islamist terrorists in the two countries. Christopher Blanchard and Alfred Prados (2007) in their report for the Members and Committees for Congress, entitled "Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues," stated that Saudi terrorists, particularly those linked to al-Qaeda, raised money directly for their operations either from individuals or through charities belonging to some Saudi Islamic organizations. The report also stated that "charities with significant Saudi government sponsorship may have diverted funding to al-Qaeda" (p. 2). The Saudi government, as itself a victim of terrorism, has closed Saudi

charity organizations—home and abroad—including the Haramain Foundation alleged for financing international terrorism. Through the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA), the government has overseen and controlled the flows and transactions of funds making sure the money does not go to terrorist organizations or use for radical activities home and abroad (see Chapter 3).

Similar cases of the use of charities for terrorism took place in Indonesia. But unlike Saudi Arabia, the Indonesian government so far does not act firmly to oversee and control the Muslims' charitable funds. Since recent years, news on the use (misuse) of Islamic charities and Muslims' funds for hajj/umrah pilgrimage for financing activities related to terrorism, radicalism, and tolerant actions has sparked angers of Indonesian citizens. Indeed, the Indonesian police has reported that various charity organizations (e.g. Syam Organizer), some of which have direct affiliations to a number of terrorist groups such as the notorious Jamaah Islamiyah, have used some funds to finance activities related to terrorism and radicalism in the country. Recently, the Police (Densus 88 Anti-Terror Squad) confiscated 400 "charity boxes" (*kotak amal*) belonging to the Abdurrahman Bin Auf Alms Charity Foundation (Lembaga Amal Zakat Abdurrahman Bin Auf or LAZ-ABA), which is affiliated to the terrorist Jamaah Islamiyah organization (*Tribun News* 2021).[4]

Due to the misuse of *dana amal* (charity funds or public donations such as zakat, infak, or sedekah) for terrorism, intolerant acts, racist campaigns, anti-pluralist movement, and other radical activities, PBNU (the national body of Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia's largest Muslim organization whose branches and networks are until village levels across the country) warned Muslims to be careful and selective if they want to donate funds for charities to Islamic organizations. KH Ahmad Ishomuddin, a member of the PBNU Supreme Council, said that the government has to regulate mechanisms for the distribution and use of *dana amal*, including the need to audit the charitable funds publicly for

[4] https://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2021/11/04/polisi-sita-400-kotak-amal-hingga-mobil-terkait-yayasan-amal-teroris-jamaah-islamiah?_ga=2.68282065.1505048640.1636713984-1196365696.1633401689. Accessed November 11, 2021.

transparency and control so that people know the flows of the "*amal* money" (*NU Online* 2021).[5]

Although allegations of some "Islamic charities for terrorism" is obvious, reliable figures on the amount of money originating in or passing through Saudi Arabia or Indonesia and ending up in terrorist hands home and abroad generally are difficult to obtain because of the following reasons. First, the relatively small amounts of money required for terrorist acts can easily pass unnoticed. Second, in Islam, charitable contributions are a form of Islamic mandate or religious obligations. Third, Muslim contributions or donations are often given anonymously; thereby, the flows of funds are difficult to track. Fourth, donated funds may be rerouted from otherwise legitimate Islamic charities. In the case of Indonesia, in particular, the authorities are sometimes reluctant to trail "Islamic charities for terrorism and extremism" because they are afraid of being accused as anti-Muslim and Islamic religion.

Last but not the least, ninth, terrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia is an urban phenomenon. The vast majority of members of the terrorist organizations in both countries came from cities or small towns. Some of them initially were from rural areas but have been radicalized when they moved or transmigrated to cities for seeking jobs, study, or others. In the cities, they interacted with or encountered radical individuals and groups (during their studies, religious gatherings, or other circumstances such as in workplaces or in rented modest homes, called "*rumah kontrakan*") or faced difficult situations such as struggling for finding proper jobs. In Saudi Arabia, the Greater Riyadh area has been the home of a large number of terrorists (Hegghammer 2006). In Indonesia, terrorists have spread in various urban locations, either major metropolitan cities (e.g. Jakarta, Surabaya, Makassar, Medan, and others) or small / medium-size towns (e.g., Solo, Poso, Bekasi, Malang, Sidoarjo, etc.).

Differences: Some Notes and Assessments

Notwithstanding some similarities, there are some notable differences between the two countries in relation to terrorism. These differences include, but not limited to, the following such as types of terrorist actors and organizations; the involvement of women, children, and families in

[5] https://nu.or.id/nasional/waspadai-penyalahgunaan-dana-amal-untuk-jaringan-teroris-2BwjJ. Accessed November 12, 2021.

terrorist operations; rationales, objectives, and roots of terrorism; the presence of lone offenders; terrorists' social backgrounds; financial sources of terrorism; the role of migration and migrant groups in terrorism; the targets of terrorism; and statistics of casualties and terrorist acts; among others. Let me briefly explain these differences.

First, I have noticed that terrorist actors (individuals or groups) and organizations in Indonesia tend to be more complicated and varied than those of Saudi Arabia. As well, terrorist factions in Indonesia appear to be more complex than those of Saudi Arabia. It is true that terrorist actors in Saudi Arabia are also multilayered, for example, not only Sunni militant Islamists affiliated to al-Qaeda or ISIL but also some Shia factions (e.g. Hezbollah al-Hejaz, founded in 1987) or even leftists in the past (see Chapter 2). Unlike in Saudi Arabia in which Hezbollah al-Hejaz was historically one of the most powerful terrorist organizations in the Kingdom affiliated to the Shia group, Indonesia does not have Shiite-affiliated terrorist organizations, excluding Husein Ali al-Habsyi, a Shia figure, who had been accused by the New Order as a mastermind of the Borobudur bombing in 1985.

Indonesian terrorists are much more complex. They consist of both religious (either Muslim or non-Muslim) and non-religious (secular) groups including Islamists, separatists, communists, socialists, leftists, seculars, and lone offenders. It is difficult to find non-Muslim terrorists in Saudi Arabia but they can be found in Indonesia in the past. Within Islamists themselves, there were multiple factions and sub-groups in which each competed (and contend) with one another because of different principles, agenda, purposes, and roots (ICG 2002a, 2003, 2004; Solahudin 2013; Hwang 2018).

Second, the involvement of women, children, and families in terrorist activities in Indonesia, which is uncommon in Saudi Arabia. In recent years, Indonesia has witnessed a new group of female, child, and family terrorists (i.e. all members of family comprising wives, husbands, and their children were directly involved in terrorist activities becoming suicide bombers) (see Chapter 5). In 2018, for the first time in the country's history, Indonesian society was shocked by the emergence of female terrorists and a terrorist family in which all members of two families (husbands, wives, and their children) were engaged in simultaneous suicide bombings in various locations, including North Sumatra, Banten, and East Java targeting government officials, police stations, churches,

housing compound, and other public places killing and injuring dozens of innocent people (Schulze 2018).

Previously, in 2017, the government detained three female citizens, disrupting a series of separate and highly organized potential suicide operations. A significant number of Indonesian women (about 600 since 2012) also migrated to the Syrian Arab Republic, the majority of them joined ISIL and a smaller number fought for pro-al-Qaeda rebels (Nuraniyah 2018). A report of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate indicates that about 12% of foreign women traveling to Syria or Iraq to join ISIL and other terrorist groups were from Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia[6] (CTED 2019). Even though women's participation in terrorism and other types of violence is nothing new, as the report estimates, women's representation in a terrorist group's membership is between 10 and 15%), their engagement in terrorist activities in Indonesia is a something new.

The phenomenon of child, female, and family terrorists is entirely absent in Saudi Arabia. There is no record of child terrorism or underage terrorists in the Kingdom, notwithstanding the existence of youth terrorism, as described earlier. Additionally, there is no record so far of terrorist acts in Saudi Arabia that involve the whole family. It is correct that there are some women of suspected terrorists but they generally provided a minor support toward their husbands (e.g. providing logistics or things related to covert communications), not become suicide bombers, as in the case of Indonesia. None of the Saudi women was involved in terrorist operations and only a handful of the terrorists' wives performed minor logistical and media-related tasks for the terrorist groups like the QAP (al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula) and ISIL. Small other wives accompanied their husbands in their underground activities (Hegghammer 2006: 40–42). This is to say that, unlike in Indonesia, terrorism in Saudi Arabia is a male phenomenon.

Indeed, there were intensive recruitment programs in the past Saudi Arabia to prepare women for jihad, including committing terrorist acts. The recruitment took place especially after the campaign by the Saudi

[6] The report is about foreign women's support for and participation in ISIL's activities. It highlights foreign women from across the globe who traveled to Syria or Iraq to join the terrorist group. Although women's radicalization to extremism and terrorism is not a new phenomenon, ISIL's success in attracting, mobilizing, and recruiting women worldwide is remarkable.

government to round up al-Qaeda members since the late 1990s or early 2000s. A specialist of terrorism studies, Abdullah Ansary, has noted that the spread of radical ideology among women in Saudi Arabia is attributed to female Internet forums and mail groups supervised by, for instance, al-Qaeda or ISIL sympathizers. Among those who have adopted radical views and ideas are mothers, sisters, and spouses. Their husbands or relatives usually either persuaded or coerced them to join militant and terrorist groups (Ansary 2008: 5–6). However, many women have refused such pressures and have been helpful to the Saudi authorities, and only a handful of wives accompanied their terrorist husbands in their underground existence by conducting minor things such as logistical assistance or media-related tasks (Hegghammer 2006: 41–2).

Third, rationales, motives, objectives, means, and roots of terrorism in Indonesia seem to be more wide-ranging than those in Saudi Arabia. Islamist terrorism in Saudi Arabia is generally motivated by the desire to purify the Kingdom and its society from "foreign, Western, non-Islamic influences." The facts that Western people and their properties have been among the targets of terrorist operations in the Kingdom indicate this tendency. Moreover, few "hardcore terrorists" perhaps want to topple the Saud family-dominated government, which they accused as the "Western puppet." Hegghammer also argued that, based on patterns of Islamist violence in Saudi Arabia, it has been much easier to mobilize Saudis for extreme pan-Islamist activism than for revolutionary activism to overturn the government (Hegghammer 2009: 395–416).

Conversely, Indonesia's Islamist terrorism was not only motivated by the wish to overthrow the secular government or state authorities, set up Islamic ideology, and replace the existing political–governmental system with a caliphate or sharia-based state and rule, as proclaimed by various Islamist terrorists (see e.g. Hwang and Schulze 2018; Schulze and Hwang 2019), but other motives as well. These include the retaliation against the West (for their interventions in Muslim-majority nations), the replacement of the political, economic, and ideological systems with those propagated by secessionist groups, either communists or other radical factions; business competition; or vengeance, among others. Secular motives are obvious since Indonesian terrorism is also typified by secular terrorism.

Fourth, the terrorist targets are more diverse in Indonesia than Saudi Arabia. Terrorists in Saudi Arabia, with few notable exceptions, generally targeted properties of the Saudi government or American, government officials, Westerners, security forces, and Shiites (along with their mosques). In Indonesia, terrorists targeted not only government officials and Westerners (for Islamist terrorists as in the case of the 2002 Bali bombings) along with their properties (e.g. hotels or cafes), or the security forces but also banks, markets, housing complexes, police stations, offices, restaurants, public buildings, non-Muslim worship places (e.g. churches, temples and so forth), among others. Unlike in Saudi Arabia, there are no terrorists in Indonesia that targeted and blasted Shia mosques. Some of Indonesia's Shia mosques were attacked by vigilante organizations or paramilitary groups linked to particular Muslim associations, not terrorists.

Fifth, terrorists' financial sources, despite some similarities (e.g. the use of charity donations, as depicted earlier), also differ between Indonesia's terrorists and those of Saudi Arabia. For example, terrorists in Indonesia obtained their funds to finance their operations came from not only al-Qaeda and donors in home and abroad (as the case of Islamist terrorists) but also from robbing banks. Since the 1980s, bank robbery has been one of the main methods for Islamist terrorists to fund their operations. This phenomenon is absent in Saudi Arabia. In fact, al-Qaeda's operations in the past had been funded by some Saudis, including Bin Laden himself. As well, there is no sufficient data about the bank robbery by terrorists to finance their operations. Saudi terrorists in the Kingdom or overseas generally received funds from Saudi individual benefactors and charitable institutions, in addition to their own money.

Sixth, terrorists of Saudi nationalities generally came from middle-class or even wealthy families. A handful of the terrorists are known to have come from influential elite members of society. At least, the majority of terrorists in Saudi Arabia were not from poor families, albeit some of them, especially the youth, were unemployed. Others were students at universities. In his study on the socioeconomic background of terrorists in Saudi Arabia, particularly members of the al-Qaeda Arabian Peninsula (QAP), Hegghammer has noted that the vast majority of these militants belong to the middle class or lower middle class (middle-high income families), many have religious professions as Islamic teachers, preachers, or others. The fact that the vast majority of terrorists came from Riyadh, a vibrant developed, modernized, industrialized area, not

from "neglected peripheries" that are considered poor such as the far south (e.g. Asir or Jizan) or far north (e.g. Tabuk or Jawf) indicates this hypothesis, namely Saudi Arabia's terrorism is an urban and middle-class phenomenon (Hegghammer 2006: 43–5). This phenomenon is in sharp contrast with Indonesia, in which the vast majority of the terrorists generally came from poor or low-income families.

Seventh, the presence of lone offenders or lone offend actors. In recent years, Indonesia had witnessed a series of terrorist acts committed by "lone offenders", namely extremists who committed terrorism alone and independent of any terrorist organizations. The lone offenders were usually victims of propaganda and indoctrination of radical clerics, through online or offline preaching, or writings containing extremist ideologies and teachings. Some of them committed terrorism because they wanted to take revenge for their husbands, families, or friends, who were captured, jailed, or shot to death by the anti-terrorist squad (Densus 88). To my knowledge, the phenomena of lone offenders, with few exceptions, barely happen in Saudi Arabia. There were some cases of suicide bombings in the Kingdom in which the terrorists sometimes act alone (e.g. the case of the Qatif mosque bombing) but they were usually associated with—or operated under the auspices of—particular terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda or ISIL.

Eighth, the direct involvement of some ex-members of the security apparatus and civil servants (government's employees) in terrorist activities in Indonesia, which is hardly present in Saudi Arabia. Indonesia's National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) reported that, from 2010 to 2020, among terrorist suspects captured, 18 of them were ex-government employees or Aparat Sipil Negara (State Civilian Apparatus) and 13 of them were ex-members of the National Police (Polri) and the National Military (TNI). BNPT also reported that about 19.4% of the total numbers of the active government's employees have been contaminated by the radical and terrorist ideologies.[7] In contrast, much of the Saudi support for terrorism is carried out by non-government employees or non-state actors. Yet, as Daniel Byman of the Brookings Institution has noted, being non-state actors (non-civil servants) does not discharge responsibility of the Saudi government, mainly because they might enjoy

[7] https://m.tribunnews.com/nasional/2021/11/05/bnpt-ungkap-puluhan-pns-jadi-tersangka-kasus-teroris-13-orang-di-antaranya-anggota-tni-polri. Accessed November 11, 2021.

a range of connections[8] with some government's officials. Some might have received direct official patronage while others indirectly. Still, others are truly private, acting independently of the government and at times in opposition to it (Byman 2016).

Ninth, statistics of terrorist acts and casualties. Concerning the number of terrorist acts and casualties, it seems that Saudi Arabia has surpassed Indonesia. Since the bomb blasts in Riyadh[9] in mid-1960s, which were carried out by the Union of the People of the Arabian Peninsula (*ittihad sha'ab al-jazirah al-arabiyah*), a North Yemen-based Nasserite political organization, the Kingdom has experienced hundreds or perhaps thousands of terrorist acts, both major and minor attacks, committed by various militant groups with countless casualties—both dead and wounded (see Chapter 2). Indonesia has indeed witnessed a number of terrorist activities but only few big cases of Islamist terrorism such as the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings in multiple areas in the country, the 2002 Bali bombings, or the 2003 JW Marriot bombing in Jakarta. Excluding the Bali bombings that killed more than 200 people and wounded hundreds of others, the victims of each terrorist act were few. The rest terrorist activities were sporadic minor cases (see Chapter 5).

Tenth, the role of migrant workers in Indonesia's terrorism, which is entirely absent in Saudi Arabia. Surprisingly, as for terrorism in Indonesia, it seems there is a link between immigration or transnationalism, immigrant workers, and terrorism. Indications of this connection are as follows. In 2017, a 34-year-old Indonesian housemaid in Hong Kong was reported to be the head of a pro-ISIL network in the East Asian region, which she used to seek new recruits, raise funds, communicate with other terrorist members, and spread propaganda for ISIL (Mansour-Ille 2020). According to a report of the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, a nongovernmental institution focusing on Indonesia's terrorism and violent extremism, several dozen Indonesian maids working in East Asia, especially Hong Kong and Taiwan, have become involved in a variety of pro-ISIL activities from providing funding for tickets to Syria to marrying fighters online. The workers are among groups that raised

[8] In Saudi Arabia, the term for individual connection is called *wasta*, which is widely used by Saudis to obtain anything including jobs, scholarships, future husbands/wives, and so forth.

[9] After the attacks, the Saudi authorities arrested several hundred Yemenis, executed 17 of them, and expelled the rest.

female extremists in East Asia and the Middle East, in which 45 known Indonesian domestic workers were active supporters of ISIL.

Not only in East Asia, in 2019, three Indonesian domestic workers, all maids, in Singapore became the first domestic workers being arrested and investigated by local authorities under the Internal Security Act for their alleged involvement in financing terrorism and active participation in multiple pro-ISIL social media chat groups and channels (Lai 2019). Moreover, in 2016, female migrant workers initiated terrorist acts in Indonesia. While experts, analysts, commentators, and policymakers were still debating whether ISIL allowed women to become terrorist jihadists, two female migrant workers turned suicide bombers were ready to blow themselves up as part of a planned terrorist attack at the presidential palace in Jakarta and a tourist site in Bali (Nuraniyah 2018).

The various data presented above suggest the link between migration, social media, and terrorism since those domestic migrant workers have been radicalized, among others, through various social media platforms. Interestingly, although Saudi Arabia is a migrant destination, terrorist acts in the Kingdom were mostly carried out by Saudi citizens, not migrant workers. In the 1970s or 1980s, Arab immigrant workers working in Aramco (now Saudi Aramco) company were involved or participated in a series of protests against policymakers in the government or the firm but they were not engaged in terrorist activities. Equally important, although Saudi Arabia is home to many Indonesian domestic female workers, none of them, including the returnees, were involved in terrorist or radical actions.

How do scholars explain this phenomenon? Other interesting questions: why did Indonesian female immigrant workers in Singapore, Taiwan, or Hong Kong engage in terrorist activities? What factors motivated their actions? Under what circumstances these migrant workers, in both home and foreign countries, participated in terrorist activities? This book does not specifically focus on the study of the links between migration and terrorism, and indeed these issues are beyond the scope of this book but such fact and phenomena are interesting for further research and study (see e.g. Mansour-Ille 2020).

Saudi Arabia's Influences on Indonesia's Terrorism?

Is there Saudi Arabia's influence on Indonesia's terrorism? Or, does Saudi Arabia contribute to the rise of Indonesia's Islamist terrorism? While it is difficult and almost impossible to see and provide evidence of Indonesia's influences on Saudi Arabia's terrorism, the vast majority of scholars (both Indonesians and foreigners, particularly Westerners) and Indonesian ordinary people generally believe that Saudi Arabia has partially contributed to the emergence of Islamist terrorism in contemporary Indonesia. They contend that one of the primary reasons for the rise of Islamist terrorist and paramilitary jihadist groups in the post-New Order Indonesia is the growing influence of Middle Eastern Islam in the country.

Of all the Middle Eastern (or Near Eastern) countries, Saudi Arabia has generally been accused or considered by many observers, journalists, policymakers, analysts, and public in general to be one of the major players, contributors, influencers, or transmitters of Islamist terrorism and jihadism in Indonesia, in addition to Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, or Palestine.[10] Several factors contributed to the process of Islamist influence and terrorist transmission from the Middle East to Indonesia. These factors include globalization, the emergence of Internet and social media, the increasing penetration of mass communications, as well as generous Middle Eastern (particularly Saudi) sponsorship of radical outreach programs and activities.

The reality, however, is far more complicated than these assumptions or stereotypes suggest. As Bubalo and Fealy (2005: 48–9) have rightly argued, there is a wide range of Islamist thinking, ideas, ideologies, practices, and behavior in the Middle East, from the innovative and the pragmatic to virulent jihadist-Salafism. Accordingly, to characterize all of Middle Eastern Islamism as dangerously radical or extremist is to miss a large part of the mosaic. Moreover, Islamism has never been uniquely Middle Eastern. South Asia (Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India) has also been major contributors and transmitters of Indonesian Islamism and terrorism. In the past, a significant number of Indonesians had traveled

[10] The influence of Egypt in Indonesia is generally through the networks of Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwanul Muslimin), Yemen was via an alumni network of the country's Islamic learning centers, Palestine is through Hamas connection, and Syria/Iraq was through ISIL network and sympathizers.

to this region, either to join the Arab Afghan Mujahidin group, connect al-Qaeda organization, or learn Islam in conservative Deobandi Islamic schools (madrasas).

Equally important, Indonesian Islam, while mainly irenic and tolerant (if compared with other Muslim-majority countries in South Asia, Middle East, or North/West Africa), has also had a long history of violent minority radicalism and extremism, before, during, and after the Dutch and Japanese colonialism, which owed little to external influences, whether from the Middle East, South Asia, or elsewhere (see Chapter 5). Indeed, these largely endogenous movements have been a major recruiting ground for present-day Islamist jihadists and terrorists (Solahudin 2013). In brief, Indonesia's terrorism of any types, including Islamist terrorism, has been influenced by multiple internal (local/domestic) and external (foreign/international) factors and roots.

Saudi Arabia's influences on Indonesian Islam are multifaceted involving both constructive and destructive influences and relationships in a variety of sectors, including education and other socio-cultural and religious matters. I have explained these issues in the previous publications; thereby, there is no need for me to re-explain them in this book (Al Qurtuby 2019; Al Qurtuby and Aldamer 2018). Suffice to say that as the birthplace of Islam, Saudi Arabia has, not surprisingly, been a powerful force in shaping the Islamic faith of Muslims in Indonesia. However, the term Saudi Arabia should be understood in terms of specific geography, location, and territory in the Arabian Peninsula, or Saudi Arabia's institutions, and not as a Saudi society. In other words, Saudi Arabia's influences on Indonesia's Islam do not always mean or refer to the influence of Saudi Muslims to Indonesian Muslims.

Historically and actually to some extent until nowadays, many Indonesians studied Islamic sciences in various centers of Islamic learning and educational institutions in the past Hijaz (especially the Haramain, a nickname for Mecca and Medina) or modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia under the auspices of non-Saudi Islamic scholars and teachers. A large number of Indonesian scholars in the past centuries, before the founding of the modern Saudi Kingdom, had been teaching in the Haramaian, and many Malay-Indonesian students studied Islam under their auspices (Rachman 1997; Azra 2004). Or, if they were Saudis, it does not always mean Salafis, Hanbalis, or Wahhabis. Many of them were actually Sufis, gurus of tareka orders, or Islamic scholars coming from various schools of thought of Islamic jurisprudence (madhhab), especially the Shafi'i and

Maliki schools. Equally important, Salafis, Hanbalis, or Wahhabis do not always mean Saudis since many of them came from outside Saudi Arabia such as Yemen, Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Pakistan, or India, among others. All of this complexity should be taken into consideration when analyzing the phenomenon of Indonesian Islamist terrorism to avoid misleading overgeneralization.

Many major streams of ideas, thoughts, and practices in Saudi Arabia (past and present), whoever its carriers, either Saudis or non-Saudis, have made their way to Indonesia since past centuries. By Indonesian Muslims, throughout history, some of these streams have been absorbed and practiced directly without modification and adjustment since they consider and believe that "Arab Islam" represents the true and pristine form of Islam. Other Muslims selected and modified various forms of "Arab Islam," combining them with existing Indonesian local knowledge, practices, cultures, and traditions. The result is a local form of Islam or a hybrid Islam that resembles its Arabian antecedents but that also has distinguishing features of local / Indonesian components. Since recent years, some supporters of this hybrid Islam call it Islam Nusantara[11] (Nusantara Islam) as the opposition of Arab Islam.

Concerning Saudi Arabia's influences on—or contributions to—Islamist terrorism in Indonesia, scholars and observers (e.g. Ramakrishna 2014; Karnavian 2014; Gunaratna 2016; Hwang and Schulze 2018) generally refer to several factors, indicators, or facts as follows. First, the fact that some Indonesian Islamist terrorists have admitted that they made contacts directly with Osama Bin Laden during their "jihad war" against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s as well as during their involvement with the Afghan Mujahidin in the post-Afghan War or with al-Qaeda in the 1990s. This means that Saudi religious ideas (or the flows of Saudi notions of Islam to Indonesia) have not always come directly from the Kingdom to the archipelago. Interactions between Indonesians and those expressing Saudi interpretations of Islam have taken place in other venues, including Afganistan during and after the Afghan War. Thus, Indonesians traveling to Afghanistan at that time came in contact with Saudis who might influence their concept of Islam.

[11] Nusantara is a sort of "historic/ancient name" of contemporary Indonesian archipelago.

For example, Abu Fida[12] (a nickname for M. Saifudin Umar), a former Islamist terrorist, said that he met Bin Laden in Pakistan or Afghanistan in late 1980s, whom he described as a "modest and generous person." His experience of encounter with Bin Laden was conveyed in a webinar I attended on November 11, 2021. Imam Samudra, one of the 2002 Bali bombers who was sentenced to death by the Indonesian government, in his book, also wrote experiences of Indonesian jihadist terrorists who met Ben Laden in Pakistan or Afghanistan (Samudra 2004). Indeed, Bin Laden was instrumental in shaping networks of international terrorist groups through al-Qaeda (Abuza 2002b; Jones 2005). In fact, leaders, activists, and members of Jamaah Islamiyah [including Abu Fida whom I met virtually and certainly its founders Abdullah Sungkar (d. 1999) and Abu Bakar Baasyir], one of Indonesia's notorious terrorist organizations, had pledged allegiance to Ben Laden and al-Qaeda (ICG 2002a, 2002b). Although the Saudi government has revoked Osama Bin Laden's citizenship (as well as his children), people still regard him as a Saudi. Accordingly, they reckon Bin Laden's influence is equal to Saudi influence, despite the fact that Bin Laden himself (through his network and branch, namely al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula, which operated mainly in Saudi Arabia and Yemen) had committed a series of terrorist attacks in the Saudi Kingdom to fight against the government and the ruling family (see Chapter 2).

The second important factor or indicator is that some Islamist terrorist actors had indeed graduated from Saudi Arabia's Islamic educational institutions and learning centers. Indeed, religious interaction between the Arabian Peninsula and Indonesia through various centers and institutions of Islamic learning has a long history. Abu Fida himself graduated from Umm Al Qura University at Mecca. He studied Islamic sciences at this university between 1990 and 1996. Other notorious Islamist figures graduated from Saudi Arabia's Islamic universities are Ja'far Umar Talib, the founder of Laskar Jihad (Jihad Forces) and Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, the founder of Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front). Both the Laskar Jihad and the Front Pembela Islam (the government has dissolved these two organizations) have received a negative image among Indonesians due to their violent actions. Other Islamist terrorists had participated

[12] Abu Fida was captured twice (and jailed) by the Densus 88 Anti-Terrorist squad for participating in various terrorist acts but later, after being deradicalized, he was released, and since then he has involved in the government-sponsored de-radicalization programs.

or attended various informal religious sermons at mosques or schools while they stayed in Saudi Arabia.

The locations of the Islamic educational institutions or learning centers can be in Saudi Arabia or Indonesia. For example, a number of Islamist terrorists and radical militants graduated from Jakarta-based Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab (known as LIPIA), an institute for Arabic and Islamic studies (formerly Lembaga Pengajaran Bahasa Arab or LPBA—the Institute for the Study of Arabic Language). Founded in 1980 by the Saudi government, LIPIA is a branch of Riyadh's Al Imam Muhammad Bin Saud Islamic University,[13] which offers bachelor degrees in Islamic studies and the Arabic language. For many years, the best alumni of LIPIA have had a chance to continue their studies and pursue degrees et al. Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University. LIPIA represents a Saudi microcosm where conservative strict forms of Islam, Salafi norms, teachings, discourses, and traditions prevail. Moreover, LIPIA not only helps Saudis influence Indonesian society but it also provides a gateway to all of Southeast Asia.

I have explained elsewhere (Al Qurtuby 2019) that, since the 1970s or 1980s, a number of Indonesian students have learned Islamic studies at some Saudi universities, most notably Umm Al Qura University (Mecca), Islamic University (Medina), Al Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University (Riyadh), Taibah University (Medina), Qassim University, Majmaah University, and King Abdul Aziz University, among others. Of these universities, the Islamic University of Medina (IUM) has been the largest host for Indonesian Muslim students pursuing multiple degrees in the Islamic sciences and disciplines such as Islamic law, hadith exegesis, da'wa (proselytizing), Qur'anic exegesis, and Islamic theology (aqidah), among others.[14] Students who receive their Islamic training from Salafi teachers and Islamist scholars (as non-Salafi and non-Islamist ones) would also tend to introduce, develop, and become the strongest advocates of Islamism, Islamic Salafism, puritanism, or Wahhabism in Indonesia. Later

[13] Initially, LIPIA was established in Jakarta in 1980 but now, reportedly, it has some other branches in Makassar (South Sulawesi), Surabaya (East Java), Medan (North Sumatra), and Aceh.

[14] At present, there are more than 1,000 Indonesian students at the Islamic University of Medina, while in other universities such as Umm al-Qura University, Taibah University, and Al-Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University, there are less than a hundred students.

on, the militant factions of the Islamist and Salafi groups created and raised tension and conflict with the local Muslim and non-Muslim populations in many areas in the archipelago from Sumatra in the west to Papua in the east.

The third indicator of Saudi influence or contribution to Indonesian Islamist terrorism concerns about the financial sources and support flowing from Saudi Arabia to some Indonesian Salafi and Islamist groupings as well as (some) perpetrators of terrorism. The support can be from private individuals, agencies, charitable organizations, or some factions in the government. In 2006, for example, the US Department of the Treasury designated the Philippine and Indonesian branches of the Saudi-based International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) as bankrolling the al-Qaeda network based on the role played by Abd Al Hamid Sulaiman Al-Mujil in keeping a network of donors interested in supporting extremism, including terrorism.[15]

It is true that since the rise of al-Qaeda, the Saudi government has realized the dangers of financial supports from Saudi society (individuals or private organizations) for financing foreign terrorist activities; thereby, it took serious steps and firm actions by composing strict regulations concerning international financial transfers. The Saudi government also froze or closed down charitable organizations (e.g. Haramain Foundation), along with their assets, which were alleged for being financers of global terrorism (see Chapter 3). Many scholars also pointed out Saudi scholarships for foreign Muslim students (including Indonesians) who wanted to study in the Kingdom's Islamic universities as part of the "Saudi support" for proliferating global jihadism and terrorism since a number of their alumni engaged in jihadist and terrorist activities abroad. The Saudi financial support can also be in the form of financing publications (books, magazines, newsletters, etc.) related to Salafi and Wahhabi teachings, which are run by various Indonesian Islamist and Salafi groups, since the 1980s (Noorhaidi 2006).

[15] US Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Designates Director, Branches of Charity Bankrolling Al Qaida Network," 3 August 2006, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp45.aspx. Accessed 23 December 2021.

There have been several channels for Saudi religious aid[16] whose funds were used by Indonesian Muslims to finance multiple activities and programs such as building mosques and schools, scholarships, publications, financial aids to organizations, or Islamic propagation. Other funds were used (or misused) by Indonesian Islamist and radical groups for financing intolerant actions and anti-pluralist movements against religious minority groups and other targets (e.g. objects or practices considered irreligious or un-Islamic), albeit Saudis might be unaware of these cases. In general, Saudis like to donate funds for Islamic charities but they never oversee, double check, or pay attention to how Indonesians use the funds. To attract Saudi philanthropists and donors,[17] Indonesian Muslims generally make proposals related to building mosques, Islamic schools, Islamic centers, or orphanage foundations (Yayasan Yatim-Piatu). However, in reality, they use the money for various activities. As well, aid was often not tied to specific Wahhabi or Salafi goals, but was placed in order to strengthen Islam within the country. This was even truer after the al-Qaeda-led tragic terrorist bombings, both in USA (2001) and in Saudi Arabia (in 2003), when the Saudi government began to campaign seriously against global terrorism, sought to dampen more radical extremist teachings, and even supported Salafi writings that demonize terrorism termed it un-Islamic.

The fourth factor signifying the Saudi influence on Indonesian Islamist terrorism is related to the formation of Islamist ideology that has spread in the archipelagic country through various ways and channels such as education, preaching, organizations, and publications, among others. As mentioned earlier (Chapter 5), Islamist ideology has been one of crucial factors that contributed to the appearance of Indonesia's Islamist terrorism (Ramakrishna 2014). Certainly, Saudi Arabia is not the only country that played roles in shaping Indonesia's Islamist ideology and a more narrow puritanical brand of Islam. Other countries

[16] During the New Order era, Suharto worried about Saudi Arabia's impact in Indonesia, leading to the requirement that all external aid come through Jakarta (the central government). But, many Saudi funds still went to private Islamic institutions such as, most notably, DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia—the Indonesian Society for the Propagation of Islam), LIPIA (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab—the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Studies), and other more new Islamic organizations.

[17] Saudi providers have included the Saudi government, individual Saudis, and Saudi religious foundations and charities (for instance, the Haramain Foundation, which was closed by the Saudi government in 2004 for charges related to terrorist financing).

like Egypt, Yemen, or Pakistan, also contributed to the formation of the ideology through their extensive alumni networks. But Saudi Arabia does contribute significantly to the shaping of the country's Islamist ideology.

Furthermore, in the past, Saudi efforts to export its strict Islamic discourse or conservative forms and radical interpretation of Islam to Indonesia coincided with what so-called Islamic Revivalism that greeted the country and other parts of Southeast Asia, especially Malaysia, in the post Iranian Islamic Revolution. This was a period of, citing von der Mehden (2014) "increased awareness of Islamic principles, the introduction of a more modest dress code, greater attention to Islam by politicians, the expansion of Islamic thought and organizations into university life, and efforts to practice Islam in a more disciplined manner."[18] In the 1980s onwards the Saudi "religious mission" in Indonesia was launched amid other events (e.g. Israel-Palestine conflict, the Afghan War, or the Iranian Revolution) that in turn significantly affected the religious perceptions of Indonesian Muslims. That era was also marked by a wide range of introductions and translations into Indonesian language of the works of some prominent Middle Eastern and South Asian Islamist and Salafi scholars and activists (e.g. Hasan Al Banna, Sayyid Qutub, Abul A'la Maududi, and many others including Saudi ulama), and in many cases with Saudi funding. Coincidentally, this came at a time when Indonesia, through the *Pembangunan Nasional* (National Development) programs, had advanced significantly in education, providing a population capable of reading the material made available to them. At the time, the Islamic Revivalism did not touch political parties because Suharto dictatorial regime controlled them severely but now (since the downfall of Suharto in 1998), the Islamist and Salafi ideas have influenced various political parties.

No doubt that Saudi Arabia has made some influences, directly or indirectly, on the emergence and development of Islamist terrorism in Indonesia. However, few things need to be clarified and reemphasized. For example, the term "Saudi Arabia" does not always mean Saudi state and society. It can be, among others, persons (teachers or scholars) of any ethnic group (Arab or non-Arab alike) and nationality that were teaching in Saudi Arabia's educational institutions and were influencing Indonesian students. As well, Saudi Arabia is not the only foreign agent or actor

[18] https://www.mei.edu/publications/saudi-religious-influence-indonesia. Accessed 23 December 2021.

that contributed to the formation of Indonesia's Islamist ideology and terrorism. In this regard, Yemen, in particular, needs to be taken into consideration.

A small number of Indonesian Muslim students, particularly those having strict Salafi and Islamist backgrounds, studied at Yemen-based Salafi educational institutions such as Al-Iman University (Sana'a) and Dar al-Hadith (in Dammaj, al-Fiyoush, al-Shihr, Marib, and Ma'bar). More specifically, Al-Iman University, founded by Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, who was a confidant of Osama bin Laden in the 1980s and is listed by the United States as a "specially designated global terrorist," has long been a key destination for Indonesian Yemeni-Salafis, particularly tiny radical Salafi-Islamist circles. Having been accused of having connections to some international terrorist groups, the university is very sensitive on the topic of foreign students and instructs students not to speak with outsiders on issues relating to the way the university is run. This is a reflection of the university's notoriety, particularly since the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, where the university was dubbed as a home for a number of high-profile terrorists and terrorist suspects, perhaps most famously the American extremist John Walker Lindh. The university was closed down temporarily after 9/11 and a large number of foreign students and former students received terrorism-related charges (Al Qurtuby 2019: 141–2).

Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that Indonesia has a small "Yemeni-Salafi" circle that traditionally sends students to a variety of Salafi institutions in Yemen in the south of the Arabian Peninsula. The term "Yemeni-Salafi" does not necessarily mean a Salafi group of Yemeni descent, albeit many are, but refers to those that follow the religious teachings of well-known Salafi scholars of Yemeni nationality such as the late Shaikh Mukbil bin Hadi al-Wad'i, Shaikh Yahya al-Hajuri, and Shaikh Abdulrahman al-Adeni as well as Saudi ulama who have close relations with Yemeni-Salafi scholars and shaikhs, most notably Shaikh Rabi al-Madkhali (Bubalo, Phillips, and Yasmeen 2011: 37). However, it is central to understand that Indonesian Salafi and Islamist groups are not monolithic having similar concerns, networks, and objectives. They are divided, and the division reflects (but also interacts with) a conflict within Yemen's Salafi community (e.g. a conflict between Shaikh Yahya al-Hajuri and Abdul-Rahman al-Adeni) (ibid., 40–2). This conflict in turn influences Indonesian Salafi groups in the decision of selecting Yemeni-Salafi learning centers.

It is also significant to take a note that, there are a great deal of Indonesian Muslim students who have essentially already become Salafi, Wahhabi, or Islamist before their departure to Saudi Arabia since they have long been educated in Indonesia's Salafi, Wahhabi, or Islamist educational institutions such as Al-Irsyad, Pesantren Darun Najah, Pondok Modern Gontor, Pondok Pesantren Imam Bukhari, Islamic Center Bin Baz, Ma'had Al Birr, Pondok Pesantren Hidayatullah, and Pondok Pesantren Khusnul Khotimah, among others. Students from these Islamic learning centers are able to continue their studies in Saudi Arabia because of networks or well-established contact they (the institutions and their teachers and owners) have long built with Saudi academic institutions.

Lastly, but not least, changes do happen in various issues. For example, educational scholarships for Indonesian students who studied at the Kingdom's universities are not always provided by the Saudi government, Saudi private agencies, and Saudi individuals. Many scholarships are actually provided by Indonesian governmental institutions, private agencies, and individual sponsors or a collaboration between the two (Saudi Arabia and Indonesia) to share portions of scholarships such as tuition, airfare tickets, stipends, and living expenses in the Kingdom. Yayasan Maghfirah Bina Ummat (YMBU),17 Jakarta, for instance, has begun to provide scholarships for talented Muslim students who are interested in studying Islam at the Islamic University at Medina. This foundation has signed an MoU with the university. Part of the agreement is that the YMBU will provide scholarship grants of SR 30,000 per year while the university will provide airfare tickets, stipends (SR 800 per month), books, and so on. Currently, there are about fifty students studying at the Islamic University under this scholarship scheme (Al Qurtuby 2019: 157–8).

To conclude, notwithstanding Saudi Wahhabi/Salafi roles, contributions, and influences on Indonesian Muslims, there are a number of factors that could become a stumbling block or a major hindrance to their widespread expansion. First, although in decline and being contested, Indonesian Islam (particularly in non-urban settings and countryside) is typified by a tradition of syncretism, incorporating local beliefs and practices into Islamic faith, which does not fit the Wahhabi/Salafi-typed puritanical form of Islam. Indonesian Muslims in general also like to enjoy music, artistic products, and other local performance arts (e.g. *wayang* or shadow play and others), which are outlawed by Wahhabis and Salafis. Their "outer appearance" might be changed (e.g. by wearing hijab) but their "inner habitual practice" remains the same (e.g. enjoy music and

performances). Many of those wearing hijab are actually because of "social pressure" not because of religious reasons.

Secondly, although it is a generally false perception, the vast majority of Indonesian populace have generally equated Wahhabis and Salafis with fanaticism, radicalism, and militancy, or even terrorism and have been cautious about their public presence and roles in contemporary Indonesia. Indeed, due to their harsh comments and violent, intolerant acts against religious minorities (non-Muslim, Muslim, or local believers) or local cultural practices, there is strong public opposition to this conservative group. Statements from media, moderate Islamic scholars, civil leaders, academicians, state authorities, and many others have reinforced negative attitudes. Various Muslim organizations, most notably Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), also have attempted to weaken Wahhabi / Salafi influences in mosques, schools, and other venues, including social media platform.

Thirdly, many Indonesian citizens-Muslim and non-Muslim-have not been comfortable with the "Arabization" of Indonesia; therefore, some of them, particularly within NU circles, created Islam Nusantara to challenge "Arab Islam," which is symbolized through the Wahhabi/Salafi movement. Although Saudi religious and cultural practices as well as the government policies have changed dramatically in recent years, Indonesian attitudes and perceptions of Arab Islam and Wahhabi/Salafi groupings do not change significantly. Finally, for the moment, the government, state authorities, and the dominant political parties have been controlled by secular factions, and many of them have been wary of Wahhabi/Salafi roles and influences on the country's religious practice and environment.

However, the contest is not finished yet, and many factors could change the face of Indonesian Islam in future. Meanwhile, national politics and central government are under the control of non-Islamist groups (i.e. nationalists, liberals, and moderates) but conservative Muslims' influences also grow in cultural domains and religious matters. A number of political elites and high-ranking bureaucrats also build alliances with various Islamist and Salafi conservative groupings. In this religious, political, and ideological contest, Saudi Arabia (both government and society) and Saudi-trained Indonesian Muslims will continue to play a role and influence the society through various means, including education. As

Carolyn Nash (2018) has noted, "As Indonesia's democracy accommodates the political agendas of hardline Muslim groups, Saudi-funded Islamic education continues to generate demand."[19]

Concluding Remarks

Few conclusions can be drawn as follows. Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have shared in common regarding incidents or cases of terrorism. The similarities include some actors involved in or motives behind terrorism. However, differences also take place. Each country has some variations and internal dynamics related to terrorism's roots, rationales, or agencies. For example, actors engaged in terrorism in Indonesia tend to be more complex involving children, women, and family members, which are absent in Saudi Arabia. Factors and rationales of Indonesia's terrorism are also more complicated and diverse than those of Saudi Arabia. Lastly, Saudi Arabia has indeed played some roles and had some influences on Indonesia's terrorism, especially Islamist terrorism.

However, many things began to change since recent years as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia started shifting its policies and orientations by embracing a moderate form of Islam and reforming many cultural, religious, and educational thoughts, discourses, and practices. The Kingdom has also carried out anti-terrorism and antiradicalism campaigns. Do these productive changes influence—or contribute to—perspectives and practices of Indonesian Muslims, especially Salafi and Islamist groups? Do Indonesian Muslims, particularly the militants and fanatics, who previously admired Saudi Arabia as the model of Islamic and Muslim country, follow progressive steps of the Kingdom? These questions are beyond the scope of this book but it is interesting to find answers to these intriguing queries.

References

Abuza, Zachary. 2002a. "Al-Qaeda's Asian Web of Terror." *Time* (Asia) 160 (22): 38–40.

———. 2002b. "Tentacles of Terror: Al-Qaeda's Southeast Asian Network." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 24 (3): 427–465.

[19] https://www.mei.edu/publications/saudi-arabias-soft-power-strategy-indonesia. Accessed December 23, 2021.

Al Qurtuby, Sumanto. 2019. *Saudi Arabia and Indonesia Networks: Migration, Education and Islam*. London, UK: I.B. Tauris & Bloomsbury.

———, and Shafi Aldamer. 2018. "Saudi-Indonesian Relations: Historical Dynamics and Contemporary Development." *Asian Perspective* 42: 121–144.

Ansary, Abdullah F. 2008. "Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach." *Middle East Policy* XV (2). http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/combating-extremism-brief-overview-saudi-arabias-approach. Accessed September 26, 2015.

Azra, Azyumardi. 2004. *The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia: Networks of Malay-Indonesian and Middle Eastern Ulama in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press.

Blanchard, Christopher, and Alfred Prados. 2007. "Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues." *CRS Report for Congress*. Congressional Research Service.

Bubalo, Anthony, and Greg Fealy. 2005. *Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism, and Indonesia*. Lowy Institute Paper No. 5. Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney.

Bubalo, Anthony, Sarah Phillips, and Samina Yasmeen. 2011. *Talib or Taliban? Indonesian Students in Pakistan and Yemen*. Australia: The Lowy Institute for International Policy.

Byman, Daniel. 2016. "Saudi Arabia and Terrorism Today." *Markaz*, September 29. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/09/29/saudi-arabia-and-terrorism-today/. Accessed November 12, 2021.

Chenoweth. Erica. 2004. "The Origins of Terrorism and Weak Statehood." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, March 11.

Crouch, Harold. 2002. "The Key Determinants of Indonesia's Political Future." *Trends in Southeast Asia* 7: 1–14.

CTED (Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate). 2019. *Gender Dimensions of the Response to Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters*. New York: United Nations Security Council.

Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 2007. "Terrorism, Regime Change and Just War." *Journal of Military Ethics* 6 (2): 131–137.

Gunaratna, Rohan. 2016. "The Islamic State's Eastward Expansion." *The Washington Quarterly* 39 (1): 49–67.

Hegghammer, Thomas. 2006. "Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia." *Middle East Policy* 13 (4): 39–60.

———. 2009. "Jihad, Yes, but Not Revolution: Explaining the Extraversion of Islamist Violence in Saudi Arabia." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 36 (3): 395–416.

———. 2010. *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism Since 1979*. London: Cambridge University Press.

Hwang, Julie Chernov. 2018. *Why Terrorists Quit: The Disengagement of Indonesian Jihadists*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

———, and Kirsten E. Schulze. 2018. "Why They Join: Pathways into Indonesian Jihadi Organizations." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 30 (6): 911–932.

ICG (International Crisis Group). 2002a. "Al-Qaida in Southeast Asia: the Case of the 'Ngruki Network' in Indonesia." ICG Asia Briefing.

———. 2002b. "Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyyah Terrorist Network Operates." ICG Asia Report No. 43.

———. 2003. "Jamaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous." Asia Report No. 63.

———. 2004. "Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix." Asia Report No. 83, September 15.

Jones, Sidney. 2005. "The Changing Nature of Jemaah Islamiyah." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 59 (2): 169–178.

Karnavian, Muhammad Tito. 2014. *Explaining Islamist Insurgencies: The Case of al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah and the Radicalization of the Poso Conflict, 2000–2007*. London, UK: Imperial College Press.

Lai, Linette. 2019. "Three Radicalised Indonesian Maids Detained under Internal Security Act." *The Straits Times*. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/three-radicalised-indonesian-maids-detained-under-internal-security-act. Accessed November 15, 2021.

Mansour-Ille, Dina. 2020. "Social Media and the Dynamics of Radicalization and Violent Extremism Among Female Migrant Workers." *Studies in Ethnicities and Nationalism* 19 (3): 248–269.

Margulies, Peter. 2004. "Making Regime Change Multilateral: the War on Terror and Transitions to Democracy." *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy* 32 (3): 389–420.

Matthiesen, Toby. 2010. "Hizbullah al-Hijaz: A History of the Most Radical Shi'a Opposition Group." *The Middle East Journal* 64 (2): 179–197.

———. 2015. *The Other Saudis: Shiism, Dissent and Sectarianism*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Nash, Carolyn. 2018. "Saudi Arabia's Soft Power Strategy in Indonesia." Middle East Institute. https://www.mei.edu/publications/saudi-arabias-soft-power-strategy-indonesia#_ftn1. Accessed December 23, 2021.

Noorhaidi. 2006. *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest of Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications.

Nuraniyah, Nava. 2018. "Not Just Brainwashed: Understanding the Radicalization of Indonesian Female Supporters of the Islamic State." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 30 (6): 890–910.

Rachman, Abd. 1997. "The Pesantren Architects and their Socio-Religious Teachings (1850 – 1950)." PhD diss., The University of California at Los Angeles.

Ramakrishna, Kumar. 2014. *Islamist Terrorism and Militancy in Indonesia: the Power of the Manichean Mindset*. Berlin, Germany: Springer.

Rotberg, Robert I. 2002. "Failed States in a World of Terror." *Foreign Affairs* 81 (4): 127–140.

Samudra, Imam. 2004. *Aku Melawan Teroris*. Solo: Al Jazeera.

Schmid, Alex, ed. 2011. *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*. London: Routledge.

Schulze, Kirsten E. 2018. "The Surabaya Bombings and the Evolution of the Jihadi Threat in Indonesia." *CTC Sentinel*, July, pp. 1–6.

———, and Julie Chernov Hwang. 2019. "Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: New Insights into Jihad in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 41 (1): 1–13.

Solahudin. 2013. *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jema'ah Islamiyah*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Urban, Mark. 2015. "Bosnia: The Cradle of Modern Jihadism?" *BBC News*, July 2. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33345618.

CHAPTER 9

Comparing Counterterrorism: Saudi Arabia and Indonesia

> Terrorism is adamant. Fight against requires endurance specific counterterrorism, intelligence, and swift operation.
>
> —Michael Harris

Introduction

This chapter compares, examines, and analyzes similarities and differences in anything related to counterterrorism (e.g. approaches, policies, strategies, tactics, programs, and so forth) between Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. What factors contributed to the similarities and differences? What makes Saudi Arabia or Indonesia unique or distinctive concerning strategies and tactics of countering terrorism and radicalism? What are the strengths and weaknesses of their counterterrorism approaches? What challenges do the two countries have in combating terrorism and preventing it from occurring in the future? Is it possible to measure the results and effectiveness of the counterterrorism policies and approaches in the two countries?

Comparing the ways of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia in fighting against terrorism aims to gain knowledge and perspectives of counterterrorism and terrorism prevention that might be useful for scholars, policymakers, academics, activists, conflict resolution practitioners, and other relevant parties and individuals working on areas of peacebuilding, conflict transformation, or interfaith relations. Certainly, as discussed below, there are some common similarities of counterterrorism methods between the two

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022

S. Al Qurtuby, *Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1337-2_9

countries but differences also exist, reflecting distinct levels of diversity, complexity, and uniqueness of social, cultural, historical, political, religious, and demographic makeup of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. The chapter also underlines some criticisms and provides some suggestions for the two governments to improve their counterterrorism approaches and antiradicalism methods. Let me describe their similarities first, followed by discussions about their differences.

Similarities: Some Notes and Assessments

Notwithstanding with the differences in ways of combating terrorism (see next section), I have noticed that the counterterrorism measures of the governments of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia show a remarkable parallel. The following is a detailed explanation of some common resemblances on histories, ways, processes, and approaches of countering terrorism between Saudi Arabia and Indonesia.

One of the similarities, first, is the two countries have a long history of combating terrorism. Some might assume that the counterterrorism approaches in the two countries have been implemented since the infamous incidents of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Yet, as explained in the previous chapters (Chapters 3 and 6), the governments of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia had actually carried out the counterterrorism methods long before the 9/11 blasts and the occurrence of al-Qaeda. In the context of Saudi Arabia, counterterrorism and antiradicalism approaches had been introduced and implemented since the era of King Faisal (1906–1975) in the 1960s. As described in Chapter 3, the application of the counterterrorism approaches became more robust during the late King Abdullah (1924–2015), when he took the throne following the death of his half-brother King Fahd (1921–2005), and reached its peak during King Salman (1935–), when he took the power in 2015. In recent years, the Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman (1985–) has been instrumental and has played a key role in fighting against terrorism and extremism.

Combating terrorism has also had long history in Indonesia. As discussed in Chapter 6, President Sukarno (1901–1970), the country's first president, had applied a limited counterterrorism approach by issuing the anti-subversion law in 1963. The successor of Sukarno's Old Order regime, the New Order government, led by Suharto (1921–2008), had introduced some methods (e.g. the security or military approach) and

policies to overcome terrorism. Suharto's transmigration policies or population transfer method can be seen as part of his strategies to curb terrorism and deradicalized terrorists. During his period, many members of the Darul Islam in West Java, the country's oldest terrorist group, had been transferred to transmigration places in outer Java (especially Sumatra). Whether this approach was successful or not is a different question. Later, the post-New Order governments (since 1999 onward) developed the model of counterterrorism approaches more widely.

Even though approaches of counterterrorism have long history in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, it was the 9/11 catastrophe and other al-Qaeda-linked domestic terrorist attacks in the two countries that actually drove the governments in these nations to take serious, vigorous, and comprehensive approaches to terrorism. More specifically, two major incidents—both linked to al-Qaeda—that triggered the development of more energetic counterterrorism and anti-terrorism approaches, namely the 2002 Bali bombings and the 2003 Riyadh bombings. Following the 9/11 tragedy, particularly a series of AQAP (al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula)—linked Riyadh terrorist attacks in 2003 and JI (Jamaah Islamiyah)—related Bali bombings in 2002, the governments of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia began an ambitious and wide-ranging counterterrorism endeavor, combining hard/military and soft/non-military approaches, to fight radical and terrorist groupings.

The second similarity deals with the use of multiple forms of "hard" (military, security) counterterrorism approaches. The authorities of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia regard the struggle against terrorism and other forms of violent extremism, among others, as a physical, direct combat against terrorists and extremists by using traditional military models. The hard approach primarily entails physical, coercive engagements which cripple destructive plans by terrorists, such as suicide bombings. Through the legislative, judiciary, and executive arms of the state, the two countries use such methods as arrest, surveillance, intelligence, and detention to cripple damaging initiatives by radicals and terrorists.

Until now the Indonesian government uses the security or military approach (mainly through Densus 88 anti-terror squad) to catch and detain Islamist terrorists, mainly those connected to ISIL or local extremist groupings (such as Jamaah Ansharud Daulah), and destroy their

cells and homegrowns in various locations across the country.[1] The anti-terror squad also continues to apprehend Islamist religious leaders and preachers (including those affiliated with the Indonesian Ulama Council) that allegedly support terrorism through various means such as proliferating hate speeches, preaching radical contents, giving financial support, or providing some assistances leading to terrorist acts. In contrast with Indonesia, the Saudi government, for the moment (particularly since 2020 onwards), does not use the "hard" methods to capture the Islamist terrorists linked to al-Qaeda or ISIL. The Saudi government now focuses on handling or intercepting Iran-backed Houthi missile attacks, targeting the Kingdom's government buildings, oil facilities, airports, industrial areas, and other sites.

Third, soft approaches to counterterrorism. Some scholars (e.g. Cortright and Lopez 2007; Boucek 2008b) call the approaches "smart," tactical, and strategic counterterrorism methods.[2] Specialists of terrorism and counterterrorism studies (e.g. Aljunied 2011; Al Zahrani 2012) have noted that one of the distinguishing features of the 'soft' approaches, which differs from "hard" approaches, is that they are designed to win the hearts and minds of radicalizing or radicalized individuals by employing non-coercive methods. More than thirty years ago, Joseph Nye, an American political scientist, developed a concept of soft power, which refers more or less to "the ability of an entity to shape the preferences of others through economic or cultural appeals, rather than through coercion in the form of strength or military might" (Nye 1990: 166). In Aljunied's words, "through soft power a country can get others to want what it wants, without the other being ordered to want it" (Aljunied 2011: 3).

[1] In 2019 the Indonesian police (Densus 88) arrested approximately 296 terror suspects and killed at least six for resisting arrest. Among those arrested was Para Wijayanto, the suspected leader of al-Qaeda-linked Jamaah Islamiyah, for his role in the 2002 Bali bombings and other attacks. https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/indonesia/. Accessed December 3, 2021. Recently, the police also captured members of the Indonesian Ulama Council for allegation of being involved in terrorist activities.

[2] Such terms as smart, tactical, or strategic are problematic and inaccurate at some points. Calling a nonmilitary approach as smart, tactical, and strategic means that a security/military approach is not smart, tactical, and strategic. In fact, in some cases, a hard approach is more effective than a soft approach, especially in dealing with hardcore terrorism.

Moreover, according to Jessica Stern, a "soft" approach to counterterrorism "seeks to undo the radicalization process by engineering the individual's return to moderate society, usually by providing them with a stable support network, probing their original reasons for radicalizing, and divorcing them from their extreme beliefs and social contacts" (Stern 2010: 108).

Like hard approaches depicted earlier, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have shared in common concerning soft (non-military) models of countering terrorism and radicalism. Like experts of terrorism and counterterrorism studies cited above, the governments of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia understand that defeating terrorism and extremism through hard, military approaches is not enough. The two governments realize that another strategy needs to be carried out to make counterterrorism programs more successful, namely the "soft" counterterrorism approach. Hamed El-Said, an expert of terrorism studies, said that "Long before the 9/11 attacks many scholars and academics were already criticizing the prevailing kinetic approach to countering the phenomenon of terrorism. Those critics have long called for a broader and more balanced approach, one which will rely more on, and incorporate larger aspects of, 'soft' or 'smart' policies as an integral part of the counterterrorism tool kit" (El-Said 2015: 2–3).

There are various ways, models, forms, and practices of soft counterterrorism approaches implemented by the Saudi and Indonesian governments, including programs related to counter-radicalization and de-radicalization such as rehabilitation, reintegration (of terrorists back into their societies), and reeducation for terrorist prisoners by empowering religious leaders, Islamic scholars, and psychologists to provide counter-narratives. Indonesia itself, through the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT), has launched the De-radicalization Blueprint and established a De-radicalization Center for terrorist inmates. Although the two countries introduce counter-radicalization and de-radicalization models, their actual implementation differs from one another, depending on the local cultures and societies of each country. Furthermore, even though Saudi Arabia and Indonesia had applied soft and hard models of combating terrorism, the two countries, as explained in the section, have different details and specificity concerning the approaches because of having different societal structures as well as historical and social contexts.

Fourth, combating terrorist ideology. Besides traditional security, military, and law enforcement attempts to arrest, imprison, kill, or punish terrorists and destroy their cells, the governments of Saudi Arabia and

Indonesia have also launched other tactics and strategies to combat their Islamist ideological justifications for terrorism and radicalism. The Saudi and Indonesian governments contend that in order to defeat terrorism and other types of violent extremism it is imperative to comprehend and refute the ideology or the ideological basis behind it, rather than simply strive to eradicate every terrorist in sight (by using military operations). Proponents of the soft approach, including the governments of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, believe that in order to be effective and efficient in countering and exterminating terrorism and radicalism there needs to be as much emphasis placed on combating the "War on Ideas" as there is on fighting the "War on Terror." In essence, "soft" counterterrorism approaches described above can also be understood as a war of ideas (a battle of thoughts) centered upon issues of legitimacy, authority, and legality/illegality in Islam. The notions of a "battle of thoughts" have also been applied by the Saudi and Indonesian government officials, for example, by using moderate Islamic scholars to engage (and challenge) in Islamic debates against terrorist ideologues.

Fifth, combating financial sources for terrorist operation. Terror networks thrive on illicit funding, often hiding behind charitable organizations. This is exactly what happens in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. Realizing the danger of terrorist financing, both countries have a strong commitment to combating this issue, locally (domestically) and globally. The two governments believe that overseeing terrorists' financial flows is an essential component in fighting terrorism in their home countries and overseas. To combat financing of Terrorism, Indonesia has joined various regional and international groups of anti and counterterrorism. For example, since 1999, Indonesia has joined the Asia and Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG-ML) and members of the Steering Committee Group representing countries in the Southeast Asia region. The country has a developed anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism system. As well, Indonesia has enacted anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism laws. In 2018, Indonesia (like Saudi Arabia) also acquired observer status in FATF (Financial Action Task Force). As well, Indonesia is also a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIL. In 2019, Indonesia prosecuted and convicted individuals for financing terrorism. Furthermore, through the Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (PPATK), Indonesia has signed a MoU (Memorandum of Understanding) with the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) from 48 countries aiming at strengthening the government on

issues around handling money laundering and terrorism funding. In brief, Indonesia have committed to combating terrorist financing.

Although the two countries have commitment to fighting terrorist financing, the Saudi government seems to be more firm, serious, and successful in this issue. To combat the threat of terrorist financing, Saudi Arabia has put in place one of the world's strictest financial control systems to prevent funds going to support domestic and global terrorism. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) offers programs and has implemented a technical program to train judges and investigators on legal matters involving terrorism financing and money laundering methods, international requirements for financial secrecy, and methods exercised by criminals to exchange information. Saudi Arabia also works closely with other countries to combat terror financing on a global scale. Last but not the least, the Saudi government has prohibited charities from transferring money abroad as well as banned the collection of cash contributions in mosques and public places. According to Celina Realuyo, former US State Department Director of Counterterrorism Finance Programs, Saudi Arabia has taken significant national, regional, and international steps to stem the flow of funds to terrorist groups. Various measures have been instituted to better regulate and secure the formal banking sector, alternative remittance systems like hawalas, and charitable organizations (Realuyo 2015).

Sixth, building networks, connections, and partnership with other countries. Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have also built connections with foreign countries and international counterterrorism agencies to combat terrorism and radicalism. The governments of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia realize that terrorism is not only a local (domestic) but also a global (international) phenomenon. Accordingly, combating it requires international cooperation. Both countries have built partnerships and forged allies with foreign governments and their agencies and counterterrorism security forces, international communities, as well as multilateral organizations aiming at advancing counterterrorism objectives and protecting national security. While Saudi Arabia has established partnerships with the United States and the United Kingdom, besides its neighboring states in the Gulf, particularly Bahrain, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, Indonesia has collaborated with the United States and Australia, in addition to its adjacent countries such as Singapore and Malaysia. Certainly, these are not the only countries where Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have established coalitions and networks for fighting against terrorism. In fact,

the two countries have continuously developed partnerships in counterterrorism and antiradicalism with many states as well as non-state and interstate institutions (e.g. the United Nations and other international bodies) across the world. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have also joined forces to strengthen multiple counterterrorism programs (see Chapter 10).

Besides what I have mentioned previously, other parallels of counterterrorism approaches between Saudi Arabia and Indonesia include the following issues such as an emphasis on reforming the anti-terror regulations, intelligence sharing with western security services (especially the United States and some European countries), creation of financial intelligence units (FIU), and compliance with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations on anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing (Ashraf 2007: 92–3).

Differences: Some Notes and Assessments

Apart from the resemblances, dissimilarities on counterterrorism also exist. I have highlighted at least eight differences as follows.

First, the primary institutions of counterterrorism. For many years, the Saudi Ministry of Interior has long been the main agency or institution that designs models, policies, and programs related to counterterrorism and counter-radicalism, added with the Ministry of Defense. However, in 2017, King Salman issued a royal decree on the establishment of the State Security Presidency (or the Presidency of State Security) or the Mabahith. The decree stipulates that all security institutions should be linked to the State Security Presidency that has a motto, "A homeland we don't protect we don't deserve to live in." These include the General Directorate of Investigation, the Special Security Forces, Special Emergency Force, Air Security, General Directorate of Forensics, and National Information Center, among others. The counterterrorism and domestic intelligence services are also under the State Security Presidency, which is overseen by the king. Furthermore, since the founding of the State Security Presidency, headed by Abdul Aziz Al-Howairini, all issues related to the Kingdom's national security, including terrorism and any type of radicalism, will be handled by this body.[3]

[3] https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2017/07/21/Saudi-Arabia-Royal-order-to-establish-a-state-security-presidium. Accessed September 20, 2020.

In Indonesia, by contrast, the primary institutions that have responsibility to handle programs related to counterterrorism are Densus 88 (a special counterterrorism unit comprising elite members of the National Police) for the "hard," security, or military counterterrorism approach and BNPT (a semi-independent governmental body, previously a counterterrorism desk under the Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Law and Security Affairs) for the "soft" (non-military) counterterrorism method. Certainly, in the implementation of the counterterrorism programs, both Densus 88 and BNPT coordinate with relevant government ministries and departments, including the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, as well as the military forces. Densus 88 is actually not the only anti-terror squad. There are other anti-terror military units such as Datasemen Khusus 81 Kopassus or Sat-81 (for the Army), Datasemen Jalamangkara or Denjaka (for the Navy), Satuan Bravo 90 or Satbravo-90 (for the Air Forces), and Komando Operasi Khusus Gabungan or Koopssusgap (a mixture of all the anti-terror military units, namely Sat-81, Denjaka, and Satbravo-90).[4] However, of all these military/police squads of anti-terror, Densus 88 is the most dominant and well known.

Second, the governments' contributions to international counterterrorism initiatives. The Saudi government, unlike Indonesia, has sponsored and funded several international counterterrorism centers and programs as part of the Kingdom's commitment in the combat of global terrorism. During the late King Abdullah, the Kingdom had donated hundreds of millions of US dollars to initiate international counterterrorism centers and assist their programs, including the United Nations Center for Counter-Terrorism, aiming at augmenting their qualities, equipment, capacities, and effectiveness in helping countries facing terrorist threats. The Kingdom's generous efforts in supporting international counterterrorism initiatives continue nowadays under King Salman and the Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman. For example, in 2017, the current ruling family sponsored and inaugurated the founding of the Islamic Military Counter-Terrorism Coalition, consisting of 41 countries and identifying the coalition as a pan-Islamic unified front against violent extremism. Indonesia, by contrast, because of limited financial resources,

[4] https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20180514202206-20-298176/lima-pasukan-elite-anti-teror-di-indonesia. Accessed December 4, 2021.

to my knowledge, never sponsors financially the establishment of international or transnational counterterrorism institutions (see Chapter 4). The government focuses on financing counterterrorism programs (counter-radicalization and de-radicalization programs) in Indonesia that spends lots of funds.

Third, the role of society or non-state actors/agencies (e.g. nongovernmental social groupings and individuals) in combating terrorism seems to be less dominant in Saudi Arabia than Indonesia. In Saudi Arabia, it is the government, especially the royal family, which has played a paramount and dominant role as well as contributed significantly and immensely to issues related to counterterrorism policies, models, and programs. In Indonesia, conversely, although the government has a significant contribution to counterterrorism approaches, society (e.g. social organizations, civil society associations, nongovernmental institutions, women's groupings, local charismatic leaders, and so forth) also participate in the terrorist de-radicalization, disengagement, integration, and rehabilitation programs. It is true that the Saudi government (the Ministry of Interior) has created the Advisory Committee whose selected members consist of some non-state actors such as moderate Islamic scholars (ulama), university professors (academicians), or psychologists to help smooth and succeed the government-supported counter-radicalization, de-radicalization, and rehabilitation programs.[5] Nevertheless, societal participation is still limited. Public involvement in the counterterrorism and antiradicalism programs (including de-radicalization and rehabilitation programs) is much wider and more noticeable in Indonesia than in the Kingdom.

This contrasting phenomenon can be understood because the two countries have different forms of governmental system and mechanism. In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, authority rests within top government officials, particularly the ruling royal family, which take control of the production and reproduction of all national policies and decisions, thereby, limit public participation. In contrast, since Indonesia embraces a democratic

[5] The Advisory Committee is a group of people who are responsible for running the Counseling Program (or "terrorist rehabilitation program") in the Saudi Ministry of Interior. The committee is divided into or made up of four sub-committee, namely the Religious Subcommittee, the Psychological and Social Subcommittee, the Security Committee, and the Media Subcommittee. The committee travels to visit prisons across the country and meet with detainees throughout the Kingdom.

system, society has also contributed to and influenced the production and reproduction of governmental policies, programs, and decision-making processes related to social issues, including radicalism and terrorism, through various agencies such as the House of Representatives, the People's Consultative Assembly, or channels of influential and charismatic individuals (for instance, religious or community/civil leaders). It is valid to state that certain individuals (e.g. religious clerics, bosses of political parties, or conglomerates) could influence the government's policies and decision-making processes. The Indonesian government itself, especially via BNPT, has coordinated and involved local individuals and social groupings in provincial, district (*kabupaten*), sub-district (*kecamatan*), and village levels such as religious leaders, clerics, scholars, *adat* (custom) chiefs, grassroots activists, practitioners, youths, and so forth (of any gender and religion) as part of the government-sponsored early warning system programs.

Fourth, issues related to combating terrorist financing. In this case, Saudi Arabia seems to be more robust and serious than Indonesia. Although the Indonesian government has certainly had programs and initiatives on combating terrorist financing, its efforts are not as extensive as the Saudi government. In fact, unlike Saudi Arabia, the Indonesian government has difficulty to freeze accounts of terrorist and radical groups (or supporters of terrorism) or curb charitable foundations used to finance radicalism and intolerant acts because of fear for being labeled as anti-Islamic. It is worth mentioning that Saudi Arabia was ranked first in the Gulf and among the top ten within G-20 countries in combating money laundering and terror financing (Realuyo 2015). The Saudi government has put financial resources used by terrorists to fund their violent acts as part of three key issues in the combat of terrorism, the others being actors (i.e., committers of terrorism) and mindset (i.e., ideology and conviction as well as religious understandings and textual interpretations that might drive acts of terrorism) (for more details, see Chapter 3). Realizing funds have become one of the major factors in contributing to terrorist activities the Saudi government has developed various initiatives and policies to stop financial flows from Saudi individual and institutional donors (home and overseas) to Saudi terrorist individuals and organizations, besides freezing accounts of terrorists' suspects.

Indeed, the Saudi government has a good reputation in the combat of money laundering and terrorism financing through various initiatives, programs, and policies. These include cooperation with various relevant

regional and international agencies and organizations, including, among others, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, and the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units (Rudolph 2018). The government has also joined forces with many foreign countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, to track down charitable institutions belonging to Saudi nationals that had used to transfer funds to terrorist perpetrators to fund violent and terrorist acts home and abroad. As a result, under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267, the authorities have frozen assets of charity foundations and organizations dubbed as terrorism funders such as the Haramain Foundation and its international branches (in Pakistan, Tanzania, Kenya, and Indonesia, among others), International Islamic Relief Organization, and Saad Al-Faqih's London-based Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia, among others.

The Saudi government itself, since 2003, has set up new financial controls and banking regulations to stop individuals or organizations (including charity institutions) that financially support terrorism and extremism in the Kingdom and abroad, particularly those committed by Saudi citizens. In 2003, the government established the Saudi Arabian Financial Crimes Unit whose primary tasks include handling money laundering and terror finance cases (Blanchard and Prados 2007; Realuyo 2015). Moreover, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority had issued instructions to all financial institutions in the Kingdom to implement 40 recommendations of the FATF of the G-8 countries regarding money laundering and recommendations concerning terror financing. Although Indonesia has joined several foreign agencies, either governments or non-state institutions, on countering terrorist financing, its execution in the domestic level is not satisfying. Up to now, the Indonesian government is still struggling for combating financial sources used for Islamist terrorism and extremism, many of which hid behind religious charities.

Fifth, the use of media (all types of media–social, online, print, audio, audiovisual, and others) also marks a significant difference between Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. Unlike Indonesia, Saudi Arabia has implemented a strict control of using media aiming at limiting the distribution, transmission, or transformation of ideas and discourses on violence, intolerance, extremism, and terrorism by radicals, extremists, terrorists, or irresponsible individuals and groupings that might contaminate Saudi society. The Indonesian government, by contrast, does not apply a severe control on

the use of media. As a result, societies (of any ethnoreligious group, theological stream, and political affiliation) are free to establish radio stations, television channels, or websites, and enjoy various programs they offer. All religious groups (Muslim and non-Muslim) and Islamic factions—ranging from moderate to conservative and militant—could freely enjoy desired programs and broadcasts presented by hundreds of television channels and radio stations (both local and national) as well as thousands of homepages.

Likewise, Indonesians could watch a variety of religious sermons on YouTube broadcasted by various religious clerics and preachers—Muslim and non-Muslim. Like the moderates and liberals, conservative and militant individuals and groups have and found their rooms to express and seed radical voices and hate speeches in the society through multiple media channels. Such a condition has made radicalism, militancy, and terrorism become easy to distribute, transform, and spread in the society, creating "lone wolves" that are ready for committing violence and terrorism on behalf of religion, ideology, or others.

In fact, self-radicalization has been a common phenomenon among contemporary Indonesians since they could learn and internalize radical notions from the Internet and media. "One of the biggest challenges of the government in combating and eliminating radicalism is the self-radicalization process," said Hamli, a former police and BNPT director.[6] It is correct that a number of recent terrorist suspects admitted that they have learned radical ideas from—and been influenced by—the Internet and social medias, televisions, and others, including techniques of making bombs and grenades. In a webinar, Dwi Djoko Wiwoho, a returnee from Syria, admitted that he, along with his family members, decided to resign his job, sell all his valuable properties, including a house, and then depart for Syria to live in an imagined Islamic caliphate because of influence of ISIL propagation on the Internet.[7]

Sixth, ways of handling and managing Muslim institutions such as mosques, schools, organizations, and Islamic centers. Like televisions or social media, the militants also utilized these institutions as tools to disseminate and propagate radical ideas. In an effort to restrict radical voices and movement in the society, the Saudi government has

[6] Online interview with Hamli, August 2020.

[7] Dwi Djoko Wiwoho in a webinar on August 17, 2020.

controlled such institutions by, for instance, replacing conservative clerics and teachers with moderate and open-minded figures as mosque imams, preachers, or schoolteachers, or overseeing private Islamic institutions, which are almost impossible in Indonesia. Most, if not all mosques in Indonesia are autonomous, operated by private individuals or non-state actors and social groups. The government might sponsor the founding of a mosque but it has no direct authority to rule the mosque. By this means, it is difficult for the government to control them. It is correct that the country has a mosque council, named Dewan Masjid Indonesia (the Indonesian Mosque Council) but its role is limited with almost no power at all. The council, for instance, is not able to appoint moderate figures to run the mosques. Accordingly, each mosque very much depends on its *takmir* (a committee that directs the mosque) that sets a rule and assigns an imam, *khatib* (a person who delivers a religious sermon during the Friday prayer), or preacher. If a mosque is established by a mass organization (e.g. Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam, LDII, and others) or an educational institution (e.g. pondok pesantren, Java-typed Islamic boarding school), leaders of these organizations and institutions might have an authority to administer the mosque. Like the Dewan Masjid Indonesia, the Ministry of Religious Affairs or the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (the country's council for Islamic scholars) also do not have authority at all to manage mosques.

Not only mosques, the Indonesian government is also not able to control schools (any types of school such as Islamic schools, Islamic boarding schools, or public/private schools) and higher educational institutions (universities or colleges). Thousands of schools and universities/colleges in the country are built and managed by private institutions associated with particular religious or non-religious organizations and individuals. Therefore, it is difficult and problematic for the government to intervene in such educational institutions. Likewise, the government-funded schools or universities/colleges also do not have a direct control to watch over (or set a rule on) religious teachings and activities in these institutions. As a result, many conservative close-minded religious teachers and lecturers have taught at schools or even higher educational institutions. This is among the reasons, based on findings of several noted research institutions such as The Wahid Institute and Syarif Hidayatullah Islamic State University's Center for Islamic Studies and Society, why religious intolerance and radicalism have spread among students in schools and universities/colleges.

Equally important, the Indonesian government, for the most part, also cannot control Muslim-based nongovernmental social organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs), which are mushroomed in the country following the fall of Suharto's New Order dictatorial rule in 1998. Terrorist groups and individuals are often, if not always, connected to—and backed up by—particular NGOs or CSOs, in addition to political parties, which have more or less similar agenda and objectives with the terrorists such as troubling the government by creating national chaos and insecurity as well as toppling the existing regime. The fact that the Parliament took longer than expected to prove the revised anti-terrorism law (i.e., UU No. 15/2003) indicates such a connection between terrorist groups and some political parties. By contrast, Saudi Arabia has very limited formal NGOs and CSOs, besides the absence of political parties. Consequently, it is much easier for the Saudi government to control or watch over Muslim institutions.

Seventh, issues related to ways of overcoming militant Islamic clerics, intolerant preachers, and radical activists. As widely known, Saudi Arabia has restricted, pacified, and taken a firm action toward radical clerics, preachers, and activists by "domesticating" or preventing them from giving public religious sermons in mosques and other public places to curtail their influences in the society and restrain the spread of viruses of intolerance and radicalism in the Kingdom. The Indonesian government, conversely, in the name of democracy that guarantees civil liberties and freedom of expressions, has been difficult to curb the fanatic clerics, preachers, scholars, and activists that are widespread in the country since the collapse of Suharto's despotic ruler.

Since then, these zealots have been free to proselytize, disseminate, and propagate radical ideas on YouTube, television channels, radios, as well as "offline shows" in mosques (e.g. during the Friday prayer), and other public places (e.g. stadiums, parks, hotels, soccer fields, sport centers, halls, and so forth) where religious sermons are held. To date, the government only detained few radical Muslim clerics such as Abu Bakar Ba'asyir of Jamaah Islamiyah or Aman Abdurrahman of Jamaah Ansharut Tuahid for their roles (directly or indirectly) in a series of terrorist activities. Recently, the government jailed Rizieq Shihab of Islamic Defender Front for his role in leading and orchestrating various radical and intolerant activities, including hate speeches. Other religious zealots are still ubiquitous in the country that eventually could (in fact, it does) produce lone

offenders and radicals that spread terror, hate speeches, vigilantism, and social disturbances in the society.

Eighth, last but not the least, on the use of a counterterrorism app. Since the last few years, Saudi Arabia has developed an app named "Kulluna Amn" (literally, "We are all security") that enables citizens and expatriates to participate in keeping national security. Launched by the Public Security Department, the app helps the Kingdom's residents and citizens to report immediately any crimes, terrorist acts, and suspicious activities as well as attach photos, recordings, and videos. According to the director of the Public Security Department, Othman Al-Muhrij, reports from the citizens and residents will reach 39 centers dispersed in the Kingdom and identities of those reporting crimes, violence, and terrorism will be kept confidential.[8] Having a GPS system that enables it to record locations of incidents, the app is linked to not only the police but also security forces and other relevant government's departments and directorates. Al-Muhjri said that the app is an actualization of the late Prince Nayef's saying that "citizen is the first security man." Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al Saud was the former Minister of Interior for 37 years from 1975 to 2012. To my knowledge, such an app is absent in Indonesia.

Criticisms, Challenges, and Suggestions of Counterterrorism Approaches

Noam Chomsky, American linguist and social critic, once said, "Everybody is worried about stopping terrorism. Well, there is a really easy way: stop participating in it."[9] Well, it is easy to say "stop participating in terrorism" but in reality, it is really difficult for some people to quit from it, although the government and society have done lots of work to criticize, counter, and demonize terrorism and pacify terrorists by implementing a mixture of hard and soft counterterrorism approaches. The difficulty to combat terrorism because, among others, terrorists are not a homogeneous group and their ways of spreading "viruses" of terrorism also complex and vary considerably from one group to another. Still, for

[8] https://english.alarabiya.net/en/media/digital/2016/02/21/Saudi-Arabia-s-residents-can-now-report-crime-through-an-app. Accessed September 19, 2020.

[9] Noam Chomsky at *Power and Terror: Noam Chomsky in Our Times*. https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0338357/characters/nm0159008. Accessed December 16, 2021.

many terrorists, especially Islamist terrorists, terrorism has been considered to be one of the most effective instruments of struggle for power, the defense of their identities and beliefs, as well as the protection of religious, ethnic, racial, and other interests. As explained below, Islamist terrorists are also convinced that their violent acts are sanctioned by the Qur'an and Islamic sharia. At some point, terrorists are rigid, stubborn, or adamant persons. Accordingly, to fight against them requires a rapid response, wide-ranging strategies, and creative techniques beyond the existing approaches.

As previously discussed, the Saudi and Indonesian governments have also implemented various methods, programs, strategies, and tactics but this does not mean that terrorism and terrorists have entirely disappeared from their lands. In fact, Indonesia's Densus 88 anti-terror squad continues to hunt down terrorists and their networks in Java and outer Java (especially Sumatra and Sulawesi). Occasionally, terrorist attacks and suicide bombings committed by Indonesian militants also continue to blast the country. Some carried out the attacks in the Philippines, as in the case of an Indonesian couple, Rullie Rian Zeke and his wife, Ulfah Handayani Saleh, who were behind the January 27 Jolo Cathedral bombing.[10] Saudi Arabia, although quite peaceful for a while from AQAP or ISIL-related terrorist attacks, the Kingdom is not immune from terrorism, and now it faces a new challenge from the Houthis, which have regularly terrorized Saudi territory by sending missiles. Indeed, like a cancer disease, terrorism in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and elsewhere never dies, albeit a significant number of terrorists had been shot dead or jailed.

Current research, studies, and attempts to develop policies for countering violent extremism (CVE), including terrorism, in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia (and elsewhere) are certainly welcomed initiatives. Yet, as stated by Hoeft (2015: 4), with the exception of a few countries' counterterrorism models and policies, the initiatives "disproportionately deal with strategies for the prevention of further radicalization." Like viruses, terrorism is easy to multiply and proliferate creating new networks, branches, and variants that are, in many cases, difficult to detect and overcome. Furthermore, realizing the state apparatus' strictness in watching over terrorist activities, strategies, mechanisms, and processes of radicalization and recruitment of individuals conducted by terrorist cadres

[10] https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/indonesia/. Accessed December 13, 2021.

are also more complex and organized. As well, Hoeft (*ibid*) stated that the governmental policies and approaches "seldom produce non-kinetic strategies for already radicalized individuals." Additionally, since types of actors participating in terrorism, directly or indirectly, vary and constantly change because of various factors, targeting high-ranking members of formal terrorist organizations (e.g. AQAP, JI, JAD, and others) is no longer sufficient to defeat the groups and their branches, variants, networks, and sympathizers. In fact, a number of terrorist acts were carried out by a splinter of major radical organizations or by lone offenders having no affiliation with any extremist organizations.

These unpleasant facts are a reminder for the Saudi and Indonesian governments in order to reevaluate the effectiveness of the existing approaches and then rebuild and redevelop more extensive and comprehensive counterterrorism models in the future.

Terrorists' Different Intellectuals and Ideological Levels

One of the major issues the governments of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia could examine carefully in dealing with Islamist terrorists is their intellectual and ideological levels. A vast majority of terrorists might be categorized as "ordinary offenders" (or "grassroots terrorists") having little knowledge and understanding about Islam. They joined and involved in various activities of a terrorist organization or carried out terrorist attacks perhaps because they were influenced by their friends or militant preachers (either online or offline) or were brainwashed by radical persons. However, some other terrorists might have (and indeed they do have) strong Islamic intellectual backgrounds, solid understandings of Islam, and deep knowledge about the Qur'an, Hadith, Islamic discourses, and traditions.

Moreover, some terrorists might be less ideological or having no interest with particular ideology, whereas others embrace a strong ideology of Islamism and a firm belief about an Islamic state. For less ideological terrorists, they might perform terrorist acts for retaliation of their family members whereas ideological terrorists committed terrorism for "idealistic" purposes and were driven by the desire to erect or dispel a particular ideology. Still, many terrorists perhaps are only fluid participants whereas some others are solid masterminds. Given the different intellectual, educational, experiential, and religious settings of the terrorists, the government's rehabilitation, reintegration, and de-radicalization

programs might be successful only for ordinary, less intellectual, and ideological terrorists but not for others. In brief, there is a need for a different approach for a different type of terrorists.

Dissenting Opinions on the Concepts of Terrorism and Jihadism

Another important issue is about the different views on the concept of "terrorism" between terrorist ideologues (and other terrorist actors and sympathizers) and moderate Islamic scholars (as well as the government officials and other anti-terrorism groups). For the moderate Islamic scholars and the state authorities, terrorism is an evil, irreligious, or un-Islamic act. Their slogan is: "Terrorism has no religion." Yet, for the "Islamist terrorists", terrorism is a form of jihadism, which is, according to them, strongly rooted in Islamic texts, doctrines, discourses, traditions, and histories. In fact, they do not call their violent actions "terrorism," arguing that such a term is an "infidel," Western concept that has been adopted by the local governments and the state authorities (which they accused as the "Western stooges") to demonize Islam and Muslim society, as expressed and stated clearly by Imam Samudra (2004), one of the Bali bombers, in his apologetic and *pledoi* (Dutch: *pleidooi*) book, *I am against Terrorist*.

Certainly, Islamic scholars (ulama) and specialists of Islamic jurisprudence (*fuqaha*) have long debated the concept of jihad in Islam, including its criteria, prerequisites, and characteristics. Indeed, in Islam, the concept of jihad, which literally means "struggle" or "effort," has various terminological and practical meanings ranging from a spiritual struggle within oneself against sin to struggle against the enemies of Islam or a holy war waged on behalf of Islam.[11] Many, including the conservative ones, have excluded terrorism as part of a jihad form (jihadism). Moreover, moderate Muslim scholars have also argued that terrorism is not a jihad act but an evil deed to destroy humanity. However, for ideological terrorists, hardcore Islamist terrorist ideologues, and elite members of terrorist organizations (including those in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia), they consider and strongly believe that terrorism is part of a "sacred jihad" action to defend Islamic faith and safeguard Muslim societies. Non-terrorist Islamic

[11] See the multiple meanings and implementation of jihad at https://www.britannica.com/topic/jihad. Accessed December 20, 2021.

scholars and the governments need to find a "reconciliatory way" to bridge this gap of understandings, interpretations, and conviction on terrorism and jihadism.

Contesting the Idea of Kufr (Infidelity)

Furthermore, Islamic scholars have also discussed the historical origins and social contexts of the concepts of *kafir* (pl. kuffar, meaning unbeliever or infidel) and "*kufr*" (unbelief/infidelity) whose meanings vary enormously. Nonetheless, Islamist thinkers, terrorist ideologues, or radical Salafis have often used this term to legalize their violent acts. These groups have used the concepts of "takfir" or "takfiri" (both were rooted in the word "*kufr*") as a theological legitimacy of their attacks or fights against their rivals and foes, including their coreligionists. In essence, they use the term takfir/i to denote particular Muslims of being an apostate (i.e. a person who do not believe in the fundamental principles of Islam or no longer a Muslim); thereby, they deserve to be killed. Moreover, for them, the concept of *kufr* is not only limited to non-Muslims but also Muslims whom they defined as "incidental disbelievers" (Kadivar 2020). For Saudi and Indonesian moderate Islamic scholars and governments, by contrast, they strive to "prevent exposure to takfiri beliefs, to refute those ideas and encourage the rehabilitation of offenders, and to promote policies that prevent relapses" (Boucek 2008a: 60–1). They believe that essential to victory over terrorism is the defeat of the ideological infrastructure (such as the takfiri ideology) that supports and nurtures extremism. Like the concept of jihad depicted earlier, the different understandings of the idea of *kufr*, if not addressed and solved properly, can be problematic and become a stumbling block for combating terrorism.

The Problem of Apologetic Views and the Need for Humane Engagement

The concepts of jihad and *kufr* described earlier are only small examples of Islamic or Qur'anic terms that have been a major source of debate and contestation between moderate Islamic scholars and hardline Islamists (see, e.g., Nardin 1998; Noorhaidi 2006; Mostfa 2021) that need for further strategic approaches and "wise engagement." Other popular instances of contested concepts among them are *harb* (war) and

qital (killing).[12] So far, the way moderate Islamic scholars (both in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia) and state authorities (particularly Saudi Arabia but also to some extent Indonesia) approach Islamist terrorist groups is rather apologetic in the sense that they claimed that their opinions, understandings, and interpretations of Islam and the Qur'an are more valid and legitimate than those of terrorists and radical Islamists. Both government officials and moderate Islamic scholars in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia cast Islamist terrorists as illegitimate because of perverting the true meanings and tenets of Islam. They, moreover, argue that Islamist terrorists lack religious authority and understandings. They assert that it was an evil ideology (away from Islamic teachings) that misled the Islamist terrorists (Boucek 2008a, b).

Since the state authorities and moderate Islamic scholars believe that Islamist terrorists are "misguided believers" having "corrupted understandings" and "misinterpretations of correct doctrine," they aspire to help them return to the correct religious path, the "true" understandings of Islam, and the "right" interpretations of the Qur'an. According to the Saudi government, the Islamic da'wah (call to Islam) should not through terrorism (and any violent extremism) and only "legitimate" Islamic scholars and knowledgeable religious authorities can authorize the issuance of jihad under strict conditions and circumstances. This means that, in the context of Saudi Arabia, the terms of legitimate Islamic scholars and religious authorities refer to members of the Council of Senior Scholars or the Senior Council of Ulama (*Majlis Hai'at Kibar al-Ulama*), the Kingdom's highest religious body that advises the Saudi king on religious matters.

The Saudi king appointed members of the Senior Council of Ulama with salaries paid by the government. The vast majority of the council's members consist of Islamic scholars from the Hanbali madhab and the Najdi families. Since its inception in 1971, the council has been the defender of the Kingdom's state Islam. To date, the council has condemned any terrorist act committed by such notorious extremist groups as al-Qaeda, ISIL, Houthi, Boko Haram, Hezbollah, and the

[12] The term *qital* (lit. "killing") does not incorporate the range of meanings found in jihad. Linguistically, it is less extensive as it is specifically reserved for war in the Qur'an. In the Qur'an, there are about 171 verses that mention the word "qital" and 10 verses where the word "harb" means war appears (Mostfa 2021: 13).

Muslim Brotherhood, to name a few, declaring that terrorism is a humanitarian crime and an insult to Islamic faith, which is innocent of any terrorist actions (*Arab News* 2020).[13] Indonesia does not have such a religious council that represents the state's forms of Islam and defends the government's interests. Indonesian moderate Islamic scholars and religious authorities that denounce terrorism as an evil and inhuman act came from various noted Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, or Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Council of Ulama) as well as university professors of Islam or independent preachers and clerics.

It is interesting to find the fact that while ordinary adherents of Salafi and Wahhabi Islam in Saudi Arabia (with few exception) generally tend to be loyal and obey to the state leadership (thereby, they follow the government's condemnation of terrorism), Indonesian Salafis and Wahhabis (known locally as "Sawah," which stands for Salafi-Wahabi) tend to criticize whatever policies and practices of the government and state authorities. Accordingly, they rarely (or never) support and echo the government's call to castigate terrorism and radicalism. In fact, the groups seldom condemn terrorist acts in Indonesia and abroad, signifying their tacit aid and implicit endorsement of Islamist radicalism.

Because of different opinions, interpretations, and understandings (and conviction) between Islamist terrorists and moderate Islamic scholars toward some basic tenets and concepts of Islam and the Qur'an, it is not easy to reconcile the dissent. The difficulty to reach consensus was expressed by, for example, members of the Saudi Counseling Committee, who were assigned by the government to deal or engage with the terrorist detainees. One of the committee's members, Sheikh Ali Al-Nafisah, said, "Initial meetings between counselors and detainees did not go well. At first the detainees refused to meet us (clerics or Islamic scholars). They refused to salute or shake hands with members of the committee, because they believed that the members were aides of infidels" (Boucek 2008a: 61–2).

[13] https://www.arabnews.com/node/1770296/council-senior-scholars-sets-sights-muslim-brotherhood. Accessed December 15, 2021.

The Contest for the "True" Religious Authority and the Legitimate Voices of Islam

The contest for the "true" religious authority and the legitimate voices of Islam is well known among various Muslim and Islamist/ic groups (and individual scholars of Islam). In Saudi Arabia, the contest was mainly between religious leaders and Islamic scholars in the Senior Council of Ulama (representing the official religious institution), the Sahwa (the "Islamic Awakening" that emerged since the late 1980s or early 1990s), and a group of scholars calls "*shuyukh al-salafiyya al-jihadiyya*" (Shaikhs[14] of Jihadi-Salafism), which, according to Saud Al-Sarhan (2015: 181–206), became one of global ideologues for jihadis worldwide. Each member of these groups tends to claim as the "holders" of legitimate religious authority and at the same time tends to delegitimize other voices of Islam. Each group accuses others as the "errant group" that had strayed from the true teachings of Islam. In Indonesia, furthermore, the contest is mainly between religious leaders and scholars in various Muslim organizations such as the Indonesian Council of Ulama, Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam, Islamic Defender Front (now dissolved), Jamaah Islamiyah, Jamaah Ansharud Daulah, among many others, as well as independent leaders and scholars.

In Saudi Arabia, while moderate Islamic scholars as well as the government officials accused terrorists as having lack of religious authority and Islamic knowledge, Islamist terrorists, particularly their kingpins and ideologues, question the credibility and authority of the Islamic scholars and clerics in the government-sponsored Advisory Committees of the counterterrorism program (as well as the Saudi official religious establishment) (Meijer, 2012a; b). Like Bin Laden, the majority of Islamist terrorists, ideologues, and linchpins (including the Shaikhs of Jihadi-Salafism) generally consider a group of ulama in both the counterterrorism advisory committees and the Senior Council of Ulama as "not Muslim enough" or "betrayer" of the true Islamic doctrines. Like Saudi terrorists, Indonesian "hardcore" Islamist terrorists also refused to meet and engage in dialogue with moderate Islamic scholars and clerics as well as acknowledge their religious authority and expertise mainly because the detainees accused them as the government's "puddle dogs", said Hamli, a retired

[14] Several important shaikhs in this camp include Humud bin Abdullah al-Uqla al-Shu'aiby, Ali bin Khudayr al-Khudayr, and Nasir bin Hammad al-Fahd.

police general and a former director at BNPT (the government-supported counterterrorism agency), in an online interview with me.[15]

Indeed, many Islamist terrorists generally do not regard and distrust the moderate Muslim clerics and Islamic scholars who assisted the government's counterterrorism programs (consisting of, mainly, de-radicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration) as true and legitimate scholars of Islam. Moreover, not only toward non-terrorists, some terrorists also accused their fellows of deradicalized and disengaged terrorists as apostates or *kuffar*, said Abu Fida, one of ex-terrorists and a former member of Jamaah Islamiyah.[16] By his friends, Abu Fida himself was accused of being an apostate (*murtad*). Some terrorists became disengaged or deradicalized perhaps because they followed the government's de-radicalization programs or other factors, for instance, were influenced by their parents, family members, teachers, friends, or by self-de-radicalization after hearing touchy religious sermons or momentous humanistic experiences.

Because of lack of trust on the part of terrorists, it is necessary for the government officials and the Islamic scholars to find another "humane" approach. Trust building is very foundational and one of "ingredients" of peacebuilding. In other words, one cannot build peace if he/she fails in building trust. In many cases, a theological debate or contest does not work; thereby, one needs another method of fruitful engagement and dialogue perhaps by implementing "practical" or "humanistic" dialogue. In other words, the Saudi and Indonesian governments could therefore implement different approaches, strategies, tactics, and programs for each terrorist, for example, between ideologues, top commanders, planners, architects, recruiters, and ordinary terrorists or fighters.

Lengthy Side Effects of Repressive Approach

Another point of concern in which the governments of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia should pay attention is about the side effects of the long-lasting repressive military approach to combating terrorism on the terrorists as well as their families and friends, resulting in a repetitive

[15] Online interview with Hamli, August 2020.

[16] Abu Fida conveyed this phenomena during an online discussion on November 11, 2021.

cycle of revenge and violent actions. In the Indonesian context, for example, for a long period of time, since the Old Order (Sukarno's era) to the New Order (Suharto's era) as well as the Reformation Era (after the New Order's collapse, particularly during the presidencies of B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Megawati Sukarnoputri), the Indonesian government has merely focused on the use of the repressive security (military) approach, thereby overlooking the root causes of the problem as well as potentially abusing human rights. The dominance of the hard approach by the Indonesian government can be seen from the vast majority (about 67%) of the total military operations (about 249) in the country carried out between 1945 and 2004.

More specifically, during Suharto's New Order government, in the name of national security and social stability, the state authorities often implemented excessive military force and, in many cases, abused human rights. Several factors lay at its origins such as the rise of communist and regional (separatist) rebellions (in Aceh or Papua). Another factor is the institutionalization of the "culture of violence" within the security establishment that made it seem natural to tackle violence with more violence and repressive measures. How effective these measures have been is questionable. In fact, research findings have indicated that blunt oppressive instruments have often created a spiral of violence and vengeance in motion (Meijer 2012a: 21). Indonesia has witnessed that a significant number of members of various terrorist organizations in the Reformation Era (1998 onwards) were actually rooted in the New Order. At some point, Saudi Arabia has shared similar story with that of Indonesia in which approaches to terrorism in the past (before King Abdullah's era) were merely relied on military or security measures. In fact, like Indonesia, some terrorists in Saudi Arabia who carried out attacks in the Kingdom were driven by retaliation to the government.

Difficulty to Measure the Results of the Government Policies

As well, another criticism, I have to admit that it is really difficult to measure the outcomes and effectiveness of the government's counterterrorism policies (let alone compare them), especially for Saudi Arabia, because of the opaqueness of the Saudi state's policies. By contrast, Indonesia's counterterrorism policies, because they are more open to

analysis and are available for the public, are easier to examine, analyze, evaluate, and measure their results and effectiveness. Another factor that makes me (and other researchers and analysts) difficult to measure the effectiveness of the Saudi government's counterterrorism policies is because of the high sensitivity of the issue of terrorism. However, if I look at from general signs and measures, it seems the Saudi government's approaches and policies of counterterrorism, for the moment, are quite successful in overcoming domestic terrorism and reducing the number of individuals joining terrorist organizations. But certainly, this does not mean that Saudi Arabia is free from terrorism.

The Absence of Civil Society Groupings

As for the case of Saudi Arabia, which is quite different from Indonesia, a wide range of society's elements so far has not been fully involved as an integral part of the comprehensive strategic and tactical programs to counterterrorism and keep peace, stability, and security in the Kingdom. Although their roles are still limited, the Indonesian government has involved parts of society and civil society groupings. In contrast, for the most part, the Saudi authorities have acted alone or only involved few segments of society (e.g. elite groups such as religious scholars or academicians) in fighting terrorists and their extremist ideologies. Furthermore, the authorities also seem to include them in the counterterrorism initiatives as a complement, not a core team (Al Qurtuby and Aldamer 2021). This happens perhaps due to Saudi Arabia being a highly centralized monarchical state. Therefore, to be more successful, the government needs to involve larger elements of civil society groups, including Muslim minorities (Shias and others) as an essential part of the counterterrorism campaign. In fact, civil society groupings add substantial strategic value to counterterrorism and anti-terrorism initiatives, and many countries in the world have maximized their key roles and contributions in combating radicals, transforming terrorists into pacifist groupings, and preventing radicalism from occurring in their given

societies[17] (Brauchler 2011; Bigio and Vogelstein 2016, 2017; Cortright et al. 2016; Spalek and Weeks 2017).

The Need to Involve Women Groups in the Counterterrorism Scheme

The government-sponsored counterterrorism units in both Saudi Arabia and Indonesia also seem to exclude women groupings (especially mothers) or at least not optimized yet despite the fact that their roles and contributions are essential in combating extremism in many countries.[18] Although there has been a steady increase in the radicalization and recruitment of young girls and women by female terrorists as in the cases of Indonesia and elsewhere, there is also a strong evidence of women's vital roles and contributions to countering terrorism and radicalism. Women are often highly influential in families, communities, societies, companies, organizations, transnational institutions, or even governments so that their proactive participation in counterterrorism efforts can create a positive change (Bigio and Vogelstein 2016, 2017).

In its resolution 2178 (2014), the Security Council encouraged member states to include and empower women in the formation and

[17] Several studies have also underlined the vitality of civil society organizations (CSOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in many parts of the world in combating terrorism, building global peace, maintaining security, as well as influencing national and international peacebuilding policy (Cortright et al., 2016). Consequently, encouraging CSOs and NGOs that are intent on promoting peaceful co-existence is one of the key factors for successful fighting against terrorism. On the one hand, the involvement of CSOs (and NGOs) can result in better informed, more inclusive, and more accountable government decision-making, as well as more effective and operative peacebuilding and counterterrorism policies on the other.

[18] Reports of the Council on Foreign Relations and the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee also suggest that women around the globe have played a vital role in violent prevention, conflict resolution, and counterterrorism (Bigio and Vogelstein, 2016; United Nations Security Council, 2020). The report provides evidence from various countries in which women groupings are one of keys in counterterrorism initiatives because they are able to detect early signs of extremism as well as mitigate radicalization in the family. The central roles of women, particularly mothers, in many families and communities throughout the world also afford them a unique viewpoint to identify unusual patterns of behavior and signs of impending conflict. Moreover, recent research shows that women could disseminate anti-terrorism and radicalism messages quite effectively throughout families and communities. Furthermore, women have an ability to challenge extremist narratives in homes, schools, and social environments, as well as have particular influence among youth populations (Bigio and Vogelstein, 2016, 2017).

development of creative models, strategies, and tactics to counter the violent extremist narrative that can incite terrorist acts and address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism and other forms of violent extremism (Al Qurtuby and Aldamer 2021). Since their roles and contributions are crucial, it is high time for the governments of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia to include and maximize them in the counterterrorism scheme. In order to strengthen the existing counterterrorism programs, the state authorities, stakeholders, and policymakers in the countries should incorporate or integrate more women leaders, activists, and scholars into national security strategies, given their potential to prevent or mitigate the radicalization of family and community members.

The Significance of Youth

For the most part, youths (like women), including university students and non-students, have also been largely marginalized (and their roles are mostly unacknowledged) by the Saudi and Indonesian governments in the counterterrorism strategic scheme. In general, the government officials and policymakers across the world see youths as part of the problems and not part of the solutions simply because they saw (male) youths have contributed to and become the majority members and sympathizers of extremist organizations and terrorist groupings in many countries, including Saudi Arabia and Indonesia (see Chapters 2 and 5). It is correct that even though terrorist radicalization can happen at any age, young people in search of meaning, a sense of belonging, purpose, and/or identity may be more vulnerable to violent extremism and terrorist radicalization.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that if youths are viewed as part of the problem, consequently, they can also be an essential part of the solution. Therefore, rather than viewing young people as a symbol of problems and perils, they should be seen as a promising and potential group. In another word, instead of viewing the youths as an object of counterterrorism, they should be seen as a subject of a counterterrorism campaign.[19] In brief, given the leading and significant roles of youths

[19] The need to empower youth prominently figures in the Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (United Nations Deputy Secretary-General, 2016). The General Assembly's review of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy encourages countries across the world to include young people in decision-making and

in countering terrorism and radicalism in many countries, it is noteworthy for the Saudi and Indonesian authorities to involve them more widely in the government-sponsored counterterrorism and anti-terrorism initiatives.

These are some weaknesses and criticisms of the existing counterterrorism approaches as well as challenges for the governments (and other actors that are concerned with countering terrorism) of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia to improve them in the future. I also suggest some ideas that might be useful to be incorporated in the current counterterrorism scheme.

Conclusion

Few conclusions can be drawn as follows. Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have some similarities and differences concerning counterterrorism approaches, driven by multiple factors, roots, and rationales. Despite having some strengths, the counterterrorism methods applied by the two state authorities have also had some weaknesses. No doubt that ever since the rise of terrorism decades ago, the two governments have made a variety of attempts at combating it. However, its stances of terrorism and counterterrorism models have some limitations resulting in criticism. One of the major criticisms, for example, is the way the governments and the "counterterrorism officials" (including Islamic scholars) oversee terrorism as a "religious (Islamic) deviation" and oversimplify approaches of countering terrorism to all types of terrorists without classifying their intellectual, experiential, and ideological levels. I suggest that it would be more strategic, tactical, and fruitful if both governments and relevant agencies further implement methods, strategies, or programs of counterterrorism

peacebuilding processes as well as in Prevent Violent Extremism efforts. Moreover, the subsequent adoption of UN Resolution 2250 (in December 2015) was a landmark—the first to recognize the important and positive role young women and men can play in sustaining and promoting international peace and security. According to Jan Eliasson, UN Deputy Secretary-General, young people in many countries are already at the forefront of efforts to combat radicalism, prevent terrorism, and counter violent extremism (United Nations Deputy Secretary-General, 2016). Furthermore, a report by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE, 2013) also underscores the significance of youths in the counter-radicalism strategy. The report suggests that youths can and should be prevented from radicalism and terrorism as well as must be involved in counterterrorism initiatives starting at an early age, in schools and houses.

and anti-terrorism in accordance with the terrorists' ideological, experiential, and intellectual heights. Rather than accusing Islamist terrorists' views, understandings, and interpretations of Islam as "un-Islamic," it is better for the moderate Islamic scholars and leaders to apply, for instance, an "internal engagement" by trying to understand their rationales, bases, and roots of Islamic thinking.

In other words, even though the roles, contributions, and efforts of the two governments in counterterrorism programs are certainly helpful and advantageous, further strategic actions, including additional tactical domestic counterterrorist policies, are necessary. The aims of this approach are twofold, namely, in the short term, to get rid of terrorist organizations that threaten Saudi and Indonesian national security and, in the long run, to prevent similar terrorist groupings from reemerging in future and to create a more social and economic stability in the two countries. In this regard, the governments of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia could add extra strategic counterterrorism approaches, while continuing to strengthen its existing tactical counterterrorism programs (Al Qurtuby and Aldamer 2021: 69).

One of the principal models to combat terrorism is by involving various key elements of societies. Recent studies (Spalek and Weeks 2017) also show that many governments around the world have started to research for better ways to manage the risks and prevent the perils of terrorist acts by trying to collaborate with multiple communities and societal groupings in their counterterrorism endeavors. Only by implementing extensive comprehensive approaches, combining tactical (hard/military approach) and strategic (soft/non-military approach) counterterrorism strategies, and involving all elements of society and community, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republics of Indonesia can further defeat terrorism and other forms of violence as well as transform extremism into productive peace in the years to come.

References

Aljunied, Syed Mohammed Adha. 2011. "Countering Terrorism in Maritime Southeast Asia: Soft and Hard Power Approaches." *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 47 (6): 652–665.

Al Qurtuby, Sumanto, and Shafi Aldamer. 2021. "Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia." *Contemporary Review of the Middle East* 8 (1): 56–76.

Al-Sarhan, Saud. 2015. "The Struggle for Authority: The Shaykhs of Jihadi-Salafism in Saudi Arabia, 1997–2003." In *Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Social, Political, Economic and Religious Change*, edited by Bernard Haykel, Thomas Hegghammer, and Stephane Lacroix, 181–206. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Al Zahrani, Hashem Mohammed. 2012. "Saudi Arabia's Efforts and Experience in Counter-Terrorism." Riyadh: Naif Arab University for Security Sciences.

Ashraf, A. S. M. Ali. 2007. "Transnational Cooperation on Anti-terrorism: A Cooperative Case Study of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia." *Perceptions*: 91–121.

Bigio, Jamille, and Rachel Vogelstein. 2016. *How Women's Participation in Conflict Prevention and Resolution Advances U.S. Interests*. New York and Washington, DC: The Council on Foreign Relations.

———. 2017. "Women Are Key to Counterterrorism." U.S. News, February 2.

Blanchard, Christopher, and Alfred Prados. 2007. "Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues." *CRS Report for Congress*. Congressional Research Service.

Boucek, Christopher. 2008a. "Counter-Terrorism from Within: Assessing Saudi Arabia's Religious Rehabilitation and Disengagement Programme." *The RUSI Journal* 153 (6): 60–65.

———. 2008b. "Saudi Arabia's Soft Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare." Carnegie Papers, No. 97, September. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC.

Brauchler, Birgit. 2011. *Reconciling Indonesia: Grassroots Agency for Peace*. London: Routledge.

Cortright, David, and George Lopez. 2007. *Uniting Against Terror: Cooperative Nonmilitary Responses to the Global Terrorist Threat*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

———, Melanie Greenberg, and Laurel Stone, eds. 2016. *Civil Society, Peace and Power*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

El-Said, Hamed L. 2015. *New Approaches to Counterterrorism: Designing and Evaluating Counter Radicalization and De-radicalization Programs*. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hoeft, Gabriel. 2015. *'Soft' Approaches to Counter-Terrorism: An Exploration of the Benefits of Deradicalization Programs*. Herzliya, Israel: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism.

Kadivar, Jamileh. 2020. "Exploring Takfir, Its Origins and Contemporary Use: The Case of Takfiri Approach in Daesh's Media." *Contemporary Review of the Middle East* 7 (3): 259–285.

Meijer, Roel, ed. 2012a. *Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Indonesia, Algeria and Saudi Arabia*. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'.

———. 2012b. "Saudi Arabia's Religious Counter-Terrorism Discourse." *Middle East Institute's Policy Analysis*, February 15. https://www.mei.edu/publications/saudi-arabias-religious-counter-terrorist-discourse. Accessed June 9, 2020.

Mostfa, Ali. 2021. "Violence and Jihad in Islam: from the War of Words to Clashes of Definitions." *Religions* 12: 1–14.

Nardin, Terry, ed. 1998. *The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Noorhaidi. 2006. *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest of Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications.

Nye, Joseph S. 1990. "Soft Power." *Foreign Policy* 80.

OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe). 2013. *Youth Engagement to Counter Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Leads to Terrorism*. Vienna: OSCE.

Realuyo, Celina B. 2015. "Combating Terrorist Financing in the Gulf: Significant Progress but Risks Remain." Working Paper, January 26. The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington.

Rudolph, Rachael. 2018. *Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia: New Approaches to Radical Threats*. London, UK: I.B. Tauris.

Samudra, Imam. 2004. *Aku Melawan Teroris*. Solo: Al Jazeera.

Spalek, Basia, and Douglas Weeks. 2017. "The Role of Communities in Counterterrorism: Analyzing Policy and Exploring Psychotherapeutic Approaches within Community Settings." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 40 (12): 991–1003.

Stern, Jessica. 2010. "Mind Over Martyr." *Foreign Affairs* 89. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/saudi-arabia/2009-12-21/mind-overmartyr.

Check for updates

CHAPTER 10

Saudi-Indonesian Relations, Bilateral Cooperation on Combating Terrorism, and Prospects for Future Peace

> The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is determined, God willing, to strike with an iron fist those who target the minds and attitudes of our youth.[1]
>
> —King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud

> I have to reaffirm that we [the government] will fight and continue to fight against–and eradicate–terrorism until its roots.[2]
>
> —President Joko Widodo

This chapter provides an analytical overview of the three main issues as follows. First, Saudi–Indonesian bilateral relations and cooperation, especially government-to-government partnership (G-to-G), on strategies and programs related to defense, security, and counterterrorism (and counter-radicalism). Since the last few years, the two governments have collaborated to find effective ways in combating terrorism in their territories. The bilateral collaboration is mainly driven by the fact that the

[1] "Saudi Arabia and Counterterrorism," The Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Washington, DC. https://www.saudiembassy.net/sites/default/files/SAUDI%20ARABIA%20AND%20COUNTERTERRORISM.pdf. Accessed September 28, 2020.

[2] President Joko Widodo's statement after attending a national meeting on building up rural, regional, and central governments at Jakarta International Expo (JIExpo), Jakarta, May 14, 2018. https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1088684/jokowi-tegaskan-pemerintah-akan-basmi-terorisme-sampai-ke-akar/full&view=ok. Accessed September 28, 2020.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022

S. Al Qurtuby, *Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1337-2_10

two nations have faced the same issues and challenges, namely terrorism, which have affected the countries' civil peace, national security, and social stability. The chapter discusses forms of the collaboration and analyzes its outcomes whether or not the partnership is fruitful for both sides (Saudi Arabia and Indonesia).

From the Saudi side, the partnership on counterterrorism might not have a direct (or indirect) effect and influence on the Kingdom because Indonesia is not a superpower or a developed country like the United States, China, the United Kingdom and others, and its territory is far away from the Gulf or the Arabian Peninsula. In fact, Indonesia is not Saudi Arabia's main ally for fighting domestic terrorism in the Kingdom. The country is not a member of Saudi Arabia-led Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism. In short, from a geopolitical perspective, Indonesia is not a key for Saudi Arabia. But, from the Indonesian standpoint, the G-to-G cooperation might be useful and strategic for several reasons as follows.

- First, whereas Indonesia does not have significant influence on the Saudi government and society, Saudi Arabia has been considered to be one of the major foreign influences for the rise of Indonesia's conservative Salafism and Islamist terrorism (see Chapter 8).
- Second, for many Indonesian Muslims, Saudi Arabia is the main center of Islam and Sunni religious authority; therefore, building partnerships with the Kingdom can reduce perceptions of the conservative Muslims and radical Islamists toward the Indonesian government, which they dubbed having lack commitment to Islam and Muslim community, as well as help weaken their influences in the society.
- Third, in the past, Saudi Arabia—through the Saudi-Indonesian networks[3] as well as some government officials in the Saudi Embassy in Jakarta—was considered to be one of the financiers of radicalism and intolerance in Indonesia. By building cooperation on counterterrorism, defense, and security issues, the Indonesian government

[3] A great number of Saudis have maintained connection with Indonesians (either via alumni of Saudi educational institutions or migrant workers and expatriates), through which they send funds for various purposes, ranging for building mosques, schools, or Islamic centers to financing da'wa (Islamic propagation) activities. By some Indonesian Islamist groups, the funds were also used to carry out intolerant acts against religious and Muslim minorities (e.g. Shiites or Ahmadis).

> hope or expect that the Saudi rulers would replace its radical-conservative minded civil servants with moderate ones as well as cut the budget used by Indonesian Islamist groups to wage anti-pluralist and intolerant actions.[4]

The second issue discussed in this chapter is about lessons learned—negative or positive, failure or success—from the cases and discussions of terrorism and counterterrorism in the two nations. Saudi Arabia might learn something from Indonesia and Indonesia might also learn something from Saudi Arabia on the rise of terrorism and ways of handling it. Thirdly, this chapter converses over the prospects for future peace and security in the two countries drawing from the historical facts and current situations. In this regard, this chapter provides a room for intellectual discussion, contemplation, and reflection regarding terrorism and counterterrorism not only in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia but also globally since terrorism has posed a major threat for many countries and societies (Cortright and Lopez 2007; Conboy 2009; Crenshaw 2010; Schmid 2011; Schulze and Hwang, 2019).

Several underlying questions that guide and need answers in this chapter are as follows. Do the governments of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia join forces to establish cooperation for combating radicalism and terrorism? If any, what types of collaboration do they have? What are the outcomes of the collaboration? Is the collaboration productive or beneficial for both sides? What can Indonesia learn from Saudi Arabia and vice versa on both terrorism and counterterrorism? What or how are the prospects for future peace and security in the two countries? What needs to be done in future to protect, secure, and save Saudi and Indonesian countries and societies from terrorism (and other types of radicalism) and to create sustainable global peace and security in these two Sunni Muslim-majority nations?

Saudi–Indonesian Bilateral Relations

Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have a strong historical, cultural, traditional, and religious connection, and the engagement between Muslim societies in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago and the Arabian Peninsula has taken

[4] Reportedly besides overseeing the flow of funds for charities in Indonesia, the Saudi government has replaced its employees or staff in the Saudi Embassy in Jakarta with moderate ones.

place for centuries. History also notes that Saudi Arabia (along with Egypt and Syria) was among the first countries in the Middle East to acknowledge Indonesia's independence. Nevertheless, relations between the two countries have not always been conducive and productive. There have been times when the bilateral relations had been tense because of various factors, including geopolitical issues (e.g. war, violence, and conflict resolution in the Middle East); the maltreatment, abuses, or death penalty of some Indonesian migrant workers in the Kingdom; or the spread of Saudi-supported conservative Salafism and Islamism in Indonesia, among others.

Notwithstanding national and regional issues that occasionally disturb the relationship, the two governments try (and continue) to build a good connection. In a press conference, held in Jakarta, a former Saudi Ambassador to Indonesia, Abdulrahman Mohammed Amen Al Khayyat, said, "At present, our relationship with Indonesia is in excellent shape," adding that Saudi Arabia would like to further strengthen the decades-old relationships with Indonesia.[5] The current Saudi Ambassador to Indonesia, Esam A. Abid Althaghafi, also stated that the bilateral relations between the two nations would continue to grow in future, building on the strong ties of Islamic brotherhood[6] and mutual interests. Taking the same line, the former Indonesian Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Organizations of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Agus Maftuh Abegebriel also initiated a long-term diplomatic program called SAUNESA (Saudi Arabia–Indonesia) to boost close relationships between the two countries in various sectors.[7]

The current Indonesian ambassador to Saudi Arabia (starting in November 2021), Abdul Aziz Ahmad, also seems to have the same commitment in building fruitful relations between the two nations in multiple sectors.[8] The ambassador said that the Indonesian government currently focuses on three main agenda or priorities, namely (1) service

[5] See http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/09/30/saudi-arabia-eyes-special-relationship-with-ri-envoy.html. Accessed November 15, 2016.

[6] https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/09/24/saudi-indonesia-ties-will-continue-to-grow-envoy.html. Accessed September 15, 2020.

[7] See http://atdikriyadh.org/index.php. Accessed September 15, 2020.

[8] In a personal conversation (October 2021), Badrus Shaleh, an attache of education affairs at Riyadh's Indonesian Embassy, said that Indonesia has developed several programs and partnerships with Saudi Arabia, including collaboration with Saudi higher education,

(and protection) of Indonesian migrant workers in the Kingdom, (2) success in the implementation of hajj/umrah pilgrimage and the possibility to add quota for Indonesian hajj pilgrims in future, and (3) increase exports of non-oil and gas as well as attempts at finding investors who are willing to invest in property, tourism, and infrastructure sectors in Indonesia. In addition, the Indonesian government plans to boost bilateral relations with the Saudis on issues related to religious moderation, labor placement, counterterrorism, health (especially concerning ways to overcome the Covid-19 pandemic), as well as collaboration among higher educational institutions in the fields of non-Islamic studies.[9]

Such energetic commitments of the two governments to build productive relations between them are not surprising principally. Although the former Ambassador Al Khayyat said that Saudi Arabia "would like to strengthen the decades-old relationships with Indonesia," referring to diplomatic bilateral relations (G-to-G), non-diplomatic cultural relationships between societies in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago and the Arabian Peninsula has taken place for centuries. Their relationships continued after the founding of the modern nation-state Republic of Indonesia (in 1945) and modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (in 1932). Their relations are not only limited to religion or education but also other sectors such as economy and business (see Al Qurtuby 2019: 25–51; Al Qurtuby and Aldamer 2018: 121–144). In recent years, the two countries have also built partnerships on defense and security issues, including programs related to combating the spread of radicalism and terrorism. In short, the history of relations and cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Indonesia takes place not only between the governments (G-to-G) and businesses (B-to-B) but also societies (S-to-S). In spite of some criticisms that I will explain later on, this trend tends to continue nowadays. For example, during the G-20 meeting in Riyadh in 2020, the Saudi and Indonesian governments also signed some partnership agreements, including in the economic and business sectors.[10]

not in the fields of Islamic sciences but rather in the areas of engineering, technology, or petroleum studies.

[9] Online conversation with the Ambassador Abdul Aziz Ahmad, December 27, 2021.

[10] Here are three recent bilateral agreements on economic and business sectors between the governments of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia in the Riyadh G-20 meeting in 2020. https://www.kemenkeu.go.id/en/publications/news/these-are-the-3-bilateral-agreements-of-saudi-arabia-indonesia-in-the-riyadh-g-20/. Accessed December 15, 2021.

It is correct that the Indonesian engagement with the Arabian Peninsula has a long history. Scholars have noted that many Indonesians had traveled to and lived (and died) in Mecca/Makkah (or Hijaz in general) since past centuries for either performing hajj pilgrimage or learning Islamic knowledge (see Bubalo and Fealy 2005; Lucking 2021), and many of them consider it as their second homeland.[11] Since decades ago, new groups of Indonesians (i.e. pilgrims, tourists, students, workers) regularly visit Saudi Arabia, either for tourism, umrah, study at universities, or work. In other words, the traveling tradition that began centuries ago continues nowadays not only for pilgrimage or education but also labor, as professional workers (e.g. engineer, scientist, researcher, teacher, etc.) or menial laborers (e.g. housemaid, driver, construction worker, etc.) (Al Qurtuby 2019; Lucking 2021).

On the contrary, many Saudis have also traveled to Indonesia for various purposes such as business, tourism, intra-religious and educational cooperation, and other matters. West Java (particularly the Greater Bogor Area, known colloquially as Puncak[12]), where many Middle Eastern stuff (from foods to shisha) are displayed at Arabic-written shops, has been one of major and favorite destinations for Saudi tourists and visitors. The locals build houses or villas for renting to Arab (and Saudi) tourists. Many Saudis, individuals or families, visit Puncak for vacation, leisure, or businesses. My previous research (Al Qurtuby 2017) indicates that many Saudi citizens, partnered with the locals (Indonesian citizens), have actually invested and opened small businesses in West Java (or Jakarta).

Although socio-cultural and religious dimensions contributed to the shape of the dynamics of Saudi-Indonesian relations, the two countries' bilateral ties are fundamentally consistent with the realist emphasis on state calculations, with each country's aiming at maximizing its own

[11] It is interesting to find the fact that a number of Indonesian residents in Saudi Arabia whom I interviewed during my research consider the Kingdom as their "second homeland", many of them want to die in Makkah or Madinah because they believe that death in these two most sacred places for Sunni Muslims will be an entry ticket to Heaven.

[12] Although many Saudis do not understand the name West Java province or Bogor regency, they are familiar with the word Puncak ("Buncak"). It is among the reasons why some Indonesians in Saudi Arabia (in collaboration with Saudis) named restaurants they built in the Kingdom as "Puncak".

national interests. In other words, national interests of both nations—whatever the means they use to achieve whether politics, business or others—have been the main basis of their bilateral relations. Nevertheless, people-to-people ties that go beyond formal political diplomacy have no doubt played a key role in the relationship, establishing historical patterns, influencing how the two countries assess each other's impact on their national interests, and shaping how the two countries see each other's governments and societies today. It is true that the religious dimension of Saudi foreign policy is not an end in itself (Preuschaft 2016) but religion (Islam) has been a major factor in Saudi foreign relations, especially with Muslim-dominated countries including Indonesia, and the same is true for Indonesia.

To some extent, until now, the Saudi government still emphasizes the cultural diplomacy in which Islamic religion has been a driving force for its foreign relations policies with Indonesia. Saudi Arabia's focus on cultural-religious diplomacy with Indonesia might also be driven by the Indonesian demands, namely at requests of some major political players and religious leaders. For example, in the past, especially during the New Order, Mohammad Natsir (1908–1993), a former prime minister whose popular Islamic political party Masyumi was banned by Sukarno in 1960, was instrumental in building channels with the Saudi elites. In brief, whereas religion is not the only reason and the only primary driving force behind Saudi-Indonesian foreign relations, Islam, as stated by the Saudi ambassador above, is a very important factor, shaping many aspects of the bilateral relationship including security, education, culture, trade, employment, business, and pilgrimage (hajj and umrah). It has also played a vital role in the vicissitudes of Saudi-Indonesian relations (Partrick 2016).

As stated earlier, although informal relations and contacts between Muslims of the Malay-Indonesian archipelago and those of the Arabian Peninsula had taken place centuries ago (Azra 2004; Al Qurtuby 2019), the formal ties between the two countries began in 1948 with the establishment of the Indonesian embassy in Jeddah. Two years later, in 1950, a Saudi representative office was set up in Jakarta, which was upgraded in 1955 to a formal embassy. Saudi Arabia and Indonesia enjoy historically close bonds, with the former being among the first countries that acknowledged Indonesia's independence in 1945. High-rank government officials of the two countries have always stated this legacy during their official visits to Saudi Arabia or Indonesia as a reminder of their close ties and friendship.

The biographer of President Sukarno (1901–1970), Cindy Adams, said that, in 1955, the president, accompanied by 31 political elites, including KH Zainul Arifin (Deputy Prime Minister) and KH Masjkur (Minister of Religious Affairs), visited Saudi Arabia for hajj pilgrimage and the country-related matters (Adams 1986). The visit took place after Indonesia hosted a successful international and historic event, namely the Asia–Africa Conference, held in Bandung of West Java.[13] A number of new-born countries (about 29) in Asia and Africa sent their delegates, including Saudi Arabia, which sent Crown Prince Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (1906–1975). The conference (known as the Bandung Conference), which resulted the Ten Principles of Bandung,[14] was driven by colonization that bitterly affected the vast majority of Asian and African regions.

In the Kingdom, President Sukarno met King Saud bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (1902–1969), Crown Prince Faisal, and the Governor of Jeddah. As a sign of friendship, King Saud presented a car gift, Chrysler Crown Imperial, to President Sukarno. King Saud warmly welcomed Sukarno's official visit. In the same year, Saudi Arabia transformed its representative office in Jakarta to become a Saudi Embassy. Later, in 1960, Sukarno revisited Saudi Arabia for hajj where he initiated and suggested King Saud to plant trees on Mount Arafat, one of hajj areas, which the king agreed with his idea. After completing the hajj and returning to Indonesia, Sukarno sent thousands of seeds of *mimba* trees to Saudi Arabia. In the following years, the seeds grew, becoming green trees around Mount Arafat. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia called the trees "Shajarah Sukarno" (Sukarno Trees) (Adams 1986). Yet, the meeting between the two rulers was more about friendship than partnership.

[13] The Asia-Africa Conference (or the Bandung Conference) is a meeting of Asian and African states that took place in Bandung, Indonesia, on April 18–24, 1955. The meeting was organized by Indonesia, Myanmar (Burma), Cylon (Sri Lanka), India, and Pakistan. Reportedly, in all, 29 countries sent delegates. The conference discussed major political issues in Asia and Africa including French colonialism in Africa, Dutch occupation in Papua (Irian Jaya), among others. https://www.britannica.com/event/Bandung-Conference. Accessed December 25, 2021.

[14] See the Ten Principles of Bandung, along with a brief history of the Asia-Conference at http://asianafricanmuseum.org/en/sejarah-konferensi-asia-afrika/. Accessed December 25, 2021.

On June 10–13, 1970, King Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud made a historic visit to Indonesia.[15] He was the first Saudi monarch who visited the country. Although Faisal previously visited Indonesia during the Bandung Conference in 1955, his capacity was as a crown prince. At the time, Indonesia was under dictatorial President Suharto (1921–2008), who ruled the country for 32 years. During his visit to Indonesia, King Faisal met President Suharto to discuss several issues related to the crisis and security of the Middle East as well as the possibility to build bilateral relationships on economic, trade, political, and cultural matters between the two countries. A year after the King Faisal's visit, perhaps to follow up the meeting, the Indonesian government composed a special law, namely Undang-Undang (UU) No. 9 Tahun 1971, on a friendship agreement between Indonesia and Saudi Arabia[16] (*Perjanjian Persahabatan Antara Republik Indonesia dan Kerajaan Arab Saudi*). Previously, in 1947, the Indonesian government had made the same law with Egypt and Syria. As stated in this law, one of the main reasons why the Indonesian government made the friendship pact law with Saudi Arabia is because of hajj matters. The Indonesian–Saudi Arabian friendship agreement law was signed by President Suharto and legalized by King Faisal on February 21, 1971, in Jeddah, with a King Decree No. N/32. Before the signing of this law, on November 24, 1970, the two governments signed a sort of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the bilateral partnership on issues related to hajj pilgrimage, health, aviation and others. The law aims somehow to elevate the status of the MoU into a higher level in order to have a strong legal basis.

The law (UU No. 9/1971) stated that the Saudi-Indonesian friendship agreement was actually initiated ten years before (about early 1960s) but some factors hampered its implementation. One of the factors was that the Indonesian government disagreed with the phrase "cooperation on Islamic issues" (*kerjasama dalam keislaman*) in the initial accord draft proposed by the Saudi government. Later on, the two governments agreed to replace this phrase with "cooperation on religious issues" (*kerjasama dalam keagamaan*). Another factor was about the chaotic situations in the last years of Sukarno's presidency resulted in the uprising

[15] https://www.nytimes.com/1970/06/11/archives/saudi-king-visits-indonesia.html. Accessed December 25, 2021.

[16] The law can be accessed at https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Home/Details/47565/uu-no-9-tahun-1971. Accessed December 25, 2021.

against his power and anti-Communist violent campaigns (led by Suharto) between 1965 and 1967, as well as the political transitions from the Old Era to the New Era (from Sukarno to Suharto), which made the Indonesian government difficult to establish foreign relations with Saudi Arabia and other countries. But, in 1970, the national political situation began to be a bit normal and conducive, albeit protests from anti-Suharto university students and Muslim factions continued.[17] About seven years after King Faisal's visit to Indonesia, President Suharto made an official visit to Riyadh in 1977, which was under King Khalid (1913–1982) at that time, to continue building relationships and partnership with the Kingdom. A series of official visits also took place at the ministry levels during and after Suharto's rule (Suryadinata 1995: 291–303).

Even though the bilateral relations had taken place since Sukarno's era in late 1940s, it was only in the post-Suharto period, especially during the presidency of Joko Widodo (since 2014), the two nations started building more productive relations (compared with previous ones) and reached various agreements on numerous issues and fields, including security, defense, agriculture, trade and economy, oil and petroleum, culture and education, and so on. During the Sukarno era, Saudi Arabia never invested its funds in Indonesia, either for business and others. This is perhaps because, at that time, the Saudi government did not have sufficient financial sources for establishing its influences abroad besides having some domestic problems (e.g. fixing local politics and turbulence) and struggling for building infrastructures in the Kingdom. During the Suharto's time, Saudi Arabia began to have small investment in economic sectors and education (e.g. in 1980, the Saudi government built an Arabic and Islamic studies institute in Jakarta, which was a branch of Riyadh-based Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University). As Nash (2018) has noted, during Suharto's New Order government, Saudi Arabia used its oil wealth to entrench its influence in Indonesia (and other countries in Southeast Asia, particularly Malaysia) through the funding of Islamic schools, universities, and scholarships. In Indonesia, Nash argues, where

[17] Even though Suharto was able to largely eliminate leftist (and communist) scholars, leaders, and activists in the years immediately following his assumption of the presidency in 1967, in the early 1970s, various student groups emerged as the platform of popular opposition to Suharto's political repression and the government's rampant corruption. As a result, a series of student protests took place in various locations, including the Taman Mini demonstrations in 1971, the Malari riots in 1974, and protests following Suharto's crackdown on students of ITB (Bandung Institute of Technology) in 1978, among others.

Islam had been crippled in the political arena and politics suppressed in the education sector, these investments shored up soft power and influence that would prove largely invulnerable to the political and social changes to come.

After Suharto collapsed in 1998, the bilateral relations continued. To sustain and strengthen the long historic and well-nurtured bilateral relations, contemporary political leaders of the two countries have also continued their predecessors' legacy by visiting one another. In 2013, for instance, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (r. 2004–2014) visited Saudi Arabia. In 2015, President Joko Widodo (r. 2014–2024) made an official visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (r. 2015–) warmly welcomed President Widodo, along with his accompanying delegations. King Salman, moreover, decorated President Widodo with the prestigious King Abdulaziz Medal at Al-Salam Palace in Jeddah. This medal is the highest honorary medal granted to foreign heads of state, symbolizing an appreciation of the strong friendship, relationship, and cooperation between the two nations. The two leaders, moreover, held talks on a number of international and regional issues of mutual concern and interests. They also discussed the state of bilateral relations and explored ways of enhancing them in multiple sectors ranging from trade and culture to security and defense.[18]

In 2019, President Widodo, accompanied by Minister of Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi, Presidential Staff Chief Moeldoko and Indonesian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Agus Maftuh Abegabriel, revisited Saudi Arabia and met with a number of high-rank government officials to discuss issues dealing with the eradication of terrorism and peaceful Islamic propagation. To follow up the historic meeting between King Salman and President Widodo, both countries have escalated their relationship by appointing high-ranking bureaucrats, particularly in the ministry levels and sending them to visit each country and strengthen the partnership of the nations. More specifically, President Widodo appointed Alwi Shihab (b. 1946), a leading Muslim scholar and a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, to be the Indonesian President's special envoy to the Middle East and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, to build communication with Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia. Additionally,

[18] See http://saudigazette.com.sa/saudi-arabia/broadening-indonesia-saudi-bilateral-relations/. Accessed November 13, 2016.

the president also assigned the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources as the liaison of Indonesia with Arab Saudi, besides the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

King Salman, in 2017, also visited Indonesia making him the second Saudi monarch to visit the country after King Faisal, who visited the archipelagic country in 1970. Reportedly, President Widodo was a bit disappointed with the outcomes of the king's visit that resulted in small investments. President Widodo's little disappointment was after he knew that Saudi Arabia had invested US $65 billion in China, whereas it pledged US $6.71 billion (other sources said US $8.8 billion) to Indonesia. But, the president clarified his previous statement stating that it was not in a serious but relaxed situation instead. He also said that the small amount of investment must serve as a basis for evaluation, and if Indonesia's ease of doing business index improves it will attract more investors to come and make investment.[19]

Indeed, before King Salman's visit, there was hope from Indonesian lawmakers and officials that Saudi Arabia would invest at least US $25 billion to cover the oil and gas, tourism, aeronautics, and property sectors, among others. The Head of the Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM)[20] also shared the same expectation. Looking at historical data of Saudi Arabia's investment in Indonesia, this hope was actually too optimistic. For example, the data of BKPM on the Foreign Direct Investment from the Gulf States to Indonesia from 2010 to 2016 shows that Saudi Arabia's investments in Indonesia have been relatively small (US $34.6 billion) compared with those from other Middle Eastern countries such as Jordan (US $237.8 billion) and United Arab Emirates (US $168 billion) or even with Afghanistan (US $65 billion). The BKPM data in 2019 also shows that the realization of the Saudi investment in Indonesia is only US $1.83 million, while UEA US $68.2 million.[21] The biggest bulk of

[19] President Widodo's statement was expressed during his visit at the Buntet Islamic Boarding School in Cirebon, West Java. https://en.tempo.co/read/866340/jokowi-clarifies-statement-about-small-saudi-arabias-investment. Accessed December 26, 2021.

[20] Kompas, "RI ingin tarik investasi Arab Saudi" (RI wants to attract Saudi Arabia's investment), February 24, 2017, https://kompas.id/baca/utama/2017/02/24/ri-ingin-tarik-investasi-arab-saudi/. Accessed December 26, 2021.

[21] https://ekonomi.bisnis.com/read/20200113/9/1189783/uea-dominasi-investasi-negara-timur-tengah-ke-indonesia. Accessed December 30, 2021.

Saudi's investment went to the real estate sector, which experienced stagnation due to an oversupply (Negara 2017: 1–17). Despite Widodo's disappointment, the Indonesian government will certainly continue to build good relations and cooperation with the Saudis in various sectors. As well, while the economic benefits may have been small, political gains appear quite significant since King Salman's visit may have increased President Widodo's Islamic credentials and propped up his domestic public reputation, particularly among Islamist groups and conservative Muslims.

After King Salman's historic visit to Indonesia, the monarch, in 2018, also assigned and sent his Minister for Foreign Affairs (now, Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs) Adel al-Jubeir to meet President Widodo in Indonesia. During the meeting with President Widodo that took place in the Presidential Office in Jakarta, Minister al-Jubeir, reportedly the second person not belonging to the House of Saud to hold the position after Ibrahim bin Abdullah Al Suwaiyel, conveyed the greetings of King Salman, the government and people of Saudi Arabia to Indonesia's President. In turn, the president sent his appreciation to King Salman, expressing his wish to see the relations between the two countries pushed to higher horizons. A former Saudi Ambassador to the United States, al-Jubeir discussed with the president ways of enhancing cooperation in the fields of political consultation and coordination, military, security, economic, investment, cultural, oil, and petrochemical industries corporation and other fields. The aim of this cooperation is to create a qualitative leap in relations between the two countries in the services of mutual concern as well as the service of the Islamic nation.

Moreover, Minister al-Jubeir held talks with the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi during which he discussed a wide range of issues relating to bilateral relations and regional and international issues of mutual concern. In a joint press conference following the talks, Minister Marsudi lauded the depth of relations between the two countries, noting that her meeting with al-Jubeir focused on ways of enhancing cooperation between the two countries in the fields of economy, energy, commerce, investments, as well as politics, security, and defense, including the combat of terrorism, among others. Al-Jubeir too lauded the bilateral relations between the two countries, based on a number of common factors. He also recalled that the Kingdom was among the first countries to have recognized the independence of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945, confirming the Kingdom's hope to see more development and enhancement of the strong relations between the two sisterly countries.

To conclude, relations between Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have been marked by tension and conflict but also peace and cooperation at the same time. Indonesia needs (and cannot away from) Saudi Arabia mainly because Mecca (and Medina), where Muslim pilgrims around the world conduct hajj, is located within the Kingdom. In contrast, in theory, Saudi Arabia does not need Indonesia because of its geographical location (far away from the Arabian Peninsula) and political economic condition (not a major player in global politics and economy) except if the country has transformed into an advanced and powerful nation in Asia (like China or Japan). This is, perhaps, among the reasons for Saudi Arabia's low investment in Indonesia's economic and business sectors.

However, Indonesia, as the world's biggest Muslim-majority nation, has consistently accounts for the largest share of pilgrims to Makkah and Madinah; thereby, it has assuredly made a significant contribution to Saudi Arabia's economy and religious tourism industry.[22] The Saudi government has also made massive cultural investments (through Islamic education and scholarships) in Indonesia and "exported" Salafism to the country since the 1970s to broaden Saudi foreign religious influence, making the Kingdom difficult to neglect Indonesia. Nash (2018) argues that the Saudi strategy of cultural investment in Indonesia-primarily engineered through building Islamic centers and schools (universities, madrasahs), supplying Salafi books, and financing scholarship opportunities-has facilitated a channel of Saudi influence in Indonesia. From this point of view, added with a long history of engagement among Muslims in the two regions, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have shared some common national interests that can sustain their relations and cooperation in future.

[22] Annually, Indonesia sends approximately 200,000 hajj pilgrims, besides tens of thousands of umrah pilgrims each month. Saudi Arabia has certainly benefited from the Indonesian pilgrims. A rough calculation indicates that Indonesians spent US $2 billion annually for both hajj and umrah pilgrimages. In view of the current long waiting list for Indonesians to go for hajj (up to 25 years), Indonesia is naturally seeking to have its quota raised by Saudi Arabia. In response to the request, the Saudi government has raised to 221,000 in 2018.

Collaboration on Counterterrorism, Defense, and Security Issues

Although Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have long struggled with overcoming terrorism, bilateral cooperation on counterterrorism only began in 2014. That year is the tipping point of Saudi-Indonesian collaboration on security and defense issues that comprise ways of combating terrorism and radicalism. At that time the two countries had signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), arguably the first agreement of its sort between Indonesia and Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries.[23] The DCA covers training, education, counterterrorism, and defense industry cooperation (Santosa 2014; Panda 2014). The deal was signed by Saudi Deputy Defense Minister Prince Salman bin Sultan Al Saud and Indonesian Deputy Minister of Defense Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin.

The prince not only signed the DCA but also visited and inspected Indonesia's defense equipment industry, to assess whether to award the industry Saudi contracts for hardware and see whether the industry could modify its products to suit Saudi needs. Among the military equipment he inspected were various firearms, armored personnel carriers, and helicopters. During his visit (reportedly it was the first trip to Indonesia), the prince, who served at the Royal Saudi Air Defense, observed a number of Anoa armored personnel carriers (APC), a Komodo tactical vehicle produced by PT Pindad in Bandung, as well as two helicopters and two transportation airplanes, which are assembled and produced by state-owned PT Dirgantara Indonesia (*The Jakarta Post* 2014). According to Sjamsoeddin, Saudi Arabia requested detailed specifications of weapon systems made by Indonesia to be assessed and matched with the Kingdom's needs and geographical conditions.[24]

There are at least two factors that drove the signing of the DCA. First, both countries have shared the same defense and security matters due to, among others, the spread of Islamist extremism, radicalism, and terrorism (see Chapters 2 and 5). The proliferation of terrorism and radicalism has

[23] On the reportage of joint conference on DCA, see http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/01/24/saudi-arabia-ri-ink-defense-cooperation-agreement.html. Accessed November 16, 2016.

[24] Yet, it is unclear whether Riyadh has purchased the military equipment from Indonesia, despite the fact that the Kingdom has bought the equipment from the United States, the United Kingdom, and other developed countries worth hundreds of billions of US dollars.

certainly posed serious threats for the countries' national security and social stability. Therefore, the two countries need to defend them from internal and external threats including from terrorist groupings. Second, both countries have special counterterrorism units (see Chapters 3 and 6). Since the former Minister of Interior Muhammad bin Nayef, Saudi anti-terror squads (since 2017, the units are under the Presidency of State Security) has battled against terrorism with a variety of counterterrorism and anti-terrorism strategies and tactics (see Chapter 3). Indonesia, via the special security unit Densus 88, also gained reputation in the success of fighting against domestic terrorism since the 2002 Bali blast (see Chapter 6). In this regard, the two counterterrorism units might work together to fight terrorism and eradicate radicalism in their countries.

With the signing of the DCA, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have agreed to work side by side on counterterrorism and counter-radicalism noting that terrorism and radicalism should not be linked to any ideology or religion, particularly Islam. Indonesia's interlocutor (Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin) added that, "No religion in the world teaches violence" (Santosa 2014).[25] For Saudi Arabia, in particular, the DCA with Indonesia comes on the heels of a similar deal with Pakistan that came two days before the signing the pact with Indonesia. Indonesia and Pakistan are the first and second Muslim-majority countries in the world; thereby, the agreements underline Saudi Arabia's interest in expanding relations and cooperation on issues related to security and defense with Muslim-dominated nations outside its immediate Middle Eastern neighborhood. One of the significant parts of the DCA deals is to collaborate in capacity building to increase professionalism by opening opportunities for joint exercise, training, or workshops involving members of security forces, especially counterterrorism units, of both countries.

Another is a joint investment on Anoa armored personnel carriers (APC) platform that suit Saudi needs in the defense industry. Saudi Arabia also donated an Arabic language laboratory to the Indonesian Peace and Security in Sentul, West Java, used to train Indonesian soldiers before their departure to Lebanon as part of the UN Peacekeeping mission. Furthermore, Indonesia's defense industry could also win lucrative Saudi contracts since the Kingdom has put in a request for detailed technical specifications of Indonesian defense/military equipment (known

[25] See http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/indonesia-and-saudi-arabia-sign-defense-cooperation-agreement/. Accessed November 16, 2016.

as alutsista–*alat utama sistem persenjataan*), and will match Indonesian offerings to its requirements. According to Deputy Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, "The assessment is at the observation phase. Today's visit was an introduction to the Indonesian defense industry's capability" (Santosa 2014). Since the signing of the DCA pact, Indonesia has sent its security personnel (the military and police) and members of counterterrorism units to participate in a series of counterterrorism and antiradicalism training in Saudi Arabia, but the purchase deals on the military equipment remain unclear since, to my knowledge, there are no updates on this issue.

Another visit by Saudi officials related to security, defense, and counterterrorism issues took place in 2018. This time, Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs, Abdel al-Jubeir, who visited Indonesia. During the visit, the two countries have also signed several Memorandum of Understandings (MoU) on multiple sectors from economy and business to defense and security issues. For example, Saudi Aramco and Indonesian Pertamina, two leading companies on oil and gas, had agreed to invest US $6 billion to explore oil fields in Cilacap, Central Java.[26] In addition, the two foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia (Adel al-Jubeir and Retno Marsudi) have also agreed to reinforce Saudi–Indonesian relations on peace, defense, and security. In an effort to wipe out terrorism and radicalism, the two ministers have settled partnerships and initiatives on counterterrorism and antiradicalism, including an intelligence exchange to share information related to issues of terrorism and radicalism.

In a joint statement with Minister al-Jubeir, Minister Marsudi said, "The Saudi Presidency of State Security and the Indonesian National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) have committed to scale up the relationship and collaboration in the combat and extinction of terrorism and radicalism."[27] The State Security Presidency, built in 2017, is a new initiative as an umbrella body that houses all security institutions, including those related to counterterrorism and domestic intelligence services. In brief, the new body is responsible for all matters related to the security

[26] https://dunia.tempo.co/read/1139209/ini-daftar-terbaru-kerja-sama-arab-saudi-indonesia. Accessed September 19, 2020.

[27] https://www.cnnindonesia.com/internasional/20181023155343-106-340778/bertukar-intelijen-ri-saudi-perkuat-kerja-sama-anti-teror. Accessed September 19, 2020.

of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.[28] BNPT, founded in 2010, now under the leadership of Boy Rafli Amar, is Indonesian non-ministerial government department to prevent and eradicate terrorism (see more details on BNPT's role in Chapter 6).

Minister Marsudi also pointed out that the counterterrorism and anti-terrorism cooperation is not only in the intelligence exchange but also in other programs such as joint military exercise, training, and capacity building. The two ministers affirmed that the collaboration in counterterrorism between Riyadh and Jakarta was mainly because the two nations have the same problems, namely both have suffered from terrorism and extremism. Previously, in 2017, during King Salman's visit to Indonesia and before the meeting of the two ministers of foreign affairs, both governments had signed MoU on the cooperation in dealing with overcoming organized crimes that include terrorism.

More specifically, BNPT and the Saudi police had also reached a commitment to handle issues related to national security and political stability of the two countries, including on combating terrorism. This promise was symbolized by signing a MoU between the Saudi police chief, Osman bin Yaser Almahriji, and BNPT chief (now retired), Gen. Suhardi Alius.[29] The two chiefs agreed that combating terrorism and extremism is an integral part of the national security and stability of the two countries. In 2017, Alius also made an official visit to Saudi Arabia to learn and explore more on the Kingdom's approaches, initiatives, policies, and programs on fighting terrorism. During his visit, Alius said, the Kingdom also committed to sponsor families of members of Densus 88 (an anti-terror elite police squad) who died in the combat of terrorism to perform hajj pilgrimage.

One of the key points in the Saudi–Indonesian counterterrorism agreement is that Saudi Arabia will host a series of trainings or workshops on combating terrorism and radicalism. Each training, held in Riyadh, takes several weeks. Sonif Nuhar, one of the workshop participants from the Navy in 2019, said that the training has several objectives as follows. First, to explain ways related to combating terrorism through military (physical war) and nonmilitary means (battle of thought). Second, to

[28] https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2017/07/21/Saudi-Arabia-Royal-order-to-establish-a-state-security-presidium. Accessed September 19, 2020.

[29] https://merahputih.com/post/read/bnpt-dan-kepolisian-arab-saudi-kerjasama-penanggulangan-terorisme. Accessed September 19, 2020.

share information of what Saudi Arabia has done (e.g. programs, activities, policies, approaches, strategies, tactics, and so forth) in relation to the battle of terrorism and radicalism. Third, to introduce Saudi Arabia–led an alliance of anti-terrorism and counterterrorism comprising a number of Muslim-majority countries. Fourth, to elucidate that terrorism is unlawful (haram and an evil deed) in Islam, meaning that this religion neither teach nor support terrorism that harms ordinary people. Fifth, to minimize common misunderstandings and misperceptions (in the West and non-West) of Islam and Muslims as the advocates of global terrorism.[30]

Nuhar said that participants of the workshops he participated in were selected from the Indonesian National Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, abbreviated as TNI, consisting of the Army, Navy, and Air Force), the TNI headquarters (Mabes TNI), as well as the Ministry of Defense. Saudi Arabia has also sponsored trainings for members of non-Armed Forces such as those of the police, the intelligence body (Badan Intelijen Indonesia, abbreviated as BIN), or the Presidential Security Force (Pasukan Pengamanan Presiden, abbreviated as Paspampres). As well, the Saudi government supplies resources of counterterrorism/antiradicalism trainings for the Indonesian military–run educational programs and institutions such as the Sekolah Staf Komando (the command staff school), Sekolah Kursus Bahasa Arab (Arabic course school), or Sekolah Pembinaan Mental (the mental building-up school). TNI also has a special intensive training program (a short course, for around four months) on issues related to terrorism countermeasures, named Sekolah Kursus Penanggulangan Teror, in which Saudi Arabia has also contributed to the program (for instance, supplying relevant materials).[31]

According to Nuhar, resource persons of the workshop in Riyadh, in which he participated were representatives of the Saudi Defense Ministry, Saudi Islamic scholars and clerics, and Indonesian doctorate students who study in Saudi Arabia. They include, among others, Muhammad Abdurrahman Al Saadan, Muhammad Al Osaimi, Abdul Aziz Al Drees, Turki bin Musawwaf, Abdussalam bin Muhammad Al Suwaiya, Shaikh Iyadh Shukri, Shaikh Ibrahim bin Abdullah Ismail, Shaikh Abdurrahman

[30] Online conversations with Sonif Nuhar, August–September 2020.

[31] See an example of the counterterrorism short course program, especially for the Navy, at https://tni.mil.id/view-59154-penutupan-kursus-penanggulangan-teror-aspek-laut.html. Accessed September 18, 2020.

Al Mukhrijtz, Abdul Aziz bin Muhammad al-Sadhan, and a number of Indonesian doctorate students from King Saud University and Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University. The involvement of Saudi Arabia's Indonesian doctorate students is because the nature of the workshop is a collaborative program between the governments of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. In 2020 and 2021, because of the Covid-19 epidemic, there was no workshop of its kind.

To date, Saudi-Indonesian cooperation on combating terrorism and things related to defense and security deal with training, education, or intelligence exchange. Saudi Arabia does not provide substantial funds to help Indonesian counterterrorism programs (run by BNPT) except for building an Arabic lab or sponsoring families of Densus 88 personnel who died during the battle against terrorists to perform hajj,[32] to name a few. Not only Saudi Arabia, other countries having similar problems of terrorism such as the United States, United Kingdom, or neighboring Australia do not provide ample funds on Indonesian counterterrorism programs. As well, Indonesia also does not supply funds to assist Saudi counterterrorism programs.

In other words, the largest portion of funds for financing counterterrorism programs in both countries were provided by each government. Whatever the forms of the collaboration on counterterrorism that Indonesia and Saudi Arabia have made and agreed, they have some advantages, especially for the Indonesian side. The commitment and agreement between the two countries to enhance dialogue on strategies to combat terrorism and stop the escalation of radicalism should be appreciated and supported. This should also be viewed as a significant phase given the increased threat of terrorism and radicalism in both nations. Yet, it remains to be seen how the two parties follow up seriously and consistently on the pacts' points as they have agreed to make it a concrete action plan.

I have also noticed that although the counterterrorism collaboration between Indonesia and Saudi Arabia only touches a small portion of the whole counterterrorism programs, the Indonesian government's attempts at making an alliance with Saudi Arabia has been strategic and advantageous due to several reasons as follows. First, Indonesia is

[32] Interview with Hamli, a former director of de-radicalization program at BNPT, August 2020.

a Muslim-dominated country in which the vast majority of Muslim population has admired Saudi Arabia, thanks in particular to Makkah and Madinah (the Haramain), where Muslims around the world believe as the most sacred sites on earth. Not only devout Muslims, nominal Muslims also want to visit Makkah (for pilgrimage, either hajj or umrah) and Madinah (for visiting Prophet Muhammad's shrine). My previous study (Al Qurtuby 2019) also indicates that visiting Makkah and Madinah has also been one of the primary reasons and driving forces for many Indonesian migrant workers, tourists, students, and professional expats in the Kingdom (see also Lucking 2021).

The second reason is that Saudi Arabia is one of the most important countries for Muslim communities around the globe and one of the world's leading centers for Sunni Muslim and Islamic studies due to the Kingdom's cultural investment on Islamic education and scholarships, driving many Muslims from many countries to come to Saudi Arabia, either for study or work. Third, as a rich country, Saudi Arabia also plays an important role in global politics of Muslim societies worldwide, and has been active in helping, financially, Muslim causes across the world (either charities or funds for development projects). Therefore, many Muslim-majority countries in Asia (including the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent) and Africa try to make connection and build partnerships with the Kingdom. For many years, Indonesia has also approached and established links to Saudi Arabia.

Lastly, but not the least, fourth, the Indonesian government has been accused by Islamist, Salafi, and conservative Muslim groups as "un-Islamic and anti-Muslim regime" or a foe of "foreign infidel countries." Accordingly, building friendship, partnership, and collaboration with Saudi Arabia could reduce such negative perspective and image. It is true that the Indonesian government's collaboration on combating terrorism with the United States and Australia, for instance, has suffered from the accusation of, especially from the perspectives of Islamist terrorists and militants, being the Western's "puddle dog" or Christian–Jewish accomplice. Moreover, the Islamist terrorists and their sympathizers accused the government-sponsored counterterrorism and antiradicalism policies as the product of Judeo–Christian conspiracy.

As well, they blamed the Indonesian government for making an alliance with the foreign Zionists and Crusaders to combat terrorism and terrorist groups aiming at satisfying American, Australian, or Western rulers on one hand and to destroying Islam and Muslim community on the other.

Against this backdrop, by joining forces with the Saudi government, their allegation has been illegitimated, lacks foundational ground, or at least puts into question. Interestingly, Saudi Islamists and terrorists also accused the Saudi government's counterterrorism programs as the Western (especially American) sponsor. Nonetheless, apart from radical views (e.g. those expressed by spiritual leaders of Jamaah Islamiyah Abu Bakar Baasyir or of Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid Aman Abdurrahman) that delegitimize or underrate the Saudi government, Indonesian Muslims in general perceive Saudi Arabia as an important Muslim and Islamic soil. From this standpoint, establishing connection and collaboration with Saudi Arabia could be beneficial for the Indonesian government. Nevertheless, it is imperative to underscore that even though Indonesian partnerships with Saudi Arabia might be advantageous, it is a mistake to state that the Indonesian endeavor of counterterrorism depends on the Saudi government.

Furthermore, while the Indonesian government might benefit from making links with Riyadh on counterterrorism programs, the Saudi government might not get much advantage from the cooperation. It is worth noting that, based on my observation, views of Indonesian Muslims toward Saudi Arabia differ significantly from those of Saudi Arabia toward Indonesia. My observation is that, from the Saudi side, the collaboration is not really significant and does not have direct impact on Saudi efforts of combating terrorism. This is because, first, geographically, Indonesia is a faraway from Saudi territory, making it no direct implication of the Kingdom's national security and socio-political stability. Second, Indonesia is not a superpower and developed country such as the United States, China, the United Kingdom, Russia, and few others that have a strong political and economic influence on Saudi and international government and societies. Third, Saudis or Arabs in general consider Indonesian Islam insignificant, peripheral, or syncretic, away from the core tenets and fundamental doctrines of Islam. As a result, for them, Indonesian Islam has lack religious authority and perhaps zero effects toward Saudi Muslim societies of any Islamic streams and schools of thought.

The Saudi government's endeavor of reaching out Indonesia is maybe driven by the belief that fighting terrorism requires a global coalition since it has been a global phenomenon with has no borders. The second reason is perhaps due to the prolonged Saudi-Indonesian relations and engagement that go beyond formal diplomatic and business relationships. Another important reason is because Indonesia is the world's largest

Sunni–Muslim dominant country that Saudi Arabia could use it as a "far friend" to fight against a common enemy, i.e. terrorism. Although the Indonesian government refused to join a military alliance of Muslim-majority nations to fight terrorism,[33] an initiative led by Saudi Arabia since 2015,[34] the refusal does not lessen Saudi commitment to collaborate with Indonesia on fighting terrorism. In fact, Saudi Arabia continues to conduct and sponsor workshops in Riyadh whose participants are from the Indonesian counterterrorism units on ways of combating and preventing societies from terrorism.

Whatever the reasons and driving forces for the Saudi government in making an alliance with Indonesia, it is obvious that any country, including Saudi Arabia, cannot combat and defeat terrorism alone since it has become a global phenomenon. The Saudi government understands that combating terrorism and defeating terrorist groups entails a strategic partnership with international countries, communities, and organizations of any ethnoreligious backgrounds. This is among the rationale of why the Kingdom builds a coalition with Indonesia and other countries–both developed countries in the Global North and developing nations in the Global South. The Kingdom itself, more specifically, in an effort of combating terrorism, has created an alliance with neighboring countries such as Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, or Egypt as well as other Muslim-majority nations across the globe. All of these attempts are certainly to confine terrorists' movement and achieve a global peace and security.

The transnational coalition on anti-terrorism and counterterrorism, either at regional or global level, is undoubtedly significant in the combat terrorism, extremism and other forms of organized and unorganized crimes. Such collaboration across ethnoreligious divides is built based on the fundamental principle and conviction that bilateral and multilateral initiatives (in various sectors such as intelligence, defense and security, law

[33] The Indonesian government refused to join Saudi-led military alliance of Muslim-majority countries to fight terrorism because the Indonesian constitution has given a mandate to the government to follow or adopt the "*bebas aktif*" (free and active) foreign policy, meaning be active to involve in finding wise solutions for conflicts overseas while at the same time be free or does not involve in a particular bloc that can potentially damage Indonesian relationships with other countries. And the Saudi-led alliance excludes Shia-majority nations or some countries engaged in conflict with the Saudis such as Iran, Irak, and Syria, among others.

[34] https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE189.html. Accessed December 30, 2021.

enforcement, legal-judicial, and political affairs, among others) can assist in attempts at fighting against extremism and terrorism. Cooperation with international communities, organizations, and foreign countries is also substantial in combating a spectrum of terrorist activities such as recruitment, propagation, indoctrination, propaganda, financing, transportation, communication, training, execution, and so forth. In recent years, as the differences between terrorism and other types of crimes and extremism are getting blurred, transnational alliances of anti-terrorism and counterterrorism—such as a coalition between Saudi Arabia and Indonesia—can also be used as a critical instrument in the fight against multinational criminal enterprises, such as money laundering, illicit businesses, and counterfeit documents (Ashraf 2007; Gunaratna et al. 2011; Rudolph 2018).

Lessons Learned from Saudi Arabia and Indonesia

What lessons-positive or negative, good or bad-can Indonesia learn from Saudi Arabia and vice versa on terrorism and counterterrorism? Concerning terrorism, several lessons can be drawn as follows.

First, never underestimate terrorist groups, organizations, or lone offenders. Terrorists' ideas, perceptions, attitudes, behaviors, actions, or commitment are really difficult to predict and detect. Although hundreds of terrorists were shot to death and thousands have been jailed, terrorists seem do not come to an end. When the right time comes, they always emerge whenever and wherever to terrorize the government and societies. Like cancer viruses, terrorists seem difficult to die. Even though thousands of terrorists have been deradicalized, disengaged, and reintegrated into their societies, this does not guarantee that terrorists have disappeared from the lands of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. In fact, at times, they appeared and committed violence.

Second, terrorism and Islamist terrorism are not only about ideology. It seems the governments of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia strongly believe that Islamist ideology has been the key for the rise of terrorism in their countries. Therefore, they focus on combating the terrorists' extremist ideology through various methods, means, and programs. Although the radical ideology of Islamist terrorists has been fundamental in shaping the terrorists' notions, practices, and behaviors, Islamist terrorism cannot be simplified as a product of Islamist radical and political ideology. Undeniably, many factors (outside ideology) have contributed to the emergence and formation of Islamist terrorism and radicalism such as economic

shortage, political disadvantage, reprisal, social pressure, or competition over scarce resources, to name a few. All of these factors need to be carefully and fairly assessed.

Third, from the cases of terrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, we can also learn about the power of the internet and social media that could transform ordinary people to become terrorists. Realizing the power and influence of the internet and social media in shaping people's thought and behavior, a great number of terrorists also utilize them to find new recruits while keeping the traditional offline methods of recruitment. They also created many websites and posted radical contents there-writings, recorded speeches, videos to spread extremist ideology and teachings, and influence people. As well, terrorists posted contents on ways to assemble bombs. In order to effectively convince, provoke, and affect people, terrorists usually attach and manipulate photos of Muslim victims (children, adult, male, female) of violence (war, shootings, bombings, etc.) committed by Western countries and their allies in the Middle East and elsewhere. Indeed, as discussed in the previous chapters, a vast number of radicals and terrorists have been influenced by the internet and social media. Hence, the governments and societies of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia should be aware of the hazard of online and virtual indoctrination and radicalization. Accordingly, they need to watch over the proliferation of the internet and social media, as well as regulate its use by composing and issuing proper policies and laws.

Fourth, terrorism is no longer an adult male world. The Indonesian cases shockingly show that female (women, girls, and housewives), children, and families have been perpetrators of deadly terrorist acts. Although there are so far no female and child terrorists that carried out bombings and suicide attacks in the Kingdom, they could emerge in future. Therefore, the Saudi and Indonesian governments and societies should not underrate them. To date, the two governments focus on adult male terrorists who have long dominated the world of terrorism while neglecting the roles and contributions of female and children in spreading radicalism and committing violence. The need to pay attention to female and child terrorists is also due to the fact that many terrorist groups started to influence, radicalize, and recruit them to become new squads aiming at obscuring their violent activities.

Fifth, in some cases, blaming or accusing terrorists' understandings of Islam as aberrant and incorrect away from the true messages and principles of Islamic teachings, the Qur'an, or Prophet Muhammad's

sayings (Hadith) are not effective in changing their views, beliefs, and practices. Like the governments and moderate Muslims in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and other Muslim-majority countries, many Islamist terrorists also convince that their radical thought, notions, and practices are essentially rooted in the Islamic doctrines, texts, and discourses. Rather than applying and pushing theological debate with the Islamist terrorists, other methods and approaches (for instance, humanistic approach) are occasionally needed and more fruitful, as in the cases of de-radicalization processes in Solo (Central Java), Lamongan (East Java), Sumbawa (NTB), Ambon (Maluku), and other places in Indonesia.

Sixth, the spread of "secular cultures" is as dangerous as that of religious fanaticism in which both can stir up terrorist violence. Muslim religious fanatics generally do not except secular cultures—foreign or local—because they believe that such cultures are evil, irreligious, un-Islamic, and potential to damage the purity of Islamic faith. The zealots not only disagree with the escalation of secular cultures (both material and nonmaterial cultures) but also try to destroy them by various means of violence, including terrorism. Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have experienced the emergence of apocalyptic groups and Islamist terrorists due to, among others, they protested the widespread practice of secular cultures in their countries and societies. Therefore, the governments need to handle the presence of secular cultures and religious fanaticism wisely and appropriately.

Those are some examples of lessons concerning cases of terrorism. Regarding counterterrorism, several lessons can also be drawn as the following. In combating terrorism, for instance, there is a need to balance between "hard" (military/security) approach and "soft" (nonmilitary) approach. The soft approach might work for some terrorists but not for others and vice versa. Within soft and hard approaches, there are also various forms of programs, strategies, and tactics, which are perhaps applicable, useful, and effective for some terrorists but not for others. It is thus significant to implement different approach to different types of terrorists since they have different levels of problems, militancy, fanaticism, and roots. As stated previously, counterterrorism approaches to hardcore terrorist ideologues, for example, should be different from "ordinary" terrorists.

Another concern is about issues of trust building toward ex-terrorists (disengaged and deradicalized terrorists). While it is central to develop trust building with those who had experienced of violence, including terrorism, in the past for future's peacebuilding, it is sometimes difficult

to trust them 100 percent. In fact, although few in percentage, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have experienced in which some former terrorists, after following programs of de-radicalization and reintegration, returned to violent and radical activities by spreading terror in the societies. As a result, the counterterrorism units recaptured them. Some problems helped them return to violence activities, for example, local society's (including family and neighborhood) rejection toward their presence, social pressure from their fellow terrorists, difficulties in making living, or government's neglect to their future life.

To conclude, although it may be premature to draw conclusions about the success and failure of counterterrorism in both nations, the public (analysts, scholars, observers, policymakers, practitioners, and others) can learn many things from both Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. As for Indonesia, where lessons can be learned, many lie in the actions of the central government, the societal factors that have enabled it, and the precarious state of "success" against terrorism (Caruso 2018). As for Saudi Arabia, the ruling family has been central in orchestrating changes in public sectors and fighting terrorism by reforming the government bureaucracy, cutting its connection with religious radical factions, and replacing the religious conservatives with the moderates in religious, cultural, and educational institutions.

In the Indonesian context, despite an increasingly conservative and pious society, particularly in urban and semi-urban areas, radical ideology and terrorism (especially of foreign origin) have been slow to gain grip the majority of populace and attracted only limited circles. Certainly, conservatism is not a safe area since it can be transformed into radicalism and even terrorism when supporting factors exist. In Saudi Arabia, religious conservatism and extremism have suffered from the public domains in recent years due to the government's crackdown on their roles. But in the private realm, they exist, and some Saudi societies continue to practice such conservative ideas and doctrines since they believe that those are part of the fundamental teachings of Islamic faith.

Prospects for Future Peace and Security: Reflections and Remarks

Notwithstanding serious and extensive efforts in fighting against terrorism, the question remains: are Saudi Arabia and Indonesia now

and in future safe from extremism and terrorist threat? Do Saudi and Indonesian societies enjoy sustainable peace and security?

It is certainly uneasy to answer these questions. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have different situations and stories. For the moment, present-day Saudi Arabia (compared to the previous one), backed with a strong government, extensive infrastructure, economic boost, and loyal citizens, tends to be more stable and safer from domestic terrorism and radicalism. To date, since 2017 onwards there are no major terrorist incidents and suicide bombings in the Kingdom. Since that year, after a series of ISIL-supported bombings in various locations (see Chapter 2), some minor terrorist incidents occurred but with zero casualties and minimum damages. This is, no doubt, good news. The biggest security threat of contemporary Saudi Arabia, again for the moment, does not come from domestic terrorist groups such as QAP and others (ISIL's network) but from its neighboring country, Yemen, especially from Iran–backed Houthi insurgency movement in the northern Yemen as well as Iran and its allies in the Middle East.

Many times, the Houthi rebels launch ballistic missiles targeting Saudi territory, the government properties, and business enterprises. However, Saudi Arabia, reportedly the third-highest defense spender on earth after the United States and China, which spent US $67.6 billion on arms in 2018, has so far been successful in intercepting the missiles, with few notable exceptions such as the 2019 drones and missile strikes on the government's oil giant Saudi Aramco facilities in the Abqaiq and Khurais of Eastern Province.[35] At the moment, Islamist terrorism is dying due to the wide-ranging counterterrorism approaches and efforts combining military and nonmilitary approaches that have destroyed terrorist groups, cells, bases, and networks, as well as deradicalized many terrorists suspects, some of whom reintegrated into society. Other types of radicalism such as vigilantism and communal violence are also fading in the Kingdom. But, again, the temporary peace and security from Islamist terrorism do not mean that the Islamist terrorists have disappeared from the land of the Arabian Peninsula.

[35] Yemen's Houthi insurgents claimed responsibility for the attacks but Saudi and US officials said Iran was responsible, a charge that Tehran has denied. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/19/how-saudi-arabia-failed-to-protect-itself-from-drones-missile-attacks.html. Accessed September 25, 2020.

Indonesia, by contrast, is still struggling with multiple forms of radicalism and extremism. It is true that, until recently, Densus 88 has been successful in capturing a great number of terrorists and destroying their cells, networks and bases, causing their damage severely. BNPT has also succeeded in pacifying, de-radicalizing, and rehabilitating many terrorist suspects. However, although not extensive (e.g. compared to the previous Bali and Marriot bombings), terrorist attacks continue to exist. Throughout the years of 2018 and 2019, terrorist incidents, including suicide bombings, occurred. The 2018 terrorist attacks, by far, were the largest—in term of casualties and bomb strength—in recent years. Since then, especially during the Covid-19 pandemics, there is no major record of terrorist acts in Indonesia (as in Saudi Arabia). However, this does not mean that, as in the case of Saudi Arabia, terrorism has vanished from the archipelagic country.

Notwithstanding having good counterterrorism units (Densus 88 and BNPT), the Indonesian government faces many problems, risks, and vulnerabilities, making prospects for future enduring peace and security uncertain. These are, among others, stakeholders (e.g. governments and moderate socio-religious organizations) can themselves be influenced and co-opted by radical, conservative, and Islamist ideology. Politicians at national, regional, and local levels have increasingly appeased radical groups to avoid conflict with them as well as collect more votes to win the parliamentary seats. Additionally, divergence in opinion on social and religious issues continue to pose risks to effective promulgation of counternarratives and antiradical rhetoric. Moreover, Indonesia's security forces themselves and the legal infrastructure supporting counterterrorism operations also face a risky and uncertain future. Some failed or ineffective terrorist attacks have appeared to be the result of poor planning by terrorists rather than effective policing (Caruso 2018). All of these factors can become a stumbling block for future peace and security.

More importantly, terrorism is not the only form of violence in Indonesia nowadays. There are other types of violence that could jeopardize the country's peace, security and stability in future such as vigilantism, collective riots, intolerant actions, anti-pluralist movement, hate speeches, racism, separatism, among others. A great number of Indonesian informants have underlined the government's success in combating terrorism while alerting its failure in overcoming non-terrorism violence, committed by various Islamist radical groupings and Muslim-affiliated paramilitary organizations that have mushroomed since the downfall of

Suharto in 1998. Since Suharto's fall, anti-pluralist Muslim groups, operated covertly during his era, have grown rapidly in major cities. On behalf of purification of Islam and implementation of sharia, the groups have carried out multiple types of violence–physical and verbal–targeting some religious minorities (non-Muslim and Muslim alike), followers of local beliefs, moderate activists, pluralist factions, adherents of Islamic sects, and any group that oppose their ideas, agenda, and objectives. They also devastated properties of devotees of religious sects they judge deviant or infidel (e.g. Gafatar, Ahmadiyah, Salamullah, among many others). As well, they ousted some Muslim-minority groups such as Shiites and Ahmadis, becoming refugees in their own country.

If not resolved properly, these militant and vigilante groups could destroy the society's tolerance and the country's deep plurality. More importantly perhaps, vigilante groups, if situations permit and found supporting resources, could become deadly terrorists. Nonetheless, resolving this issue and appeasing such groups are also not easy mainly because, for the most part, the militant groups have supporters or backup from some elite factions in the government, parliaments and other institutions having particular political agenda and economic interests. The backers can be fanatic religious leaders, greedy conglomerates, corrupt politicians, dirty bureaucrats, and disappointed military/police (or ex) elites, among others. They use radical groups only as a vehicle or ladder to achieve particular political, economic, and ideological agenda. Once their interests have been fulfilled, violence ceases or at least fades. If not yet, they will continue to disrupt the government, country and society by mobilizing the radical vigilante groups. Islamist terrorists, for the most part, differ from the vigilante groups. While Islamist terrorists are "idealist groups" (and independent at some point) carrying out violence for some fundamental principles they have believed (either bad or good), vigilantes can be opportunistic groups (and sometime interdependent) that undertake violent acts for—or on behalf of—other people/groups' interests.

Apart from the temporary absence of terrorist incidents in recent years, both in Saudi Arabia and in Indonesia, this does not guarantee that the two countries would safe, peaceful, and free from terrorism in upcoming years. Many terrorist suspects are still alive, in a jail or hideout. Although some terrorist culprits died, radical, and extremist ideology that form terrorism never dies. In a digital age, people could easily learn and absorb

such ideologies through the Internet. A number of Saudis and Indonesians who departed for Syria or Iraq to join ISIL were also because of propaganda from members of this notorious terrorist organization via the internet and social media, as mentioned earlier. Ordinary people could also learn ways of assembling a bomb and other terrorist devices and techniques via the internet. The development of social media and internet technology help distributions and proliferation of radical ideology and terrorist practices become easier and faster than before. Anytime, the ideology could influence any people of any age, gender, educational background, and social class to become new terrorists if conditions support them and, certainly, if they are brave enough to carry out such violent act.

Based on various cases of terrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia presented in this book, it becomes clear that terrorism has nothing to do with a political transition or the regime's fragility. It is correct to state that a political shift in a country could drive criminals take an opportunity to "play a game" hoping to gain power and economic control by spreading terror. As well, the regime's fragility could influence political players and culprits to execute their agenda by committing evil deeds. These facts also occurred in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. Nevertheless, terrorist activities did not only take place in times of crisis. Terrorism could take place anytime in any circumstances as long as necessary conditions of terrorism exist such as skills, courage, chance, bitter situations, and unpleasant experiences–skills of making bombs, courage to carry out attacks, chance to commit terrorism, unpleasant situations (e.g. discrimination, racism and others), and terrorists' negative experiences in the past.

All of these supporting factors are the "ingredient" of terrorism without which terrorism would never become reality, existing only in the human's head or the world of idea. For example, although a person has negative experiences (e.g. being tortured, discriminated, harassed, and so forth) and situations in the society or country are unfriendly and hostile toward him/her, if he/she does not have bravery to undertake a terrorist attack (or does not know ways of making or exploding a bomb), terrorism would not happen.

In brief, although most recent situations of Indonesia and Saudi Arabia are free from terrorism, I do not and never know what is happening in future. However, the two countries have done marvelous jobs in combating and countering terrorism through multiple hard (military) and soft (nonmilitary) approaches that help society and country secure

from terrorist attacks at the moment. More specifically, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have pioneered in the terrorist rehabilitation approach comprising disengagement, de-radicalization, and aftercare programs that are effective and fruitful for pacifying terrorists and, in turn, creating a society safe from terrorism. In the long run, the rehabilitation method aims at reintegrating ex-terrorist suspects back into society through a series of de-radicalization process, namely a process of ideological, psychological, political, or religious adjustment whereby a terrorist no longer believes in, or is engaged with, terrorism. The de-radicalization process includes multiple programs such as, but not limited to, reeducation, psychological counseling, social engagement, vocational training (if need be), as well as a process of disengagement from terrorism (i.e. the secession of terrorist acts) (Gunaratna, Jerard, and Rubin 2011; Hwang 2018).

Commenting on strategic counterterrorism approach, Bruce Hoffman, an expert of terrorism studies, said, "Attempts at rehabilitation of a terrorist along strict ideological or political lines may be ineffective, if not waste of time. Instead, [terrorist] reintegration into society should probably be predicated upon reducing or neutralizing his [terrorist] sense of alienation. This might be accomplished by providing the terrorist (and potential terrorist) with opportunities for gainful employment, and with that, upward economic and social mobility" (Hoffman 1985:4). Through aftercare programs, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia have implemented Hoffman's suggestion around 35 years ago that ultimately help diminish potential threat of terrorism. If Saudi Arabia and Indonesia could uphold or further develop their tactical and strategic counterterrorism approaches, added with just policies and productive development programs that benefit their citizens of any religious and ethnic backgrounds, terrorism might not emerge in the years to come, and both countries continue to enjoy the national peace and security that are free from terrorist activities. However, who can guarantee the future's peace and security in a society and country?

References

Adams, Cindy. 1986. *Bung Karno: Penyambung Lidah Rakyat*. Jakarta: Gunung Agung.

Al Qurtuby, Sumanto. 2017. "Arabs and Indo-Arabs in Indonesia: Historical Dynamics, Social Relations and Contemporary Changes." *International Journal of Asia Pacific Studies* 13 (2): 45–72.

Al Qurtuby, Sumanto. 2019. *Saudi Arabia and Indonesia Networks: Migration, Education and Islam*. London, UK: I.B. Tauris & Bloomsbury.

———, and Shafi Aldamer. 2018. "Saudi-Indonesian Relations: Historical Dynamics and Contemporary Development." *Asian Perspective* 42: 121–144.

Ashraf, A. S. M. Ali. 2007. "Transnational Cooperation on Anti-terrorism: A Cooperative Case Study of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia." *Perceptions*: 91–121.

Azra, Azyumardi. 2004. *The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia: Networks of Malay-Indonesian and Middle Eastern Ulama in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press.

Bubalo, Anthony, and Greg Fealy. 2005. *Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism, and Indonesia*. Lowy Institute Paper No. 5. Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney.

Caruso, Phil. 2018. "Indonesia and Terrorism: Success, Failure and Uncertain Future." *Middle East-Asia Project*. https://www.mei.edu/publications/indonesia-and-terrorism-success-failure-and-uncertain-future#_ftn2. Accessed August 6, 2020.

Conboy, Ken. 2009. *The Second Front: Inside Jemaah Islamiyah, Asia's Most Dangerous Terrorist Network*. Sheffield, UK: Equinox Publishing.

Cortright, David, and George Lopez. 2007. *Uniting Against Terror: Cooperative Nonmilitary Responses to the Global Terrorist Threat*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Crenshaw, Martha. 2010. *Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes and Consequences*. London: Routledge.

Gunaratna, Rohan, Jolene Jerard, and Lawrence Rubin, eds. 2011. *Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalization*. London, UK: Routledge.

Hoffman, Bruce. 1985. "The Prevention of Terrorism and Rehabilitation of Terrorists: Some Preliminary Thoughts." The Rand Paper Series P-7059, February, pp. 1–5.

Hwang, Julie Chernov. 2018. *Why Terrorists Quit: The Disengagement of Indonesian Jihadists*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Lucking, Mirjam. 2021. *Indonesians and Their Arab World: Guided Mobility Among Labor Migrants and Mecca Pilgrims*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Nash, Carolyn. 2018. "Saudi Arabia's Soft Power Strategy in Indonesia." Middle East Institute. https://www.mei.edu/publications/saudi-arabias-soft-power-strategy-indonesia#_ftn1. Accessed December 23, 2021.

Negara, Sewage Dharma. 2017. "The Impact of Saudi King's Visit to Indonesia." *Perspective* 16: 1–11.

Panda, Ankit. 2014. "Indonesia and Saudi Arabia Sign Defence Cooperation Agreement." *The Diplomat*, January 25. https://thediplomat.com/2014/01/indonesia-and-saudi-arabia-sign-defense-cooperation-agreement/. Accessed September 16, 2020.

Partrick, Neil, ed. 2016. *Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy: Conflict and Cooperation*. New York: I.B. Tauris.

Preuschaft, Menno. 2016. "Islam and Identity in Foreign Policy." In *Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy: Conflict and Cooperation*, edited by Neil Patrick, 16–28. London: I.B. Tauris.

Rudolph, Rachael. 2018. *Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia: New Approaches to Radical Threats*. London, UK: I.B. Tauris.

Santosa, Novan Iman. 2014. "Saudi Arabia, RI Ink Defence Cooperation Agreement." *The Jakarta Post*, January 24. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/01/24/saudi-arabia-ri-ink-defense-cooperation-agreement.html. Accessed September 15, 2020.

Schmid, Alex, ed. 2011. *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*. London: Routledge.

Schulze, Kirsten E., and Julie Chernov Hwang. 2019. "Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: New Insights into Jihad in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 41 (1): 1–13.

Suryadinata, L. 1995. "Islam and Suharto's Foreign Policy: Indonesia, the Middle East, and Bosnia." *Asian Survey* 35 (3): 291–303. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2307/2645546.

Bibliography

Aba al-Khail, Sulayman bin Abdallah bin Hamud. 2003. *Mawqif al-Mamlaka al-'Arabiyya al-Sa'udiyya min al-irhab: Dirasa shar'iyya 'ilmiyya watha'iqiyya* [The Position of The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia towards Terrorism: A Legal Scientific Documentary Study]. Riyadh.

Abbas, Tahir. 2021a. *Countering Violent Extremism*. London: Bloomsbury.

———. 2021b. "Reflection: the 'War on Terror', Islamophobia and Radicalization Twenty Years On." *Critical Studies on Terrorism*. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2021.1980182.

Abdulmahmood, A. 2005. *Counterterrorism*. Riyadh: Naif Arab University for Security Science.

Abiyoso, Anis, and Ahmadun Y. Herfanda. 1995. *Teror Subuh di Kanigoro*. Yogyakarta: Yayasan Bentang Budaya.

Abou El Fadl, Khaled. 2005. *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists*. New York, NY: HarperSanFrancisco.

Abuza, Zachary. 2002a. "Al-Qaeda's Asian Web of Terror." *Time* (Asia) 160 (22): 38–40.

———. 2002b. "Tentacles of Terror: Al-Qaeda's Southeast Asian Network." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 24 (3): 427–465.

———. 2003. *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Adams, Cindy. 1986. *Bung Karno: Penyambung Lidah Rakyat*. Jakarta: Gunung Agung.

Aljahani, A. F. 2005. *Terrorism: Concept and Reality*. Riyadh: Naif Arab University for Security Sciences.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022

S. Al Qurtuby, *Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1337-2

Aljunied, Syed Mohammed Adha. 2011. "Countering Terrorism in Maritime Southeast Asia: Soft and Hard Power Approaches." *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 47 (6): 652–665.

Al-Amri, Hassan bin Sulaiman. 2020a. "Tackling Terrorist Exploitation of Youth." *Monthly International Reports*, May. Riyadh: The Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition.

———. 2020b. "Lone Offenders." *Monthly International Report*, April. Riyadh: The Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition.

Al-Jubair, Adel. 2002. "Saudi Arabia Does Not Support Terrorism." Interviewed by Lee Michael Katz. *National Journal* 34 (19): 1407–1409.

Al-Jundi, Ammar. 2003. "600 Suspects Nabbed in Crackdown, Says Turki." *Arab News*, October 23. https://www.arabnews.com/node/239296. Retrieved June 2, 2020.

Al Chaidar. 1999. *Pemikiran Politik Proklamator Negara Islam Indonesia SM Kartosuwiryo*. Jakarta: Darul Falah.

Al Mustafa, Hassan. 2015. "Hezbollah el-Hejaz: A Story Not Yet Written." *Al Arabiya*, October 1. https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2015/10/01/Hezbollah-al-Hejaz-A-story-not-yet-written. Accessed May 21, 2020.

Alyami, Awad M. S. 2015. "The Role of Art Therapy in Counterterrorism: The Saudi Experience." *The Arts in Therapy* 44: 1–10.

Al-Othaimin, Ibrahim. 2017. "Saudi Efforts to Combat Terror Financing." *Saudi Gazette*, September 14. https://saudigazette.com.sa/article/517163. Accessed June 11, 2020.

Al Qurtuby, Sumanto. 2010. "In Search of Socio-Historical Roots of Southeast Asia's Islamist Terrorism." *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 4 (2): 205–239.

———. 2016. *Religious Violence and Conciliation in Indonesia*. London: Routledge.

———. 2017. "Arabs and Indo-Arabs in Indonesia: Historical Dynamics, Social Relations and Contemporary Changes." *International Journal of Asia Pacific Studies* 13 (2): 45–72.

———. 2018. "The Paradox of Civil Society." *Asian Journal of Social Science* 46: 5–34.

———. 2019. *Saudi Arabia and Indonesia Networks: Migration, Education and Islam*. London, UK: I.B. Tauris & Bloomsbury.

———, and Shafi Aldamer. 2018. "Saudi-Indonesian Relations: Historical Dynamics and Contemporary Development." *Asian Perspective* 42: 121–144.

———, and Shafi Aldamer. 2021. "Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia." *Contemporary Review of the Middle East* 8 (1): 56–76.

Al-Rasheed, Madawi. 2007. *Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Al-Sarhan, Saud. 2015. "The Struggle for Authority: The Shaykhs of Jihadi-Salafism in Saudi Arabia, 1997–2003." In *Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Social, Political, Economic and Religious Change*, edited by Bernard Haykel, Thomas Hegghammer, and Stephane Lacroix, 181–206. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Al-Saud, Naef Bin Ahmed. 2009. "Saudi Arabia's Strategy to Combat Terrorism." *The RUSI Journal* 154 (6): 74–80.

Al Saud, Turki Al Faisal bin Abdul Aziz. 2013. "Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy." *Middle East Policy* 20 (4): 37–44.

Al Suhail, Turki. 2017. "Iran Planned to Revive Hezbollah al-Hejaz Under al-Mughassil's Command." *Asharq al-Ausat*, Augustus 25. https://web.archive.org/web/20170901120355/https://english.aawsat.com/turkisuhail/news-middle-east/iran-planned-revive-hezbollah-al-hejaz-al-mughassils-command. Accessed May 21, 2020.

Alterman, Jon B., and William McCants. 2014. "Saudi Arabia: Islamist Rising and Falling." In *Religious Radicalism After the Arab Uprisings*, edited by Jon B. Alterman, 144–175. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Al Zahrani, Hashem Mohammed. 2012. "Saudi Arabia's Efforts and Experience in Counter-Terrorism." Riyadh: Naif Arab University for Security Sciences.

Al-Sharhan, Saud. 2015. "The Struggle for Authority: The Shaykhs of Jihadi-Salafism in Saudi Arabia, 1997–2003." In *Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Social, Political, Economic and Religious Change*, edited by Bernard Haykel, Thomas Hegghammer, and Stephane Lacroix, 181–206. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Ansari, Muhammad Hassan, et.al. 2019. *Memberantas Terorisme di Indonesia: Praktik, Kebijakan dan Tantangan*. Jakarta: The Habibie Center.

Ansary, Abdullah F. 2008. "Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach." *Middle East Policy* XV (2). http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/combating-extremism-brief-overview-saudi-arabias-approach. Accessed September 26, 2015.

Appleby, R. Scott. 2000. *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Aragon, Lorraine V. 2001. "Communal Violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi: Where People Eat Fish and Fish East People." *Indonesia* 72: 45–79.

Asai, Yasufumi, and Jeffrey L. Arnold. 2003. "Terrorism in Japan." *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine* 18 (2): 106–114.

Ashraf, A. S. M. Ali. 2007. "Transnational Cooperation on Anti-terrorism: A Cooperative Case Study of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia." *Perceptions*: 91–121.

Asia News. 2004. "A Bomb Against Minibus in Poso, Two Young Men Detained." November 19.

Asseri, Ali S. Awadh. 2009. *Combating Terrorism: Saudi Arabia's Role in the War on Terror*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Atwan, Abdel Bari. 2015. *Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate*. Los Angeles, CA: The University of California Press.

Azra, Azyumardi. 2004. *The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia: Networks of Malay-Indonesian and Middle Eastern Ulama in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press.

———. 2006. "Islamic Radical Movements in Indonesia." *The Jakarta Post*, February 15.

Bahaa, Sherine. 2005. "Striking Hard." *Al Ahram Weekly*, No. 738, April 7–13. https://web.archive.org/web/20130326185702/http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/737/re9.htm. Accessed May 22, 2020.

Bahgat, Gauwdat. 2004. "Saudi Arabia and the War on Terrorism." *Arab Studies Quarterly* 26 (1): 51–63.

Barfield, Thomas. 2004. "Problems in Establishing Legitimacy in Afghanistan." *Iranian Studies* 37 (2): 263–293.

———. 2005. "An Islamic State Is a State Run by Good Muslims: Religion as a Way of Life and not an Ideology in Afghanistan." In *Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, and Democratization*, edited by Robert W. Hefner, 213–239. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

———. 2012. *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Barton, Greg. 2004. *Indonesia's Struggle: Jamaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam*. Sidney: University of New South Wales Press.

———. 2018. "How Indonesia's Counter-terrorism Force Has Become a Model for the Region." *The Conversation*, July 2. https://theconversation.com/how-indonesias-counter-terrorism-force-has-become-a-model-for-the-region-97368. Accessed August 3, 2020.

Barret, Richard. 2014. "The Islamic State." Working Paper, November. The Soufan Group.

———. 2017. "Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees." Working Paper, October 31. The Soufan Center.

Bayat, Asef. 2013. *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Baylor, Ellizabeth. 2016. "Ethnocentrism." https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199766567/obo-9780199766567-0045.xml. Accessed June 23, 2020.

Bazzi, Mohamad. 2015. "ISIS, Saudi Arabia, and a New Wave of Terrorist Violence." *The New Yorker*, June 29. https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-new-wave-of-terrorist-violence. Accessed September 11, 2020.

BBC. 2003. "Bali Death Toll Set at 202." February 19. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2778923.stm. Accessed July 14, 2020.

———. 2019. "Christchurch Shootings: 49 Dead in New Zealand Mosque Attacks." May 15. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47578798. Accessed June 26, 2020.

Bergen, Peter L. 2001. *Holy War, Inc. Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden*. Florence, MA: Free Press.

Berridge, W. J. 2018. *Islamism in the Modern World: A Historical Approach*. London, UK: Bloomsbury.

Bertrand, Jacques. 2004. *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Bertrand, Julia Lau. 2009. "Analyzing Terrorism Trends and the Effect of Political Transition on Terrorism in Indonesia, 1949–2008." Paper presented at the 50th Annual International Studies Association Convention, New York, February 15.

Bielby, Kylie. 2019. "The Making of a Terrorist: How Radicalize You." *Homeland Security Today*, May 29. https://www.hstoday.us/channels/global/the-making-of-a-terrorist-how-friends-radicalize-you/. Accessed June 20, 2020.

Bigio, Jamille, and Rachel Vogelstein. 2016. *How Women's Participation in Conflict Prevention and Resolution Advances U.S. Interests*. New York and Washington, DC: The Council on Foreign Relations.

———. 2017. "Women Are Key to Counterterrorism." U.S. News, February 2.

Bhakti, Ikrar Nusa. 2001. *Militer dan Politik Kekerasan Orde Baru*. Bandung: Mizan.

Blanchard, Christopher, and Alfred Prados. 2007. "Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues." *CRS Report for Congress*. Congressional Research Service.

Bohm, C. J. 2005. *Brief Chronicle of the Unrest in the Moluccas, 1999–2005*. Ambon: Crisis Centre Diocese of Amboina.

Bonner, Raymond. 2006. "Indonesia to Execute 3 for Roles in Riots that Killed Hundreds." *The New York Times*, August 11. https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/11/world/asia/11indo.html?_r=1&ref=asia. Accessed July 14, 2020.

Boucek, Christopher. 2008a. "Counter-Terrorism from Within: Assessing Saudi Arabia's Religious Rehabilitation and Disengagement Programme. *The RUSI Journal* 153 (6): 60–65.

———. 2008b. "Saudi Arabia's Soft Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare." Carnegie Papers, No. 97, September. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC.

Branscomb, Lewis M. 2007. "Science, Technology and Countering Terrorism: The Search for a Sustainable Strategy." In *Weapon and Technology to Counter Terrorism: Proceedings of an Indo-US Workshop*, edited by The National Academy of Sciences, 1–13. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.

Brauchler, Birgit. 2011. *Reconciling Indonesia: Grassroots Agency for Peace*. London: Routledge.

Brewer, John, and Garret Higgins. 2014. *Religion, Civil Society and Peace in Northern Ireland*. London: Oxford University Press.

Brooks, Frank H. 1994. *The Individualist Anarchists: An Anthology of Liberty (1881–1908)*. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Bubalo, Anthony, and Greg Fealy. 2005. *Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism, and Indonesia*. Lowy Institute Paper No. 5. Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney.

Bubalo, Anthony, Sarah Phillips, and Samina Yasmeen. 2011. *Talib or Taliban? Indonesian Students in Pakistan and Yemen*. Australia: The Lowy Institute for International Policy.

Budiardjo, Miriam. 1972. *Dasar-Dasar Ilmu Politik*. Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama.

Burke, Jason. 2003. *Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Byman, Daniel. 2016. "Saudi Arabia and Terrorism Today." *Markaz*, September 29. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/09/29/saudi-arabia-and-terrorism-today/. Accessed November 12, 2021.

Carnegie, Paul J. 2017. "On the Horns of a Dilemma: State, Security and Militancy in Indonesia." In *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy*, edited by Scott Nicholas Romaniuk, Francis Grice, Daniela Irrera, Stewart Webb, 733–747. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Carter, April. 1978. "Anarchism and Violence." *Nomos* 19: 320–340.

Caruso, Phil. 2018. "Indonesia and Terrorism: Success, Failure and Uncertain Future." *Middle East-Asia Project*. https://www.mei.edu/publications/indonesia-and-terrorism-success-failure-and-uncertain-future#_ftn2. Accessed August 6, 2020.

Chenoweth. Erica. 2004. "The Origins of Terrorism and Weak Statehood." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, March 11.

———, and Elizabeth Lowham. 2007. "On Classifying Terrorism: A Potential Contribution of Cluster Analysis for Academics and Policy-makers." *Defence & Security Analysis* 23 (4): 345–357.

Chulov, Martin. 2018. "My Son, Osama: The al-Qaeda Leader's Mother Speaks for the First Time." *The Guardian*, August 3. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/03/osama-bin-laden-mother-speaks-out-family-interview. Accessed May 12, 2020.

CNN. 2007. "Poll: Most Saudis Oppose al-Qaeda." *CNN*, December 18. http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/12/17/saudi.poll/index.html. Accessed June 13, 2020.

———. 2020. "US Terrorist Attacks Fast Facts." Updated May 25. https://edition.cnn.com/2013/04/18/us/u-s-terrorist-attacks-fast-facts/index.html. Accessed June 26, 2020.

Cohen, Abner. 1974. *Two-Dimensional Man: An Essay on the Anthropology of Power and Symbolism in Complex Society*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Colombijn, Freek, and J. Thomas Lindblad, eds. 2002. *Roots of Violence in Indonesia*. Leiden: KITLV Press.

Collier, Kit. 2005. "Dynamics of Muslim Separatism in the Philippines." In *Violence in Between: Conflict and Security in Archipelagic Southeast Asia*, edited by Damien Kingbury. Clayton and Singapore: Monash Asia Institute and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Commins, David. 2009. *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*. London: I.B. Tauris.

———. 2015a. *Islam in Saudi Arabia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

———. 2015b. "From Wahhabi to Salafi." In *Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Social, Political, Economic and Religious Change*, edited by Bernard Haykel, Thomas Hegghammer and Stephane Lacroix, 151–166. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Conboy, Ken. 2009. *The Second Front: Inside Jemaah Islamiyah, Asia's Most Dangerous Terrorist Network*. Sheffield, UK: Equinox Publishing.

Corbin, Jane. 2002. *The Base*. London, UK: Simon & Schuster.

Cordesman, Anthony H. 2001. "Islamic Extremism in Saudi Arabia and the Attack on Al Khobar." Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

———. 2006. "Saudi Arabia: Friend or Foe in the War on Terror?" *Middle East Policy* 13 (1): 28–41.

———, and Nawaf Obaid. 2005. *Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia: Asymmetric Threats and Islamist Extremists*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Cortright, David, and George Lopez. 2007. *Uniting Against Terror: Cooperative Nonmilitary Responses to the Global Terrorist Threat*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Cortright, David, Melanie Greenberg, and Laurel Stone, eds. 2016. *Civil Society, Peace and Power*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

Coyne, John. 2017. "The Future of the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation." *The Strategist*, February 21. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/future-jakarta-centre-law-enforcement-cooperation/. Accessed August 4, 2020.

Crenshaw, Martha. 2010. *Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes and Consequences*. London: Routledge.

Cribb, Robert. 2008. *Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People's Militia and the Indonesian Revolution, 1945–1949*. Sheffield, UK: Equinox Publishing.

Crouch, Harold. 2002. "The Key Determinants of Indonesia's Political Future." *Trends in Southeast Asia* 7: 1–14.

CTED (Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate). 2019. *Gender Dimensions of the Response to Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters*. New York: United Nations Security Council.

Cozzens, J. B. 2006. *Identifying Entry Points of Action in Counter-Radicalization: Countering Salafi-Jihadi Ideology Through Development Initiatives–Strategic Openings*. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.

Dahlby, Tracy. 2005. *Allah's Torch: A Report from Behind the Scenes in Asia's War on Terror*. New York: Harper Perennial.

Dekmejian, R. Hrair. 1995. *Islam and Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

DeLong-Bas, Natana J. 2004. *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Del Cid Gomez, Juan Miguel. 2015. "A Financial Profile of the Terrorism of al-Qaeda and Its Affiliates." *Journal of Perspectives on Terrorism* 4 (4): 1–16.

Dennis, Anthony. 1996. *The Rise of the Islamic Empire and the Threat to the West*. Bristol, IN: Wyndham Hall Press.

Dengel, Holk. 1986. *Darul Islam dan Kartosuwirjo*. Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan.

Dorsey, James. 2015. *Thinking the Unthinkable: Coming to Grip with the Survival of the Islamic State*. Singapore: National University of Singapore's Middle East Institute.

Duncan, Christopher. 2013. *Violence and Vengeance: Religious Conflict and Its Aftermath in Eastern Indonesia*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 2007. "Terrorism, Regime Change and Just War." *Journal of Military Ethics* 6 (2): 131–137.

El-Said, Hamed L. 2015. *New Approaches to Counterterrorism: Designing and Evaluating Counter Radicalization and De-radicalization Programs*. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Eriten, Nilufer Duygu, and Jennifer Romine. 2008. "Instrumental and Symbolic Resources of Ethnic Conflict: Application of the Kurdish Conflict in Turkey." https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/INSTRUMENTAL-AND-SYMBOLIC-SOURCES-OF-ETHNIC-TO-THE-Eriten-Romine/1342a3cef640f92044d39b17320e33c13a4c86c9. Accessed June 11, 2020.

Errico, Francesco Bergoglio. 2018. "The Road to Daesh: The History of the Takfir and Its Interpretation." https://eeradicalization.com/the-road-to-daesh-the-history-of-the-takfir-and-its-interpretations/. Accessed June 20, 2020.

Esposito, John L. 1994. *The Islamic Threat*. New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 2002. *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Estes, Kenneth W. 2006a. *The Second Gulf War (1990–1991)*. Zurich, Switzerland: International Relations and Security Network.

———. 2006b. "Iraq Between Two Occupations: the Second Gulf War (1990–91)." Zurich, Switzerland: International Relation and Security Network.

Ewans, Martin. 2002. *Afghanistan: A Short History of its People and Politics*. New York: HarperCollins.

Farquhar, Michael. 2017. *Circus of Faith: Migration, Education, and the Wahhabi Mission*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Formichi, Chiara. 2013. *Islam and the Making of the Nation: Kartosuwiryo and Political Islam in 20th Century Indonesia*. Leiden: Brill.

Forsyth, J. 2011. "Clegg Collides with Cameron Over Extremism." *The Spectator*, March 3. http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/2011/03/clegg-collides-with-cameron-over-extremism. Accessed June 16, 2014.

Fradkin, Hillel, Hussain Haqqani, and Eric Brown, eds. 2005. *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*. Washington, DC: Hudson Institute.

Friedman, Uri. 2016. "How Indonesia Beat Back Terrorism—For Now." *The Atlantic*, September 25. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/09/indonesia-isis-islamic-terrorism/500951/. Accessed August 6, 2020.

Gabriel, Mark. 2002. *Islam and Terrorism: What the Qur'an Really Teaches About Christianity, Violence, and the Goals of Islamic Jihad*. Lake Mary, FL: Charisma House.

Gause III, Gregory F. 2004. "Saudi Arabia and the War on Terrorism." In *A Practical Guide to Winning the War on Terrorism*, edited by Adam Garfinkle, 89–102. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.

Gambetta, Diego, and Steffen Hertog. 2007. "Engineers of Jihad." Sociology Working Paper 10. Oxford University's Department of Sociology, Oxford, UK.

———. 2017. *Engineers of Jihad: the Curious Connection Between Violent Extremism and Education*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ganor, Boas. 2002. "Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?" *Police Practice and Research* 3 (4): 287–304.

Gellner, Ernest. 1964. *Thought and Change*. London, UK: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.

Gendron, Angela. 2010. "Confronting Terrorism in Saudi Arabia." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 23: 487–508.

Gerges, Fawaz A. 2005. *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Gold, Dore. 2003. *Hatred's Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism*. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing.

Gonggong, Anhar. 2004. *Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar: Dari Patriot Hingga Pemberontak*. Jakarta: Ombak.

Goodson, Larry P. 2004. "The Taliban Resurface and a New Constitution is Born." *Asian Survey* 44 (1): 14–22.

Gopin, Marc. 2000. *Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence, and Peacemaking*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Gross, Max L. 2016. *A Muslim Archipelago: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia*. Scotts Valley, CA: CreateSpace Publishing.

Gunaratna, Rohan. 2002. *Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*. Columbia, NY: Columbia University Press.

———. 2005. "Al-Qaeda's Ideology." In *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, edited by Fradkin, Hillel, Hussain Haqqani, and Eric Brown. Washington, DC: Hudson Institute.

———. 2016. "The Islamic State's Eastward Expansion." *The Washington Quarterly* 39 (1): 49–67.

———. 2017. "Strategic Counter-Terrorism: A Game Changer in Fighting Terrorism?" *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 9 (6): 1–5.

———, Jolene Jerard, and Lawrence Rubin, eds. 2011. *Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalization*. London, UK: Routledge.

Hammond, Peter. 2010. *Slavery, Terrorism, and Islam*. Maitland, FL: Xulon Press.

Hannigan, Tim. 2015. *A Brief History of Indonesia: Sultans, Spices and Tsunami*. Clarendon, VT: Tuttle Publishing.

Hardjono, J. 1988. "The Indonesian Transmigration Program in Historical Perspective." *International Migration* 26 (4): 427–439.

Hashemi, Kamran. 2008. *Religious Legal Traditions, International Human Rights Laws and Muslim States*. Leiden: Brill/Nijhoff.

Hastings, Justin. 2010. *No Man's Land: Globalization, Territory and Clandestine Groups in Southeast Asia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Hedman, Eva-Lotta E., ed. 2008. *Conflict, Violence, and Displacement in Indonesia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Publication.

Hefner, Robert W. 2000. *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

———. 2005. "Muslim Democrats and Islamist Violence in Post-Suharto Indonesia." In *Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, and Democratization*, edited by Robert W. Hefner, 273–301. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Hegghammer, Thomas. 2006. "Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia." *Middle East Policy* 13 (4): 39–60.

———. 2008. "Islamist Violence and Regime Stability in Saudi." *International Affairs* 84 (4): 701–715.

———. 2009. "Jihad, Yes, but Not Revolution: Explaining the Extraversion of Islamist Violence in Saudi Arabia." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 36 (3): 395–416.
———. 2010a. *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism Since 1979*. London: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2010b. *The Failure of Jihad in Saudi Arabia*. West Point: Combating Terrorism Center.
———. 2015. "Classical and Global Jihadism in Saudi Arabia." In *Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Social, Political, Economic and Religious Change*, edited by Bernard Haykel, Thomas Hegghammer, and Stephane Lacroix, 207–228. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
———, and Stephane Lacroix. 2007. "Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-'Utaybi Revisited." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 39: 103–122.
Hilmy, M. 2010. *Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia: Piety and Pragmatism*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Hoeft, Gabriel. 2015. *'Soft' Approaches to Counter-Terrorism: An Exploration of the Benefits of Deradicalization Programs*. Herzliya, Israel: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism.
Hoffman, Bruce. 1985. "The Prevention of Terrorism and Rehabilitation of Terrorists: Some Preliminary Thoughts." The Rand Paper Series P-7059, February, pp. 1–5.
———. 1999. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press (2nd ed., 2017).
Horikoshi, Hiroko. 1975. "The Dar-ul Islam Movement in West Java (1948–62)." *Indonesia* 20: 58–86.
Horgan, John, and Tore Bjorgo, eds. 2009. *Leaving Terrorist Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*. London: Routledge.
Horgan, John, and Kurt Braddock. 2012. *Terrorism Studies*. London: Routledge.
House, Karen Elliot. 2015. "Kingdom at the Crossroads: Can Saudi Arabia Find a Middle Path?" *Time*, February 9, pp. 24–28.
HRW (Human Right Watch). 2002. "Breakdown: Four Years of Communal Violence in Central Sulawesi." https://www.refworld.org/docid/3e3141720.html. Accessed July 14, 2020.
Huq, Aziz. 2016. "The Uses of Religious Identity, Practice and Dogma in Soft and Hard Counterterrorism." University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 610.
Hussain, Zakir. 2016. "How ISIS Passing Through Singapore were Nabbed." *The Straits Times,* March 6.
Hwang, Julie Chernov. 2009. *Peaceful Islamist Mobilization in the Muslim World: What Went Right*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

———. 2018. *Why Terrorists Quit: The Disengagement of Indonesian Jihadists*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
———, and Kirsten E. Schulze. 2018. "Why They Join: Pathways into Indonesian Jihadi Organizations." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 30 (6): 911–932.
Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. 1982. "Egypt's Islamic Militants." MERIP Reports, No. 103, February, pp. 5–14.
ICG (International Crisis Group). 2002a. "Al-Qaida in Southeast Asia: the Case of the 'Ngruki Network' in Indonesia." ICG Asia Briefing.
———. 2002b. "Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyyah Terrorist Network Operates." ICG Asia Report No. 43.
———. 2003. "Jamaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous." Asia Report No. 63.
———. 2004. "Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix." Asia Report No. 83, September 15.
———. 2006. "Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's Networks." Asia Report No. 114, May 5.
———. 2007. "Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge." Asia Report No. 127, January 24.
———. 2008. "The Philippines: Counter-Insurgency versus Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao." Asia Report No. 152, May 14.
Institute for Economics & Peace. 2020. Global Terrorism Index 2020: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism. Sydney, November. http://visionofhumanity.org/reports.
Irawan, Irsad Ade. 2018. "Pergeseran Orientasi Terorisme di Indonesia." *Kumparan*, May 17. https://kumparan.com/erucakra-garuda-nusantara/pergeseran-orientasi-terorisme-di-indonesia-2000-2018/full. Accessed July 1, 2020.
Ismail, Noor Huda. 2007. "Al-Qaeda's Southeast Asia, Jamaah Islamiyah and Regional Terrorism: Kinship and Family Links." *Japan Focus*, January 8.
Jalali, Ali A. 2003. "Afghanistan in 2002: The Struggle to Win the Peace." *Asian Survey* 43 (1): 174–185.
Jawhar, Sabria S, and Rob L. Wagner. 2005. "Battle of Al-Ras." *The Saudi Gazette*, April 12. https://sites.google.com/site/roblwagnerarchives/battle-of-al-ras. Accessed May 21, 2020.
Jones, Toby. 2009. "Embattled in Arabia: Shi'is and the Politics of Confrontation in Saudi Arabia." Occasional Paper Series, June 3. Shi'a Militancy Program, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point.
Jones, Sidney. 2005a. "The Changing Nature of Jemaah Islamiyah." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 59 (2): 169–178.
———. 2005b. "The Changing Face of Terrorism in Indonesia: Weaker, More Diffuse and Still a Threat." Proceedings of the ASPI Conference. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Barton, Australia.

———, and Solahudin. 2014. "Terrorism in Indonesia: A Fading Threat?" *Southeast Asian Affairs*: 139–147.

Juergensmeyer, Mark. 2003. *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Kadivar, Jamileh. 2020. "Exploring Takfir, Its Origins and Contemporary Use: The Case of Takfiri Approach in Daesh's Media." *Contemporary Review of the Middle East* 7 (3): 259–285.

Karnavian, Muhammad Tito. 2014. *Explaining Islamist Insurgencies: The Case of al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah and the Radicalization of the Poso Conflict, 2000–2007*. London, UK: Imperial College Press.

Kennedy, Michael L. 2000. *The Jacobin Clubs in the French Revolution, 1793–1795*. New York: Berghahn Books.

Khan, Mehmood-Ul-Hasan. 2014. "Saudi Arabia's Counter Terrorism Law: A Strategic Orientation." *Defense Journal Pakistan* 14 (9): 60–63.

Kifner, John. 1987. "400 Die as Iranian Marchers Battle Saudi Police in Mecca; Embassies Smashed in Teheran." *The New York Times*, August 2. https://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/02/world/400-die-iranian-marchers-battle-saudi-police-mecca-embassies-smashed-teheran.html. Accessed May 16, 2020.

Kingsbury, Damien, ed. 2005. *Violence in Between: Conflict and Security in Archipelagic Southeast Asia*. Clayton and Singapore: Monash Asia Institute and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Kovacs, Amanda. 2014. "Saudi Arabia Exporting Salafi Education and Radicalizing Indonesia's Muslims." GIGA Focus, No. 7: 1–7.

Kowalewski, David. 2003. "Vigilantism." In *International Handbook of Violence Research*, edited by Wilhelm Heitmeyer and Johan Hagan, 339–349. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Kunkler, Mirjam, and Alfred Stepan. 2013. *Democracy and Islam in Indonesia*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Lacey, Robert. 2009. *Inside the Kingdom: Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia*. London, UK: Penguin Books.

Lacroix, Stephane. 2005. "Islamo-Liberal Politics in Saudi Arabia." In *Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs*, edited by Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman, 35–56. London, UK: C. Hurst & Co.

Lai, Linette. 2019. "Three Radicalised Indonesian Maids Detained under Internal Security Act." *The Straits Times*. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/three-radicalised-indonesian-maids-detained-under-internal-security-act. Accessed November 15, 2021.

Lamchek, Joyson S. 2019. *Human Rights-Compliant Counterterrorism: Myth-Making and Reality in the Philippines and Indonesia*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Laqueur, Walter. 1987. *The Age of Terrorism*. Toronto and Boston: Little Brown.

Latif, Busjarie. 2014. *Manuskrip Sejarah 45 Tahun PKI, 1920–1965*. Bandung, Indonesia: Ultimus.

Leonnig, Carol D. 2006. "Iran Held Liable in Khobar Attack." *Washington Post*, December 23. https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/22/AR2006122200455.html. Accessed May 19, 2020.

Lewis, Bernard. 2003. *What When Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East*. New York: Harper Perennial.

———. 2004. *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*. New York, NY: The Random House.

Lubis, Todung Mulya. 2004. "Pasal-Pasal Rawan dalam Undang-Undang No. 15 & 16 tahun 2003." *Tempo*, August 29, p. 4.

Lucking, Mirjam. 2021. *Indonesians and Their Arab World: Guided Mobility Among Labor Migrants and Mecca Pilgrims*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Maarif, Ahmad Syafii. 1996. *Islam dan Politik: Teori Belah Bambu Masa Demokrasi Terpimpin, 1959–1965*. Jakarta: Gema Insani Press.

MacAndrews, Colin. 1978. "Transmigration in Indonesia: Prospects and Problems." *Asian Survey* 18 (5): 458–472.

Mahboob, Abdualhafiz. 2017. *al-irhab wa al-sharq al-awosat al-jadeed* [Terrorism and the New Middle East]. London: E-Kutub Ltd.

Malthaner, Stefan. 2018. "Spaces, Ties, and Agency: The Formation of Radical Networks." *Perspective on Terrorism* 12 (2): 32–42.

Mamdani, Mahmood. 2005. *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror*. New York, NY: Three Rivers Press.

Mann, Joseph. 2012. "King Faisal and the Challenge of Nasser's Revolutionary Ideology." *Middle Eastern Studies* 48 (5): 749–764.

Mansour-Ille, Dina. 2020. "Social Media and the Dynamics of Radicalization and Violent Extremism Among Female Migrant Workers." *Studies in Ethnicities and Nationalism* 19 (3): 248–269.

Margulies, Peter. 2004. "Making Regime Change Multilateral: the War on Terror and Transitions to Democracy." *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy* 32 (3): 389–420.

Matthiesen, Toby. 2010. "Hizbullah al-Hijaz: A History of the Most Radical Shi'a Opposition Group." *The Middle East Journal* 64 (2): 179–197.

———. 2015a. *The Other Saudis: Shiism, Dissent and Sectarianism*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2015b. "The Domestic Sources of Saudi Foreign Policy: Islamists and the State in the Wake of the Arab Uprisings." Working Paper Series. Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.

McCants, William. 2015. *The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

McIntyre, Jamie. 1995. "US Vows Terrorist Bomb Won't Effect Saudi Relationship." *CNN*, November 13. http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9511/saudi_blast/pm/. Accessed May 19, 2020.

McKenna, Thomas. 1998. *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Meijer, Roel. 2005. "The 'Cycle of Contention' and the Limits of Terrorism in Saudi Arabia." In *Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs*, edited by Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman, 271–314. London, UK: C. Hurst & Co.

———. 2006. "Re-reading of al-Qaeda Writings of Yusuf al-Ayiri." *ISIM Review* 18: 1–2.

———, ed. 2012a. *Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Indonesia, Algeria and Saudi Arabia*. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'.

———. 2012b. "Saudi Arabia's Religious Counter-Terrorism Discourse." *Middle East Institute's Policy Analysis*, February 15. https://www.mei.edu/publications/saudi-arabias-religious-counter-terrorist-discourse. Accessed June 9, 2020.

Menchik, Jeremy. 2016. *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mockaitis, Thomas R. 2007. *The 'New' Terrorism: Myth and Reality*. Westport, CT: Pentagon Press.

Mostfa, Ali. 2021. "Violence and Jihad in Islam: from the War of Words to Clashes of Definitions." *Religions* 12: 1–14.

Mousalli, Ahmad S. 1992. *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb*. Beirut: American University of Beirut.

Mujani, Mujani, and R. William Liddle. 2009. "Muslim Indonesia's Secular Democracy." *Asian Survey* 49 (4): 575–590.

Muolod, Wald Alsdeeq. 2018. *Mukafahat al-Irhab* [Countering Terrorism]. Amman, Jordan: Academic Book Center.

Nardin, Terry, ed. 1998. *The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Nash, Carolyn. 2018. "Saudi Arabia's Soft Power Strategy in Indonesia." Middle East Institute. https://www.mei.edu/publications/saudi-arabias-soft-power-strategy-indonesia#_ftn1. Accessed December 23, 2021.

Nasr, Vali. 2007. *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future*. New York: W. W. Norton.

Negara, Sewage Dharma. 2017. "The Impact of Saudi King's Visit to Indonesia." *Perspective* 16: 1–11.

Neighbour, Sally. 2004. *In the Shadow of Swords: How Islamic Terrorists Declared War on Australia*. Sydney: HarperCollins.

Neubauer, Sigurd. 2015. "King Salman's Foreign Policy Priorities." The Arab Gulf Studies Institute, Washington, DC.

Newman, Edward. 2007. "Weak States, State Failure and Terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19 (4): 463–488.

Nisan, Mordechai. 2007. "Saudi Arabia's Jihad in the Middle East and the World." The Ariel Centre for Policy Research, Israel.

Nordholt, Henk Schulte, and Gerry van Klinken, eds. 2007. *Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia*. Leiden: KITLV Press.

Noorhaidi. 2006. *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest of Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications.

Nuraniyah, Nava. 2018. "Not Just Brainwashed: Understanding the Radicalization of Indonesian Female Supporters of the Islamic State." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 30 (6): 890–910.

Nye, Joseph S. 1990. "Soft Power." *Foreign Policy* 80.

Obaid, Nawaf. 2014. "A Saudi Arabian Defense Doctrine: Mapping the Expanded Force Structure the Kingdom Needs to Lead the Arab World, Stabilize the Region, and Meets Its Global Responsibilities." Defense and Intelligence Projects, Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

Olzak, Susan. 2007. "Ethnic, Racial, and Nationalist Movements." In *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology*, vol. III, edited by George Ritzev. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe). 2013. *Youth Engagement to Counter Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Leads to Terrorism*. Vienna: OSCE.

Panda, Ankit. 2014. "Indonesia and Saudi Arabia Sign Defence Cooperation Agreement." *The Diplomat*, January 25. https://thediplomat.com/2014/01/indonesia-and-saudi-arabia-sign-defense-cooperation-agreement/. Accessed September 16, 2020.

Partrick, Neil, ed. 2016. *Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy: Conflict and Cooperation*. New York: I.B. Tauris.

Parameswaran, Prashanth. 2015. "The Trouble with Indonesia's New Counterterrorism Command." *The Diplomat*, June 11. https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-trouble-with-indonesias-new-counterterrorism-command/. Accessed August 7, 2020.

Paul, Jim. 1980. "Insurrection at Mecca." MERIP Reports No. 91: 3–4.

Peterson, J. E. 2003. *Historical Dictionary of Saudi Arabia*. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.

Pipes, Daniel. 1982. *In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power*. New York: Basic Books.

Platzdasch, Bernhard. 2009. *Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in the Emerging Democracy*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Popkin, Jeremy D. 2016. *A Short History of the French Revolution*. London: Routledge.

Preuschaft, Menno. 2016. "Islam and Identity in Foreign Policy." In *Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy: Conflict and Cooperation*, edited by Neil Patrick, 16–28. London: I.B. Tauris.

Rabasa, Angel. 2003. *Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals, and Terrorist*. London: Routledge.

———. 2007. *Beyond Al-Qaeda: Countering Terrorist and Other Non-Traditional Threats*. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation.

Ramakrishna, Kumar. 2005. "Delegitimizing Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 27 (3): 343–369.

———. 2014. *Islamist Terrorism and Militancy in Indonesia: the Power of the Manichean Mindset*. Berlin, Germany: Springer.

Rashid, Ahmad. 2001. *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*. Yale: Yale University Press.

———. 2008. *Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*. New York: Viking Penguin.

Realuyo, Celina B. 2015. "Combating Terrorist Financing in the Gulf: Significant Progress but Risks Remain." Working Paper, January 26. The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington.

Reid, Anthony. 1975. *The Blood of the People: Revolution and the End of Traditional Rule on Northern Sumatra*. Singapore: NUS Press.

———. 2005. *An Indonesian Frontier: Acehnese and Other Histories of Sumatra*. Singapore: NUS Press.

Reuters. 2009. "Q+A: Noordin Mohammad Top and Islamic Militancy in Indonesia." *Reuters*, September 17. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-militants-qanda-sb/qa-noordin-mohammad-top-and-islamic-militancy-in-indonesia-idUSTRE58G2OR20090917. Accessed July 15, 2020.

Richardson, L. 2006. *What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Terrorist Threat*. London: John Murray.

Ricklefs, M. C. 2007. *Polarizing Javanese Society: Islamic and Other Visions (c. 1830–1930)*. Singapore: NUS Press.

———. 2008. *A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200*. Stanford, CA; Stanford University Press.

Riedel, Bruce. 2015. "The Prince of Counterterrorism." *The Brookings Essay*, September 29. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. http://csweb.brookings.edu/content/research/essays/2015/the-prince-of-counterterrorism.html. Accessed June 7, 2020.

Robertson, Roland. 2012. "Globalization or Glocalization?" *The Journal of International Communication* 18 (2): 191–208.

Robinson, Geoffrey. 1995. *The Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence in Bali*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

———. 2019. *The Killing Season: A History of Indonesian Massacre, 1965–66*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Robison, Richard, and Vedi R. Hadiz. 2004. *Reorganizing Power in Indonesia: the Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets*. London: Routledge.

Romaniuk, Scott, Francis Grice, Daniela Irrera, and Stewart Webb, eds. 2017. *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Rotberg, Robert I. 2002. "Failed States in a World of Terror." *Foreign Affairs* 81 (4): 127–140.

Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Information Office. 2015. "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Initiatives and Actions to Combat Terrorism." Washington, DC. https://saudiembassy.net/files/PDF/Reports/Counterterrorism.pdf. Accessed September 26, 2015.

Roy, Oliver. 1991. "The Mujahidin and the Future of Afghanistan." In *The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact*, edited by John L. Esposito. Florida: Florida International University Press.

———. 1990. *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rubin, Barnett R. 1995. *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Rudolph, Rachael. 2006. "Identity, Foreign Policy, and the War on Terrorism in Saudi Arabia." MA thesis, Faculty of the School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC.

———. 2018. *Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia: New Approaches to Radical Threats*. London, UK: I.B. Tauris.

Sageman, Marc. 2004. *Understanding Terror Networks*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Said, Edward. 1983. *The World, the Text, and the Critic*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Santosa, Novan Iman. 2014. "Saudi Arabia, RI Ink Defence Cooperation Agreement." *The Jakarta Post*, January 24. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/01/24/saudi-arabia-ri-ink-defense-cooperation-agreement.html. Accessed September 15, 2020.

Samudra, Imam. 2004. *Aku Melawan Teroris*. Solo: Al Jazeera.

Sarwono, Sarlito Wirawan. 2012. *Terorisme di Indonesia dalam Tinjauan Psikologi*. Ciputat, Indonesia: Pustaka Alvabet.

Schmid, Alex. 1992. "The Response Problem as a Definition Problem." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4 (4).

———, ed. 2011. *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*. London: Routledge.

Schulze, Kirsten E. 2018. "The Surabaya Bombings and the Evolution of the Jihadi Threat in Indonesia." *CTC Sentinel*, July, pp. 1–6.

———, and Julie Chernov Hwang. 2019. "Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: New Insights into Jihad in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 41 (1): 1–13.

———, and Joseph Chinyong Liow. 2018. "Making Jihadis, Waging Jihad: Transnational and Local Dimensions of the ISIS Phenomenon in Indonesia and Malaysia." *Asian Security* 15 (2): 122–139.

Schwartz, Stephen. 2003. *The Two Faces of Islam: Saudi Fundamentalism and Its Role in Terrorism*. New York: Anchor Books.

Sebastian, Leonard C. 2003. "The Indonesian Dilemma: How to Participate in the War on Terror Without Becoming a National Security State." In *After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, edited by Kumar Ramakhrisna and See Seng Tan, 357–382. Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies.

———. 2005. *Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia's Use of Military Force*. Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.

Shadid, Anthony. 2002. *Legacy of the Prophet: Despots, Democrats, and the New Politics of Islam*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Sidel, John. 2006. *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Siegel, James T. 2000. *The Rope of God*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Singh, Bilveer. 2016. "Revising Indonesia's Anti-terrorism Laws." RSIS Commentary No. 057: 1–3.

Soebardi, S. 1983. "Kartosuwiryo and the Darul Islam Rebellion in Indonesia." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 14 (1): 109–133.

Spalek, Basia, and Douglas Weeks. 2017. "The Role of Communities in Counterterrorism: Analyzing Policy and Exploring Psychotherapeutic Approaches within Community Settings." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 40 (12): 991–1003.

Solahudin. 2013. *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jema'ah Islamiyah*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Spencer, Robert. 2004. *The Myth of Islamic Tolerance: How Islamic Law Treats Non-Muslims*. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.

Sreedhar. 1982. *The Gulf Scramble for Security*. New Delhi: ABC Publishing House.

Stern, Jessica. 2010. "Mind Over Martyr." *Foreign Affairs* 89. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/saudi-arabia/2009-12-21/mind-overmartyr.

Suryadinata, L. 1995. "Islam and Suharto's Foreign Policy: Indonesia, the Middle East, and Bosnia." *Asian Survey* 35 (3): 291–303. https://doi.org/10.2307/2645546.

Susanto, Budi. 2007. *Sisi Senyap Politik Bising*. Yogyakarta: Kanisius.

Schwarz, Adam. 1999. *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability*. St. Leonards, NSW: Allen and Unwin.

Swift, Ann. 2011. *The Road to Madiun: The Indonesian Communist Uprising of 1948*. Sheffield, UK: Equinox Publishing.

Teitelbaum, Joshua. 2000. *Holier than Thou: Saudi Arabia's Islamic Opposition*. Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

TFT (Terror Free Tomorrow). 2007. "Saudi Arabia Overwhelmingly Reject Bin Laden, al-Qaeda, Saudi Fighters in Iraq, and Terrorism; Also Among Most Pro-American in Muslim World: Results of a New Nationwide Public Opinion Survey of Saudi Arabia." Washington, DC: The Center for Public Opinion. http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/TFT%20Saudi%20Arabia%20Survey.pdf. Accessed June 13, 2020.

Thayer, Carlyle A. 2005. "Leadership Dynamics in Terrorist Organizations in Southeast Asia." Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Center for Defense Leadership Studies.

The Embassy of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the United States. 2017. "Saudi Arabia and Counterterrorism." An Official Report, April. https://www.saudiembassy.net/sites/default/files/White%20Paper_Counterterrorism_April2017_1.pdf. Accessed June 13, 2020.

———. 2019. "Saudi Arabia Counterterrorism." An Official Report, March. https://www.saudiembassy.net/sites/default/files/SAUDI%20ARABIA%20AND%20COUNTERTERRORISM.pdf. Accessed June 7, 2020.

The Guardian. 2004. "Timeline: Bomb Attack in Indonesia." September 9. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/09/indonesia. Accessed July 14, 2020.

The Jakarta Post. 2004. "Deadly Blast, Accident Mar New Year's Eve." January 2. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2004/01/02/deadly-blast-accidents-mar-new-year039s-eve.html. Accessed July 14, 2020.

The Soufan Group. 2015. "Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq." Unpublished manuscript.

Thompson, Mark C. 2014. *Saudi Arabia and the Path to Political Change: National Dialogue and Civil Society*. London and New York: I.B. Tauris.

———. 2015. "Saudi Women Leaders: Challenges and Opportunities." *Journal of Arabian Studies* 5 (1): 15–36.

———. 2019. *Being Young, Male and Saudi: Identity and Politics in a Globalized Kingdom*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Tibi, Bassam. 2012. *Islamism and Islam*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Tim Imparsial. 2003. *RUU Anti Terorisme: Antara Kebebasan dan Keamanan Rakyat*. Jakarta: Imparsial.
———. 2004. *Catatan HAM 2004: Keamanan Mengalahkan Kebebasan*. Jakarta: Imparsial.
Townshend, Charles. 2002. *Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Trofirmov, Yaroslav. 2007. *The Siege of Mecca: The Forgotten Uprising in Islam's Holiest Shrine and the Birth of al-Qaeda*. New York, NY: Doubleday.
Trovimof, Yaroslav. 2007. *The Siege of Mecca*. New York: Doubleday.
Urban, Mark. 2015. "Bosnia: The Cradle of Modern Jihadism?" *BBC News*, July 2. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33345618.
Van Bruinessen, Martin. 2002. "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia." *South East Asia Research* 10 (20): 117–154.
Van Dick, Cees. 1981. *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Van Klinken, Gerry. 2007. *Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia*. London and New York: Routledge.
Vickers, Adrian. 2013. *A History of Modern Indonesia*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Wahid, Abdurrahman. 2005. "Right Islam vs. Wrong Islam." *The Wall Street Journal*, December 12. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB113590649048834335. Accessed June 8, 2020.
———. 2006. *Islamku Islam Anda Islam Kita: Agama Masyarakat Negara Demokrasi*. Jakarta: The Wahid Institute.
Waskiewicz, Todd. 2012. "Friend of a Friend Influence in Terrorist Social Networks." https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Friend-of-a-Friend-Influence-in-Terrorist-Social-Waskiewicz/d7c798764c632e33675ef3b18594b08e40f94393. Accessed June 20, 2020.
Weller, Robert P. 1999. *Alternate Civilities: Democracy and Culture in China and Taiwan*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Weston, Mark. 2008. *Prophets and Princes: Saudi Arabia from Muhammad to the Present*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Williams, Michael J., John G. Horgan, and Williams P. Evans. 2016. "The Critical Role of Friends in Networks for Countering Violent Extremism: Toward a Theory of Vicarious Help-Seeking." *Behavioural Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 8 (1): 45–65.
Wilson, Chris. 2008. *Ethno-Religious Violence in Indonesia: From Soil to God*. London: Routledge.
Wright, Rubin. 2001. *Sacred Rage: the Wrath of Militant Islam*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Wynbrandt, James. 2010. *A Brief History of Saudi Arabia*. New York, NY: Checkmark Books.

Yamani, Mai. 2009. *Cradle of Islam: The Hijaz and the Quest for Indentity in Saudi Arabia*. London, UK: IB Tauris.

Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. 2002. *The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Index

A

Abdul Aziz al-Shaikh (Shaikh, Grand Mufti), 53, 71, 147
Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah bin Baz, 63
Abdullah Azzam (Abdullah Yusuf Azzam), 4, 71, 76, 144, 146, 214, 220
Abdullah Sungkar, 197, 209, 218, 220, 223, 339
Abdurrahman Wahid (aka Gus Dur), 227, 259, 263, 298, 375
Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, 146, 197, 209, 220, 221, 314, 339, 365, 404
Abul A'la Maududi, 200, 210, 220, 343
Abu Sayyaf Group, 7, 194, 235
Aceng Kurnia, 208, 210
Adel Al-Jubeir, 5, 21, 54, 395, 399
Afghanistan, 3, 7, 20, 22, 35, 51, 53, 54, 56, 70–73, 75, 76, 79, 85, 89, 91, 112, 144, 190, 192, 197, 209, 213, 214, 217–219, 221, 233, 236, 238, 290, 291, 323, 325, 326, 336, 338, 339, 394
Afghan jihadist/s, 3, 7, 53, 72, 73, 75, 77, 197
Afghan War, 70–72, 76, 85, 109, 110, 118, 144, 197, 209, 212, 213, 218–221, 223, 291, 338, 343
Agus Salim, 201, 202
Ahsa, 57, 66, 88, 108
Ajengan Masduki, 220
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, 108
Ali Ghufron, 191, 192
Ali Moertopo, 258
Al-Irsyad, 198, 345
al-Qaeda, 1, 3–8, 19–22, 25, 26, 32, 34, 35, 51–55, 58, 65, 69, 80, 82, 83, 85, 86, 91, 100, 109–111, 113, 117, 118, 120, 122, 146, 148, 153, 160, 161, 182, 190, 212, 214–222, 225, 227, 231, 233, 235–237, 265, 290, 294, 323, 326, 329–333, 337–339, 341, 342, 352–354, 371

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022

S. Al Qurtuby, *Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1337-2

al-Qaeda Arabian Peninsula (QAP/AQAP), 57, 82, 84, 86, 87, 145, 178, 180, 181, 330, 332, 353, 367, 410
Amir, 197, 223
Amrozi, 191, 223
Anarchist Movement, 2
Anti-Money Laundering, 123, 124, 356, 358
Anti-Subversion Law, 251–253, 262, 263, 280, 352
Antiterrorism, 8, 14, 15, 23, 27, 30, 35–37, 91, 98, 119, 120, 131, 136, 170, 171, 176, 246–249, 264, 279, 316, 320, 353, 365, 376, 379, 380, 398, 400, 401, 405, 406
Apocalyptic group, 58, 66, 408
APPU (Arabian Peninsula People's Union), 59, 101, 102, 105
Arab/s, 4, 30, 53, 59, 71, 72, 83, 101, 102, 212, 214, 216, 335, 337, 388, 393
Arabian Peninsula, 56, 60, 61, 77, 91, 101, 106, 109, 216, 323, 325, 334, 337, 339, 344, 384, 385, 387–389, 410
Aum Shinrikyo, 5, 32
Ayatollah Khomeini, 67, 68, 212
Ayidh al-Qarni, 64
Ayman al-Zawahiri, 3, 85, 180, 219, 220
Azhari Husin (Azahari Husin), 192, 224, 230, 265

B

Baath (Baath Party), 60, 102
Baathist, 59, 64, 70, 101, 102
BAKIN, 258, 259
Bali bombings, 23, 32, 38, 54, 191, 192, 216, 224, 228, 230, 245, 246, 249, 263–265, 267, 290, 297, 334, 353
Basic Law of Saudi Arabia, 107
Bedouin, 61, 63
Bhineka Tunggal Ika, 310, 311
Binladin Group, 7
BNPT (a National Counterterrorism Agency), 191, 247, 248, 253, 254, 261, 266, 270–276, 279–281, 287, 315, 333, 359, 361, 363, 374, 400, 411
Bush, George W., 6

C

Caliphate, 9, 89, 160, 201, 223, 292, 300, 331, 363
Christchurch, 5
Christian/s, 74, 128, 213, 229, 231, 233, 256, 270, 296, 303, 305, 306, 403
Christmas Eve bombings, 226–228, 263, 334
Church, 207, 208, 224, 226, 227, 231, 233, 234, 303, 324, 329, 332
Cipari Boarding School, 203
Combating Terrorist Financing, 124, 357, 361
Communism, 194, 197, 202, 254, 288
Counterradicalism, 136, 312, 398
Counterterrorism, 8, 10–19, 22, 23, 27, 30, 35–39, 63, 86, 91, 97–100, 116–122, 126, 130–138, 143–145, 167, 170, 172, 176, 177, 181, 182, 191, 236, 245–249, 253, 260–268, 270–274, 277, 279–281, 285–287, 301, 302, 304, 307–313, 315, 316, 319, 320, 351–360, 366–368, 373–380,

383–385, 387, 397–406, 408–411
Cultivation System, 291

D
Dakwah, 211
Daud Beureueh, 204, 207, 253
DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia), 198, 211
Declaration of Jihad, 77, 216
Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided Democracy), 204, 251–254
Densus 88, 191, 230, 247, 248, 261–272, 275, 279–281, 315, 353, 359, 367, 398, 400, 402, 411
Deobandi (a school), 212, 217, 218, 337
Deradicalization, 13, 39, 274, 326, 355, 360, 368, 374, 408, 409, 414
DI (Darul Islam), 193–214, 217, 219, 220, 226, 236–238, 255–260
DNA, 266, 299, 312, 313, 315

E
East Indonesia Mujahidin, 193
Egyptian Islamic Jihad, 3, 222
El Paso shooting, 5

F
Fatwa/s, 63, 71, 76, 103, 111, 112, 161, 202, 209, 216, 230
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 114, 123, 124, 358, 362
Free Aceh Movement, 193, 207, 216, 228
Free Papua Movement, 193
French Revolution, 2
Fretilin, 193, 224

G
Gamal Abdel Nasser, 56, 58, 60, 101, 102
Gaos Taufik, 207
Gerakan Pemuda Kabah, 193, 209
Global Interfaith Dialogue Initiative, 127, 128
Global South, 10, 405
Global Terrorism Database (GTD), 195
Glocalization, 34, 191, 235, 236, 300
Golkar (a political party), 206, 258
Gulf (Gulf countries), 67, 70, 73, 75, 78, 90, 114, 124, 125, 154, 174, 357, 361, 384, 394
Gulf War (Second Gulf War), 50, 53, 56, 70, 72, 73, 75, 77, 78, 82, 91, 102, 146

H
Hadatha, 70
Hadith, 62, 137, 154, 160, 179, 295, 323, 340, 368, 408
Hakimiyah, 210
Hanbali (madhab, school of thought), 146, 337, 338, 371
Haramain Brigades, 57, 84, 91
Haramain Foundation, 327, 341, 362
Hard approach, 14, 74, 101, 103, 106, 109, 115, 117, 120, 130, 246, 249, 254, 260, 307, 353, 355, 375, 408
Hasan Tiro, 207
Hassan al-Saffar, 106
Hezbollah, 66, 67, 80, 81, 371
Hezbollah al-Hejaz, 25, 56, 66–68, 80, 81, 91, 105–107, 109, 144, 324, 329
Hezbollah el-Hejaz, 58
Hijrah, 209, 211
Hizbullah (Indonesia's militia group), 198, 202, 306

Houthi/s, 100, 324, 354, 367, 371, 410
Hudaibiyah (a pact), 205, 206, 218

I
Ibnu Hadjar, 204
Imam, 61, 88, 128, 147, 152, 169, 198, 203, 209, 304, 305, 364
Imam Muhammad Bin Saud Islamic University, 340, 392, 402
Imam Samudra, 191, 192, 214, 223, 286, 297, 314, 339, 369
IMCTC (Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition), 21, 99, 118, 119
Indonesia, 1, 5–20, 22, 23, 26, 27, 30, 31, 34–39, 49, 54, 71, 120, 130, 134, 136, 144–146, 178, 180, 189–193, 195–198, 200–203, 207, 210–214, 216, 218, 220–228, 230, 232–238, 246, 251, 255–260, 262–265, 267, 269, 271, 274, 276–281, 287, 289–296, 298–304, 308–311, 314–316, 319–340, 342–347, 351–362, 364, 366–368, 371–380, 384–392, 394–414
Indonesian Communist Party, 193, 196, 255
Iranian Revolution, 65, 68, 105, 212, 213, 324, 343
Iraq, 7, 9, 16, 17, 20, 22, 51, 54, 55, 67, 68, 70, 73, 74, 79, 87, 89, 91, 101, 105, 108, 116, 144, 148, 154, 165, 229, 234, 236, 237, 277–279, 316, 330, 336, 413
ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and Levant), 7, 16, 21, 25, 34, 57, 65, 87–91, 100, 122, 132, 136, 144, 146, 154, 160, 161, 190, 194, 224, 225, 231–237, 265, 277, 278, 290, 323, 329–331, 333, 413
ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), 7, 8, 24–26, 34, 87, 190
Islam, 3, 9, 10, 18, 19, 23, 24, 33, 53, 61, 62, 65, 85, 89, 91, 100, 104, 112, 119, 127, 129–131, 137, 145–147, 149, 151–157, 160–162, 164, 171, 172, 174, 175, 178, 179, 192, 197, 200–203, 208, 209, 211, 212, 214–216, 220, 222, 226, 229, 231, 238, 254, 255, 259, 271, 276, 292–294, 296–298, 300, 305, 308, 311, 323, 328, 336–340, 342, 343, 345–347, 353, 356, 364, 368–374, 380, 384, 389, 393, 398, 401, 403, 404, 407, 412
Islamic boarding school, 212, 301, 309, 324, 364
Islamic Jihad Organization in Hijaz, 66, 105
Islamic Law, 3, 154, 198, 199, 201, 203, 204, 207, 211, 223, 340
Islamic State, 3, 7, 9, 10, 16, 17, 55, 87, 89, 193, 198–203, 206, 211, 221, 231, 237, 238, 255, 259, 290, 292, 293, 302, 314, 323, 364, 368
Islamic University of Madinah, 102, 147
Islamism, 3, 10, 18, 20, 23, 24, 33, 68, 69, 137, 194, 197, 198, 288, 294, 311, 314, 336, 340, 368, 386
Islamist/s, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 13, 19, 20, 22, 24–26, 33, 34, 36–38, 51, 58, 60, 64, 65, 69, 70, 76, 77, 81, 102, 112, 122, 137, 144, 146, 155, 160, 178–180, 189,

190, 192–194, 196–198, 200, 205, 210, 213, 215–218, 222, 223, 225, 227, 230–232, 235–238, 252, 263, 265, 266, 268, 269, 271, 277, 285, 290, 294, 301, 305, 311, 314, 320, 323, 325, 326, 329, 331, 332, 336–347, 353, 354, 356, 367, 368, 370–374, 380, 384, 385, 395, 397, 403, 404, 406, 408, 410–412
Islamist ideology, 9, 19, 25, 58, 60, 64, 131, 197, 205, 342–344, 406, 411
Islamist radicalism, 18, 238, 372
Islamist terrorism, 3, 8–11, 19, 33–36, 38, 50, 53, 69, 78, 181, 190, 193, 197, 231, 235–237, 311, 314, 315, 320, 323, 326, 331, 334, 336–338, 341–343, 347, 362, 384, 406, 410
Islamist violence, 331
Islamofascism, 293

J
Jamaah Ansharud Daulah, 22, 193, 232, 233, 314, 353, 373
Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, 22, 193, 323, 404
Jamaah Islamiyah, 5, 7, 8, 19, 22, 146, 160, 192–194, 197, 219, 222, 233, 260, 290, 314, 323, 327, 339, 353, 354, 365, 373, 374, 404
Jamiyatul Washliyah, 202
Jihadism, 10, 36, 68–70, 72, 76, 135, 144, 146, 178, 179, 190, 195, 197, 198, 212, 215, 216, 235, 263, 285, 321, 323–325, 336, 341, 369, 370
Jong Islamieten Bond, 200
Juhayman al-Otaybi, 56, 58, 60, 61, 103, 105, 144
JW Marriot Hotel bombing, 228

K
Kahar Muzakkar, 204, 209, 253
Kanigoro, 196, 197, 254
Kartosuwirjo (Sekarmadji Maridjan), 198–206, 253, 255
Khobar Towers bombing, 25, 80
Kiai, 305, 309
King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue (KACND), 115, 116, 129
King Abdullah Al Saud, 121
King Fahd, 16, 68, 74, 78, 81, 107, 108, 110, 114, 115, 123, 173, 352
King Faisal, 59, 97, 98, 352, 391, 392, 394
King Faisal Foundation, 4
King Ibn Saud (King Abdulaziz Al Saud), 23, 98, 101
King Khalid, 63, 65, 104, 392
King Salman, 97, 118, 119, 144, 352, 358, 359, 393–395, 400
King Salman Youth Center, 135
King Saud bin Abdulaziz, 59, 390
Komando Jihad (Jihad Command, 193, 205, 207, 259
KOMPAK, 193
Koopsusgab, 261, 262, 279
Kufr, 79, 157, 168, 178, 370

L
Legion of Mujahidin, 216
LIPIA (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab), 340, 342
Lone offender/s, 156, 157, 193, 194, 224, 225, 228, 233, 235, 237, 329, 333, 366, 368, 406

Lone wolf, 89, 157, 193, 194

M

Madiun Unrest, 196
Mahdi, 61–63, 104
Majoritarianism, 288, 298
Manichean Mindset, 9
Masjumi (i.e., Indonesia's Islamist political party during the Old Order era), 198, 237, 252
McVeigh, Timothy, 5
Mennonite Diakonia Service, 306
Middle East, 1, 4, 17, 54, 59, 65, 67, 70, 71, 90, 105, 110, 124, 125, 136, 158, 165, 167, 193, 214, 216, 222, 237, 335–337, 362, 386, 391, 393, 403, 407, 410
MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front), 216, 218, 219, 235, 236
Mindanao, 207, 212, 218, 219, 226, 233, 236, 276, 278, 291, 316, 325
Misk Global Forum, 135
Mohammad Natsir, 200, 389
Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), 21, 99, 110, 118, 119, 135
Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab, 24, 25, 147
Muhammad bin Abdullah al-Qahtani, 62, 104
Muhammad bin Nayef (MBN), 86, 110, 116–118, 131, 398
Muhammadiyah (i.e., organization in Indonesia), 199, 211, 274, 305, 309, 364, 372, 373
Muhammad Surur, 70
Muhammad Tito Karnavian, 220
Mujahidin, 6, 22, 71, 72, 77, 209, 213–215, 217–221, 226, 232, 235, 236, 276, 337, 338
Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, 22, 193, 232, 237, 314
Muslim Brotherhood, 4, 58, 60, 64, 65, 69, 70, 72, 75, 102, 198, 201, 210, 211, 214, 222, 237, 336, 372

N

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, organization), 196, 197, 199, 202, 255, 274, 290, 301, 305, 308, 327, 346, 364, 372, 373
Naif Arab University for Security Sciences, 125
Napiter, 281
Nasakom, 254
Nasir al-Omar, 64
National Guard Training Center, 56, 78, 109
New Order, 14, 37, 190–192, 194, 195, 206, 207, 209–211, 224, 225, 238, 245, 246, 249, 252, 254, 258–261, 265, 270, 279, 280, 291, 292, 322, 329, 342, 352, 365, 375, 389, 392
NII (Negara Islam Indonesia/Indonesian Islamic State), 203, 206, 220
NKRI (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia/Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia), 292, 300
Noordin Mohammed Top (aka Noordin M Top), 224

O

Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto, 201, 202
Old Order, 195, 238, 245, 246, 249, 250, 254, 256, 279, 280, 291, 352, 375
Operation Desert Shield, 70, 73
Osama Bin Laden (aka Bin Laden), 3, 4, 6, 21, 24, 52, 54, 69, 72, 74, 75, 79, 82, 110, 113, 144, 146,

148, 167, 180, 190, 230, 338, 339, 344

P

Pancasila (i.e., Indonesian state ideology), 193, 199, 205, 251, 278, 289, 300, 310, 311
Pan-Islamism, 20, 26, 51, 69, 76, 87, 102, 201, 202
Pan-Islamist terrorism/movement, 68–70
Perguruan Cikini, 195, 205, 255
Permesta, 253
Pesantren, 209, 227, 276, 301, 305, 308–310, 345
Petisi 50, 209
Petrus, 249, 250
Polri (Indonesian National Police), 261–265, 267–269, 271, 279, 280, 333
Pondok Ngruki, 209
Poso, 227–229, 232, 269, 270, 276, 328
Princess Justice Legion, 193
Prince Turki bin Faisal Al Saud, 4, 62
PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia/Revolutionary Government of Republic of Indonesia), 253

Q

Qatif, 66, 68, 80, 81, 88, 89, 108, 147, 333
Qur'an (Al-Qur'an), 9, 61, 62, 107, 137, 153–155, 178, 179, 208, 295, 313, 323, 367, 368, 371, 372, 407
Qutbism, 64
Qutb (Muhammad), 70
Qutb (Sayyid), 64, 70, 200, 220

R

Ras al-Juaima, 56, 66
Red Army, 3, 7, 71
Reeducation, 130, 255, 257, 276, 355, 414
Reformasi Era, 245, 246, 265, 279, 280, 292
Rehabilitation, 13, 39, 100, 117, 118, 126–128, 130, 137, 138, 246, 247, 255, 257, 259–261, 273, 275, 276, 280, 305, 315, 355, 360, 368, 370, 374, 414
Reintegration, 13, 14, 39, 131, 246, 255, 257, 273, 276, 280, 303, 355, 368, 409, 414
Riduan Isamuddin (aka Hambali), 218
Ring Banten, 193
Riyadh bombings, 32, 98, 109, 110, 113, 114, 116, 131, 216, 353
Robespierre, Maximilien, 2, 29
Robespierre's Reign of Terror, 29
Royal Amnesty, 68, 107, 108

S

Safar al-Hawali, 53, 64, 70, 75, 146
Sahwa (movement), 53, 60, 64, 65, 69, 75, 102, 146
Sahwist, 64, 70, 76
Salafi, 10, 19, 24, 25, 64, 83, 160, 197, 337, 338, 340–347, 370, 372, 396, 403
Salafi jihadism, 10, 19, 199
Salafism, 10, 23, 149, 340, 384, 386, 396
Salman al-Ouda, 64, 70
Satgas Bom, 263, 266
Saudi Arabia, 1, 4–27, 30, 31, 34–39, 49–55, 58–62, 64–83, 85–91, 98, 100–102, 105, 106, 108–111, 114, 116, 118–120, 122–127, 130, 131, 135, 143–146, 148, 151–155, 158,

162, 164, 165, 167, 174, 175, 177–179, 181, 183, 190, 212, 213, 216, 220, 222, 235, 281, 287, 319–343, 345–347, 351–353, 355–358, 360–362, 365–369, 371–380, 384–414
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), 114, 123–125, 327, 357
Saudi Aramco (ARAMCO), 26, 50, 52, 66, 335, 399, 410
Saudi Council of Senior Scholars, 103
Saudi (government, society, Kingdom), 20, 21, 25, 37, 51, 53, 55–57, 59–65, 69, 70, 72, 73, 76, 77, 83, 84, 86, 87, 90, 91, 97–99, 101, 102, 104–106, 109, 111–114, 116, 118, 120–123, 125, 126, 129–132, 134, 135, 138, 139, 143–145, 150, 160, 167, 168, 174, 181–183, 216, 285, 286, 324, 326, 331–333, 337, 339–342, 345, 354, 357, 359–363, 365, 371, 376, 384, 385, 389, 391, 392, 396, 401, 404, 405
Saudi Qutbism, 64
Sayed Mohammad al-Shirazi (Grand Ayatollah), 67
Separatism, 193, 254, 411
Separatist movement, 200, 225, 237
Shaikh, 24, 51, 61, 63, 65–67, 69, 71, 103, 104, 112, 116, 152, 153, 344, 373, 401
Shari'a, 9
Shia, 25, 50, 66–68, 87–89, 105–109, 112, 115, 116, 147, 148, 152, 154, 172, 176, 210, 212, 213, 324, 329, 332, 376, 405
Shiites, 25, 50, 52, 57, 67, 68, 80, 81, 86–89, 105–108, 115, 128, 145, 148, 193, 212, 323, 324, 332, 384, 412
Shura Council, 112, 116, 134
Soft approach, 14, 35, 99, 102, 105, 117, 120, 130, 138, 182, 246, 247, 272, 279, 280, 354, 356, 408
Strategic counterterrorism, 15, 35, 110, 121, 130, 132, 138, 182, 246, 254, 354, 380, 414
Subversi, 250, 251
Suharto, 194, 206, 208, 209, 212, 213, 220, 221, 225, 245, 249–251, 253, 256–260, 262, 263, 265, 268–270, 292, 322, 324, 342, 343, 352, 353, 365, 375, 391–393, 412
Sukarno, 23, 195, 198–200, 202–207, 220, 238, 249–255, 257, 262, 263, 279, 280, 352, 375, 389–392
Sukarnoputri, Megawati, 264, 279, 280, 375
Sunni, 12, 24, 25, 50, 68, 69, 76, 109, 112, 115, 116, 122, 128, 145, 146, 148, 152, 160, 172, 213, 217, 323, 329, 384, 385, 388, 403, 405
Syria, 7, 9, 16, 17, 51–54, 56–60, 64, 67, 70, 87–89, 91, 101, 102, 181, 190, 210, 232, 234, 236–238, 277–279, 316, 323, 330, 334, 336, 338, 363, 386, 391, 405, 413

T

Tactical counterterrorism, 15, 35, 121, 130, 132, 254, 380
Takfir, 74, 159–161, 199, 200, 203, 211, 370
Taliban, 194, 222

Tanjung Priok, 197, 210, 211, 213, 259, 324
Tauhid, 210, 211
Tenet, George, 110, 111
Tentara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Army), 197, 198, 202, 253, 280
Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), 261, 262, 266, 268, 269, 279, 280, 333, 401
Teror Warman, 208
Terror, 1, 6, 7, 13, 20, 29, 30, 32, 36, 53, 59, 83, 85, 86, 100, 101, 109, 114, 117, 123, 125, 147, 148, 191, 192, 196, 199, 202, 205, 207, 230, 232, 247, 249, 254, 265, 278, 292, 293, 356, 357, 361, 362, 409
Terrorism, 1–3, 5–39, 49–52, 54, 55, 58–60, 69, 78, 82, 86, 87, 90, 91, 97–101, 105, 106, 109–123, 125–128, 130–139, 143–159, 162–171, 173–183, 189–198, 212, 215, 222, 224, 225, 230, 235–238, 245–250, 253–257, 259–264, 267–269, 271–281, 285–287, 289–303, 305–309, 312–316, 319–323, 325–331, 333–337, 341, 342, 344, 346, 347, 351–363, 366–372, 374–380, 383–385, 387, 393, 395, 397–414
Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC), 125
Terrorist ideology, 16, 19, 20, 34, 116, 146, 154, 158, 159, 161, 162, 164, 165, 170, 171, 181, 182, 190, 355
Terrorist rehabilitation, 8, 14, 304, 414

U

Ulama, 25, 31, 64, 69, 74, 76, 104, 116, 131, 147, 161, 311, 344, 346, 354, 364, 371–373
Ummah, 160, 222
United Kingdom, 10, 31, 70, 106, 138, 173, 357, 362, 384, 397, 402, 404
United Nations Center for Counter Terrorism (UNCCT), 121
United States, 1–7, 10, 11, 18, 20, 21, 30, 50, 54, 55, 66, 70, 74–78, 80, 81, 89, 90, 98, 102, 106, 110, 113, 114, 118, 120, 122, 125, 126, 145, 148, 156, 173, 192, 227, 266, 267, 321, 322, 344, 357, 358, 362, 395, 397, 402–404, 410
US–Gulf summit, 125
Usrah (a religious study group), 211
UUD 1945 (i.e. the Indonesian Constitution), 193

W

Wahhabi, 20, 21, 24, 25, 50, 64, 65, 104, 112, 116, 181, 337, 338, 341, 342, 345, 346, 372
Wahhabism, 23–25, 50, 64, 69, 90, 340
Widodo, Joko (Jokowi), 262, 278, 279, 383, 392–395
World Islamic Front, 216
WTC (World Trade Center), 1, 4, 6, 21, 32, 52, 54, 109, 110, 227

Y

Young Ambassadors for Peace, 136
Youth Action Northern Ireland (YANI), 136


N
U
١٣٤٤
1926

Sumanto
Al Qurtuby.com

"Long regarded as one of the most gifted analysts of Muslim culture and politics in Indonesia, Sumanto Al Qurtuby in this new book extends his gaze to analyze the causes and consequences of religious extremism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, as well as the efforts undertaken by government and societal organizations in both countries to counter such currents. The result is a rare achievement in contemporary scholarship: a book that simultaneously demonstrates a profound understanding of Islam and society in these two important countries, while also speaking with clarity and insight to policy analysts and security experts."

—**Robert Hefner**, Professor of Anthropology and Global Affairs, Pardee School of Global Affairs, Boston University, Boston, USA

This book is a comparative study of terrorism and counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. It explores the history and contemporary developments of terrorism, especially Islamist terrorism, in these two Sunni Muslim-majority countries. In doing so, it analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of governments' policies, strategies, and models of counterterrorism, including terrorist rehabilitation and reintegration programs. In addition, the book also documents the opinions of Saudis and Indonesians to find societal voices on effective ways of combating violent extremism and discusses Saudi-Indonesian cooperation on counterterrorism, defense, and security issues.

The book suggests that although particular Islamic texts, teachings, and discourses might influence radical behaviors and practices of some Muslim individuals and groupings, terrorism is beyond ideological, religious, and doctrinal issues. Therefore, multiple methods and strategies are needed to combat radicalism and create sustainable peace in society. The work will be is beneficial for both academic and non-academic communities, particularly students of conflict, violence, peacebuilding, and religious studies.

Sumanto Al Qurtuby is an associate professor of Cultural Anthropology in the Department of Global Studies and an affiliate of the IRC for Finance & Digital Economy, KFUPM Business School, King Fahd University of Petroleum & Minerals. He holds a Ph.D. from Boston University and was a former fellow at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at University of Notre Dame and the Middle East Institute of National University of Singapore. He is the author of *Religious Violence and Conciliation in Indonesia* (2016) and *Saudi Arabia and Indonesian Networks: Migration, Education and Islam* (2019).

ISBN 978-981-19-1336-5

9 789811 913365

www.palgrave.com

palgrave
macmillan